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Abstract 
In  the  last  decade  in  Australia  and  the  United  Kingdom,  the  review  of 
immigration  decisions  in  tribunals  and  courts  has  been  marked  by  constitutional 
conflict between the executive and the judiciary; a crisis of confidence; and continual 
change. This thesis explores what this tumultuous story of immigration review tells us 
about the law — as a social practice, as an institution, and as a linguistic genre — in 
these jurisdictions, in these times. 
This  thesis  argues  that  the  story  of  immigration  review  is  explained  best  not 
through the conventional story of a battle between the executive and the judiciary, 
but rather as a story of the fundamental challenges immigration poses to the social, 
institutional,  ideological  and  linguistic  dimensions  of  law,  and  of  the  attempt  by 
judges  and  the  legal  community  to  defend  their  different  conceptions  of  the 
legitimacy of the law from those challenges, in different ways.  
Four  fundamental  challenges  are  identified.  First,  immigration  challenges  the 
coherence  of  the  legal  framework,  as  it  exposes  tensions  within  and  between  the 
different legal regimes. Second, the more reductive language used in legal contexts 
competes badly with more complex, and more socially powerful, discourses about 
immigration.  Third,  immigration  challenges  the  capacity  of  law  to  perform  the 
functions  of  resolving  disputes  and  regulating  behaviour.  Fourth,  immigration 
challenges our deepest concepts of legality.  
The  thesis  examines  these  challenges,  and  the  responses  they  provoke,  by 
drawing  on  the  insights  of  migration  studies,  contemporary  political  philosophy, 
language and the law, and regulatory theory, as well as examining important case law 
in detail. In doing so, it aims both to capture the story of immigration review more 
fully, and to illuminate some of the complexities of, and limits to, the contemporary 
social practice of law.    4 
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Update 
Since this thesis was submitted, there have been a number of significant policy 
changes  that  affect  this  thesis.  Rather  than  rewriting  the  various  sections  of  this 
thesis, I note these changes here. 
In  Australia,  the  Rudd  Government  announced  on  5  May  2009  it  will  adopt 
reforms recommended in a recent review of the federal justice system. This will entail 
abolishing the Federal Magistrates Court, and absorbing those magistrates into the 
two superior federal courts, the Family Court and the Federal Court.  Whereas the 
previous immigration review structure involved an appeal to the Federal Magistrates 
Court,  it  will  now  involve  an  appeal  to  the  ‘second  tier’  of  the  Federal  Court 
(constituting those magistrates).
∗ 
In Australia, the politics of compromise have become more evident, as a fresh 
flow of boat arrivals has prompted the Rudd Government to reopen the Christmas 
Island facility built by the former Howard Government; re-ignited debate about the 
value  of  temporary  protection  visas;  and  prompted  strong  statements  about  co-
operation with the Indonesian authorities to impede human smuggling. The global 
financial crisis has also prompted the Rudd Government to reduce the permanent 
skilled migration intake (to 108,1oo places, an overall drop of about 20%),
† and tighten 
entry criteria. On the other hand, it has increased the quota for refugees and family 
members;  introduced  a  new  Multicultural Advisory  Council;  begun  publishing the 
country of origin research used by the Refugee Review Tribunal; and replaced the 
regulating body for migration agents.  
In  the  Budget  announced  on  12  May,  several  significant  policy  changes  were 
introduced, including the introduction of complementary protection; the removal of 
work and welfare restrictions on the bridging visas granted to refugee claimants who 
apply 45 days after arrival; greater funding and support for refugee determinations in 
the community; the introduction of a four-year planning program for refugee quotas; 
and the redevelopment of a major detention centre. However, funding for language 
classes will be cut by over $20 million. 
                                                   
∗ See http://www.ag.gov.au/www/ministers/RobertMc.nsf/Page/MediaReleases_2009_ 
SecondQuarter_5May2009-RuddGovernmenttoReformFederalCourts.  
† See http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/media-releases/2009/ce02-budget-09.htm.   12 
 In  the  UK,  there  has  been  a  very  significant  change  with  the  government 
announcing  on  8  May  2009  that  it  will  move  (by  early  2010)  the  Asylum  and 
Immigration Tribunal’s functions into the unified tribunal system (as foreshadowed in 
this thesis).
‡ The immigration review system will now involve a decision in the First 
Tier of the Tribunal and, with permission to appeal by either Tier of the Tribunal, an 
appeal to a separate chamber in the Upper Tier of the Tribunal, which will have the 
power to re-make the decision or remit the decision if it finds an error of law. The 
Upper Tribunal is not expected to be ‘routinely’ subject to judicial review, although 
the  government  is  not presently proposing  to restrict  access  to  judicial  review  by 
legislation. There will not, however, be oral hearings for permission to appeal to the 
Upper  Tribunal.  The  procedure  rules  will  be  made  by  the  Tribunal  Procedure 
Committee, rather than by the Lord Chancellor as originally proposed. The courts will 
have the power to decide, on a case by case basis, to transfer immigration and asylum 
judicial review cases downward to the Upper Tribunal, and there will be a power for 
the heads of the judiciary and the Lord Chancellor to agree to transfer a class of cases 
in like manner. The aim is for 90% of asylum applications to either have been granted 
or exhausted their appeal stages in 18 weeks. 
Another important change has been that the draft consolidating bill referred to in 
the  thesis  was  not  introduced  into  the  2008-2009  Parliamentary  session,  and  was 
postponed  till  autumn  2009.  Instead,  a  smaller  piece  of  legislation,  the  Borders, 
Citizenship and Immigration Bill, was introduced in January 2009. As of 19 May 2009, 
it was awaiting its second reading in the House of Commons (having passed through 
the  third  reading  stage  in  the  Lords).  This  includes  the  provisions  on  ‘earned 
citizenship’, the combining of customs and immigration powers, and the introduction 
of immigration controls in the Common Travel Area. The transfer of judicial review 
cases from the courts to the Upper Tier of the unified Tribunal is also a feature of this 
bill.   
The rollout of the points system has continued, with the introduction of Tier 4 
(Students) and a tightening of requirements for Tier 1 in March 2009. Similarly, the 
expansion of the national identity card system has continued for foreign nationals. 
                                                   
‡ See Home Office UK Border Agency and Tribunals Service, ‘Immigration appeals: Response to 
consultation  —  Fair  decisions,  faster  justice’,  at 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/consultations/closedconsult
ations/immigrationappeals/immigration-appeals-response.pdf?view=Binary.    13 
The proposal to lift the minimum age to 21 for leave to enter as a spouse or partner 
was implemented in rules in November 2008. 
The UK has also suspended (from 30 January 2009) its administrative policy of 
automatically suspending removal proceedings on a second application for judicial 
review, where the previous application was found to be merit or was withdrawn or 
otherwise concluded. 
So nothing remains still, as usual, in the ever-changing field of immigration law 
and policy.   14 
Introduction  
You leave the faded neoclassical grandeur of the Victorian Supreme Court; pass 
through the knots of smoking men in ill-fitting suits outside the glossy County Court; 
and enter a glassed office block, where an elevator glides you to the twelfth floor. In 
the hush you enter a room not much larger, and marginally less bland, than a small 
office. You see the backs of three people, united by an air of quiet nervousness. Across 
from them, on an oversized table, is a tidy stack of files. A large Australian flag droops 
in the corner. A tape machine whirrs in the silence. 
You leave the renovated cafes of Exmouth Market, and wend your way through a 
jumble of blank-faced premises to the dung-brown building on the corner. Emptying 
your pockets, you walk through the body scanner, and wait for the elevator to deposit 
you in the worn-out reception area. Young lawyers steam past clutching enormous 
sheaves of paper, trailed by anxious families. Through the warren of corridors, you 
make  your  way  to  a  drab  room,  dominated  by  an  elevated  judge’s  bench  and  a 
horseshoe-shaped  table.  Sunlight filters  weakly  through  the  blinds,  as  time  drains 
away. 
Welcome to the shadowed world of immigration review, with its curious mix of 
borrowed symbolism and desperate banality. In these glorified offices, destinies are 
won and lost; families reunited and separated; safe haven granted and refused. These 
small rooms are the sites of one of the most complex interactions between the legal, 
political  and  administrative  systems  in  Australia  and  the  UK.  They  are  places  of 
paradox; of ambivalence; of plain old hypocrisy and double-speak. Moreover, they are 
places  in  which  space  itself  is  in  contest  — territorial  space,  political  space,  legal 
space, linguistic space. They are places in which borders and orders are constructed, 
imposed, and challenged. 
In the last decade, these small rooms in Australia and the UK have become major 
sites  of  controversy.  The  tribunals  that  sit  in  them  have  been  renamed  and 
restructured; the courts that preside over them have had the scope and shape of their 
supervision  continually  altered.  There  have  been  torrents  of  amending  legislation, 
endless streams of reports, and rivers of academic commentary. Judges and ministers 
have traded barbs. Constitutional conventions and traditions have been unmade, and 
re-made.   15 
This thesis explores what this tumultuous story of immigration review has to tell 
us about the state and place of law in these jurisdictions. Predominantly, academic 
commentary has described this story in terms of a battle between the executive and 
the judiciary, and critiqued features of immigration law using other legal standards, 
such as constitutional and administrative law, refugee law, and human rights law. Yet, 
as I shall demonstrate, the story of immigration review is much more interesting, and 
much more challenging, than that.  
This  story  is,  I  suggest,  best  captured  in  a  central  metaphor.  As  Dworkin 
insightfully put it, law is an empire.
1 Like all empires, it exhibits great variation and 
plurality which inevitably results in friction between its constituent parts. Like all 
empires,  it  expands  and  contracts;  triumphs  and  retreats;  wages  epic  battles  and 
negotiates  quiet  truces.  Like  all  empires,  its  vitality  depends  upon  its  power  — 
physical, administrative, linguistic and ideological. Like all empires, it contests spaces 
and places, redrawing its borders continuously. 
Read in this way, the story of immigration review reveals itself as a prism for 
understanding  the  increasing  complexity  of  legal  governance  —  its  strengths  and 
weaknesses, and the challenges it poses. The forms of law multiply and morph, posing 
insoluble challenges, and exposing inescapable weaknesses. It is a story, therefore, 
that illuminates the limitations of the law — common throughout law’s empire, but 
particularly exposed in immigration — and our responses to them.  
The  story  of  immigration  review  reveals  four  fundamental  challenges. 
Immigration  challenges  the  coherence  of  the  law,  because  immigration  review 
invokes  a  dynamic  and  unstable  constellation  of  legal  regimes  that  depend  upon 
different  normative  paradigms  and  political  structures,  producing  irresoluble 
normative  tensions  and  generating unsatisfactory  judicial  resolutions.  Immigration 
also  engages  the  law  in  a  structurally  unequal  competition  with  other  powerful 
discourses and social spheres, which is exacerbated by the richness and complexity of 
immigration,  as  well  as  its  symbolic  significance.  Immigration  also  challenges  the 
capacity of law to perform its core functions of dispute resolution and regulation.  
Most importantly, however, immigration poses a deeper challenge to underlying 
concepts of legality. In doing so, immigration also exposes the weakness of legal tools 
                                                   
1 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (1986). As will be apparent, this thesis does not, however, follow a 
Dworkinian path.   16 
and theory, for distinctively legal critiques fail either to conceptualise or counter this 
deeper challenge to legality adequately. 
This analysis is inspired in part by Boswell’s account of the relative failures of 
immigration  policies  in  terms  of  the  competing  imperatives  of  the  State.
2  The 
legitimacy of modern Western States, she argues, rests upon their performance of four 
functions: the provision of security; the provision of conditions for the accumulation 
of wealth; the promotion of fairness, broadly in the sense of redistributive justice but 
also dependent upon a latent ethic of universalist rights; and its compliance with 
certain formal conditions for the preservation of liberty and democracy (which she 
terms ‘institutional legitimacy’). Immigration tends to raise conflicts between these 
functions, which States manage by compromising between imperatives (‘fudging’), or 
‘trumping’ one imperative with another. Adapting this account to the legal sphere, I 
argue that immigration exposes conflicts within and between imperatives of the law: 
the functional imperative of resolving disputes and regulating human behaviour; the 
normative  imperative  of  reflecting  and  enforcing  the  norms  of  society;  and,  most 
importantly, the ‘institutional’ imperative of defending the legitimate role of the law. 
In rewriting the story of immigration review in this way, this thesis performs 
several functions. First, it counters the myth that the controversies of immigration 
review  merely  reflect  either  political  battles  between  refugee  advocates  and 
restrictionists or age-old battles between executive and judicial power. Rather, these 
controversies  are  intimately  and  ultimately  controversies  about  the  province  and 
place of law itself.  
Second, this thesis counters the myth that it is merely the bad faith, hypocrisy or 
mean-heartedness of governments that is responsible for the unsatisfactory nature of 
immigration law. Rather, I argue, many of these controversies arise out of inescapable 
limitations of the law.  
Third,  by  tracing  these  limitations,  and  our  anxieties  about  and  responses  to 
them,  I  develop  an  account  of  the  contemporary  legal  sphere  that  captures  its 
promises, practices, pitfalls and potential more accurately, an account that also comes 
closer to capturing the essence of the story of immigration review. The burden, and 
the primary value, of this thesis rest upon this account.  
Fourth and finally, in more precisely diagnosing the pitfalls and potential of the 
law, the aim is to escape the trap of disillusionment and despair that envelops the 
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story of immigration review. Acknowledging the fundamental limitations of the law 
allows us to begin to identify ways of ameliorating the effect of those limitations, and 
to begin learning the more profound lessons of the story of immigration review. It is 
not, however, the purpose of this thesis to make detailed recommendations for reform 
—  a  task  performed  elsewhere  in  greater  depth  by  those  with  greater  expertise. 
Rather, the purpose here is to identify how, by re-telling this story, we can begin to re-
orient our strategies. 
1  Definitions 
1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1  T T T The law he law he law he law    
A number of terms first need to be explained, beginning with ‘the law’. It would, 
of course, be more analytically precise to distinguish between specific usages of the 
term,  such  as  to  identify  the  rules  that  have  the  status  of  law;  to  refer  to  legal 
institutions and processes; to describe a distinctive linguistic genre; or to indicate a 
corpus of legal values and normative claims. Most broadly, I use ‘the law’ to refer to 
the contemporary social sphere of activity focused upon distinctive legal processes in 
Australia and the UK.
3  
However,  that  approach  misrecognises  the  central  significance  of  the 
interrelations  between  these  different  usages  of  law.  It  is  precisely  the  slippage 
between  these  different  aspects  of  law  in  our  everyday  linguistic  and  conceptual 
practices,  and  the  social  significance  of  that  slippage,  that  interests  me.  We  talk 
about, think about, and evaluate the law in all these different senses. Thus, although 
in general I refer ‘to the law’ in the broadest sense outlined above, I wish to embrace 
rather than reduce the complexity of the term.  
1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2  Immigration, migration and refugees Immigration, migration and refugees Immigration, migration and refugees Immigration, migration and refugees    
The  terminology  in  the  field  of  immigration is notoriously slippery. Since the 
almost exclusive focus of law and policy in both jurisdictions is immigration, I use 
‘immigration law’ to refer to the domestic laws governing movement into the State, 
rather than ‘migration law’ as is traditional in Australia. I refer to ‘immigration’ where 
I am focusing upon entry into States, and ‘migration’ when referring to movement 
between States more broadly. Since immigration laws do not hinge upon the length of 
                                                   
3 Unlike the broadest sociological definitions, this embraces only State law.   18 
residence, I do not use ‘immigration’ to denote only long-term immigration, as is 
conventional in social sciences. By ‘immigration review’, I refer primarily to the legal 
processes  by  which  individual  decisions  on  immigration  status,  or  related  to 
immigration, are reviewed (as described in the first chapter) although I acknowledge 
the  significance  of  non-legal  mechanisms  for  reviewing  immigration  policy  and 
decisions. 
I also use ‘immigration’ and ‘migration’ as an umbrella term, including within it 
streams of forced migration, addressing the distinctive issues of refugee movements 
separately when they arise. While I use the term ‘refugee’ in its narrow legal sense, as 
this  is  a  legal  thesis,  the  sharp  legal  divide  between  immigrants  and  refugees 
oversimplifies  both  the  empirical  reality  and  the  intimate  connections  between 
immigration  and  refugee  policy.  Finally,  I  use  ‘refugee  claimant’  and  ‘irregular 
immigrant’  in  preference  to  the  politically  loaded  and  misleading  terms  ‘asylum 
seeker’ and ‘illegal immigrant’.  
2   Jurisdictions 
This thesis considers Australian and British immigration review, but it does not 
make claims to a distinctively comparative methodology. Nevertheless, it is necessary 
to explain the choice of jurisdictions. This, of course, is partly dictated by practical 
matters of access and familiarity with the legal systems.  
However, the comparison between Australia and the UK is illuminating as well 
because  of  the  patterns  of  convergence  and  divergence  between  the  jurisdictions. 
While  immigration  patterns  and  policy  have  historically  been  very  different  (as 
discussed in chapter 5), contemporary patterns are converging, compelling a marked 
and often deliberate convergence in policy. On the other hand, the legal frameworks, 
traditions and climates of the jurisdictions are diverging, as UK immigration law is 
dramatically reshaped by European Union (‘EU’) law and the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK) (‘HRA’).  
3  Orientation of thesis 
As is already evident, this thesis is not doctrinal, and does not stake its claims on 
legal  exegesis,  coherence  and  methodological  purity.  Rather,  it  takes  a  socio-legal 
approach  that  is  informed  by  the  insights  of  postcolonial  theory  (as  discussed  in 
chapter 5) in favouring the exposure of tensions and ambivalence; in emphasising the 
irreducibility  of  complexity;  and  in  adopting  an  exploratory  rather  than   19 
argumentative  mode  of  scholarship  —  “scaveng[ing]”
4  for  insights  in  an  eclectic 
fashion. 
To  demonstrate  my  claims,  I  employ  insights from  a  range  of  disciplines  and 
perspectives, an approach that better fits the complexity of the contemporary legal 
sphere by examining it at different angles, and at different levels of generality. In 
exploring the challenge of coherence, I both broadly describe the political structure 
and normative paradigms of the major legal regimes involved in immigration review, 
and descend in detail to examine significant judgments. In exploring the challenge of 
competition, I analyse key legal texts in a manner inspired by literary analysis, and 
contrast this analysis with a broad range of different perspectives and disciplines. In 
exploring the challenge of capacity, I apply the insights of disparate branches of legal 
theory and migration studies to immigration. In exploring the challenge to legality, I 
examine the weaknesses of distinctively legal critiques before assessing immigration 
law’s  compliance  with  broader  legal  standards  and  values.  While  this  varied 
methodological approach might sacrifice nuance and risk charges of over-ambition, it 
mitigates the biases and omissions of individual perspectives, allowing us to capture 
broader truths.  
 Lastly, I openly recognise that all scholars are embedded in their own cultural 
contexts, and exhibit their own predispositions, prejudices and preferences. Like most 
immigration law scholars, I have a great deal of sympathy for migrants. I am a migrant 
twice over, and come from a family of migrants: my father has been a forced migrant, 
an irregular migrant, and a legal migrant. As someone deeply marked by migration, I 
am  all  too  aware  that  migration  is  a  lived,  unique,  experience  that  cannot  be 
adequately captured by classification and theorising. 
4  Outline 
All that remains is to signal the path ahead. The thesis is structured around the 
four different challenges, beginning with the narrower focus on the legal framework 
itself and widening gradually to the conclusion.  
I begin by describing the story of immigration review, moving to the challenge of 
coherence in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 demonstrates how the legal constellation 
governing immigration review embeds competing normative paradigms that generate 
an unusual degree of normative polyvalence. Chapter 3 then demonstrates how this 
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polyvalence is manifested, and unsatisfactorily resolved, through the examination of 
four landmarks of the story of immigration review.  
Chapters 4 and 5 turn to the challenge of competition. Chapter 4 examines the 
impoverishment  of  legal  discourse,  with  its  simplified  models  of  the  person, 
migration, the State and power relations. This is contrasted in chapter 5 with richer 
and more socially powerful discourses which expose unusually acutely the limitations 
of legal discourse. In Chapter 6, I explore the difficulties of dispute resolution and 
regulation.  I  argue  that,  in  immigration  contexts,  the  paradigm  of  the  ‘dispute’  is 
misleading, and the regulatory matrix unusually complex.  
I turn in chapter 7 to discuss the ways in which immigration challenges a deeper 
account of legality, as expressed in relatively concrete legal standards and values, and 
underpinned  by  the  broader  claim  of  law  to  act  as  a  counterweight  to  politics. 
Importantly, immigration also reveals the weakness of distinctively legal critiques, 
since these are ultimately premised on the very boundaries between law and politics 
that are in contest. Finally, in the conclusion I draw out the lessons we have learnt, 
and explore ways in which we can begin to address the challenges revealed by the 
story of immigration review.   21 
Chapter 1 — The story of immigration review 
1  Introduction 
Let us begin by describing what I call the story of immigration review: that is, the 
story of the protracted ‘crisis’ enveloping immigration review over the past decade in 
Australia  and  the  UK.  However,  it  is  first  necessary  to  know  the  history  of 
immigration review, for the story of immigration review is, above all, a narrative of 
loss and variation, a story of imperial retreat and decay.  
This chapter thus begins by describing the development of immigration review, 
leading up to the ‘model’ of immigration review that pertained prior to the mid-1990s. 
In this part of the history, immigration is a barbarian territory, colonised by the law 
only in the 1970s, after which, for a period — gilded now by nostalgia — imperial rule 
held sway.  
What  follows  is  a  story  characterised  by  conflict,  a  crisis  in  confidence,  and 
constant change. The story of immigration review is a story patterned by conflict 
between  the  executive  and  the  judiciary;  intense  criticism  expressing  a  crisis  of 
confidence; and constant changes to the structure and jurisdiction of, and access to, 
immigration review. 
This chapter not only describes the objective features of the crisis, therefore, but 
also seeks to evoke (and indeed exaggerate) the emotive undertones of this story — to 
bring out the plaintive note of loss and disillusion that, in the end, structures the 
story of immigration review.  
2  The development of immigration review 
Until the 1970s, immigration was a Wild West. Legal controls were extremely 
limited, judges showed great restraint, and there was very limited review by advisory 
bodies.  Then  came  the  brave  new  world  of  administrative  law  and  immigration-
specific tribunals, which eventually settled down into the ‘model’ of immigration law.   22 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  The prehistory of immigration review The prehistory of immigration review The prehistory of immigration review The prehistory of immigration review    
Immigration  review  did  not  exist  before  the  20
th  century.  There  were  no 
permanent immigration controls in the UK.
5 While in Australia there were various 
colonial statutes restricting the entry of Chinese (and, in some jurisdictions, all non-
whites),  these  were  not  subject  to  legal  challenge.  The  reason  for  this  was  that, 
according to the Privy Council in Musgrove, the fact that an alien had no enforceable 
legal right to enter British territory meant he could not maintain an action in the 
courts.
6  
This changed at the turn of the century. In Australia, the Immigration Restriction 
Act  1901  (‘1901  Act’)  criminalised  prohibited  entry,  and  thus  brought  immigration 
decisions  within  the  criminal  jurisdiction  of  the  courts.  The  Constitution  also 
conferred  original  jurisdiction  on  the  High  Court  to  review  administrative  action 
(under s 75(v)), although this jurisdiction would only become practically significant 
much later.
7  
In  contrast,  the  first  modern  British  immigration  statute,  the  Aliens  Act  1905 
(‘1905 Act’), created a short-lived specialist system of immigration appeal boards, in 
which  the  courts  played  almost  no  role.
8  These  boards,  comprised  of  lay  persons 
chaired by a lawyer, heard appeals very rapidly at the ports. The story of these boards 
provides a foretaste of what was to come: introduced to appease communities affected 
by substantive restrictions, they were criticised for their emphasis on speed, their 
secrecy, and their use of lay rather than legal members. The boards’ surprisingly high 
rate of success angered the Home Office and they were suspended on the outbreak of 
World War I, never to be revived.
9  
For most of the 20
th century, however, immigration decisions were treated by the 
judiciary  as  a  great  untouchable  preserve  of  State  sovereignty  and  executive 
                                                   
5 Temporary immigration controls were introduced in the Napoleonic era, and unimplemented 
legislation  passed  in  1848:  see  Dallal  Stevens,  UK  Asylum  Law  and  Policy:  Historical  and 
Contemporary Perspectives (2004), 19-28. 
6 Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy [1891] AC 272.  
7 See also s 75(iii) of the Constitution. State courts also have jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas 
corpus: see, eg, R v Governor of Metropolitan Gaol ex p Tripodi [1962] VR 180. 
8 The reports disclose only two cases: Attorney-General v Sutcliffe [1907] 2 KB 997; and Falkirk 
Parish Council v Jensen [1912] 1 SLT 87.  
9 For excellent accounts, see Prakash Shah, Refugees, Race and the Legal Concept of Asylum in 
Britain  (2000),  37-39;  Ann  Dummett  and  Andrew  Nicol,  Subjects,  Citizens,  Aliens  and  Others: 
Nationality and Immigration Law (1990), 151-152.    23 
discretion.
10 British courts consistently emphasised the wide nature of the discretion 
to deport.
11 Both jurisdictions excluded immigration from the rules of natural justice,
12 
showing extreme deference in this pre-eminently political arena: 
The  Parliament  in  this  legislation  is  dealing  with  a  national  interest  of  paramount 
importance, namely, the composition of the nation, determining who shall enter and who 
shall stay. The decision of those questions is not hedged, nor can it be hedged, around 
with principles of the kind that the judiciary are wont to consider: nor is it necessary, or 
convenient, or indeed desirable, that reasons be assigned for the determination of those 
questions.
13 
In the Australian case, this deference was buttressed by judicial support for the 
White Australia policy, vividly evidenced by the successes of white claimants and the 
losses of Chinese claimants in the High Court.
14  
However, a few immigration-specific advisory procedures were developed during 
this  period.  In  both  Australia  and  the  UK,  advisory  committees  or  boards  heard 
representations against deportations. The Australian version was infrequently used
15 
and the UK version during the 1930s lasted only four years, succumbing because of its 
high success rates,
16 although a different procedure was introduced in 1956.
17  
Both  the  boards  and  these  advisory  procedures  used  oral  hearings,  involved 
judges and lawyers, and adapted court procedures. However, they were significantly 
limited: they covered only deportations; were advisory only; and, in the UK, were 
discontinued if too many decisions were overturned.  
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  The brave new wo The brave new wo The brave new wo The brave new wor r r rld ld ld ld    
The tightening of immigration controls, pressures from immigrant communities 
and  the  influence  of  administrative  law  principles  all  combined  in  the  1970s  to 
produce a brave new world of immigration review.  
In the UK, the proximate cause was the introduction of immigration controls on 
Commonwealth  citizens  in  the  1962  and  1968  Commonwealth  Immigrants  Acts.  In 
                                                   
10  See  esp  Stephen  Legomsky,  Immigration  and  the  Judiciary:  Law  and  Politics  in  Britain  and 
America (1987). 
11 Ibid. 38-39, 96-97. See, eg, R v SSHA ex p Duke of Chateau Thierry [1917] 1 KB 922.  
12 R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex p Soblen (No 2) [1963] 2 QB 243; Schmidt v SSHA [1969] 2 Ch 149; 
Salemi v MacKellar (No 2) (1977) 137 CLR 396; The Queen v MacKellar ex p Ratu (1977) 137 CLR 461.  
13 Salemi, n12, 402. 
14 Compare esp Potter v Minahan (1908) 7 CLR 277 with Donohoe v Wong Sau (1925) 36 CLR 404. 
See Mary Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law in Australia (1998), 17-18.  
15 1901 Act, s 8A, as amended (continued presently as s 203). By 1985, it had been used 12 times: 
ARC, Review of Migration Decisions (1986), 26-27.  
16 Committee on Immigration Appeals, Report (1967), 74-75. 
17 Pursuant to the European Convention on Establishment, CETS No 19. The procedure provided for 
representations to the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate if the person had resided for at least 2 years, 
or otherwise to the Home Office.   24
their  wake,  the  Wilson  Committee  recommended  an  immigration  appeals  system, 
inspired partly by the desire to mollify ethnic communities and partly by the norms of 
administrative law.
18 This was largely implemented in the Immigration Appeals Act 
1969  and  the  Aliens  (Appeals)  Order  1970,
19  and  substantially  replicated  in  the 
Immigration Act 1971 (‘1971 Act’).
20  
This  system  provided  for  a  two-tier  structure,  known  as  the  Immigration 
Appellate  Authority  (‘IAA’).  Single  adjudicators  reviewed  immigration  decisions, 
subject to an appeal, by leave and on the papers, to a three-member tribunal, the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (‘IAT’). However, decisions made on national security 
grounds were excluded, although representations could be heard by ‘Three Wise Men’ 
in another advisory procedure with lesser procedural safeguards.
21  
Meanwhile, in Australia the mid-1970s saw the dawn of the ‘new administrative 
law’ at the federal level, comprising the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (‘AAT’),
22 the 
Federal  Court,
23  an  Ombudsman,
24  a  supervisory  Administrative  Review  Council 
(‘ARC’), and a statutory codification and streamlining of the grounds and procedures 
of judicial review in the ADJR Act.
25 Subsequently, the Human Rights Commission 
(‘HRC’) was also established.
26  
All of these institutions could review immigration decisions. The Ombudsman 
and HRC could investigate complaints. The AAT could make recommendations in 
relation to deportations of convicted criminals and the insane.
27 The Federal Court 
heard appeals from the AAT,
28 and could also judicially review immigration decisions 
and conduct under the ADJR Act and s 39B(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903.
29  
This was complemented by the development of internal review procedures,
30 and 
the  creation  of  two  independent  extra-statutory  review  procedures.  The 
Determination  of  Refugee  Status  (‘DORS’)  Committee,  an  interdepartmental 
                                                   
18 Committee on Immigration Appeals, n16, 27-28. 
19 These both commenced on 1 July 1970.  
20 Pt II, Sch 5. 
21 Described in R v SSHD ex p Cheblak [1991] 1 WLR 890, 901-903. 
22 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1977 (Cth) (‘AAT Act’). 
23 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (‘FCA Act’). 
24 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth). 
25 Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). 
26 Human Rights Commission Act 1981 (Cth). 
27  Statute  Law  Revision  Act  1981  (Cth),  s 60.  The  AAT  also  had  jurisdiction  in  relation  to  the 
regulation of migration agents, but this was never used: Crock, n14, 259. 
28 AAT Act, s 44. 
29 This provides jurisdiction equivalent to s 75(v) of the Constitution.  
30 Crock, n14, 35-36.   25 
committee  created  in  1977,  both  advised  on  initial  refugee  determinations  and 
reconsidered them on the papers.
31 By 1982, specified classes of immigration decisions 
could also be considered by the advisory Immigration Review Panels, comprised of 
two lay members and chaired by a Departmental officer.
32 However, during the mid-
1980s  pressure  was  building  for  review  by  the  AAT,  as  evidenced  by  the 
recommendations of three independent reports.
33  
The  1980s  also  saw  the  emergence  of  more  searching  judicial  review  in  both 
jurisdictions.  The  Privy  Council  required  the  Hong  Kong  government  to  fulfil  its 
promise to hear cases prior to deportation,
34 and held that courts could review the 
factual basis of a person’s classification as an ‘illegal entrant’.
35 The House of Lords 
imposed  a  higher  standard  of  judicial  review  in  refugee  cases,  that  of  the  ‘most 
anxious scrutiny’.
36  
Meanwhile, the Australian High Court finally held that deportations attracted the 
requirements  of  procedural  fairness;
37  and  held  that  refugee  determinations  were 
reviewable under the ADJR Act.
38 By the early 1990s, the flow of cases had angered the 
government,
39 with the Minister refusing to accept the recommendations of the AAT
40 
and the government removing the power to grant permits on ‘compassionate and 
humanitarian’ grounds.
41 
The  final  impetus  in  Australia  was  the  spectacular  rise  of  applications  for 
immigration review and refugee status.
42 A radical overhaul of the Migration Act 1958 
(‘the Act’) in 1989 included the creation of a two-tier statutory regime for immigration 
                                                   
31  This  comprised  representatives  from  the  Departments  of  Immigration;  Prime  Minister  and 
Cabinet;  Foreign  Affairs  and  Trade,  and  the  Attorney-General,  and  an  observer  from  UNHCR: 
DILGEA, Review ‘89 (1989), 26. See also HRC, Human Rights and the Migration Act 1958 (1985), 46-
47. 
32 Their jurisdiction is described in MIEA v Akbas (1985) 7 FCR 363, 368-369. 
33 HRC, n31; ARC, n15; Committee to Advise on Australia’s Immigration Policies, Immigration: A 
Commitment to Australia (1988). See also Cheryl Saunders, ‘In search of a system of migration 
review’ in David Goodman, D J O’Hearn and Chris Wallace-Crabbe (eds), Multicultural Australia: 
The Challenges of Change (1991) 134. 
34 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629. 
35 Khawaja v SSHD [1984] AC 74. 
36 Bugdaycay v SSHD [1987] AC 514. 
37 Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550. 
38 MIEA v Mayer (1985) 157 CLR 290. 
39 See generally Mary Crock, Administrative Law and Immigration Control in Australia: Actions and 
Reactions (PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1992).  
40 DILGEA, Australia and Immigration: 1788 to 1988 (1988), 115. See, eg, Haoucher v MIEA (1990) 169 
CLR 648. 
41 Then s 6A(1)(e) of the Act: see Crock, Immigration and Refugee Law, n14, 133-134. 
42 By 1987, there were 10,866 pending immigration review applications: DILGEA, Review ‘87 (1987) 
89. Between 1989-1990, refugee applications soared from 564 to 3,598: DILGEA, Review ‘89, n31, 44.   26 
review,  consisting  of  an  internal  review  authority,  the  Migration  Internal  Review 
Office (‘MIRO’), with an appeal to the Immigration Review Tribunal (‘IRT’).
43 The IRT 
generally sat alone, but could be constituted by multi-member panels.
44 The DORS 
Committee was reconstituted as a second tier of review, in the form of the Refugee 
Status Review Committee, but in 1993, in partial compensation for a tougher refugee 
policy, the IRT model was essentially duplicated for refugee decisions in the form of 
the single-member Refugee Review Tribunal (‘RRT’).
45 In the same year, the UK also 
introduced refugee appeals to ‘special adjudicators’ within the IAA.
46 
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3  The ‘model’ of imm The ‘model’ of imm The ‘model’ of imm The ‘model’ of immigration review igration review igration review igration review    
Thus, from the establishment of the IAA and the IRT/RRT until around 1996, 
there was in both jurisdictions what I call the ‘model’ of immigration review — a 
relatively stable system of immigration review, comprising two tiers of independent 
review  and  a  third  tier  of  judicial  review.  From  1993,  the  British  courts  were  also 
empowered to hear appeals, by leave, on a question of law.
47 This neat picture was, 
however,  complicated  by  the  severe  restriction  of  the  Australian  Federal  Court’s 
jurisdiction in 1994 (discussed below). 
Occasional resort was also had to a ‘fourth tier’ — in the UK, in the form of the 
European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’);
48 and in Australia, in the form of the 
Minister’s  personal,  non-delegable,  non-compellable,  and  non-reviewable  statutory 
powers to substitute an adverse tribunal decision with a more favourable decision 
(‘ministerial intervention’).
49  
This relatively mainstream legal model of review was complemented by other 
mainstream mechanisms for reviewing immigration policy and administration. These 
included the administrative law institutions (Ombudsmen, the HRC and its successor 
                                                   
43 Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth), ss 25, 27. The IRT had original jurisdiction in 
respect of some decisions. 
44 These formed 9-20% of the total: see IRT, Annual Report 1992-1993 (1993), 1; IRT, Annual Report 
1994-1995 (1995), 5. 
45 Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), s 31, with effect from 1 June 1993. 
46 Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 (UK) (‘1993 Act’), s 8. 
47 Ibid s 9. For ease of reference, I refer throughout this thesis to the English courts.  
48 See East African Asians v UK, 14 December 1973, (1981) 3 EHRR 76 (a decision of the European 
Commission  of  Human  Rights,  which  the  Committee  of  Ministers  decided  not  to  refer  to  the 
ECtHR: see Lord Lester, 'Thirty years on: The East African Asians case revisited' [2002] PL 52); 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK, 28 May 1985, Series A no 94; Vilvarajah v UK, 30 October 
1991, Series A no 215; Lamguindaz v UK, 23 June 1993, Series A no 258-C. 
49 Presently ss 351 (MRT); 391 (AAT, on transfer from MRT); 417 (RRT), 454 (AAT, on transfer from 
RRT), 501J (AAT protection visa decision).   27 
the HREOC,
50 and its UK equivalent, the Commission for Racial Equality); internal 
bureaucratic  processes  of  review;  and  parliamentary  accountability,  including 
representations by MPs, parliamentary debates, and committees, particularly the UK 
Home Affairs Committee (‘HAC’) and the Australian Joint Standing Committee on 
Migration (‘JSCM’).
51 Equally important was the scrutiny of the ‘policy community’, 
including international and regional bodies, non-governmental organisations, sector-
specific organisations, and the media. 
While  the  review  systems  were  structurally  similar,  there  were  important 
differences between the IRT/RRT and IAA in terms of jurisdiction and procedure, as 
well as more minor differences in their powers and composition (for details, including 
legislative references, see Appendices, Tables 4-6).  
The most significant difference was the IAA’s comparatively generous jurisdiction 
which was determined by the class of decision. There was a right of appeal in relation 
to:  refusals  of  entry  and  refusals  to  revoke  deportation  orders  (albeit  only  from 
abroad); the conditions of admission; the issuing of removal directions; the making of 
deportation  orders;
52  and  even  the  destination  of  removal.  There  were  important 
omissions,  however:  there  was  no  appeal  against  deportations  following  the 
recommendation of a criminal court; against removals of illegal entrants; or against 
the refusal of work permits.
53 
The  IRT/RRT’s  jurisdiction,  on  the  other  hand,  was  tied  to  proximity  to  the 
Australian community. While the original jurisdiction of the IRT
54 evinced no clear 
pattern, its jurisdiction was rapidly enlarged to cover essentially decisions affecting 
those already in Australia, and those sponsored or nominated by Australians, mostly 
on appeal from MIRO. The RRT could review all adverse refugee decisions, while the 
AAT could review decisions made on criminal or national security grounds, unless the 
Minister  conclusively  certified  otherwise.  The  AAT  also  reviewed  decisions 
concerning  the  regulation  of  migration  agents  and  the  cancellation  of  business 
                                                   
50 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Act 1986 (Cth). In September 2008, HREOC changed its 
official title to the Australian Human Rights Commission.  
51 Originally the Joint Standing Committee on Migration Regulations, established 1990. 
52 Immigration Act 1988 (UK) (‘1988 Act’), s 5, also restricted deportation appeals for those who had 
arrived in the last 7 years. 
53 Ian Macdonald and Frances Webber (eds), Immigration Law and Practice in the United Kingdom 
(6th ed, 2006), 1160. 
54 Described in IRT, Annual Report 1990-1991 (1991), 3-6.   28 
permits. The IRT/RRT could also refer decisions to the AAT, although this power has 
been rarely invoked.
55 
The other significant difference was in the innovation of an ‘inquisitorial’ model 
for  the  IRT/RRT.  The  IRT/RRT  members  had  greater  investigative  powers,  and 
questioned the applicant during the hearing without the benefit of a departmental 
representative.  The  applicant  had  no  right  to  legal  representation,  to  make 
submissions, or to cross-examine witnesses. However, in practice this inquisitorial 
model has been less radical than it appears.
56  
The powers of the IRT/RRT were slightly broader. In line with the Australian 
merits review system, its role was effectively to re-make the decision again, while the 
IAA’s  role  was  conventionally  appellate,  with  adjudicators  reviewing  the  evidence 
existing  at  the  time  of  decision  and  allowing  appeals  if  the  decision  was  not  in 
accordance  with  the  law,  or  if  an  available  discretion  should  have  been  exercised 
differently.  
There were also some minor differences in the composition of the tribunals. Lay 
members played a more prominent role in Australia, with the UK appointing only 
legally  qualified  adjudicators  from  1987.
57  In  the  same  year,  the  Lord  Chancellor’s 
Department, which had always appointed IAT members, took over the appointment 
of adjudicators from the Home Office. In comparison, the IRT/RRT members were 
appointed by the Australian Department of Immigration,
58 unlike AAT members who 
are appointed by the Attorney-General’s Department and presided over by Federal 
Court judges. 
Finally, fees and time limits also varied. In Australia, it cost AU$200 and AU$300 
to seek review at MIRO and IRT respectively, while the IAA was free. Time limits were 
roughly  equivalent  and,  importantly,  non-extendable,  with  28  days  for  in-country 
appeals, and for appeals from abroad either 70 days (in Australia) or 3 months in the 
UK. However, there were significantly shorter time periods too — 7 working days for 
                                                   
55 There appears to be only one such case: SRPP v MIMA [2000] AATA 878.  
56  See  Robin  Creyke,  ‘‘Inquisitorial’  practice  in  Australian  tribunals’  (2006)  57  Admin  Rev  17. 
Written submissions are usually requested prior to the hearing, and representatives are commonly 
asked if there is anything they want to add. 
57  Macdonald  and  Webber  (eds),  n53,  1165.  At  least  one  member  of  the  IAT  had  to  be  legally 
qualified: 1971 Act, Sch 5, para 12. 
58  The  Department  of  Immigration  has  been  associated  over  the  years  with  other  functions, 
including Multicultural or Ethnic Affairs, Indigenous Affairs, and latterly Citizenship. For clarity, I 
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detainees in Australia, and 14 days against decisions of the Secretary of State and 
appeals against destination in the UK.  
Perhaps  the  most  obvious  difference,  however,  was  the  sheer  scale  of  review. 
Between  1990–1996,  the  IRT  annually reviewed  2,000-4,000  cases  (overturning  40-
60%  of  decisions)  and  the  RRT  4,000-7,000  (overturning  10-17%).  In  comparison, 
adjudicators heard approximately 25,000-35,000 cases, with 6,000-10,000 applications 
for leave and hearings at the IAT level.
59 
3  The story of immigration review 
The  model  of  immigration  review  had  its  faults,  primarily  its  deviations  from 
standards  adopted  in  other  administrative  fields,  as  discussed  in  chapter  7.  Yet, a 
decade later, it looks like a lost golden age. For the story of immigration review that 
follows is largely a story of ‘decline and fall’, albeit with some important cross-cutting 
trends in the UK stimulated largely by European influence and early New Labour 
enthusiasms. 
As  with  the  introduction  of  the  Australian  immigration  review  system,  a 
proximate cause was rising numbers. In Australia, between 1995-1996 and 2002-2003, 
the lodgements of immigration matters at the Federal Court soared from 331 to 1,836, 
while in 2002-2003 the High Court recorded an astonishing 2,105 lodgements.
60 In the 
UK, between 1996-2001 the number of asylum-related judicial review claims almost 
doubled, from 1,225 to 2,210,
61 while by 1999 there was a backlog of nearly 65,000 
asylum claims.
62 This increase underlies the three major symptoms of this crisis: the 
conflict between the executive and the judiciary; a pervasive crisis of confidence; and 
continuous reforms and changes. 
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  Battles with the Bench Battles with the Bench Battles with the Bench Battles with the Bench    
The conflict between the executive and the judiciary took the principal forms of a 
war of words, and a pattern of executive defiance, peaking in the brazen attempts (in 
2001, in Australia, and 2003-2004 in the UK) to largely exclude judicial review through 
ouster clauses, which is discussed in chapter 3. 
                                                   
59 Figures from Annual Reports of the IRT/RRT and Council on Tribunals. No comparable success 
rates are available for the IAA during this period.  
60 Federal Court of Australia, Annual Report 1999-2000 (2000), 140; Federal Court of Australia, 
Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003), Appendix 5; High Court of Australia, Annual Report 2002-2003 
(2003), 8.  
61 Robert Thomas, ‘The impact of judicial review on asylum’ [2003] PL 479, 560. 
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3.1.1  WAR OF WORDS 
In  the  UK,  the  stage  was  set  by  judicial  attacks  between  1995-1997  by  the 
Conservative Home Secretary, Michael Howard,
63 but it was Home Secretary David 
Blunkett, during 2001-2004, who provided the real drama.
64 Similarly, while there had 
been thinly veiled attacks by Australian Labor Ministers,
65 the war of words climaxed 
under Philip Ruddock’s tenure as Minister of Immigration, between 1996-2003.  
The theme of their attacks was the judicial perversion of democratic processes of 
majoritarian decision-making.
66 Blunkett warned: “The law will be made by those who 
are held to account for both making it and changing it”.
67 He implied that judges 
provided “justice [only] for the small few who use our democracy to hide in”.
68 Most 
directly, he lashed out: “Frankly, I’m personally fed up with having to deal with a 
situation where Parliament debates issues and the judges then overturn them”;
69 and 
asked: “do we have a democracy where we say, ‘you can go so far but actually the real 
democracy is the judiciary’”.
70 More recently, then Home Secretary John Reid attacked 
“inexplicable or bizarre” decisions as “reinforc[ing] the perception that the system is 
not working to protect, or in favour of, the vast majority of ordinary, decent hard-
working citizens in this country”.
71 
Ruddock began his attacks as early as 1992, when he complained of the “creative 
way in which the High Court of Australia got into the business of determining refugee 
claims.”
72 His challenge was even blunter: “Again, the courts have reinterpreted and 
re-written Australian law, ignoring the sovereignty of Parliament and the will of the 
Australian people. Again, this is simply not on.”
73 In June 2002, as the Federal Court 
prepared  to  consider  the  ouster  clause,  Ruddock  announced  that  the  courts  were 
                                                   
63 Andrew Le Sueur, ‘The judicial review debate: From partnership to friction’ (1996) 31 Gov Oppos 
8. 
64 Anthony Bradley, ‘Judicial independence under attack’ [2003] PL 397; Frances Gibb, ‘Blunkett v 
the Bench: the battle has begun’, The Times, 4 March 2003, 3. 
65 ‘Justice Einfeld and Mr Hand’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 December 1992, 12; M Hardy, ‘Court 
chief out of touch, says Bolkus’, Courier-Mail, 20 July 1995, 6. 
66 Helen Pringle and Elaine Thompson, ‘Tampa as metaphor: Majoritarianism and the separation of 
powers’ (2003) 10 AJ Admin L 107. 
67 Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Is David Blunkett the biggest threat to our legal system?’ Daily Telegraph, 13 
November 2001, 19. 
68 Alan Travis, ‘On the brink of war’, The Guardian, 4 October 2001, 2. 
69 Robert Verkaik, ‘Asylum system flawed, rules High Court’, The Independent, 20 February 2003, 4. 
70 Sarah Hall and Alan Travis, ‘Lords vote: “a clash of wills”‘, The Guardian, 8 March 2004, 1. 
71 ‘Reid steps up the fight to kick out Afghan hijackers’, The Express, 12 May 2006, 33. 
72  Australia,  Hansard,  HoR,  16  December  1992,  3935  (Philip  Ruddock,  Shadow  Minister  for 
Immigration). 
73 Cited in LCAC, Provisions of the Migration Amendment (Judicial Review) Bill 2004 (2004), 157-158.    31 
“finding  a  variety  of  ways  and  means  of  dealing  themselves  back  into  the  review 
game”, and that he did “remember a time when judges who wanted to be able to 
involve themselves in the political process saw it as being more appropriate to resign 
from  the  bench  and  stand  for  parliament.”
74  The  Chief  Justice  demanded  an 
explanation, effectively threatening the Minister with an action for contempt, averted 
by Ruddock’s subsequent ‘clarification’.
75  
Judges,  in  their  turn,  have  not  been  short  of  criticism.  British  judges  have 
lamented wasteful litigation
76 and poor administration.
77 Both Australian and British 
judges  have  condemned  refugee  policies  as  intolerable  to  “civilised  nation[s]”,
78 
“barbaric”
79 and a “national disgrace”.
80 Munby J, in separate judgments, rebuked the 
Home Office for “at best an unacceptable disregard … of the rule of law, at worst an 
unacceptable disdain by the Home Office for the rule of law, which is as depressing as 
it ought to be concerning”;
81 and denounced them for “scandalous” and “profoundly 
shocking” behaviour that “expose[d] … the seeming inability of that Department to 
comply not merely with the law but with the very rule of law itself.”
82 
3.1.2  EXECUTIVE DEFIANCE 
Executive  disagreement  spilled  over  into  executive  defiance,  mainly  through 
interference, or near-interference, with judicial process. Australian Ministers failed to 
inform lawyers that they had returned their client;
83 and deported two Kenyan boys 
despite  a  pending  court  application.
84  British  Home  Secretaries  breached  a  court 
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Financial Review, 20 June 1994, 4. 
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undertaking by removing a client,
85 deported a woman in breach of the law,
86 and 
evaded legal action by removing people late at night and on weekends.
87  
There  was  also  a  pattern  of  legislative  reversal.  In  Australia,  the  Labor 
Government introduced a bill to reverse a decision on China’s one child policy before 
the  decision  was  overturned  on  appeal.
88  The  Liberal  Government  limited  the 
Ombudsman’s and HREOC’s access to detainees, reversing another decision.
89 The 
British  government  was  even  more  active.  It  reversed  decisions  which,  inter  alia, 
invalidated regulations removing benefits for refugees;
90 precluded removal of refugee 
claimants  to  Germany  and  France;
91  constrained  the  Secretary’s  power  to  renew 
indefinitely a refugee claimant’s status of temporary admission;
92 and required local 
authorities to house homeless refugee claimants contrary to dispersal policies.
93  
In Australia, the pattern of executive defiance was sometimes flagrant. The Labor 
government pre-empted the release of Cambodians by rushing through mandatory 
detention  legislation  two  days  before  the  court  hearing;
94  and  then  pre-empted 
compensation  proceedings  for  their  prior  unlawful  detention  by  rushing  through 
legislation  capping  compensation  to  a  dollar  a  day.
95  The  succeeding  Liberal 
government  retrospectively  validated  all  of  its  actions  over  the  Tampa  affair 
(discussed  in  chapter  3);
96  and  when  civil  liberties  groups  had  the  temerity  to 
challenge them, they aggressively pursued them for their court costs.
97 When refugee 
claimants landed on Melville Island, the government simply invalidated their refugee 
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88  Migration  Legislation  Amendment  Bill  (No  4)  1995  (Cth);  MIEA  v  A  (1994)  127  ALR  383, 
overturned in MILGEA v A (1995) 130 ALR 48. 
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90 Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 (UK) (‘1996 Act’), s 11, reversing JCWI, n78. 
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UKHL 39. 
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94 See Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (1992) 176 CLR 1, [5].  
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applications  by  ‘excising’  Melville  Island  from  the  migration  zone  through 
retrospective (and subsequently disallowed) regulations.
98  
Least remarked, but no less a threat to separation of powers,
99 was the use of 
legislation to confine judicial interpretation
100 of the Refugee Convention,
101 and to 
require adverse credibility inferences to be drawn in specific circumstances.
102 
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  Crisis of confidence Crisis of confidence Crisis of confidence Crisis of confidence    
The second thread in the story is that of a pervasive crisis of confidence both in 
immigration  decision-making  and  review,
103  evidenced  in  a  torrent  of  paper  and 
forthright expressions of discontent.  
Reports  have  issued  unremittingly  from  parliamentary  committees,
104  audit 
agencies,
105 and non-governmental organisations.
106 The UK has issued a number of 
consultation papers
107 and White Papers,
108 while several independent ad hoc reports 
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to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267 (‘Refugee Convention’). See chapter 2, part 4. 
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complex realities – Seeking truth in the face of section 8’ (2006) 20 IANL 95. 
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demarcation between decision-making and review. 
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Immigration  Control  (2006);  CAC,  Asylum  and  Immigration  Appeals  (2004);  CAC,  Legal  Aid: 
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L&CLC,  Migration  Legislation  Amendment  (Judicial  Review)  Bill  1998  [1999]  (1999);  LCRC,  A 
Sanctuary under Review: An Examination of Australia’s Refugee and Humanitarian Processes (2000); 
LCAC, Administration and Operation of the Migration Act 1958 (2006). 
105 In the UK: NAO, The Home Office: The Immigration and Nationality Directorate’s Casework 
Programme (1999); NAO, Improving the Speed and Quality of Asylum Decisions (2004); NAO, Visa 
Entry to the United Kingdom: The Entry Clearance Operation (2004); NAO, Returning Failed Asylum 
Applicants (2005). In Australia: ANAO, Management of the Processing of Asylum-seekers (2004); 
ANAO,  Management  of  Tribunal  Operations—Migration  Review  Tribunal  and  Refugee  Review 
Tribunal (2007). 
106 See, eg, Amnesty International, Get It Right: How Home Office Decision-making Fails Refugees 
(2004); Bail for Immigration Detainees and Asylum Aid, Justice Denied: Asylum and Immigration 
Legal  Aid  –  A  System  in  Crisis  (2005);  Mayor  of  London,  Into  the  Labyrinth:  Legal  Advice  for 
Asylum-seekers in London (2005); Kazimierz Bem et al, A Price Too High: The Cost of Australia’s 
Approach to Asylum Seekers (2007); Nina Field, Playing God with Sanctuary: A Study of Australia’s 
Approach to Complementary Protection Obligations Beyond the Refugee Convention (2008); Oxfam 
(Community  Aid  Abroad),  Adrift  in  the  Pacific:  The  Implications  of  Australia’s  Pacific  Refugee 
Solution (2002). 
107 See, eg, IND and Lord Chancellor’s Department, Review of Appeals (1998); IND, Fair, Effective, 
Transparent and Trusted – Rebuilding Confidence in Our Immigration System: An Independent and   34 
have  been  commissioned  in  Australia.
109  Remarkably,  in  both  jurisdictions  wide-
ranging independent inquiries have been initiated by civil society, in the form of the 
UK  Independent  Asylum  Commission
110  and  the  Australian  ‘People’s  Inquiry  into 
Detention’.
111  
The crisis of confidence is most pithily conveyed by the players themselves. Reid 
famously declared the Home Office “not fit for purpose”,
112 while Blunkett admitted: 
“The asylum system doesn’t work. It is a mess from beginning to end”.
113 In Australia, 
the Palmer report indicted the Department as “overly self-protective and defensive”, 
and “largely unwilling to challenge organisational norms or to engage in genuine self-
criticism or analysis”.
114 
The poor quality of initial decision-making has been relentlessly attacked,
115 in 
terms succinctly summarised thus: 
Primary decision-makers … are often woefully ignorant of the law and of conditions in the 
country against which they assess the applicant. Anecdotal evidence is that they are often 
arrogant, hostile and even abusive towards applicants. In some cases, they reveal attitudes 
of prejudice, xenophobia and racism.
116  
Meanwhile, Australian lawyers appeared to have lost faith in the RRT: 
At the moment this system engenders confidence in no-one, certainly not the working 
practitioners. If I told you what their views were of the Refugee Review Tribunal and some 
of the members who operate on it—I do not think I can be that candid.
117  
In Selliah, two judges forthrightly condemned the practices of the RRT: 
[H]earings before the Tribunal are virtually unique in Australian legal procedures and in 
the common law system generally. … The Tribunal is both judge and interrogator, is at 
liberty to conduct  the interview in any way it wishes, without order,  predictability, or 
consistency of subject matter, and may use any outside material it wishes without giving 
the person being interrogated the opportunity of reading and understanding the material 
before  being  questioned  about  it.  …  These  methods  contravene  every  basic  safeguard 
established by our inherited system of law for 400 years.
118 
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British criticisms of the appeals process have been even more colourful. Home 
Secretaries and Ministers have proclaimed it: “the longest, most prevaricating process 
that anyone has ever devised”;
119 “virtually unworkable”;
120 and an “endless process of 
challenge  after  challenge”.
121  Primary  decision-makers  believed  that  “the  appeal 
process, run by lawyers and judges who are ignorant of local conditions, regularly 
overturns ‘good’ decisions.”
122 One Home Office lawyer described the system as “a 
complete waste of everyone’s time and money … It’s just a farce”,
123 while a former IAT 
member called proceedings “often little more than a pantomime”, and the system 
“just an expensive, legalistic game.”
124 Even the tribunal’s President, Mr Justice Hodge, 
has expressed his frustration, saying: “Something like 65% of people who are refused 
by my first tier judiciary in asylum cases tr[y] the review system because there is 
absolutely no reason why they should not”.
125 This was compounded by the concern 
that “you work hard and you produce a result and it does not result in anything very 
much.”
126 
Finally, and unforgettably, the British tabloids have waged a vociferous campaign 
against judges, complaining:  
Britain’s unaccountable and unelected judges are openly, and with increasing arrogance 
and perversity, usurping the role of Parliament, setting the wishes of the people at nought 
and pursuing a liberal, politically correct agenda of their own, in their zeal to interpret 
European legislation.
127 
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  From there to here: Reforms to the immigration review system From there to here: Reforms to the immigration review system From there to here: Reforms to the immigration review system From there to here: Reforms to the immigration review system    
The third, most complicated, thread in the story involves the number and scale of 
changes made to the structure of the system, the jurisdiction of tribunals and courts, 
and access to the system. 
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3.3.1  STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
3.3.1.1  The legal system 
The  most  obvious  structural  change  has  been  the  replacement  of  two-tier 
structures  with  single-tier  structures.  While  the  RRT  was  always  single-tier,  the 
MIRO/IRT structure was replaced by the present Migration Review Tribunal (‘MRT’) 
on 1 June 1999,
128 and the IAA replaced with the single-tier Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal (‘AIT’) in April 2005.
129 This was much more controversial in the UK than in 
Australia,
130 with UK parliamentary committees urging that decision-making should 
be improved first.
131 
Significantly,  neither  the  MRT/RRT  nor  the  AIT  was  subsumed  into  the 
mainstream  administrative  model,  namely  the  Australian  AAT  or  the  newly 
centralised First Tier and Upper Tier Tribunals in the UK under the Leggatt reforms
132 
— although, very recently and despite earlier indications, the UK government has 
proposed  exactly  this.
133  The  Australian  government  did  propose  to  merge  the 
MRT/RRT  with  the  AAT  into  a  new  super-tribunal,  the  Administrative  Review 
Tribunal, but this was stalled in the Senate by opposition to the reduction of the 
AAT’s procedural safeguards.
134 In recent years, the MRT and RRT have effected a de 
facto merger, with co-location of the tribunals, sharing of staff and leadership, cross-
appointment of members, and integrated financial management.
 135  
More importantly, the creation of the MRT signalled the practical elimination of 
multi-member  panels,  greater  reliance  on  staff,
136  and  the  almost  complete 
reconstitution of its membership.
137 In contrast, the AIT has turned out to be a less 
radical  reform  than  it  appeared.  Existing  members  have  been  retitled,  with 
adjudicators  becoming  Immigration  Judges,  and  IAT  members  becoming  Senior 
                                                   
128 Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 1998 (Cth). 
129 2004 Act, s 26. 
130 Since MIRO was perceived as a mere “rubber stamp”: L&CLC, Migration Legislation Amendment 
Bill (No 4) 1997 and Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 5) 1997 (1997), [1.46], [1.51]. 
131  CAC,  Asylum  and  Immigration  Appeals,  n104;  HAC,  Asylum  and  Immigration  (Treatment  of 
Claimants, etc.) Bill (2003). 
132 Sir Andrew Leggatt, Tribunals for Users: One Service, One System (2003). 
133 UK Border Agency, Immigration Appeals: Fair Decisions, Faster Justice (2008). 
134 Benjamin Haslem, ‘Labor and Democrats to block super tribunal’, The Australian, 15 February 
2001, 6. See L&CLC, Inquiry into the Provisions of the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill 2000 and 
the Administrative Review Tribunal Bill (Consequential and Transitional Provisions) Bill 2000 (2001). 
135 MRT, Annual Report 2004-2005 (2005), 2; MRT and RRT, Annual Report 2005-2006 (2006), 4. 
136 IRT and MRT, Annual Report 1998-1999 (1999), [16]-[17].  
137 According to the annual reports, 5 members continued in office.    37 
Immigration  Judges.
138  By  default,  three  Immigration  Judges  hear  substantive 
claims,
139  but  a  ‘transitional’  filter  mechanism  subjects  this  to  further 
‘reconsideration’, on the ground of an error of law, by Senior Immigration Judges.
140 
The ‘reconsideration’ stage frequently involves another hearing, known as a ‘second 
stage’ reconsideration, introducing new legal complexities.
141 It seems unlikely that 
the procedure envisaged by the statute, whereby High Court judges would review AIT 
cases on the papers,
142 will ever be used.  
While the IAA has been structurally downgraded, three new immigration-related 
tribunals  have  been established.  In Chahal,
143  the  Three Wise  Men  procedure  was 
found to violate the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’),
144 and was 
replaced by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (‘SIAC’) in 1997.
145 The 1999 
Act,  which  created  an  independent  system  of  asylum  support  and  regulated 
immigration  advisers,  also  established  asylum  support  adjudicators
146  (now  the 
Asylum Support Tribunal)
147 and the Immigration Services Tribunal.
148 These tribunals 
are small, with annual workloads of 1,000-2,000 cases
149 and 10-20 cases respectively.
150 
SIAC  has  been  by  far  the  most  controversial  of  these  new  tribunals,
151  albeit 
largely  because  of  the  extension  of  its  jurisdiction  to  reviewing  the  detention  of 
suspected  terrorists.
152  It  was  relatively  little  used  for  immigration,  with  no 
deportations  having  resulted  by  March  2005,
153  although  its  workload  has  since 
increased.
154  However,  there  has  been  controversy  over  the  procedures  for  non-
                                                   
138 Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (Judicial Titles) Order 2005 (UK). There is also provision for 
Designated Judges. 
139 AIT Practice Directions 2007, [2.2].  
140 2004 Act, Sch 2, para 30. 
141 See, eg, DK (Serbia) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1747; MA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2007] EWCA Civ 16. 
142 2004 Act, s 103A. 
143 Chahal v UK, 15 November 1996, ECHR 1996-V. 
144 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS 5; 213 UNTS 221.  
145 Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997 (UK). 
146 Ss 102-103. 
147 Upon its transfer to the Tribunals Services from the Home Office in April 2007. This will be 
subsumed into the First-Tier Tribunal on 3 November 2008.  
148 S 87. 
149 Figures from the Appendices to the Council on Tribunals’ Annual Reports. 
150 See http://www.immigrationservicestribunal.gov.uk/registers.htm. 
151 See CAC, The Operation of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission and the Use of Special 
Advocates (2005). 
152 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (UK), Pt 4. This has been replaced by the system of 
control orders, as discussed in chapter 3, 4.1. 
153 CAC, SIAC Report, n151, 14.  
154 See http://www.siac.tribunals.gov.uk/outcomes2007onwards.htm.    38 
disclosure of evidence and the exclusion of the appellant and his representatives from 
hearings.  
Finally,  during  this  period,  the  use  of  the  Australian  ministerial  intervention 
soared,
155 becoming an important fourth tier with its own administrative guidelines,
156 
and causing a scandal over allegations of politically motivated decisions.
157 The Rudd 
government, however, has signalled its intention to confine greatly the use of these 
discretions.
158 
3.3.1.2 Other accountability mechanisms 
The expansive use of ministerial intervention chimed with a trend towards the 
use, both by advocates and government, of review mechanisms outside of the systems 
of  immigration  review  described  above.  These  included  increased,  but  largely 
ineffective,
159 recourse by Australian advocates to the UN treaty monitoring bodies, 
the  UN  Human  Rights  Committee  (‘UNHRC’),
160  and  the  UN  Committee  against 
Torture (‘UNCAT’).
161  
The  governments turned  enthusiastically  to  more  flexible  review  mechanisms, 
including (as we have seen) ad hoc reports, increased reliance on the audit agencies, 
as well as non-statutory advisory groups.
162 In Australia, the Ombudsman’s powers 
                                                   
155  Over  4000  requests  were  made  in  2006-2007:  Elizabeth  Proust,  Report  to  the  Minister  for 
Immigration and Citizenship on the Appropriate Use of Ministerial Powers under the Migration and 
Citizenship Acts and Citizenship Regulations (2008), 8. 
156 Currently Migration Series Instruction 386, ‘Guidelines on ministerial powers under sections 
345, 351, 391, 417, 454 and 501J of the Migration Act 1958’.  
157 See Select Committee on Ministerial Discretion in Migration Matters, Inquiry into Ministerial 
Discretion in Migration Matters (2004). 
158  Minister  for  Immigration  and  Citizenship,  ‘Ministerial  intervention  powers  under  review’, 
(Media Release, 9 July 2008). 
159 For an example of Australia’s response, see Ryszard Piotrowicz, ‘The detention of boat people 
and Australia’s human rights obligations’ (1998) 72 ALJ 417.  
160 Under Optional Protocol 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 UNTS 
171 (‘ICCPR’). The UK has not ratified this. Australia’s detention policy has consistently been found 
to violate the ICCPR: see, eg, Shams v Australia UNHRC Communication Nos 1255, 1256, 1259, 1260, 
1266, 1268, 1270, 1288/2004 (11 September 2007). 
161 Only 1 case has thus far succeeded: Sheq Elmi UNCAT Communication No 120/1998 (25 May 
1999). The UK has not recognised the competence of UNCAT in respect of individual complaints.  
162 In Australia, these included the Refugee Resettlement Advisory Council, established 1997; the 
Immigration  Detention  Advisory  Group,  2001;  and  the  Detention  Health  Advisory  Group, 
established 2006: see DIMA, Annual Report 2005-2006 (2006), Appendix 1. In the UK, these include 
stakeholder  groups  and  the  Migration  Advisory  Committee,  which  advises  on  occupational 
shortages.   39 
were notably increased by a new power to review cases of long-term detention,
163 
although HREOC’s influence diminished.
164  
The  UK  government  was  especially  enthusiastic,  creating  a  multiplicity  of 
mechanisms  both  to  review  the  quality  of  decision-making,  and  to  monitor 
detention
165 (see Appendices, Table 7). Four part-time statutory positions of ‘monitor’ 
were created to review decisions and make recommendations,
166 largely as a cheap 
quid pro quo for reduced appeal rights, while UNHCR also reviewed the quality of 
decision-making under its ‘Quality Initiative’.
167 In 2008, many of these bodies were 
merged in the new Chief Inspectorate, which took over the roles of the Race and 
Certification Monitors, the Complaints Audit Committee, and (most controversially) 
the Advisory Panel on Country Information.
168  
In  addition,  the  salience  of  immigration  provoked  an  increase  in  institutional 
scrutiny,  as  well  as  a  growth  in  the  policy  community.  As  already  noted, 
parliamentary committee reports flowed thick and fast, from the Australian Senate 
Legal  and  Constitutional  Affairs  Committee  (‘LCAC’)  and  its  UK  equivalent,  the 
Constitutional Affairs Committee (‘CAC’), as well as the more recently established UK 
Joint Committee on Human Rights (‘JCHR’) and the House of Lords’ European Union 
Committee.  Local  and  umbrella  advocacy  organisations  mushroomed;  mainstream 
advocacy organisations such as Amnesty increased their activities in this area; and the 
devolution of immigration control increased the range of sector-specific organisations 
involved.  
                                                   
163 Part 8C, inserted by Migration Amendment (Detention Arrangements) Act 2005 (Cth), Sch 1. 
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entry clearance system’ in Prakash Shah and Werner Menski (eds), Migration, Diasporas and Legal 
Systems in Europe (2006) 302. 
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168  UK  Borders  Act  2007  (UK),  ss  48-56.  See  IND,  Fair,  effective,  transparent,  and  trusted  – 
Rebuilding confidence in our immigration system: An independent and transparent assessment of 
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3.3.2  CHANGES TO JURISDICTION 
Perhaps  the  most  complex  aspect  of  the  story,  however, has  been  changes  in 
jurisdiction — in the UK, at tribunal level, and in Australia, at the court level. 
3.3.2.1 Tribunals 
There has been little change to the jurisdiction of the Australian tribunals,
169 with 
minor additions to the MRT’s jurisdiction as new regulatory mechanisms were added, 
and one major extension (albeit with significant procedural variations) to the AAT’s 
jurisdiction regarding strengthened powers to cancel visas on character grounds. 
In contrast, the changes to the IAA/AIT’s jurisdiction have been mind-bogglingly 
complex in detail, and cross-cutting. On the one hand, there have been a range of 
significant expansions, of which two (refugee appeals and SIAC) have already been 
noted.  Appeals  relating  to  European  Economic  Area  (‘EEA’)  rights  were  put  on  a 
statutory footing in 1994,
170 and an appeal right was conferred along with the newly 
created power to deprive a person of citizenship.
171 
The  most significant  expansions,  however,  were  early  New  Labour’s HRA  and 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, which brought new freestanding appeals based 
on  human  rights
172  and  racial  discrimination,  transformed  later  into  grounds  of 
appeal.
173 Refugee and human rights claims also propelled an expansion in the IAA’s 
powers to consider post-decision evidence,
174 now available in most cases.
175 In Art 8 
ECHR cases, additionally, their powers amount to a re-making of the decision on 
proportionality.
176 
However, the predominant trend was one of ad hoc abolition or restriction of 
appeal rights (Table 1). This incremental withdrawal has carved out a complicated 
                                                   
169 See Appendices, Table 5. 
170 Immigration (EEA) Order 1994 (UK). 
171 British Nationality Act 1981 (UK), s 40A, inserted by 2002 Act, s 4. This replaced the right of a 
hearing  before  a  specially  commissioned  inquiry,  which  was  never  invoked:  Macdonald  and 
Webber (eds), n53, 1170. 
172 Previously, these attracted only judicial review: see, eg, R v SSHD ex p Kebbeh (30 April 1998, 
Hidden J); R v SSHD ex p Gangadeen [1998] Imm AR 106.  
173 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 (UK), ss 6, 19B, Sch 2, paras 32-40; 2002 Act, s 84(1)(b). 
174 Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97; R v SSHD ex p Razgar [2004] UKHL 27, codified in 
s 77(3) and extended to Art 8 in s 77(4) of the 1999 Act. 
175 2002 Act, s 85. The exceptions are refusals of entry clearances and certificates of entitlement, 
and  more  recently  in  relation  to  points-based  applications  (new  s 85A).  See  Macdonald  and 
Webber (eds), n53, 1205. 
176 Huang v SSHD [2007] UKHL 11. See Gina Clayton, ‘Prediction or precondition? The House of 
Lords judgment in Huang & Kashmiri’ (2007) 21 JIANL 311.   41 
hierarchy  of  appeal  rights  that  depends  upon  three  variables:  on  the  class  of 
decision;
177 on the ground of appeal,
178 and sometimes on the class of person (such as 
family  visitors).
179  Further,  appeal  rights  may  be  in-country,  out-of-country,  and 
subject to ad hoc limitations.  
For  the  sake  of  space  and  the  reader’s  comfort,  I  leave  the  details  aside  and 
concentrate on the broad outlines of the changes. Both refusals of entry and appeals 
against variations of leave have been greatly confined, with most such decisions either 
not appellable at all or not appellable in-country. On paper, claims based on asylum, 
human rights, or racial discrimination grounds (‘the newer grounds’) appear to attract 
greater protection, as they are often available in-country or result in the waiver of 
limitations. However, in practice these claims are greatly restricted by processes of 
‘certification’  of  ‘unfounded’  claims  that  expedite  return  and  preclude  claims 
(discussed below). Multiple appeals are also prevented through the use of a ‘one-stop’ 
procedure, in which subsequent appeals are excluded after the applicant is requested 
to state exhaustively the grounds of appeal.
180  
Year of 
Act 
Changes to jurisdiction  Section 
1993  Removal of appeal for visitors, short-term or prospective students, and those 
failing to meet certain objective criteria 
210-211 
  Refugee claims certified as being ‘without foundation’ accelerated  Sch 2, it 
5 
1996  Out-of-country appeal for ‘safe third country’ claims; first-instance appeal for 
other ‘certified’ claims 
1-2 
1999  Removal of appeal for overstayers or those breaching conditions  10 
  ‘One-stop’ appeal  96 
2002  Out-of-country appeals for asylum or human rights claims ‘certified’ as 
clearly unfounded 
94 
 
  IAT jurisdiction confined to points of law  101(1) 
  Judicial review of IAT’s refusals of permission to review replaced by paper-
based ‘statutory review’ 
101(3) 
  Abolition of appeals against destination   82 
2004  Replacement of IAA with AIT  26 
  Extension and entrenchment of ‘safe third country’  Sch 3 
2006  Removal of appeals against refusal of leave to enter and entry clearance, 
excepting family visitors, and other ‘straightforward’ appeals abolished 
4-6 
2007  Out-of-country appeals against ‘automatic’ deportation for foreign criminals, 
unless well-founded asylum or human rights claim 
35 
2008  No appeal against designation of ‘special immigration status’ for foreign 
criminals and families thereof 
Pt 10 
Table 1: Restrictions and removals of appeal rights. 
                                                   
177 2002 Act, ss 82-83A. 
178 Ibid s 84. 
179 S 88A. 
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In this hierarchy, European Community (‘EC’) law claims sit at the apex;
181 claims 
based  on  the  newer  grounds  receive  notionally  greater  but  practically  lesser 
protection; and ‘pure’ immigration appeals sit at the bottom of the heap. 
These trends are continued in the simpler, narrower, provisions of the 2008 draft 
bill (see Appendices, Table 8). This consolidates the various appeal rights in relation 
to refugee claims, other protection claims, immigration permission, and expulsion 
orders  (covering  removal  directions  and  deportations),
182  and  remove  the  various 
exceptions based on ‘newer grounds’. In general, the provisions shift appeal rights 
towards the initial decision to refuse permission, remove most out-of-country appeal 
rights, and strengthen certification powers. The grounds of appeal are narrower, with 
appeals no longer allowed on the ground that a discretion should have been exercised 
differently, and the removal of express reference to the ‘newer grounds’.
183 
3.3.2.2 Courts 
The real battlefield in Australia concerned the courts’ jurisdiction, beginning in 
1994 with the insertion of a new Part 8 in the Act conferring a migration-specific 
jurisdiction and excluding its other powers of judicial review.
184 Most notably, this 
excluded  the  most  relevant  grounds  of  judicial  review,  such  as  denial  of  natural 
justice;  Wednesbury  unreasonableness;  taking  into  account  an  irrelevant 
consideration, or failing to take into account a relevant consideration; bad faith; and 
abuse of power.
185 This was eventually upheld as constitutionally valid.
186 
Some Federal Court judges responded creatively, by inferring the application of 
these grounds indirectly through statutory obligations to act “according to substantial 
justice”,
187 or to set out its findings on any material question of fact, and refer to the 
supporting evidence or material.
188 These strategies were, however, overruled by the 
                                                   
181 These may all be brought in-country without limitation. S 92(4)(b). 
182 Draft s 37. 
183 Draft s 174. These would normally fall under the provision that the decision is ‘not in accordance 
with law’, but it is possible this might not cover unincorporated parts of the Refugee Convention. 
184 Migration Reform Act s 33.  
185 S 476. See Charles Beltz, ‘The Migration Reform Act 1992 and changes to judicial review’ (1994) 
Admin Rev 36; Mary Crock, ‘Judicial review and Part 8 of the Migration Act: Necessary reform or 
overkill?’ (1996) 18 Syd LR 267. 
186 Abebe v Commonwealth (1999) 197 CLR 510. See Mary Crock, ‘Of Fortress Australia and castles in 
the air: The High Court and the judicial review of migration decisions’ (2000) 24 MULR 190.  
187 S 420. 
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High  Court.
189  The  result,  however,  was  merely  to  displace  litigation  to  the  High 
Court, with its constitutionally entrenched jurisdiction.  
The Liberal government, however, went further by concocting a savage ouster 
clause (s 474),
190 eventually passed in circumstances described in chapter 3. As also 
detailed in that chapter, this clause did not have its intended effect: after surviving the 
Full Federal Court,
191 it was defanged by the High Court’s decision that the clause did 
not touch decisions infected by jurisdictional error.
192 Thus, the Federal Court largely 
regained jurisdiction over the grounds of review excluded under the former Part 8.  
The  response  of  the  government  was  to  continue  the  process  of  displacing 
migration litigation to the newly created Federal Magistrates Court (‘FMC’). This had 
received migration jurisdiction in 2001 and by 2002-2003 was already the principal 
migration court.
193 The Migration Litigation Reform Act 2005 conferred upon the FMC 
the  equivalent  of  the  High  Court’s  constitutional  jurisdiction,
194  with  the  Federal 
Court instead hearing appeals from the FMC.
195 The present route, therefore, is to 
appeal to the MRT/RRT, with judicial review before the FMC, an appeal (as of right) 
to the Federal Court constituted usually by a single judge, and exceptionally to the 
Full Federal Court;
196 and finally, with special leave, to the High Court. 
The focus in the UK has been on restricting judicial review at the High Court, first 
by replacing it with a faster, paper-based form of ‘statutory review’ by single High 
Court  judges,  with  no  further  right  of  appeal.  Shortly  afterwards,  as  discussed  in 
chapter  3,  the  UK  government  also  brazenly  proposed  to  oust  judicial  review 
altogether in its 2004 Bill, but was forced by an uproar to withdraw this proposal 
when the bill was introduced in the House of Lords. Instead, this was replaced by the 
reconsideration process and transitional filter mechanism already described, in which 
the  Administrative  Court  is  limited  to  reviewing,  on  the  papers,  applications  for 
further review rejected by the Senior Immigration Judge,
197 again with no further right 
of appeal. The Administrative Court may also refer an application for review to the 
                                                   
189 MIMA v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611; MIMA v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30. See John McMillan, ‘Judicial 
restraint and activism in administrative law’ (2002) 30 FL Rev 335. 
190 Introduced by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001 (Cth) (‘Judicial 
Review Act’). 
191 NAAV v MIMIA [2002] FCAFC 228. 
192 Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth of Australia [2003] HCA 2. 
193 FMC, Annual Report 2002-2003 (2003), 26. 
194 S 476B. 
195 S 476. 
196 Ss 476, 476A; Federal Magistrates Act 1999 (Cth), s 39; FCA Act, s 24.  
197 2004 Act, Sch 2, para 30.   44 
Court  of  Appeal.
198  Further,  where  the  AIT  is  composed  of  three  legally  qualified 
members, or conducts a reconsideration, there is an appeal direct to the Court of 
Appeal  (see  Figure  1).
199  This  is  supplemented  by  judicial  review,  which  remains 
available for interlocutory decisions in exceptional cases;
200 decisions without appeal 
rights;
201 certifications of ‘clearly unfounded’ cases;
202 fresh claims;
203 and refusals of 
asylum support due to ‘late’ claims.
204 
3.3.3  CHANGES TO ACCESS  
Less  visible,  and  most  problematic,  have  been  the  myriad  ways  in  which 
governments have reduced access to review through practices of interception, and the 
erection of legal and practical barriers.  
3.3.3.1  Interception 
The first, and most high-profile, approach is simply to stop people getting in. To 
that end, both governments operate multi-layered border controls, the effect of which 
is to create an obstacle course for unwanted migrants. 
First, prior permission is required in the form of visas for all except New Zealand 
citizens in Australia,
205 and for over ¾ of the world’s population in the case of the UK, 
while all intending to stay longer than 6 months must obtain entry clearance.
206 In the 
UK,  fingerprints  are  also  now  required.
207  This  information  is  checked  against 
increasingly sophisticated passenger information databases. 
 
                                                   
198 2002 Act, s 103C. 
199 Ss 103E, 103B. 
200 R (AM (Cameroon)) v AIT [2007] EWCA Civ 131. 
201 However, out-of-country appeal rights preclude use of judicial review: SSHD v R (Lim) [2007] 
EWCA Civ 773.  
202 2002 Act, s 94(1A). However, the prospects of succeeding given the statutory presumptions are 
limited. 
203 See WM (DRC) v SSHD [2006] EWCA Civ 1495. 
204 2002 Act, s 55. 
205 S 42 of the Act. 
206 Appendix 1, para 24 of the Immigration Rules. 
207 2002 Act, s 126; Immigration (Provision of Physical Data) Regulations 2006 (UK). UK Border 
Agency, ‘Ten point plan for border protection and immigration reform – First milestone met as 
fingerprint checks go global’, (Press release, 14 January 2008).    45 
 
Figure 1: The present UK system. 
Source: Jonathan Lewis, Court of Appeal Immigration and Asylum Law Benchbook (2007), [3-3], 
http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/cms/files/Bench_Book_SEPTEMBER_2007.pdf.   46 
Those without adequate documents will generally be turned away by carriers who 
are fined for bringing in unauthorised passengers,
208 and are advised by governmental 
airline  liaison  officers  in  this  regard.
209  British  immigration  officers  also  perform 
immigration control in neighbouring sea ports and the Channel Tunnel (‘juxtaposed 
controls’),
210 and use ‘new detection technology’ to detect people hidden in vehicles 
crossing the Channel. 
Those that arrive in Australian airports without authorisation are removed within 
72  hours,  after  an  initial  interview  to  screen  for  refugee  claims  (the  ‘turnaround’ 
procedure).
211 The Rudd government has recently signalled they will greatly improve 
this procedure by providing publicly funded legal advice and assistance, access to 
independent merits review, and external scrutiny by the Ombudsman.
212 
Most  controversially  of  all,  Australia  began  in  2001  to  ‘interdict’  people  who 
sought  to  bypass  this  system  by  trying  to  reach  Australia  by  sea,  with  the  navy 
intercepting and returning them to the country of origin or to detention centres in 
Nauru and Papua New Guinea where their refugee status would be determined, under 
the  so-called  ‘Pacific  Solution’  policy.
213  Practices  of  interception had  already  been 
practised by the US
214 and Mediterranean countries.
215 In 2006, a proposal to extend 
this  to  refugee  claimants  who  reached  the  Australian  mainland  was  narrowly 
defeated.
216 The policy was immediately abolished by the Rudd government,
217 but 
unauthorised arrivals will still be processed at Christmas Island.
218 
                                                   
208 In the UK, see 1971 Act, Sch 2, paras 19, 20 (costs of detention); 1999 Act, s 40 (inadequately 
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(costs of detention); ss 229, 232 (inadequately documented passengers); s 230, modified by Reg 
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(Speech presented at Australian National University, Canberra, 29 July 2008). 
213 Later renamed the ‘Pacific Plan’. See Bem et al, n106.  
214 Bill Frelick, ‘Haitian boat interdiction and return: First asylum and first principles of refugee 
protection’ (1993) 26 Cornell Int’l LJ 675. 
215 See European Union Committee, FRONTEX: The EU External Borders Agency (2008) ch 5. 
216  Migration  Amendment  (Designated  Unauthorised  Arrivals)  Bill  2006  (Cth).  See  LCAC, 
Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (2006). 
217 DIAC, ‘Last refugees leave Nauru’, (Media release, 8 February 2008). 
218 Evans, n212.   47 
This policy inspired the UK to propose, controversially, that the EU create ‘transit 
processing areas’ and ‘regional protection areas’, in which refugee claimants would be 
returned  to  safety  zones  for  refugee  determination.  However,  this  proposal  was 
eventually abandoned due to lukewarm EU support.
219 
3.3.3.2 Legal exclusion 
Restricting or abolishing appeal rights is only one of many legal tools that effect 
exclusion. The crudest, perhaps, is the Australian use of ‘invalidating clauses’, which 
simply deem certain visa applications to be invalid (with the possibility of ministerial 
waiver),  most  notoriously  in  the  ‘excision’  of  certain  geographical  areas  from 
Australia’s ‘migration zone’.
220 
The most prominent methods in the UK have been the twin concepts of ‘safe 
third countries’ and ‘safe countries of origin’. The first idea is that the claimant can be 
adequately protected from persecution by another country, of which they are not a 
national; the second idea is that refugee claims from certain countries are usually not 
well-founded.  
The  ‘safe  third  country’  concept  effectively  enables  the  UK  to  return  refugee 
claimants who have transited through another EU country (all of which are deemed 
‘safe’) back to that country, under the EU’s Dublin II Regulation.
221 However, in one of 
the  key  battles  between  the  executive  and  the  judiciary,  various  versions  of  the 
legislation  were  rendered  ineffective  by  judicial  review,
222  leading  to  the  relatively 
‘bullet-proof’ version now in place in which the Secretary must, or may, certify claims 
where removal is possible to a country in one of the three lists provided, or other 
designated countries.
223 Certification has a triple effect: it enables removal without 
consideration  of  the  merits  of  the  claim;  it  prevents  in-country  appeals  on  any 
grounds; and it applies a statutory presumption in out-of-country appeals and judicial 
review that such countries will not breach the Refugee Convention. The ‘safe third 
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country’  concept  was  adopted  in  a  more  limited  legislative  form  in  Australia,
224 
although  there  is  now  an  affiliated  concept  —  judicially  created,
225  judicially 
overruled,
226 but now legislatively entrenched
227 — of ‘effective protection’ in which 
those with an effective right to enter and reside elsewhere may be excluded. 
In the UK, the Secretary can enable the removal of those entitled to reside in ‘safe 
countries of origin’, listed on the statutory ‘White List’,
228 through certification.
229 The 
listing of countries is, however, judicially reviewable, and the inclusion of Pakistan 
and Bangladesh was successfully challenged in this way.
230 
Another, more subtle, legal technique has been the use of procedural means of 
restricting access. These include tougher sanctions for procedural non-compliance, 
such as non-appearance, and tighter requirements for adjournments.
231 However, the 
greatest focus has been on tighter time limits (see Appendices, Table 6).  
In Australia, non-extendable time limits of 2 working days apply to immigration 
detainees, and 9 working days for those whose visas have been cancelled on character 
grounds. Again, however, it was the courts that attracted greater attention, with a 
non-extendable time limit of 28 days for the Federal Court, and 35 days for the High 
Court. Despite the later provision of a further extension of up to 56 days, however, the 
High Court ruled its time limit was unconstitutional,
232 and the Federal Court made 
the  time  limits  for  itself  and  the  FMC  unworkable.
233  The  Rudd  government  has 
introduced a bill providing for 35 days, with a broad power of extension.
234 
These time limits look comparatively generous when one turns to the UK’s time 
limits, with 10 days to appeal to the AIT for in-country immigration appeals, 28 days 
for out-of-country appeals, and 5 days for detainees, although these time limits are 
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now  extendable.  However,  decisions  on  time  limits  are  taken  as  a  preliminary 
decision on the papers, without further review; and the AIT must abide by strict time 
limits in urgent cases of ‘imminent removal’. There is a time limit of only 5 days to 
apply for reconsideration (28 if overseas), and although the normal judicial review 
time  limits  apply,  there  is  no  protection  from  removal  until  an  application  is 
instituted,
235 and no practice of automatic stay at the Court of Appeal.
236  
The UK has also taken time limits to a new level, with the ‘fast-tracking’ of ‘easy’ 
claims,  which  involves the  detention of  refugee  claimants  and  an  extremely  rapid 
timeline for interviews and appeals.
237 In the procedure at Oakington, introduced in 
2000, the aim was to make and serve the initial decision within 7-10 days (revised now 
to  10-14  days),
238  with  the  process  at  Harmondsworth  Removal  Centre  and  Yarl’s 
Wood even tighter.
239 Not surprisingly, 98-100% of such claims are initially refused, 
and only 4-7% of appeals allowed.
240 
This has been taken even further with the New Asylum Model, phased in from 
May  2005  and  fully  in  operation  from  April  2007.  Under  this  model,  all  refugee 
claimants are streamed into 5 processing categories, with varying timelines (see Table 
2), with most initial decisions to be made within 30 working days, and an ultimate 
target  of  6  months  for  all  stages.  This  is  to  be  achieved  by  the  assignment  of 
individual Case Owners and reporting requirements.
241 As the Refugee Council has 
reported, this has diminished access to legal advice.
242 
 
Table 2: Timelines under the New Asylum Model. 
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Source: Refugee Council, The New Asylum Model (2007). 
Finally, there are other more subtle methods of precluding access. In Australia, 
for example, this may be done by requiring that some visas be applied for offshore,
243 
thereby  precluding  access  to  the  MRT.  In  both  jurisdictions,  it  is  also  done  by 
confining  the  scope  of  executive  discretion:  Australia’s  regime  of  mandatory 
detention, for example, greatly reduces the potential for judicial intervention,
244 while 
the UK has recently mandated the ‘automatic’ deportation of foreign criminals.
245 
3.3.3.3 Practical exclusion 
Exclusion has also been effected by practical barriers, most significantly in the 
form of financial barriers, access to legal representation and evidential barriers. 
3.3.3.3.1  Financial barriers 
The most visible financial barrier in Australia is the huge increase in review fees 
to  AU$1400.  The  UK  also  experimented  briefly,  and  unsuccessfully,  with  fees  for 
family visitors.
246 More indirect barriers include financial obligations on sponsors, the 
imposition of securities, huge increases in visa fees, and, perhaps most offensively, 
liability for the costs of one’s own detention in Australia.
247 
Most controversial, however, have been policies that render refugee claimants 
effectively destitute, impeding effective access to immigration review.
248 In Australia, 
those who claim refugee status more than 45 days after their entry, or those awaiting 
judicial  review,  are  excluded  from  free  medical  care  and  cannot  work.
249  These 
claimants are thus reliant on State or Territory funded programs,
250 or more usually 
community and charitable organisations. 
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In  the  UK,  asylum  support  is  presently  available  to  those  awaiting  initial 
decisions
251 with more limited support for those whose claims have failed but cannot 
leave immediately for reasons beyond their control,
252 and the small possibility of 
local authority support if there are other care needs.
253 However, those who submit 
claims that are considered ‘late’ are excluded from asylum support,
254 except to the 
extent necessary to prevent a breach of Art 3 ECHR.
255 The resulting destitution of 
refugee  claimants  has,  among  other  things,  significant  practical  ramifications  for 
access to justice. 
3.3.3.3.2 Legal advice and representation 
Another important battleground has concerned both access to, and quality of, 
legal advice and representation. In Australia, there is a hierarchy of access to legal 
advice and assistance. There is no access if intercepted, or until very recently in the 
‘turnaround’ procedure.
256 Detainees have access only if they expressly request it,
257 
and representatives have reported informal practices of obstruction.
258 Expenditure 
on publicly funded legal advice has shrunk by more than half since 1996-1997, when it 
was governed by mainstream legal aid rules.
259  
Since then, the Department of Immigration has funded a specialist scheme for 
detained refugee claimants, disadvantaged refugee claimants in the community, and a 
small number of ‘disadvantaged’ immigrants. This only covers the preparation and 
lodgement  of  visa  and  merits  review  applications,  and  explanation  of  Tribunal 
reasons. In 2006-2007, this provided ‘application assistance’ for 343 detainees and 449 
disadvantaged  visa  applicants,  at  a  cost  of  AU$1.6  million,  with  a  meagre  further 
AU$700,000 for immigration ‘advice’ to (a somewhat astonishing) 6250 applicants.
260 
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Some specialist legal centres receive limited philanthropic funding. Most claimants 
therefore privately fund their own agent,
261 for AU$1,000-$4,000.
262 
In the courts, legal aid is only available if there are differences of judicial opinion 
that have not been settled by either the Full Federal or High Courts, or where the 
lawfulness of detention is being independently challenged.
263 Means and merits tests 
must also be fulfilled. Pro bono referral schemes, including court-sponsored panels,
264 
have taken up some of the slack, although their use appears to be declining.
265 This 
has  led  to  high  rates  of  unrepresented  applicants,  estimated  at  over  50%  in  the 
Federal Court in NSW, and 95% in the High Court.
266 
The story was somewhat different in the UK, since early New Labour reforms 
extended access, while later reforms took away. In 2000, legal aid was extended to 
representation  before  the  IAA,  albeit  in  combination  with  a  scheme  restricting 
funding to contracted and audited providers. This early extension was soon whittled 
away. Both the 2002 Act and former Procedure Rules allowed judges and the IAT to 
certify cases as having no merit, with funding implications.
267 In 2004, major changes 
were made, including a requirement for prior permission for any work done past a 5-
hour threshold for an individual, and a withdrawal of representation at Home Office 
interviews,  leading  to  an  exodus  of  practitioners.
268  The  2004  Act  and  2005  Rules 
aggravated  matters  by  providing  for  retrospective  funding  orders  for 
reconsiderations,
269 shifting the financial risk on to the representative.  
These restrictions leave immigrants vulnerable to poor quality legal advice or, 
worse,  exploitation.  The  effect  of  bad  representation  can  obviously  be  disastrous, 
particularly  as  courts  are  not  inclined  to  be  lenient.
270  The  prevalence  of  these 
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problems has led to regulation in both countries, with advice restricted to registered 
individuals and, in the case of the UK, qualified lawyers. Both jurisdictions are also 
considering ways to regulate overseas advisers.
271 This regulatory regime, however, 
may also impede access to advice — with Australian registration costs of AU$3,400, 
and  ongoing  costs  of  AU$2,200,  for  non-profit  advisers.
272  In  2004,  the  Australian 
Minister was also empowered to refer agents with high refusal rates for disciplinary 
action,
273 enabling the punishment of agents considered to be ‘abusing’ the system — 
although no such referral has taken place.  
3.3.3.3.3 Evidential barriers 
These restrictions are made worse by the linguistic and cultural difficulties and 
legal  inexperience  of  most  immigrants.  These  same  factors  also  strengthen  the 
evidential barriers encountered by applicants, although, as with most tribunals, the 
rules of evidence used in courts do not apply.    
In many appeals, applicants will not be conversant or fluent in the language used. 
While  both  jurisdictions  provide  free  interpreters  at  hearings,  there  are  practical 
difficulties:  the  availability  of  interpreters;  potential  conflicts  of  interest;  and 
problems  arising  from  differences  of  gender,  class,  ethnicity  or  dialect.
274  Further, 
interpreters are not mere conduits, but rather change the meaning of, and the power 
relations  in,  the  interaction.
275  Perhaps  most  worryingly,  the  accuracy  of  any 
interpretation is generally not verifiable: a decision-maker or judge must simply rely 
upon it to convey accurately the meaning and nuance of the original, in appeals where 
context and nuance matter greatly. 
Another  endemic  problem  is  the  cross-cultural  nature  of  most  interactions. 
Human  behaviour  is  inextricably  embedded  in  and  shaped  by  social  and  cultural 
norms, which guide any evaluation of what is ‘normal’. For example, a Filipino woman 
smiling  as  she  discussed  her  rape  may  be  misinterpreted  as  not  attaching  great 
significance  to  it.
276  Decision-making  may  also  be  culturally  biased:  Asylum  Aid 
                                                   
271 2008 Australian bill, Sch 4, it 4; HAC, Immigration Control, n104, [33]-[34]. 
272 LCRC, Legal Aid and Access to Justice (2004), 147-148. 
273 S 306AG, inserted by Migration Legislation Amendment (Migration Agents Integrity Measures) 
Act 2004 (Cth), Sch 1, it 183.  
274 See, eg, LCAC, Administration and Operation, n104, 29-31. 
275  Roxana  Rycroft,  ‘Communicative  barriers  in  the  asylum  account’  in  Prakash  Shah  (ed),  The 
Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (2005) 223. 
276 Cited in Lesley Hunt, ‘Cross cultural issues – Implications for procedural fairness’ (1999) 20 
AIAL Forum 13, 18.   54 
documents several decisions in which the ratification of international conventions by 
Sudan, China, and the Czech Republic were thought to render improbable abusive 
practices.
277 On the other hand, other decisions imply that “the only ‘genuine’ refugee 
is a dead one”: 
You state that the men drove you to a place one-and-a-half hours away and told you to run 
before  they  opened  fire  on  you.  The  Secretary  of  State  …  considers  that  if  the  men 
intended to kill you they would have done so straight away, rather than give you a chance 
to escape.
278  
The  nature  of  refugee  determinations  produces  a  uniquely  difficult  evidential 
matrix,  consisting  as they  do  largely of  the  claimant’s  testimony,  expert  evidence, 
‘country information’, and credibility inferences.
279 The effects of these are, to some 
extent, mitigated by the lower standard of proof applied to refugee claims.
280   
Each of these types of evidence, however, raises particular evidential difficulties. 
The claimant’s testimony is obviously partial, often based on different cultural norms, 
sometimes  exaggerated,  misremembered  or  fabricated,  and  subject  to  the 
psychological pressures of memory and trauma.
281 Expert evidence is usually partial, 
often based on the claimant’s account, and difficult for non-experts to assess.
282  
There  has  been  much  discussion  about  the  poor  quality,  accessibility  and 
timeliness of country information,
283 concerns that led to the establishment in the UK 
of  the  Advisory  Panel  on  Country  Information.  Moreover,  its  use  requires  careful 
consideration  of  its  source,  nature,  and  currency.  For  example,  State  Department 
reports may reflect foreign policy imperatives;
284 while a tourist guide is unlikely to 
provide a true guide to the persecution of homosexuals.
285 Finally, it is tempting for 
most  decision-makers  to  prefer  the  apparent  ‘objectivity’  and  ‘official’  nature  of 
country information to oral testimony, with all its flaws of subjectivity, unreliability 
and bias.  
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Even greater concerns have been raised about the common use of credibility to 
determine  refugee  status
286  since  such  decisions  are  very  difficult  to  challenge  on 
appeal.
287 One Australian practitioner noted:  
[C]redibility is like the magic formula for the RRT. They know that if they want to reject 
someone, all they have to do is say that they don’t believe them and that won’t be able to 
be easily reviewed in the Federal Court.
288 
There  are,  thus,  myriad  ways  in  which  access  to  immigration  review  may  be 
indirectly and practically excluded or significantly restricted. Evidential, financial, and 
legal  barriers;  restrictions  on  legal  advice  and  representation;  and  interception 
practices combine with jurisdictional and structural changes to produce, in the end, a 
sorry tale. 
4  Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the rise and fall of immigration review in Australia and 
the UK, although that neat story arc is more complicated in the UK where cross-
cutting trends are also visible. The stories, however, share striking similarities. Both 
jurisdictions have a history of broad executive discretion, with small-scale advisory 
operations until the 1970s, which saw a flourishing of a specialist appeals system in 
one jurisdiction, and a generalist administrative law system in another. For a certain 
period,  both  operated  two-tier  tribunal  structures  prompted  by  increasing 
immigration restrictions.  
In recent years, both jurisdictions have witnessed increased conflict between the 
executive  and  the  judiciary,  a  gradual  undermining  of  confidence  in  the  system 
evidenced by endless critical reports, and incessant modification including multiple 
direct and indirect ways of restricting access to immigration review. Most strikingly, 
both stories include a constitutional stand-off over that fragile bastion of the rule of 
law, judicial review. 
The history of immigration review, as described in this chapter, is a history of the 
sudden  and  spectacular  expansion  of  law  into  the  field  of  immigration  —  an 
expansion met with resistance — followed by a hard-fought, high-profile, retreat. We 
can learn much from this story about the nature of the hydra-headed challenges to 
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the law detailed in this chapter, and from the responses to them. It is a story that 
reveals much about the changing boundaries of law and politics, and in the emotive 
undertones of loss, disillusionment and frustration that I have emphasised in this 
chapter, we can learn much about our investments and beliefs in law.  
The story of immigration review is thus an especially fertile field for investigating, 
and  reflecting  upon,  the  place  and  space  of  the  contemporary  legal  sphere.  The 
balance of this thesis seeks to explore the implications of this story, by explicating the 
different challenges to the law and the responses to them, and thus interrogating our 
hopes and fears about — and the limitations and potential of — law.   57 
Chapter 2 — The legal constellation 
1  Introduction 
This chapter begins exploring what I call the challenge of coherence. That is to 
say, immigration review is governed by a constellation of normatively incoherent and 
polyvalent  legal  regimes,
289  which  provides  multiple  legal  answers  to  the  same 
questions. While this challenge presents itself in many legal fields, it is particularly 
acute in immigration review.  
This is in part because immigration review involves a multiplicity of legal regimes 
—  most  relevantly,  immigration  law,  citizenship  and  nationality  law,  refugee  law, 
constitutional law, and common law principles of judicial review. In the UK, human 
rights law is also highly significant, as is EU law, which encompasses three separate 
regimes involving the movement of persons. This list is not exclusive: one might also 
include  discrimination  law,  labour  law,  welfare  law,  and  international  treaties 
concerning the movement of persons,
290 which have been omitted here for reasons of 
space.  
This chapter gives a highly abbreviated sketch of the distinctive characteristics of 
each regime, beginning with those common to both jurisdictions, and emphasising 
the  dynamic,  complex  and  unstable  interactions  between  them.
291  This  hybridity, 
complexity  and  instability  is  accentuated  in  the  UK,  given  its  greater  plurality  of 
regimes.  
The complexity of the legal constellation has several sources. First, there are often 
significant tensions between competing values, norms, and concepts within the legal 
regimes themselves.  
Second, legal regimes also evince considerable historical dynamism, as underlying 
normative paradigms shift, new concepts evolve, and forms and structures alter. In 
recent decades, refugee law has been greatly elaborated at the domestic and regional 
level; the EU has rapidly developed its own immigration and asylum policy since 1999; 
and there have been profound constitutional changes under New Labour. The most 
rapid development has occurred within British immigration law, however. In 2008, 
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the  UK  is  introducing  an  admission  policy  structured  around  ‘five  tiers’,
292  has 
proposed citizenship be ‘earned’,
293 and is overhauling all its immigration legislation 
in its ‘simplifying’ project, manifested in its draft partial Immigration and Citizenship 
Bill 2008.
294 Meanwhile, the new Australian Labor government has been busy issuing 
a stream of significant policy changes.  
Tensions between the regimes provide a third source of complexity. Each legal 
regime  has  a  different  political  structure,  and  is  premised  on  different  normative 
paradigms. The predominance of particular legal forms (legislation, case law, treaties, 
soft law) in different legal regimes affects the plurality of legal actors in those regimes 
and the relative degree of legal autonomy. Most notably, the predominance of the 
executive in immigration law provides a very thin dividing line between immigration 
policy and immigration law. The legal regimes also differ in the underlying normative 
claims they assume, maintain, and reinforce.  
 The  relationships  between  legal  regimes  also  vary,  further  complicating  the 
picture. At the heart of the legal constellation is immigration law.
295 Citizenship and 
nationality law is both driven by immigration law, and delimits its scope. Refugee law 
is  partly  incorporated  into  immigration  law,  but  is  rooted  in  international  law, 
modified by EU law, and governed by a different normative paradigm. Immigration 
cases also drive the development of constitutional law and common law principles of 
judicial  review,
296  both  of  which  provide  the  basic  institutional  framework  of 
immigration review and also provide avenues for challenging immigration decisions. 
In  the  UK,  human  rights  law  and  EU  law  modify  the  broader  constitutional 
frameworks, and provide other avenues for legal challenge.  
Finally,  the  complexity  also  arises  because  the  legal  constellation  involves 
increasing interaction across domestic, regional, and international orders, as refugee 
law  illustrates  with  its international  heart,  domestic  elaboration,  and  more  recent 
harmonisation at the EU level. As well, there is increasing influence across domestic 
legal orders as policies are rapidly borrowed, most strikingly in the recent wave of 
                                                   
292 Pursuant to the Home Office, A Points-Based System: Making Migration Work for Britain (2005). 
293 Home Office, The Path to Citizenship: Next Steps in Reforming the Immigration System (2008). 
294 Home Office, Draft (Partial) Immigration and Citizenship Bill (2008). 
295 Defined in the Introduction, 1.2. 
296 As is evident, I treat human rights law and EU law separately, although these also constitute 
distinct streams of judicial review. In this chapter, henceforth, ‘judicial review’ is used to refer to 
the common law principles of judicial review.   59 
citizenship tests introduced by the UK, Australia, the Netherlands, Germany, France 
and Austria.
297 
The  relationships  between  and  within  these  regimes  are  therefore  neither 
straightforward, nor static. The regimes rub against each other, generating friction, 
change, and further development. The core of the constellation, immigration law, is 
displaced, modified, and reshaped by other legal regimes, creating a dynamic and 
complex web of law. 
This  has  two  important  consequences.  First,  the  legal  constellation  is  diverse 
enough in its values and orientations (what I call its polyvalence) to provide multiple 
answers to the same legal question; and, second, this diversity produces inevitable 
tensions  between  and  within  the  legal  regimes  that  cannot  be  authoritatively 
resolved. As the next chapter illustrates, ‘hard’ immigration cases frequently invoke a 
haphazard legal constellation, leaving judges with the difficult task of managing and 
temporarily resolving the normative tensions and conflicts between regimes.  
2  Immigration law 
Immigration law is the most peculiar of these regimes, for several reasons. First, 
its political structure is both narrow and top-heavy, because there are relatively few 
creators of the law and because the greatest power is conferred on the executive, and 
relatively little power conferred on the judiciary.  
This  arises  out  of  the  predominance  of  executive  forms  of  law-making.  In 
Australia, this takes the form of the Migration Regulations 1994 (‘the Regulations’), 
supplemented  by  bureaucratic  guidelines.
298  In  the  UK,  it  takes  the  form  of  the 
Immigration Rules (‘the Rules’),
299 rules of administrative practice which have the 
practical effect of law,
300 and is supplemented by a mass of Instructions and individual 
policies,  including  concessions.
301  The  all-important  criteria  for  admission  to  the 
                                                   
297 Introduced on 1 November 2005 in the UK (and extended to applications for indefinite leave to 
remain  on  1  April  2007);  and  introduced  in  Australia  on  1  October  2007,  along  with  a  ‘Values 
Statement’ on 15 October 2007. For information on the European countries, see Human Rights 
Watch,  The  Netherlands:  Discrimination  in  the  Name  of  Integration  Migrants’  Rights  under  the 
Integration Abroad Act (2008); ‘Integration and Immigration: What Role for the Law?’ Conference 
of the Migration and Law Network (4 June 2008).  
298 The Procedures Advice Manuals, which consolidates individual Ministerial Series Instructions. 
299 These are laid before Parliament and are subject to the negative resolution procedure.  
300  Pearson  v  IAT  [1978]  Imm  AR  212.  See  2002  Act,  s 84(1)(a),  (f).  There  are,  however,  some 
circumstances  in  which  its  legal  status  as  policy  are  relevant:  see  MO  (Nigeria)  [2007]  UKAIT 
00057.  
301 These are also enforceable, if the policy is known: R v SSHD ex p Amankwah [1994] Imm AR 240; 
Dhudi Saleban Abdi v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 148.   60 
country are mostly set out in the Regulations and the Rules, as well as in individual 
policies and concessions.  
The mark of the executive is also heavily imprinted in legislation, because of the 
frequent and hasty amending legislation passed in the previous decade at a time of 
executive  dominance.  This  pattern  is  more  evident  in  the  UK  because,  while 
Australia’s  amendments  have  been  consolidated  into  the  Act,  the  UK  has  not  yet 
consolidated  its  12  immigration-related  Acts  (listed  in  Table  3,  and  referred  to 
henceforth by the year of enactment) — a situation due to be remedied in the next 
Parliament.
302  
The legislation, Regulations, Rules, and policy are both voluminous — with the 
Act  and  Regulations  in  Australia  constituting  11  volumes  —  and  tightly  textured, 
relegating the judiciary to an extremely subordinate role in judicial interpretation. 
Year  Name  Primary features 
1971  Immigration Act  Basic structure of immigration control 
1987  Immigration (Carriers’ 
Liability) Act 
Created system of carriers’ sanctions for improperly 
documented passengers 
1988  Immigration Act  Restriction of polygamous spouses; legislation for EC free 
movement 
1993  Asylum and Immigration 
Appeals Act 
Primacy of Refugee convention; right of appeal on asylum 
grounds 
1996  Asylum and Immigration 
Act 
Employer sanctions; new criminal offences; restricted appeal 
rights; safe third country 
1997  Special Immigration 
Appeals Act 
Creation of Special Immigration Appeals Commission for 
national security decisions 
1999  Immigration and Asylum 
Act 
Restriction of appeal rights; carriers’ liability; asylum 
support; removal centres; marriage registration; new 
criminal offences  
2002  Nationality, Immigration 
and Asylum Act 
Deprivation of citizenship; asylum support; extension of 
powers of immigration officials; definition of Refugee 
convention terms; immigration procedure 
2004  Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, 
etc) Act 
Merger of two-tier tribunal system; removal of asylum 
support for families; new criminal offences; applications for 
marriages 
2006  Immigration, Asylum and 
Nationality Act 
Changes to appeals; employer sanctions; obtaining and using 
information; cessation and exclusion clauses of Refugee 
Convention; deprivation of right of abode  
2007  UK Borders Act  Biometric registration; asylum support; enforcement; 
deportation of foreign criminals; Chief Inspectorate; 
information 
2008  Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 
Special immigration status for foreign criminals who cannot 
be returned 
Table 3: UK immigration legislation. 
 
This volume, detail, complexity and frequent amendment gives immigration law 
the  character  of  what  I  call  ‘hyper-law’  —  a  regime  of  laws  that  proliferates  and 
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changes so rapidly that it is inaccessible to all but specialist practitioners. Yet this 
paradoxically  co-exists  with  what  Shah  has  identified  as  the  “lawlessness”
303  of 
immigration. Partly, this lawlessness is manifested in the interception practices and 
other methods of directly or indirectly bypassing the law discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
Partly, however, this lawlessness derives from the normative paradigm underlying 
immigration law itself, which buttresses the political structure of immigration law. 
This  normative  paradigm  dates  from  the  turn  of  the  20
th  century,  in  the  judicial 
affirmations of the foundational norm of immigration law: the sovereign right of the 
State to exclude.
304 As judges in the Privy Council, Australia and the US confirmed 
during this period: 
 One of the rights possessed by the supreme power in every State is the right to refuse to 
permit an alien to enter that State, to annex what conditions it pleases to the permission 
to enter it, and to expel or deport from the State, at pleasure, even a friendly alien.
305  
This  expansive  view  of  sovereignty  was  a  natural  accompaniment  to  the 
Westphalian model of nation-States prevailing at this particular historical moment, 
although in both the UK and Australia it was modulated and complicated by the 
imperial relationship. Importantly, these judicial pronouncements accord the State an 
independent  moral  status:  the  sovereign  right  to  exclude  derives  not  from  the 
preservation of democracy or the benefits to its members, but flows directly from the 
existence  of  the  State. This  is  reflected  in  the  widely  held  judicial  view  that  such 
power is prerogative in nature
306 — a legal categorisation that gives primacy to the 
power of the executive.  
 These pronouncements also, importantly, model the relationship between the 
State and outsider entirely as one of privilege (the “pleasure” of the State), rather than 
in a framework of rights. The model is entirely binary: the State has all the power, and 
the outsider has none, as is dramatically highlighted by the decision in Musgrove that 
the outsider does not even have the right to maintain a legal action.
307 This model of 
benefactor-beneficiary is still evident in the terminology of ‘leave’ in the UK: ‘leave to 
                                                   
303 Prakash Shah, ‘Introduction: From legal centralism to official lawlessness?’ in Prakash Shah (ed), 
The Challenge of Asylum to Legal Systems (2005) 1. 
304  This  originated  in  international  law.  See  Satvinder  Singh  Juss,  International  Migration  and 
Global Justice (2006) 11-15. 
305 Attorney-General for Canada v Cain [1906] AC 542, 546. See also Musgrove, n6; Robtelmes v 
Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 403. 
306 See, eg, Soblen, n12. See Black CJ’s extensive dissent on this aspect in Ruddock v Vadarlis [2001] 
FCA 1329.  
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enter’, ‘leave to remain’, ‘indefinite leave to remain’ (‘ILR’), and the former category of 
‘exceptional leave to remain’ (‘ELR’, previously the major category for refugees).
308 The 
draft 2008 bill retains this flavour in its adoption of the terminology of ‘permission’.
309  
By focusing on the relationship between outsider and the State, immigration law 
is founded on an ‘external’ perspective of the State, viewing its relationship vis-à-vis 
outsiders rather than within its own community. This ‘external’ perspective entirely 
erases two characteristics of people ‘under the law’ (and within the community) — 
their equality and their rights-bearing character.  
This normative paradigm has persisted throughout the history of immigration 
law. Indeed, it was strengthened in the next epoch, the World Wars, most obviously 
in  the  UK  with  the  suspension  and  eventual repeal  of the 1905  Act  by  the  Aliens 
Restriction  Act  1914  and  its  successor,  the  Aliens  Restriction  Act  1919.  These  Acts 
granted the executive all powers in relation to aliens — including, notoriously, that of 
internment or detention — an extremely opaque regime that lasted until the 1971 Act. 
It was only in the third epoch of immigration law, with the introduction of more 
detailed legislation and appeals regimes from the 1970s onwards, that this paradigm 
became qualified by the acceptance of outsiders’ procedural rights, as discussed in 
chapter  1,  and  by  legislatively  conferred  rights  of  entry.  The  purely  discretionary 
regimes of entry permits and visas previously operated in Australia were remodelled 
into a framework of rights, with the entitlement to enter and remain conferred by 
issuance of a visa.
310 The dual regime of entry clearance and leave to enter in the UK 
has recently converged in practice with the Australian approach, as entry clearances 
now typically also operate as leave to enter,
311 and will converge in law through the 
single concept of ‘permission’ in the 2008 bill. 
The Australian Act now requires the Minister to grant a visa if all the relevant 
criteria  are  fulfilled,
312  and  to  grant  a  protection  visa  if  satisfied  that  the  Refugee 
Convention definition is fulfilled.
313 In the UK, a similar effect is produced by the 
provision that the AIT may reverse a decision that is “not in accordance with the law” 
including  the  Rules.
314  However,  such  rights  depend  upon  the  ever-changing 
                                                   
308 ELR was removed from 1 April 2003. 
309 See, eg, draft ss 4, 6. 
310 S 29. 
311 Pursuant to Immigration (Leave to Enter and Remain) Order 2000 (UK). 
312 S 65. 
313 S 36. 
314 2002 Act, s 84(1)(e).   63 
conditions of admission — prescribed by the Rules in the UK, and in Australia by visa 
criteria  in  Sch 2  of  the  Regulations,  including  ‘primary’,  ‘secondary’ and  ‘common 
criteria’
315 — and are thus weakly entrenched. A more significant right is the right of 
abode  (the  right  to  enter  and  remain  indefinitely,  free  from  immigration  control) 
granted to British citizens and certain Commonwealth nationals by the 1971 Act,
316 
although  the  2008  bill  proposes  to  remove  this  right,  in  favour  of  the  simpler 
correlation between citizenship and right of entry, with non-citizens currently having 
the right of abode protected instead by executive designation.
317 
The  introduction  of  detailed  legislation  also  made  more  explicit  the  other 
foundational  norm  of  immigration  law:  the  primacy  of  the  national  interest, 
articulated  most  clearly  in  s  4  of  the  Australian  Act.
318  In  this  remodelling  of  the 
paradigm, immigration is conceived of as a benefit conferred upon outsiders, for the 
greater good of insiders, reflecting a broader political shift towards citizens as the 
primary units of moral concern. The rights of outsiders are thus derived from the 
interests  of  insiders,  and  immigration  law  therefore  premised  on  an  inherent 
inequality between outsiders and insiders.  
While these changes significantly qualified the normative paradigm, they did not 
replace  it.  This  is  made  clear  in  the  legislative  provisions  expressly  preserving 
executive or prerogative power in both jurisdictions,
319 and through the continued 
executive  resistance  to  legal  constraints  displayed  so  vividly  in  the  story  of 
immigration review.  
The legislation also reveals the different conceptions of immigration in Australia 
and  the  UK.  In  Australia,  immigration  has  historically  connoted  permanent 
immigration, controlled by the government in the pursuit of ‘nation-building’. Visas 
are thus divided into temporary and permanent visas,
320 the latter of which confer 
entitlement to permanent residence immediately, and the government sets annual 
targets for the migration program (which refers only to permanent immigration). The 
migration  program  is  predominantly  composed  of  independently  skilled  migrants, 
                                                   
315  The  visa  applicant  must  fulfil  the  primary  criteria,  and  their  family  the  secondary  criteria. 
Common criteria refer to common conditions relating primarily to health and character. 
316 S 1. See R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2008] UKHL 61 
on the implications of the common law right of abode. 
317 Draft ss 1, 8. 
318 Subsection 1 provides: “The object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming 
into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.” 
319 S 7A of the Australian Act; 1971 Act, s 33(5). 
320 S 30.   64 
namely those selected for their skills and qualifications via a system that allocates 
various points for educational qualifications, language, age, and occupation.
321  
In the UK, historically immigration has been conceived of as a more fluid process 
of  long-term  movement,  in  which  no  one  is  entitled  immediately  to  permanent 
residence. A significant consequence is that not all people are ‘migrants’ in these two 
jurisdictions  —  most  notably,  international  students,  who  are  not  migrants  in 
Australia, but constitute by far the largest category of migrants to the UK.
322 However, 
the UK is converging with the Australian model, having introduced independently 
skilled labour migration using an ‘Australian points style’ system.
323 The mechanism 
of points is extended throughout the ‘five tier’ structure being introduced in the UK, a 
structure which represents a hierarchy of benefits, with the first three tiers based on a 
hierarchy  of  skill.
324  The  draft  2008  bill  also  divides  temporary  from  permanent 
immigration permission.
325 Nevertheless, as Figure 2 shows, the relative emphases of 
permanent and temporary migration in the jurisdictions differ significantly. 
These  general  rules  are  subject  to  significant  regional  exceptions  in  both 
jurisdictions. As is discussed below, EEA citizens are effectively free from immigration 
control,  and  there  are  no  immigration  controls  within  the  Common  Travel  Area, 
comprised  of  the  UK,  the  Channel  Islands,  the  Isle  of  Man,  and  the  Republic  of 
Ireland.
326  There  is  also  a  Trans-Tasman  Travel  Agreement  between  Australia  and 
New Zealand, which allows nationals of the two countries to enter, work and reside in 
the other country without prior permission.
327 
 
                                                   
321 Ss 92-96. 
322 In 2007, 358,000 students entered, compared with 124,000 work permit holders: Home Office, 
Control of Immigration: Statistics, United Kingdom 2007 (2008), 10. 
323 Under the superseded Highly Skilled Migrants Program (‘HSMP’), described in HSMP Forum Ltd 
v SSHD [2008] EWHC 664 (Admin). 
324 The first tier caters for the highly skilled, replacing several earlier schemes on 29 June 2008. The 
second replicates the work permit system, and the third tier for low-skilled workers is intended 
only to operate if EU migrants cannot fulfil demand. Students and youth programs make up the 
last two tiers.  
325 Draft s 4. 
326 1971 Act, s 1(3). See Bernard Ryan, ‘The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland’ (2001) 
64 MLR 855. However, the UK is presently proposing to introduce routine immigration checks on 
non-nationals of the Common Travel Area: UK Border Agency, Strengthening the Common Travel 
Area (2008).  
327 This is implemented in Australia by s 32(2)(a) of the Act, which makes New Zealand citizens 
eligible for ‘special category’ visas. Provision is also made for traditional inhabitants in a protected 
zone: s 13(2).   65 
 
Figure 2: Australia and UK migration flows.  
Figures from DIAC, Annual Report 2006-2007 (2007); Home Office, Control of Immigration: 
Statistics (2006); UK, Hansard, HL, 28 November 2006, WA 47 (Baroness Scotland). 
The two countries also differ in their conception of refugee flows. First, while the 
Australian ‘protection visa’ for refugees is one of the few expressly provided for in the 
Act,  asylum  has  historically  been  treated  as  an  exceptional  category  in  the  UK.
328 
Second,  Australia  also  sets  annual  targets  for  its  ‘humanitarian  program’,  which 
includes a large number of refugees resettled from abroad, as well as people who 
apply onshore for refugee status. In contrast, almost all refugees in the UK apply 
onshore, although recently the UK has piloted a much smaller refugee resettlement 
programme  along  the  same  lines.
329  Third,  the  UK  also  grants  subsidiary  or 
complementary  protection  to  those  who  can  demonstrate  compassionate 
circumstances  (Discretionary  Leave)  or  whose  return  would  breach  human  rights 
(Humanitarian Protection).
330 Australia provides a small range of other offshore visas 
to  accommodate  those  at  special  risk  (usually  sponsored  by  Australians),  but 
otherwise  humanitarian  protection  apart  from  refugee  status  is  possible  only  by 
ministerial intervention.
331  
These different categories of admission and conceptions of immigration buttress 
the political structure of immigration law and its foundational norms. The stress on 
                                                   
328 Asylum was first fully acknowledged in primary legislation in the 1993 Act. In European Roma 
Rights  Centre  v  Immigration  Officer  at  Prague  Airport  [2002]  EWHC  1989  (Admin),  [79]-[82], 
Burton J held that asylum was not a ‘purpose covered by the Rules’, indicating its status as an 
exceptional category.  
329 ‘Gateway Protection Programme’, Asylum Policy Instruction. Around 500 refugees have been 
accepted annually, with an increase to 750 in 2008/2009. 
330 ‘Discretionary Leave’, Asylum Policy Instruction; paras 339C-H of the Rules.  
331 Field, n106.  
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‘controlling’ and ‘nation-building’ in Australia underpins the norm of the national 
interest, strengthens the nexus between sovereignty and immigration, and places the 
question  of  immigration  policy,  insofar  as  they  relate  to  the  migration  and 
humanitarian programs, firmly in the hands of the executive. On the other hand, the 
UK’s historical laissez-faire approach left even greater discretion in the hands of the 
executive, since most immigrants entered without a permanent right of residence and 
had  to  wait  several  years  for  ILR.  This  laissez-faire  approach  also  emphasised  the 
power of the State to decide whom to admit or expel “at pleasure”.  
The different categories of migrants also create an elaborate hierarchy of people, 
with highly skilled migrants at the top of the tree and those seeking humanitarian 
protection at the bottom. This differentiation therefore builds upon the premise of 
inequality already embedded in immigration law, constructing new inequalities that 
are largely congruent with class and nationality, with the rich from rich countries at 
the top of the tree and the poor from poor countries at the bottom.  
The  normative  paradigm  of  the  absolute  power  of  the  State  is  also  vividly 
manifested  in  the  enforcement  of  immigration  law.  The  traditional  forms  of 
enforcement  —  criminalisation,  detention  and  removal  —  empower  the  State  to 
exercise  physical  control  over  the  body  of  the  migrant,  in  the  most  dramatic 
manifestations of State control one can imagine. These forms have been strengthened 
and  extended  in  recent  decades,  most  prominently  with  the  proliferation  of  new 
criminal offences,
332 the Australian policy of mandatory detention, and record levels 
of removals in the UK.
333  
In Australia, by far the most political heat has been generated by the policy of 
mandatorily detaining all those without a valid visa,
334 although detainees may be 
given ‘bridging visas’ or (since 2005) ‘residence determinations’ which allow entry into 
the community.
335 Unlike in the UK, there is no provision for bail,
336 and almost no 
judicial  supervision.  The  remoteness  of  some  detention  centres,  the  inhumane 
conditions  and  treatment,  and  the  detention  of  children  have  all  been  extremely 
                                                   
332 There are at least 33 specific immigration offences in the UK: see Home Office, Statistics 2008,  
n322, Table 6.7.  
333 MJ Gibney, ‘Asylum and the expansion of deportation in the United Kingdom’ (2008) 43 Gov 
Oppos 146. 
334 S 189. 
335 Ss 37, 197AA-AG. 
336 See Immigration Act 1971 (UK), Sch 2, para 22.   67 
controversial,
337  and  the  political  mood  changed  decisively  after  over  100  cases  of 
wrongful detention were publicly revealed.
338 The issue is being revisited by the Rudd 
government,  which  has  announced  a  significant  move  toward  ‘risk-based’ 
detention,
339  and  requested  a  further  parliamentary  inquiry  into  immigration 
detention.
340 However, so far changes have been administrative rather than legislative, 
and the mandatory nature of the detention looks likely to be retained.
341  
Similar concerns have been raised in the UK in the context of a rapid increase in 
detention in the last few years.
342 However, the difficulty of implementing removals 
has  been  the  most  controversial  issue  in  the  UK.
343  Notoriously,  in  2004,  Prime 
Minister  Blair  promised  that  the  government  would  remove  unsuccessful  refugee 
claimants at a rate exceeding the predicted number of ‘unfounded’ claims in the same 
period,  known  as  the  ‘tipping  point’  target. This  claim  proved  impossible  to  fulfil 
except in 2007,
344 although deportations have risen substantially.  
The  enforcement  of  immigration  law  has  also  been  ‘devolved’  to  secondary 
parties, with criminal offences now applying to employers,
345 unregistered migration 
agents,
346 those involved in the review regime,
347 and administrating officers,
348 while 
                                                   
337 See, eg, HREOC, Those Who’ve Come Across the Seas: Detention of Unauthorised Arrivals (1998); 
HREOC, A Last Resort?: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (2004); Briskman 
et al, n111. 
338 247 possible cases were referred to the Ombudsman: see Commonwealth Ombudsman, Lessons 
for Public Administration – Ombudsman Investigation of Referred Immigration Cases (2007). The 
Department has conceded there may be legal liability in 135 of them: Adam Gartrell, ‘Dept maybe 
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non-citizens  who  have  repeatedly  breached  their  visa  conditions.  Children  will  no  longer  be 
detained. 
340 See http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/mig/detention/index.htm. The JSCM began the 
inquiry on 29 May 2008. 
341 David McLennan, ‘Inquiry to scrutinise immigration detention’, Canberra Times, 11 June 2008, 4. 
342 See, eg, Amnesty International, Seeking Asylum is Not a Crime: Detention of People Who Have 
Sought Asylum (2005). 
343 Catherine Phuong, ‘The removal of failed asylum seekers’ (2005) 25 LS 117; Committee of Public 
Accounts, Returning Failed Asylum Applicants (2006). 
344  James  Slack,  ‘Blair’s  pledge  on  removal  of  asylum  seekers  lies  in  tatters’,  Daily  Mail,  22 
November 2006, 4; Home Office, ‘Record high on removals of failed asylum seekers’, (Press release, 
27 February 2007); Ben Leach, ‘Sharp fall in removals of asylum seekers’ Telegraph.co.uk, 16 August 
2008. 
345 Migration (Employer Sanctions) Act 2007 (Cth); 1996 Act, s 8; 2002 Act, s 137. 
346 Pt III of the Australian Act; 1999 Act, s 91. 
347 Ss 334-335 of the Australian Act. 
348 1999 Act, s 91.   68 
sponsors bear an increasing financial burden. Finally, as discussed in chapter 1, there 
has been a rapid strengthening of border controls.  
This extension and coerciveness of immigration enforcement reinforce the model 
of ‘absolute control’ implicit in the normative paradigm of immigration law, since 
they dramatise the executive’s power over the body of the migrant, both through the 
use  of  ‘hyper-law’  and,  increasingly,  through  the  ‘lawlessness’  of  interception 
practices.  
Finally,  there  is  a  notable  absence  in  immigration  law  —  the  absence  of  a 
normative heart. The primary aim of immigration law is regulation in the national 
interest, as defined by the executive. It is to be judged by its efficacy rather than its 
justice  (which  remains  the  province  of  immigration  policy),  and  it  contains  no 
internal criteria for judging the adequacy of those rules.  
As  I  shall  argue  throughout  this  thesis,  part  of  the  challenge  of  coherence  is 
caused precisely by these peculiar features of immigration law. Its political structure is 
narrow  and  top-heavy,  emphasising  the  executive  and  providing  for  little  legal 
autonomy; its structure is a paradoxical combination of ‘hyper-law’ and ‘lawlessness’, 
coupled with the absence of a normative heart; its normative paradigm is premised on 
the  absolute  power  of  the  State  and  the  absolute  subjection  of  the  outsider,  on 
immigration as a privilege rather than a right, on the inequality between citizen and 
non-citizen, and on the primacy of the national interest. This normative paradigm is 
qualified by later legal developments, but it is also buttressed by several features of 
contemporary  immigration  law  and  practice.  The  strong  nexus  between  nation-
building, executive control and immigration; the elaboration of inequality through a 
hierarchy of categories; the ‘exceptionality’ of refugee streams; the physical control 
exercised over the body of the migrant; and the proliferation of other kinds of State 
control over the phenomenon of migration all entrench these peculiar features of 
immigration law.  
3  Citizenship and nationality law 
Citizenship and nationality law most closely resembles immigration law in its 
normative paradigm, although not in its structure. The predominant legal form is 
consolidated legislation, in the form of the recently enacted Australian Citizenship Act   69 
2007 (‘ACA 2007’) and the British Nationality Act 1981 (‘BNA 1981’),
349 which confers 
primary legal power on the legislature rather than the executive. 
Unusually,  Australian  citizenship  is  not  a  constitutional  concept,  having  been 
deliberately  omitted  by  the  drafters.
350  This  leaves  the  judiciary  in  its  usual 
subordinate  posture  in  relation  to  legislation,  rather  than  in  its  superior  role  as 
guardian of the Constitution. However, the Constitution does provide a legislative 
power in respect of ‘aliens’,
351 and there has been significant judicial dispute about 
whether a constitutional alien corresponds exactly with a (legislative) non-citizen.
352 
While some judges have thought there was room for an autonomous constitutional 
concept of alienage, the most recent decision effectively equated constitutional aliens 
with non-citizens,
353 preserving the political structure of citizenship law. 
As citizenship law in both jurisdictions primarily concerns the acquisition and 
loss of citizenship — rules that are relatively formal and determinate — the scope for 
judicial autonomy is further restricted. The rights and obligations of citizenship — 
that  is,  its  substance  —  are  instead  scattered  piecemeal  throughout  other 
legislation.
354 Using Fransman’s distinction, the law in both jurisdictions is in truth 
nationality law, rather than citizenship law, as the law is concerned with identifying 
the nationals of a country rather than their rights and obligations.
355 Thus, in these 
jurisdictions, citizenship law adopts an ‘external’ perspective of the State, and also 
lacks a normative core. 
The  ambiguity  between  citizenship  and  nationality  also  arises  in  British 
terminology, since the category of British citizenship is supplemented by five other 
categories of British nationality — British Overseas Territories citizens (‘BOTCs’),
356 
British  Overseas  citizens  (‘BOCs’),  British  subjects,  British  Nationals  (Overseas) 
(‘BN(O)s’) and British protected persons (‘BPPs’). Most unusually, these categories of 
British nationality do not confer the central right of citizenship: the right to enter and 
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reside.
357  For  the  most  part,  these  nationals  also  do  not  benefit  from  EU  free 
movement provisions.
358 This is the direct result of the influence of immigration law, 
for nationality was decoupled from the right of entry and residence by the 1962 and 
1968  Commonwealth  Immigrants  Acts,  and  the  category  of  nationality  of  BN(O) 
invented to preclude wholesale immigration from Hong Kong.
359 
This ambiguity in terminology reflects the shifting historical conceptions of the 
relation between the individual and the community that underpin citizenship and 
nationality law (hereafter, for the sake of convenience, citizenship law). The genesis of 
British, and thus also Australian, citizenship law lies in the concept of the ‘British 
subject’, grounded in the feudal relationship of obedience and protection between 
subject  and  sovereign,  and  most  famously  expressed  in  Calvin’s  Case.
360  This 
framework proved useful in the political integration first of the United Kingdom, and 
later of the British Empire.
361  
It was only in 1948, near the end of Empire, after Canada had asserted its desire to 
create its own citizenship, that this largely unitary status of British subject began to 
fissure, in the form of the British Nationality Act 1948 (‘BNA 1948’) and the Australian 
Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948. While Australia consolidated its own category of 
citizenship, the British took a path of fragmentation prior to consolidation. The BNA 
1948 distinguished between three categories within the overarching concept of British 
subject:  ‘citizens  of  an  independent  Commonwealth  country’,  such  as  Australia; 
‘citizenship of the UK and Colonies’ (‘CUKC’)
362 (for most other British subjects); and, 
in a smaller category, ‘British subjects without citizenship’.
363 These categories were 
reorganised largely into the present categories by the BNA 1981, which moved partly 
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to a unitary concept of citizenship by removing British subject status from citizens of 
independent  Commonwealth  countries.  A  2002  Act  has  further  consolidated  this 
category by converting most BOTCs into British citizens.
364 British nationality law, 
therefore,  has  made  a  long,  tortuous  and  incomplete  journey  to  the  international 
norm of citizenship as a unitary status defining membership of an independent and 
relatively closed polity. Yet this international norm is itself being challenged, most 
prominently by the concept of EU citizenship, but also by devolution and the rising 
numbers of ‘denizens’, or long-term residents.
365  
If one major driver of citizenship law has been the breakup of Empire, the other 
has  been  fear  of  immigration.  As  already  noted,  this  led  to  the  decoupling  of 
nationality from right of residence in the UK. It has also fuelled significant changes to 
the  rules  of  acquisition  and  loss  of  citizenship,  such  as  the  modification  of  the 
common law tradition of conferring birth by territory (jus soli) with the requirement 
of  birth  by  a  parent  citizen  or  ‘denizen’,  importing  a  kinship  element  to  the 
conception of citizenship.
366  
More  recently,  in  the  context  of  political  controversy  over  the  integration  of 
immigrants, linked also to fears of terrorism,
367 there has been a significant tightening 
of  naturalisation  requirements,  with  the  extension  of  the  Australian  residence 
requirement from 2 to 5 years,
368 and with the UK’s proposed concept of ‘probationary 
citizenship’  extending  the  ordinary naturalisation  from  5 to 8  years.
369  Further,  as 
already noted, both jurisdictions have introduced ‘citizenship tests’,
370 extended in the 
UK  to  those  applying  for  ILR,  and  in  modified  form  to  most  Australian  visa 
applicants.
371 Both countries have also recently strengthened their powers to deprive 
people of citizenship,
372 with the UK also introducing powers to revoke ILR
373 and to 
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deprive a person of the right of abode.
374 Australia has always retained the right to 
cancel a permanent visa and has done so even where such people have lived virtually 
their whole lives in Australia.
375 
Citizenship  law  thus  traces,  imperfectly,  the  changing  alignments  of  political 
structures, moving from the feudal notion of allegiance, to the sovereign nation-state, 
to  a  model  of  civic  democracy  and  integration,  intertwined  with  the  exclusionary 
imperatives  of  immigration  policy.  Although  citizenship  law  is  often  seen  as  the 
converse  of  immigration  law,  defining  the  outsiders  implicitly  by  defining  the 
insiders, neither its political structure nor its normative paradigm exactly matches 
that of immigration law. It shares with immigration law certain important features: a 
relatively narrow political structure, a conception of the State as a relatively closed 
and sovereign political community, and the absence of a normative core. However, 
the  executive  is  much  less  dominant;  there  is  no  structure  of  hyper-law  and 
lawlessness;  and,  finally,  although  it  is  crucially  moulded  by  immigration  law, 
citizenship law has historically performed an integrative and inclusive role — a role 
that emphasises the equality of citizens and, albeit indirectly, attaches rights to that 
status.  
4  Refugee law 
Refugee law contrasts with both immigration and citizenship law in its political 
structure. The heart of refugee law is an international treaty, the Refugee Convention, 
which has become increasingly embedded in domestic and now EU legislation. It has 
also been elaborated by domestic courts and, in the form of ‘soft law’, by a panoply of 
international and non-governmental actors, most notably the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’). This creates a much more open and plural 
political structure, a feature enhanced by the relatively open-textured nature of the 
treaty itself. 
The  plurality  of  this  structure,  however,  masks  the  hierarchy  implicit  in  the 
political structure of refugee law. Born in a time of transition, between the horrified 
rejection of the Holocaust and the new totalitarianisms of the Cold War, refugee law 
straddles uncomfortably the tension between the framework of state sovereignty and 
human  rights.  While  the  Refugee  Convention  marked  a  signal  advance  from  the 
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‘absolute sovereignty’ model of immigration law, marking an outsider as worthy of 
legal  consideration,  it  is  a  child  of  its  time  and  its  political  structure  remains 
dominated by States.  
Like all treaties, the text is a compromise between States, and its implementation 
a matter of choice by States — as its partial incorporation in Australia and the UK 
demonstrates.
376 State practice is particularly influential in shaping the development 
of  refugee  law,  and  may  also  preclude  its  norms  from  attaining  the  status  of 
customary international law.  
This  State  bias  is  accentuated  in  the  case  of  the  Refugee  Convention,  partly 
because it includes no provisions on its implementation, including the procedures for 
refugee status determination, and partly because, unlike other human rights treaties, 
it creates no monitoring body, although UNHCR has a supervisory role.
377 Thus, a 
supposedly  universal  system  of  protection  is  undermined  by  huge  variations  in 
national recognition rates.
378 UNHCR itself is dependent upon a handful of donor 
States, and State representatives sit on its Executive Committee, which issues ‘soft 
law’ in the form of Conclusions.  
This political hierarchy is further embedded by several textual features of the 
Refugee  Convention.  First,  it  is  largely  confined  to  defining  the  legal  category  of 
refugee, and attaching a set of rights to that status, leaving a great deal of room for 
State discretion in implementation.  
Second, it is founded not on individual rights, but rather on the obligations and 
rights of the State: principally, the State’s obligation of non-refoulement,
379 and the 
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State’s right to grant asylum.
380 Most of the rights attached to the status of refugee are 
rights of equivalence — rights to be treated in line with citizens or lawful aliens, 
leaving the actual standard of treatment up to the States.
381  
Third, as is well known, the definition of refugee in Art 1A(2) imports a particular 
normative paradigm into refugee law. It provides that a refugee is a person who: 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality  and  is  unable  or,  owing  to  such  fear,  is  unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it. 
This definition is grounded upon the then-prevailing paradigm of Nazi and Cold 
War persecution, focusing on an individualised notion of persecution by the State 
that largely excludes the contemporary causes of forced migration, such as civil war, 
the collapse of States, and environmental degradation.
382 The State invoked here is 
either a Leviathan, crushing the puny refugee in its wake; or, in the alternative, a 
‘failed State’, which is incapable of performing its usual duty of protecting its citizens. 
It is, thus, the relationship of the individual to the State that is critical.  
Fourth,  the  definition  also  embeds  a  compromise  in  favour  of  States  that 
preserves  the  cardinal  value  of  sovereignty  —  namely,  the  requirement  that  the 
person  be  “outside  his  country  of  nationality”.  This  requirement  had  significant 
practical implications during the Cold War. Since exit controls prevented the escape 
of many, the Refugee Convention was a relatively cheap ideological victory for the 
West. It has proven equally significant in the present era, as States attempt to prevent 
access to their territory through interception practices. 
The Refugee Convention also qualifies this definition by providing for both the 
cessation  and  exclusion  (for  reasons  of  national  security  or  criminal  activities)  of 
refugee  status.
383  Security  grounds  may  also  exclude  the  obligation  of  non-
refoulement,  and  the  obligation  not  to  expel  a  lawfully  resident  refugee.
384  While, 
historically, the cessation and exclusion clauses were little-used, they have become 
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popular  recently.
385  Both  Australia  and  the  UK  began  offering  only  temporary 
protection, with Australia requiring re-examination of refugee claims every 3 years
386 
and the UK after 5 years.
387 However, the Rudd government has recently reversed this 
controversial policy.
388  
State practice has also exacerbated these tendencies, through the innovation of 
jurisprudential concepts such as the ‘safe country’ practices described in chapter 1, 
and the concept of ‘internal relocation’ (also known as ‘the internal flight alternative’), 
which  denies  protection  to  a  person  who  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  relocate 
within their home State.
389  
Therefore, while the political structure of refugee law is more open and plural, 
the influence of the State still dominates. This influence is enabled not only by the 
internal features of the Convention created by the States themselves, but also by the 
relative  autonomy  of  legal  orders,  the  lack  of  centralised  interpretative  or 
enforcement  machinery,  and  the  centrality  of  State  practice  in  international  law. 
Ultimately,  too,  the  normative  paradigm  underlying  refugee  law  embeds  the 
sovereignty  of  States  while  granting  a  very  limited,  although  practically  and 
theoretically significant, exception to it. The global rise in refugees, however, has seen 
States assert their influence in the creation and practice of refugee law, pressing ever 
greater on this limited exception.  
5  Constitutional law 
While immigration and refugee law are centrally concerned with the (external) 
sovereignty of States, constitutional law focuses on the internal distribution of power. 
The most important differences between the jurisdictions in this distribution arise 
because of the contrasting legal forms of constitutional law: the flexible unwritten 
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constitution of the UK, in which the constitution is “what happens”;
390 and the “frozen 
continent”
391 of the written Australian Constitution. 
These forms create different hierarchies of power, most notably in the orthodox 
subjection of the judiciary to parliamentary sovereignty in the UK, compared with the 
Australian judiciary’s role as guardian of the Constitution. However, as we shall see in 
chapter 3, the written Constitution also inhibits the Australian judiciary from straying 
too far from its text.  
This posture of textual interpretation is highly significant in immigration because 
of the internal limitations of the Constitution, most notably the virtual absence of 
individual  rights
392  and  the  breadth  of  the  immigration  and  aliens  powers.
393  The 
Australian Constitution therefore ties constitutional law to the prevailing conception 
of the relation between the individual and the State at the turn of the century: a 
conception that included the ideal of a White Australia, and an expansive view of the 
plenitude of State power.  
 The result is that there are only four major avenues of constitutional challenge: 
through the interpretation of the division of legislative power within the Federation; 
through  the  doctrine of  separation  of powers,  especially  the exclusivity  of  judicial 
power;
394  through  the  original  judicial  review  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court;  and 
through the more fragile forays into protecting ‘implied’ individual rights, of which 
the most important is the implied freedom of communication.
395 These provide rather 
indirect, and largely unpromising, avenues of challenge for immigrants. 
While the largely unwritten form of the British constitution gives primacy to the 
politicians, the lack of a foundational text and the breadth of the major constitutional 
principles enable a more creative judicial approach. This was vividly manifested in the 
recent  suggestion  of  some  Law  Lords  that,  in  extreme  cases,  the  constitutional 
principle  of  the  rule  of  law
396  may  trump  that  of  parliamentary  sovereignty,
397 
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following extra-judicial comments to the same effect during the ouster clause saga, as 
discussed in chapter 3.  
Importantly,  however,  these  constitutional  structures  are  mediated  by 
constitutional climates. The textual and insular approach promoted by the Australian 
constitutional structure was importantly challenged by the Mason High Court in the 
1980s, during a period of constitutional renaissance provoked in part by broader re-
definitions  of  Australian  identity.
398  The  Mason  Court’s  innovations  included  the 
previously noted freedom of political communication; the recognition of Aboriginal 
land rights,
399 and an expansion of judicial review
400 — innovations that were difficult 
to draw from the text of the Constitution or legislation itself. However, it was this very 
perception of disobedience to the cardinal text that made the Howard government 
insist  upon  appointing  “capital  C”  conservative  judges.
401  This  constitutional 
conservatism was also manifested in the Howard government’s skilful termination of 
the republican debate,
402 its dismantling of multicultural and indigenous institutions, 
and its burial of the human rights agenda.  
In  contrast,  the  Blair  government  unleashed  a  “torrent  of  constitutional 
changes”,
403 including devolution, the partial reform of the House of Lords, increased 
engagement  with  the  EU,  the  introduction  of  the  HRA  and  the  Freedom  of 
Information Act 2000. Also prominent in this landscape has been a more activist and 
human rights-oriented judiciary that is more receptive to international law and ‘soft 
law’ than hitherto. The establishment of a Supreme Court and the reform of the role 
of the Lord Chancellor, combined with statutory statements of the independence of 
the judiciary and tribunals, also institutionalise a more formal separation of powers.
404 
The  high  tide  of  this  trend,  however,  seems  to  have  passed,  despite  the  Brown 
government’s elevation of ‘constitutional renewal’ and bipartisan commitment to a 
British Bill of Rights,
405 as economic woes dominate the agenda. 
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As we shall see in the next chapter, these different structures and climates have 
important effects on the outcomes of cases. Nevertheless, this should not obscure 
their  essential  commonalities:  the  ways  in  which  the  political  structure  of 
constitutional  law  engages  executive,  legislature  and  judiciary  more  equally  and 
directly;  the  ways  in  which  changing  normative  paradigms  of  governance  are 
reflected, imperfectly, in the constitutional structures and climates; and, crucially, the 
ways in which such normative paradigms articulate a normative core about the right 
ways to distribute political power within a State.  
6  Common law principles of judicial review 
Similarly,  judicial  review  incorporates  a  normative  core  about  the  proper 
distribution of political power. This core is structured around a key tension — the 
tension between the ultra vires theory of judicial review, in which the ultimate aim of 
judicial review is to respect the legislative intent, and the ‘common law’ theory of 
judicial review, which emphasises instead the creative role of the judiciary in judicial 
review.
406  This  tension  maps  on  to  age-old  debates  about  judicial  activism,  the 
appropriate degree of deference, and the political role of the judiciary. 
These competing visions of judicial review construct different political structures, 
with judges acting as either the handmaidens of the legislature or as independent law-
creators constraining the executive. Nevertheless, in both traditions and jurisdictions, 
judicial  review  is  a  judicial  heartland,  since  its  primary  legal  form  is  case  law, 
notwithstanding important statutes such as the ADJR Act. (Indeed, the decoupling of 
immigration  from  the  ADJR  Act  has  revived  the  development  of  common  law 
principles of judicial review.)
407 Of all the legal regimes in the constellation, judicial 
review thus enjoys the greatest degree of legal autonomy.  
Like  citizenship  and  constitutional  law,  the  normative  paradigms  underlying 
judicial  review  reflect  changing,  and  competing,  conceptions  of  the  relationship 
between individual and the State. The limited State; the behemoth State; the welfare 
State;  the  State  as  service  provider;  and  the  State’s  respect  for  the  dignity  and 
participation of the individual all inflect judicial review, and continue to shape its 
tensions.  As  Harlow  and  Rawlings  famously  argued,  different  traditions 
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conceptualised  judicial  review  either  as  a  method  of  “controlling”  the  executive 
(revealing a preference for a minimalist State) or as a method of “facilitating” good 
administration  (revealing  a  preference  for  an  interventionist  State).
408  Like 
constitutional  law,  then,  judicial  review  is  ultimately  an  enterprise  based  on 
(admittedly broad) theories about the correct distribution of power. 
The shifts between these theories is well illustrated by the history of immigration 
review, with the historic conception of immigration as the untouchable preserve of 
sovereignty contrasting with immigration’s dominant position in the modern judicial 
review caseload. In immigration review, as in judicial review, we see changing and 
competing  conceptions  of  how  governments  should  treat  their  citizens,  and  how 
judges should supervise that treatment. 
These competing conceptions are reflected in the increasing divergence between 
Australian  and  British  principles  of  judicial  review.  The  three  most  significant 
divergences concern the standard of judicial review (and, in particular, the dominance 
of  the  Wednesbury  reasonableness  standard),
409  the  doctrine  of  legitimate 
expectations, and the distinction between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional errors. 
In the UK, partly driven by the European influence of the proportionality standard of 
review, and partly driven by a shifting judicial philosophy in favour of greater legal 
scrutiny of decisions impacting on fundamental rights,
410 the Wednesbury standard 
has  declined  rapidly  in  popularity,  with  influential  advocates  arguing  for  its 
replacement  by  proportionality.
411  However,  in  Australia,  judicial  support  for 
proportionality has been, with the exception of Kirby J, “tentative”
412 at best, while 
Wednesbury  itself  has  been  narrowly  confined  to  discretionary  decisions,  with 
“extreme irrationality or illogicality” emerging as a separate ground of review.
413 
This  constriction  of  Wednesbury  occurred  in  an  effort  to  protect  the  Federal 
Court’s  immigration  jurisdiction  after  the  introduction  of  Part  8,  since  that  Part 
excluded Wednesbury reasonableness as a ground of review. Similarly, immigration 
has  been  the  site  of  a  major  battle  in  Australia  over  the  doctrine  of  legitimate 
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expectations  (as  chapter  3  details)  with  Australia’s  pioneering  efforts  being  firmly 
rejected by the current Australian High Court.
414 In stark contrast, the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations has flourished in the UK, extending even to the fulfilment of 
substantive expectations.
415  
Finally, while the UK has long abandoned the distinction between a jurisdictional 
and  a  non-jurisdictional  error,
416  it  has  remained  relevant  in  Australia  for 
constitutional reasons,
417 and indeed the concept of jurisdictional error has been given 
renewed life by the High Court’s decision in Plaintiff S157.
418 
These doctrinal debates reflect different political paradigms about the legitimacy 
of  judicial  intervention  in  the  jurisdictions,  mirroring  the  diverging  constitutional 
climates  in  Australia  and  the  UK.  Again,  however,  these  differences  obscure  the 
greater commonality: a political structure that grants the judiciary a central place; a 
normative  core  concerning  the  correct  distribution  of  political  power;  and  an 
articulation of the normative principles governing individual and the administration, 
within the State, founded on competing versions of a liberal political philosophy.  
7  Human rights law 
The political structure of human rights law is closest to that of refugee law, with 
its heart in the International Bill of Rights — the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (‘UDHR’),
419 the ICCPR
420 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights.
421 It is elaborated, however, by a plethora of group-specific and 
subject-specific treaties, most relevantly the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (‘CAT’)
422 and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (‘CROC’).
423  
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However, human rights law is also reflected at regional and domestic levels, most 
relevantly in the ECHR, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights,
424 and in the HRA. 
Most  noticeably,  however,  human  rights  law  as  such  is  absent  at  the  Australian 
federal level, although States are now incorporating their own bills of rights,
425 and 
momentum for a federal Bill of Rights is increasing under the Rudd government.
426 
This creates a plural and open legal space, with an even greater range of creators 
of  ‘soft  law’  than  in  refugee  law.  Importantly,  there  is  also  a  greater  range  of 
interpretative  authorities  and,  most  significantly,  enforcement  mechanisms  in  the 
form of independent regional courts, the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice 
(‘ECJ’).  This  enables  a  much  greater  degree  of  legal  autonomy,  enhanced  by  the 
breadth and open texture of the principles involved. The room for judicial manoeuvre 
is also expanded by several of the ECtHR’s interpretative principles,
427 such as the 
principle  that  human  rights  must  be  interpreted  so  as  to  be  “practical  and 
effective”;
428  that  its  terms  may  be  interpreted  independently  of  national 
classifications;
429 and that they must be interpreted progressively.
430  
Most significantly, human rights law provides a powerful and relatively intuitive 
—  if  perhaps  philosophically  unconvincing
431  —  conception  of  the  relationship 
between the individual and the State, a conception which conflicts with the premises 
of  immigration  law.  It  does  so  by  attenuating  the  significance  of  outsider  status, 
making  the  question  one  about  humans  rather  than  citizens;  by  remodelling  the 
relationship  between  outsider  and  State  as  one  of  rights  and  obligations;  and  by 
express  application  of  the  norms  of  equality  and  non-discrimination.  Most 
distinctively, it envisages humans, not citizens, as the ultimate unit of moral concern. 
Less visibly, but importantly, the political strength of the human rights discourse, 
which  has  entrenched  respect  for  human  rights  as  a  sine  qua  non  of  political 
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legitimacy for liberal States, both buttresses human rights law and generates a degree 
of  normative  legitimacy  independent  of  that  derived  from  majoritarian  decision-
making.  
The appeal of human rights law for immigration and refugee advocates is thus 
obvious. Human rights law provides a relatively concrete critical legal standard with 
which to assess, and ultimately dislodge, political practices. Perhaps the most visible 
manifestation of this tension is the interpretation of Art 3 ECHR as preventing the 
return of people where there are substantial grounds for believing they would face a 
real  risk  of  torture,  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment,
432  and  (very  exceptionally) 
where it would deny a person urgent medical treatment.
433 The unqualified nature of 
this right dislodges the centrality of immigration policy, unlike Art 8 ECHR where the 
impact of removal upon family and private life is normally considered proportionate 
to the legitimate aim of immigration policy.
434 Significantly, there has only been one 
(very recent) case so far in which expulsion has been precluded because of anticipated 
breaches of Art 8 in the country of return.
435 
The ECHR rights have been extended by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Relevantly,  these  include  a  right  to  asylum;
436  an  express  codification  of  the  non-
refoulement obligation implicit in Art 3;
437 a right to human dignity;
438 a prohibition 
on human trafficking;
439 a right to the protection of personal data;
440 a freestanding 
non-discrimination provision;
441 a right to respect for cultural, religious and linguistic 
diversity;
442  express provision  for  the  best  interests  of  the  child;
443  rights to  social 
security and health care;
444 access to legal aid;
445 and a right to an effective remedy 
and fair trial that, unlike its equivalent in the ECHR, is not restricted to civil rights 
and obligations, and is thus applicable to immigration decisions.
446  
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Nevertheless, human rights law carefully delimits the scope of its application to 
certain ‘core’ (and in the case of the ECHR and HRA, largely civil and political) rights. 
Immigrants largely engage these rights only indirectly and fitfully. Like refugee law, it 
embeds internal compromises, most clearly manifested in the ECHR in the specific 
and general qualifications to rights; in the power to derogate under Art 15; and in the 
jurisprudential ‘margin of appreciation’.
447 The HRA embeds a further compromise in 
the mechanism of judicial declarations of ‘incompatibility’,
448 articulating clearly the 
implicit premise of human rights law — its ultimate faith in political acquiescence. 
Like refugee law, too, State practice is crucial in determining the prevailing human 
rights standards at any particular time. 
Nevertheless, human rights law produces the greatest normative tensions with 
immigration  law,  since  it  rejects  in  large  part  its  premises.  These  tensions  are 
minimised in part by the limited scope of those rights, by the internal compromises of 
the  text  and  jurisprudential  practice,  and  by  the  limitations  of  State  practices 
themselves.  Yet  human  rights  law  provides  an  alternative  and  politically  powerful 
normative  paradigm  that  brings,  for  the  first  time,  the  individual  into  the  legal 
limelight. Unlike citizenship law, constitutional law, and judicial review, with their 
blends  of  overlapping  paradigms,  its  normative  paradigm  is  much  more  specific, 
coherent and intuitive; and unlike those regimes, its structure is more plural, open 
and  autonomous.  What  it  does  is  extend  the  normative  rules  of  the  ‘internal’ 
perspective of the State, embedded within other regimes, beyond the boundaries of 
the  State  itself,  mediating  the  tension  between  these  internal  and  external 
perspectives as best it can.  
8  EU law 
Finally,  we  turn  to  three  specific  regimes  within  the  EU  legal  order:  the  free 
movement of EU citizens and their family members within the EU; the Schengen 
acquis, enabling the abolition of internal borders within the Schengen area by the 
creation of an external border; and the rapid development of the EU’s immigration 
and asylum law regime (‘Title IV regime’). These are, of course, affected and modified 
by the EU’s own regimes of citizenship, administrative law and human rights. 
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These regimes evince the most complex political structures of all, partly because 
of the internal complexity of the varying legislative processes and the plethora of legal 
forms  that  structure  the  relationships  between  the  multiplicity  of  EU  organs,  and 
partly because of the external complexity of the EU’s relations with its Member States 
and third States. These factors are exacerbated in these three legal regimes for three 
reasons. First, different institutional processes of law-making apply to each regime. 
Second, these arrangements have changed over time. Third, these regimes manifest 
dramatically  the  ‘variable  geometry’  of  EU  law,  with  the  free  movement  rights 
extending beyond the EU to the EEA; the Schengen States forming a smaller grouping 
within the EU and extending outside it to Switzerland, Iceland and Norway; and with 
Denmark, Ireland and the UK ‘opting out’ generally from the Title IV regime. 
Thus, while the free movement of persons within the EU dates back to the Treaty 
of Rome, and has always been governed by EC institutions and laws, the Schengen 
acquis grew out of an intergovernmental agreement between a core nucleus of States 
in 1985,
449 operating under its own institutional arrangements prior to its transfer into 
EU law in 1999.
450 The Title IV regime, on the other hand, has more recent origins, 
first under the State-dominated ‘Third Pillar’ of the Maastricht Treaty regime, where 
only  non-binding  legal  forms  survived  the  need  for  State  consensus,  and  latterly 
under  arrangements  under  Title  IV  created  by  the  Amsterdam  Treaty.
451  This 
envisaged a five-year period in which institutional rules for harmonising elements of a 
common immigration and asylum policy granted greater influence to the States, prior 
to a second phase under the ‘Community method’ of co-decision, qualified majority 
voting and full judicial control by the ECJ. The political complexity of these regimes is 
further complicated by a hierarchy of Association and Co-operation Agreements with 
third States, most relevantly with the EEA and Switzerland (providing their nationals 
with virtually equivalent rights of free movement); with accession States; and with 
Turkey.
452 
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Thankfully, the labyrinthine details of these arrangements need not detain us 
here. It is only necessary to highlight how this has created both a hierarchy of regimes 
of movement with differing levels of State influence; and a new and visible European 
‘space’ through the division of EU from non-EU citizens.  
This  hierarchy  of  regimes  also,  importantly,  evinces  different  normative 
paradigms. The free movement of persons was originally connected to the creation of 
a European economic space, and was thus originally restricted to the free movement 
of  workers,  service  providers  and  the  freedom  of  establishment.
453  However,  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  connected  freedom  of  movement  to  the  project  of  EU 
citizenship,
454 transforming it into a pillar of the broader political project of “ever 
closer union”, assisted by the generous interpretation of the ECJ.
455 The Schengen 
acquis was also prompted by economic concerns as part of the single market project, 
but has been managed more as an intergovernmental co-operation project to facilitate 
the abolition of border controls than as part of the broader EU vision.  
Finally,  the  tensions  within  the  EU  project  have  been  most  remarkably 
demonstrated in the Title IV regime, with the EU’s proclaimed foundation on human 
rights
456 tilting it originally towards a liberal approach, but with the rising political 
salience of immigration and terrorism leading to much conflict between States within 
the Council, and the lopsided development of the Title IV regime. In the nine years of 
frenzied law-making since the 1999 Tampere summit, the greatest progress has been 
made  on  measures  for  irregular  migration  and  enforcement,  and  the  greatest 
enthusiasm  evidenced  for  operational  measures  and  readmission  agreements  with 
third  countries.  In  contrast,  the  development  of  the  Common  European  Asylum 
System  (‘CEAS’)  has  been  marked  by  dramatic  conflict,  the  watering  down  of 
standards  and  the  entrenchment  of  interception  practices.  Finally,  there  has  been 
little progress on legal migration. Unsurprisingly, the UK has chosen to opt into most 
of the asylum measures and irregular migration measures, while opting out of the few 
legal migration measures.
457  
What is important here is that the CEAS measures elaborate refugee law; partly 
constrain UK law and practice; and add importantly to the patchwork of legal rights 
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in the legal constellation. The CEAS’s first phase, recently completed, comprised four 
important  pieces  of  legislation.  The  Dublin  II  Regulation,
458  already  noted,  was  a 
strengthened version of an earlier treaty,
459 signed as part of the Schengen process, 
which enabled EU States to return refugee claimants to other EU States, based on a 
hierarchy of connecting criteria including transit through that State. The other three 
elements were new: the Reception Directive, conferring important rights to ‘reception 
conditions’ such as housing, health care and financial support on refugee claimants;
460 
the Qualification Directive, harmonising key aspects of the refugee definition;
461 and 
the  Procedures  Directive,
462  harmonising  less  successfully  certain  ‘minimum 
standards’ for asylum procedures.
463 In its second phase, the European Commission 
proposes — ambitiously, in light of the protracted negotiations over the Procedures 
Directive — a common asylum procedure, as well as a uniform refugee status and 
greater convergence in standards of reception and refugee determination.
464 
Together,  these  entrench  an  important  catalogue  of  rights  into  UK  law.  The 
Qualification  Directive  confers  an  enforceable  entitlement  to  refugee  status  and 
subsidiary  protection;
465  a  range  of  rights  to  recognised  refugees  and  their  family 
members;
466  rights  of  guardianship  and  care  and  protection  of  family  unity  for 
unaccompanied  minors;
467  the  right  to  an  individual  examination  of  the 
circumstances taking all facts into account;
468 and a range of more limited procedural 
                                                   
458  Regulation  343/2003/EC.  Dublin  I  remains  in  force  as  between  Denmark  and  the  Member 
States.  
459 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one 
of the Member States of the European Communities (1990), OJ C254/1, 19 August 1997. See Andrew 
Nicol and S Harrison, ‘The law and practice in the application of the Dublin Convention in the 
United Kingdom’ (1999) 1 EJML 465. 
460 Directive 2003/9/EC. 
461 Directive 2004/83/EC. This is implemented in the UK through Pt 11 of the Rules. 
462 Directive 2005/85/EC. 
463 I exclude here the Temporary Protection Directive (Directive 2001/55/EC), since it has yet to be 
invoked. 
464 Commission (EC), The Future Common European Asylum System (Green Paper), COM (2007) 301 
final, 6 June 2007; Commission (EC), Policy Plan on Asylum – An Integrated Approach to Protection 
Across the EU, COM (2008) 360 final, 17 June 2008. 
465 Arts 13 and 18. 
466 These include the right to a residence permit (Art 24) and a travel document (Art 25); rights to 
employment  (Art  26);  education  (Art  27);  social  assistance  (Art  28);  health  care  (Art  29); 
accommodation (Art 31); freedom of movement (Art 32); provision for integration (Art 33); and 
financial  assistance  for  repatriation  (Art  34).  These  substantially  supplement  the  rights  in  the 
Refugee Convention, of which only the right to a travel document and freedom of movement are 
broadly equivalent. 
467 Art 30. This is paralleled in the Reception Directive, Art 19.  
468 Art 4(3).   87 
rights.
469  The  Reception  Directive  confers  rights  to  adequate  ‘material  reception 
conditions’;
470 access to emergency and essential health care;
471 evidence of refugee 
status;
472 rights to information about rights and support;
473 rights to respect for family 
unity in the provision of housing;
474 equal access to the education system for children 
after 3 months;
475 and access to the labour market after a maximum of a year, albeit 
with significant restrictions.
476 The Procedures Directive confers a general right to 
remain for the process of refugee determination (subject to important exceptions),
477 
and a range of important procedural safeguards: the right to a personal interview in 
most circumstances,
478 including access to a written report of the interview;
479 the 
right for an application to be examined “individually, objectively and impartially” by 
trained  staff  with  access  to  quality  country  of  origin  information;
480  the  right  to 
reasoned decisions for refusal including written information on how to challenge the 
decision;
481 the right to notice of the decision “in reasonable time”;
482 the right to 
publicly funded interpreters;
483 the right to legal assistance at one’s own cost, and to 
free legal assistance after an adverse decision (with significant exceptions);
484 the right 
to communicate with UNHCR;
485 and rights to information.
486 It also confers the right 
to “speedy judicial review” in cases of detention,
487 although it provides no cap on the 
limit to detention, and the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal in 
relation to specified decisions.
488  
The limitations of this legislative framework have been exhaustively examined 
elsewhere,  with  most  commentators  highly  critical  of  the  watering  down  of  the 
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Procedures Directive
489 and its inclusion of so many exceptions, delegations to States, 
and  weak  minimum  standards.  Peers  and  Rogers  said  of  it:  “Never  before  in  the 
history of the Community have so many human rights breaches — leaving aside the 
breaches  of  EC  constitutional  law  —  been  committed  by  a  single  piece  of 
legislation.”
490 
In many respects, therefore, the three legal regimes, together with the other EU 
regimes,  mimic  and  magnify  the  complexity  and  normative  incoherence  of  the 
domestic legal order. The Title IV regime, in particular, is structured like domestic 
immigration law on paradox and ambivalence; on a combination of hyper-law and 
lawlessness, exacerbated by the inherent structure of EU law as a compromise; and, 
finally, on an internal tension between the promise of transcendence, and the politics 
of mutual interest. 
9  Conclusion 
This  whirlwind  tour  of  the  legal  constellation  gives  us  the  flavour  of  the 
complicated interaction of several distinct legal regimes, and explores the way these 
create distinctive political structures and are based on different normative paradigms. 
Crucially, they empower different degrees of legal autonomy, are based on different 
paradigms of legitimacy, and exhibit an unusual degree of normative tension. 
This normative tension is particularly marked in respect of immigration law, with 
its ‘external perspective’ of the State and its premises of the absolute subjection of the 
outsider to the power of the State; of the inequality between non-citizen and citizen; 
and of the absence of rights of the outsider. This paradigm, quite frankly, is obsolete: 
it has been qualified and modified out of existence by the strengthening of liberal 
principles in ‘internal’ regimes such as constitutional law and judicial review, and 
most prominently by human rights law.  
Nevertheless,  the  hardened  residue  of  this  paradigm  persists  in  the  legal 
constellation, and creates everywhere normative tensions and exposes deficiencies. It 
continues  to  drive  citizenship  law,  asserts  itself  in  the  internal  compromises  and 
political structure of refugee law, and re-emerges in the breadth of the constitutional 
powers in Australia and in the historical invisibility of immigration in judicial review. 
In  the  UK,  it  creates  enormous  tension  with  the  paradigm  of  human  rights,  and 
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emerges in, although it is mediated by, the complicated institutional dynamics of the 
EU. 
Indeed,  everywhere  in  the  legal  constellation  we  can  see  the  residue  of 
obsolescent paradigms, such as the complicated after-effects of Empire in citizenship 
law; the Cold War paradigm of the refugee; the virtual absence of individual rights in 
the Australian Constitution; and the orthodoxy of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
UK.  
As the next chapter examines in detail, these residues and tensions have real 
effects,  guiding  judicial  reasoning  and  undermining  the  acceptability  of  such 
reasoning.  I  examine  this  legal  constellation  in  depth  not  merely  to  dissect  their 
different logics, but because it explains part of the story of immigration review. What 
it  explains  is  the  challenge  immigration  poses  to  the  coherence  of  the  law  —  a 
coherence we prize for its ability to produce the relatively determinate rules necessary 
to  guide  human  behaviour,  and  for  its  ability  to  produce  ideologically  coherent 
visions of the world that ground the legitimacy of judicial reasoning. 
This challenge arises because, first, different elements of the legal constellation 
may  be  mobilised  for  different  purposes  and  may  logically  point  in  different 
directions. The polyvalence of law thus enables a multiplicity of answers to the same 
legal question, undermining the determinacy of the rules and the ideological value of 
the law.  
Second, the legal constellation therefore has enormous potential to create ‘hard’ 
cases, cases that will pivot on the tensions inherent within and between the legal 
regimes. These ‘hard’ cases cannot be authoritatively settled normatively, because of 
the co-existence and competition between these different legal regimes. There will, all 
too often, be a competing normative perspective, or a different balancing of priorities, 
that cannot be adequately addressed through the usual legal tools.  
We turn, in the next chapter, to examine the operation of these usual legal tools, 
of which the most important are the vertical and horizontal drawing of boundaries, 
and  the  strategies  of  fudging  and  trumping.  The  vertical  drawing  of  boundaries 
involves using the vertical legal hierarchy of form — using the Constitution to trump 
legislation, legislation to trump case law, and so forth — to resolve disputes. The 
horizontal drawing of boundaries involves delimiting the area of conflict, for each 
legal regime affects only a subset of immigration law. Thus, where the other legal 
regimes do not apply, we are left in the realm of immigration law simpliciter. The   90 
strategy of ‘fudging’ involves an artful compromise in the instant case between the 
normative  tensions,  such  as  the  incorporation  of  immigration  policy  into  human 
rights via the qualifications clauses. The strategy of ‘trumping’, on the other hand, is 
more immediately intellectually attractive, since it ‘trumps’ one normative paradigm 
with  another,  preserving  normative  coherence  but  running  the  risks  of  political 
insensitivity.
491  
What  these  usual  legal  tools  do  not,  however,  provide  is  an  intellectually 
satisfactory  solution.  These  manoeuvres  foster  disagreement  since  different  people 
reasonably disagree on the moral, as opposed to the legal, priority of the normative 
paradigm. Those inclined to the positivist model of legitimacy may reasonably object 
to  a  legal  hierarchy  that  privileges  legal  regimes  based  on  increasingly  abstract 
notions of State consent, over a legal regime (immigration law) that is most obviously 
based  on  specific,  empirically  verifiable,  democratic  consent.  On  the  other  hand, 
those inclined to be suspicious of the metaphysical claims of the State may reasonably 
object to the confinement of human rights principles in deference to the State.  
Moreover,  the  legal  hierarchy  obscures  the  differing  allocations  of  power 
underpinning different sources of law. We may thus also reasonably disagree upon 
the political legitimacy of the different forms of law, and about who should exercise 
law-making power. For example, by locating law-making power at the level of the EU, 
greater influence is granted to the bureaucracy through the European Commission, 
and to governments through the European Council and Council of Ministers. Access 
to policy-makers by NGOs and representative groups is more limited and variable, 
and different States have different political weight, with the newly acceding States on 
the  frontier  of  the  EU  likely  to  suffer  disproportionately  from  refugee  burden-
sharing.
492 We rightly contest the shifting of laws between regime and orders, since 
they are configured by different political structures. 
What this analysis of the legal constellation reveals, therefore, is that ultimately 
this challenge of coherence can expose the precarious nature of legality itself. For if 
we may pick and choose between different traditions; if the haphazardness of the 
legal constellation and the happenstance of different judicial philosophies ultimately 
govern the multitude of ‘hard’ cases that arise; and if the legal strategies employed 
merely foster disagreement about the priority of normative paradigms, where then is 
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our system of determinate rules based on a coherent normative framework, which we 
are guided by because judicial reasoning is normatively persuasive? This challenge 
may be mistranslated and oversimplified by politicians and judges into the tropes of 
judicial  activism  and  the  battle  between  the  executive  and  the  judiciary,  but 
nevertheless there is a real challenge here to our deepest notions of impartial justice, 
in our faith in law as a system of rules, and in our ability to endorse judicial reasoning 
based on this hybrid, complex, and unstable interaction of norms.   92 
Chapter 3 — Confronting the challenges 
1  Introduction 
This chapter turns to examine the ways in which the challenge to coherence is 
manifested, and to make good the claim that the haphazard application of the legal 
constellation leads to unsatisfactory judicial resolutions. I do so in respect of four 
landmarks in the story of immigration review: the sagas of the ouster clauses, and 
judgments on extraterritorial schemes, indefinite detention, and the enlargement of 
the scope of judicial review.  
In part, these case studies have been chosen because they constitute the four 
most  controversial  elements  of  the  story  of  immigration  review;
493  and,  in  part, 
because  they  illustrate  the  different  kinds  of  challenges,  and  responses,  that 
immigration throws up. The ouster clauses and indefinite detention manifest direct 
challenges to the rule of law and the cardinal legal value of liberty, respectively. The 
extra-territorial schemes expose a tension between the normative justifications of law 
and the institutional limits of law. The enlargement of the scope of judicial review 
exposes  a  tension  between  different  justifications  for,  and  thus  different 
constitutional understandings of, judicial review. 
As this chapter reveals, the different responses may be explained as the product 
of  three  factors:  the  nature  of  the  challenge;  the  legal  constellation;  and  judicial 
agency. As we shall see, even the most direct challenges often mask the weaknesses 
and incoherence of the legal constellation, which in turn is crucial in structuring the 
spaces for judicial agency.  
This chapter reveals how the story of immigration review is a story of the tensions 
and conflicts within and about the law. The different responses can all be read as ways 
of defending different conceptions about the province and purpose of law, or what I 
have earlier called law’s empire. Indeed, we can envisage these different responses as 
different kinds of imperial defences, including strategic retreat; the transmission of 
imperial values; the limited toleration of diversity; and last but not least, the pitched 
battle. 
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2  The ouster clause sagas  
We turn first to the pitched battle, in the form of the ouster clause sagas. The 
introduction of ouster clauses in both jurisdictions is both the most striking similarity 
in the stories of immigration review, and their high-water mark. Their outcomes were 
hailed as victories for the rule of law,
494 and as evidence of the strength and defensive 
capacity of the law. However, as we shall see, upon closer examination the picture is 
less rosy. 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  The Australian ouster clause The Australian ouster clause The Australian ouster clause The Australian ouster clause    
The Howard government pledged that it would restrict access to judicial review 
for  immigration  matters  before  the  1996  election,
495  and  the  ouster  clause  was 
(together with the creation of the MRT) part of that package. Combined opposition in 
the Senate, however, left the ouster clause languishing after its introduction in two 
bills in 1997
496 and 1998.
497 The Senate committee reports on the bills were similarly 
divided along party lines.
498  
The key section of the proposed clause provided: 
(1) A privative clause decision: 
  (a)  is final and conclusive; and 
  (b)  shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed or 
called in question in any court; and 
  (c)  is not subject to prohibition, mandamus, injunction, declaration 
or certiorari in any court on any account. 
Subsections  2  and  3  widely  defined  the  terms  ‘privative  clause  decision’  and 
‘decision’, so as to cover all immigration decisions except for those expressly excluded 
by subsection 4. However, the clause was not intended to be read literally (for this 
would patently violate s 75(v) of the Constitution), but rather, as the Explanatory 
Memorandum made clear, according to the High Court’s decision in Hickman.
499 This 
would enable review, according to the Minister, only on the grounds of exceeding 
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constitutional limits, narrow jurisdictional error or bad faith (the so-called ‘Hickman 
provisos’).
500  
This clause would have remained a dead letter but for the extraordinary political 
events of the Tampa (discussed below), and the Howard government’s seizure of the 
political  momentum  to  pressure  the  Opposition  into  passing  seven  ‘urgent’ 
immigration bills (including the ouster clause) over two nights. The Opposition had 
already rejected the first Tampa bill
501 — a bill presented with only 40 minutes’ notice 
to the Opposition,
502 and which no MP saw before it was introduced in Parliament.
503 
However, the second time around, Labor gave in to its overwhelming fear of losing 
the imminent election, and the bills passed unamended.
504 
This episode dramatically illustrated the limitations of Parliamentary scrutiny in 
the face of party discipline. As Senator McKiernan, a dissentient in both committee 
reports, commented: “At the end of the day, when these bills come to a vote, I will be 
supporting them, because that is what my party has determined, but I will not be 
doing it with any great deal of comfort.”
505  
When the ouster clause came to the Federal Court, the court found itself divided, 
a  division  replicated  by  a  specially  convened  five-member  Full  Federal  Court  in 
NAAV.
506  The  majority  of  this  Court  effectively  agreed  with  the  Minister’s 
interpretation of the clause and upheld its constitutional validity, although they noted 
a Hickman proviso overlooked by the Minister — that the decision was subject to any 
‘inviolable’ statutory limitations. As von Doussa J explained, these were few indeed: 
that the Minister consider the visa application; and that the visa application, review 
application, delegations of power, and the constitution of the Tribunal were valid.
507  
The minority, however, argued that Dixon J’s approach in Hickman was not one 
of subordinating all other sections to the ouster clause, but rather of reconciling the 
apparent contradiction between the clause and statutory limitations by reading them 
together to determine which limitations were indispensable. More significantly, the 
minority held that the term ‘privative clause decision’ did not reach decisions infected 
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by jurisdictional error, since these were ‘no decisions at all’ in the eyes of the law.
508 
The High Court essentially, and unanimously, agreed with the minority in Plaintiff 
S157, a different appeal on the same constitutional point.
509 
The  minority  of  the  Federal  Court,  and  the  High  Court,  captured  the  central 
paradox  of  hyper-law  and  lawlessness  in  their  discussion  of  the  “contradiction” 
between, on the one hand, an elaborate legislative structure that seeks to structure 
and confine discretion, and on the other, attempts to ‘expand’ the power of decision-
makers  beyond  those  limits.
510  As  Wade  and  Forsyth  put  it,  the  ‘reconciliatory’ 
approach was a “brave endeavour to strike some sort of balance between legislative 
intention  and  constitutional  logic”.
511  Manoeuvring  between  the  competing 
imperatives of deference to the democratic legitimacy of the courts, and upholding 
the rule of law, their Honours’ strategy was a classic ‘fudge’. The executive and the 
judiciary had stood toe to toe, and the judiciary had simply chosen to walk around its 
antagonist. 
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  The UK ouster clause The UK ouster clause The UK ouster clause The UK ouster clause    
A  few  months  afterward,  the  UK  repeated  the  experiment  by  proposing  “the 
mother  of  all  ouster  clauses”,
512  alongside  the  merger  of  the  IAA,  in  its  2004  Bill. 
Proposed s 108A provided that no court should have supervisory or other jurisdiction, 
whether statutory or inherent, in relation to the Tribunal, and prohibited courts from 
entertaining proceedings for question, by way of appeal or otherwise, in relation to 
almost  all  immigration  decisions.
513  Further,  subsection  3  expressly  prohibited  all 
grounds of judicial review excepting bad faith, and subjected claims under the HRA to 
the ouster clause. Unlike in Australia, where the written Constitution constrained any 
such ouster, this clause meant what it said.  
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However,  unlike  in  Australia  also,  the  clause  received  critical  scrutiny  and, 
indeed, condemnation by three parliamentary committees,
514 and there was strong 
dissent within government, expressed by Labour backbenchers,
515 within Cabinet,
516 
and (crucially) by the former Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine.
517  
As in Australia, however, the bill’s passage revealed deficiencies in the legislative 
process. The ouster clause was not included in the consultation document, surfacing 
only in the draft bill published 9 working days after consultation closed;
518 and was 
thus not considered in HAC’s rushed report.
519 In any event, the government rejected 
the report “within hours, if not minutes”.
520  
The ouster clause saga did demonstrate the vitality of the legal community. The 
clause  was  “roundly  condemned  by  many  respected  organisations,  including  the 
General  Council  of  the  Bar,  the  Law  Society,  the  Immigration  Law  Practitioners 
Association,  the  Refugee  Council  and  the  Immigration  Advisory  Service.”
521  In  the 
newspapers, eminent professors called the clause a “constitutional outrage”,
522 and 
intimated  that  it  might  be  ruled  unconstitutional.
523  On  3  March  2004,  in  an 
apparently co-ordinated attack, both Lords Woolf and Steyn attacked the clause as 
contrary to the rule of law in extra-curial speeches. Lord Woolf revealed that the 
judiciary  had,  when  consulted,  advised  the  clause  was  unworkable,  but  the 
government had merely removed the loopholes.
524 Lord Steyn condemned the Bill as 
attempting “to immunise manifest illegality”.
525  
On  15  March,  with  a  long  list  of  Law  Lords,  former  Lord  Chancellors  and 
barristers due to speak against the clause, Lord Falconer withdrew the clause at the 
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beginning of its second reading in the House of Lords.
526 It was eventually replaced 
with  the  transitional  ‘filter’  mechanism  already  discussed.  In  this  saga,  then,  the 
executive  and  the  judiciary  had  dramatically  confronted  each  other  —  and  the 
executive had blinked first. 
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3  Explaining ‘success’ Explaining ‘success’ Explaining ‘success’ Explaining ‘success’    
Three factors promoted the eventual outcomes of the ouster clause sagas: the 
nature of the challenge; the adequacy of the constitutional concepts involved; and 
constitutional design. 
2.3.1  THE ‘CONSTITUTIONAL OUTRAGE’ 
First of all, there was no mistaking the nature of the challenge. The clauses clearly 
threatened  the  constitutional  role  of  the  courts  in  ensuring  the  legality  of 
administrative action, and struck directly at the heart of the rule of law.  
The clarity of the challenge was matched by the significance of judicial review in 
immigration. Immigration decisions involved important rights and legal issues, and 
its  consequences  were  momentous  for  the  individual.  Immigration  decisions  also 
constituted  the  lion’s  share  of  judicial  review,  which  had  exposed  the  significant 
extent of inadequate decision-making and maladministration in this field. The ouster 
clause would thus remove a significant part of law’s empire from people who needed 
the protection of the law more than most. 
Nor were there compelling political imperatives. The justifications for the clauses 
were primarily that of cost and delay, translated into moral arguments about abuse of 
process and the unfair burden placed on the citizen.
527 These were, as an MP pointed 
out,  arguments  of  administrative  inconvenience  balanced  against  arguments  of 
constitutional  principle.
528  In  any  case,  these  justifications  were  not  necessarily 
convincing, since cost and delay could be attributed to other causes and the statistics 
were far from robust. Indeed, in NAAV two Federal Court judges went so far as to 
prescribe alternative recommendations for reform.
529 
Importantly, the compelling imperative that had stayed the hands of judges for 
most  of  the  20
th  century,  namely  the  political  importance  and  sensitivity  of 
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immigration, was virtually invisible in the debates. It was no longer possible to return 
to the days of yore, before immigration had been absorbed into law’s empire. The 
values  transmitted  by  law’s  empire  —  the  need  for  accountability,  the  need  for 
protection of the vulnerable, the existence of human rights — had taken root too 
firmly.  
The vociferous defence of law’s empire was also provoked by the sense that these 
values were being undermined elsewhere, by anti-terrorism laws and incursions on 
civil liberties, by increasing attacks on the judiciary, and in the UK in the context of 
fundamental  constitutional  reforms.  The  ouster  clause  sagas  therefore  became  a 
totemic struggle over the preservation of the authority of the law itself, and a symbol 
of the law’s power to tame irrepressible governments. As Lord Woolf put it a decade 
ago in a classic piece of British understatement, the law was merely taking up the 
slack “during a period when the other restraints on the executive were not as great as 
ideally they should be”.
530  
2.3.2  THE RULE OF LAW REDUX 
The  second,  less  visible,  factor  promoting  the  outcomes  was  that  the  ouster 
clauses engaged the regime of constitutional law. Significantly, this reconfigured the 
dispute as a dispute about the balance between executive and judicial power. This had 
long  been  a  central  concern  of  constitutional  law,  and  there  was  thus  a  readily 
applicable legal framework, and a readily available legal tradition, which captured the 
nature of the challenge.  
In Australia, as Gleeson CJ’s judgment in Plaintiff S157 concisely evidenced, this 
legal framework was captured very clearly by the Constitution’s overriding constraints 
on parliamentary power; the Constitution’s express provision for judicial review;
531 the 
constitutional ‘assumption’ of the rule of law;
532 and the doctrine of separation of 
powers.
533 These principles were buttressed by interpretative presumptions in favour 
of  rights  and  international  obligations,
534  and  supported  by  a  long  tradition  of 
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defending judicial power, as reference to high judicial authority testified.
535 As Wilcox 
J noted, in the 57 years since Hickman, no court had in fact applied it to protect an 
otherwise invalid act.
536  
Further, the constitutional status of the regime encouraged courts to elevate the 
significance  of  the  dispute,  and  look  beyond  the  technicalities  to  the  “real  and 
substantive dispute”.
537 As Wilcox J noted, the boundary between text and non-text 
was more permeable in the case of a Constitution, requiring judges to go beyond its 
text to its “normative” background.
538 
This more permeable and open-textured nature of the constitutional legal regime 
was critical, since — despite the clarity and coherence of the constitutional principles 
— the text of the Constitution itself provided no direct or obvious path, especially as 
the  ouster  clause  was  virtually  identical  to  that  upheld  in  Hickman.  Witnesses 
testifying to the Senate committee candidly admitted that, while the clause might be 
unconstitutional, it was not clear exactly how:  
It is my submission that the High Court—I am guessing; I am chancing my arm—would 
simply  say,  ‘Look,  this  has  simply  gone  too  far.  Sure,  the  clause  looks  the  same  as 
everything else, you are using the same language, but stand back from it. The government 
has been a little too cheeky on this decision.’
539  
Indeed, the route eventually taken was not one of constitutional invalidity, but 
rather through the classic judicial back-door of restrictive interpretation. Despite all 
the  constitutional  thundering,  Plaintiff  S157  in  fact  exposed  the  gap  between  the 
normative constitutional framework and its manifestations in constitutional text and 
precedent.  
Finally,  the  invocation  of  the  constitutional  legal  regime  was  also  highly 
significant because of its status in the legal hierarchy and its political structure. This 
allowed the court to resolve the dispute through vertical boundary-drawing, since the 
Constitution  ‘trumped’  legislation;  and  it  positioned  the  court  as  guardian  of  the 
Constitution. Thus, instead of being “activist”, the Court was rather “obedient to its 
constitutional function.”
540  
This combination of the normative strength of the law masking the weaknesses of 
its manifestations was also evident in the UK, where the legal path was even less 
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straightforward. Surprisingly, the HRA did not provide a “knock out blow”,
541 as one 
might have expected. As the JCHR noted, Art 13 ECHR (effective remedy) did not 
necessarily require judicial review in addition to a tribunal,
542 while Art 6 ECHR (fair 
trial) did not apply to immigration decisions.
543 Instead, the best case invoked the 
more indirect arguments that inadequate Tribunal decision-making rendered it an 
ineffective remedy;
544 that the removal of judicial review discriminated against non-
citizens;
545 and that removal of judicial review left the rights provided by Arts 2, 3 and 
8 unprotected, except by appeal to the ECtHR.
546  
As the JCHR recognised, the challenge was best captured instead by the principle 
of the rule of law.
547 However, there were two difficulties: the vertical hierarchy of the 
constitutional framework, and a gap in institutional design.  
In the orthodox conception of the British constitutional hierarchy, the principle 
of  the  rule  of  law  was  ‘trumped’  by  the  principle  of  parliamentary  sovereignty.
548 
However, in a prescient article, Lord Woolf had postulated that the courts could act 
in an unprecedented fashion in extreme cases, such as the abolition or substantial 
impairment of judicial review, by making it clear that there were “ultimately ... limits 
on the supremacy of Parliament which it is the courts’ inalienable responsibility to 
identify and uphold.”
549 This slip of extra-curial dicta was evoked by Lords Woolf and 
Steyn  in  their  speeches  attacking  the  ouster  clause,  and  (as  noted  earlier)  was 
provocatively raised in a subsequent House of Lords decision.
550  
This ‘nuclear option’
551 was most extensively considered in Fordham’s brief for the 
Refugee  Council  on  the  ouster  clause.
552  Fordham’s  argument  depended  centrally 
upon the rule of law, but also brought together recent constitutional developments 
including  the  articulation  of  constitutional  rights;  the  principle  of  legality;  the 
common law origin and constitutional role of judicial review; and the notion of the 
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‘dual sovereignty’ of the courts. Fordham also relied upon a revival of earlier common 
law traditions; cited Marbury v Madison
553 as evidence of the inherent judicial power 
to ask questions of constitutional legality; and suggested that Anisminic,
554 and other 
decisions circumscribing ouster clauses, could provide a foundation for converting an 
interpretative presumption into a ‘constitutional principle’.  
Fordham’s analysis evidences both the resilience and the fragility of the British 
constitutional framework. On the one hand, it evidences the dynamic nature of the 
common  law  tradition:  its  ability  to  draw  upon  alternative  traditions,  and  its 
responsiveness to changing constitutional climates. On the other, it strings together 
disparate and still developing constitutional doctrines. As an MP observed, an ouster 
clause would “force the judiciary to become ever more creative and imaginative in 
finding a way round it”, “undermining the rationality and logic of the rule of law”
555 — 
meeting the challenge to the law would involve undermining the methodology of the 
common law. 
The  problem  of  hierarchy  has  received  greater  attention  than  the  problem  of 
institutional  design  —  namely  the  lack  of  any  institutional  mechanism  to  resolve 
conflict in the event the usual constitutional constraints failed. In one sense, this lack 
promoted the eventual outcome. The ouster clause “left the courts with little option, 
but  to  lie  down  like  pussycats,  or  alternatively  to  take  constitutional  law  to  new 
places”.
556  By  endangering  the  constitutional  balance,  the  government  endangered 
itself, making the stakes too high for the government to proceed. The constitution 
operated as a political ‘No trespassing’ sign, behind which lurked an indefinable and, 
thus more dangerous, threat. 
On the other hand, overruling the legislation would be akin to jumping off a 
constitutional cliff. There was no written Constitution conferring authority to do so; 
there was no legal tradition of doing so; and there was no knowing exactly how the 
judiciary would go about it, or what would happen if they did. Lord Donaldson later 
asserted that he was “quite confident that if [the ouster clause] had been passed, the 
judges would have said, ‘We're not having this’”. However, his Lordship continued: 
“How the judges could have done that is a different matter”.
557 The lack of a specific 
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institutional  mechanism  renders  all  such  threats  of  unconstitutionality  nebulous, 
although not unreal. 
In both jurisdictions, therefore, the conceptual toolbox was ready and waiting, 
but the technical instructions left much to be desired. These victories for the rule of 
law demonstrated the strength of the normative concepts of constitutional law; but 
what they masked was their textual, hierarchal and institutional fragility. 
2.3.3  CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Although,  as  we  have  seen,  the  sagas  vividly  demonstrate  the  limitations  of 
parliamentary  scrutiny,  some  elements  of  constitutional  design  also promoted  the 
eventual  outcomes.  The  committee  reports  and  parliamentary  debates  at  least 
enabled the intervention of lawyers and lobby groups and promoted public debate. 
However, in both cases, the most important element was the differing composition of 
the second chamber. It was the proportional system of the Australian Senate that 
enabled the Opposition and minor parties to stall the clause for four years; and, when 
the clause was passed, it was the Senators from minor parties who stood up and spoke 
out. 
In the UK, as members of the House of Commons correctly observed, it was the 
“other place” that refused to countenance the ouster clause.
558 The House of Lords, 
with its much weaker party discipline and its insulation from electoral pressure, its 
tradition as the house of the ‘good and the great’, and its Law Lords and Bishops, 
proved critical in forcing the climb-down. As one MP observed, such a clause may 
well have been passed by a wholly elected upper House
559 — and the relevant example 
(although quoted nowhere) is that of Australia.  
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4  Qualified celebrations Qualified celebrations Qualified celebrations Qualified celebrations    
The simplistic depiction of the ouster clause sagas as victories for the rule of law 
obscures the fact that the outcomes were never certain. Lurking in these sagas is the 
contrary decision in NAAV, and the haunting probability that, had the ouster clause 
been enacted in the UK, the judges would ultimately have blinked rather than pressed 
the nuclear button. 
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 The  sagas  also  expose  a  range  of  serious  institutional  deficiencies:  the 
inadequacies  of  constitutional  text,  precedent  and  mechanisms;  the  potential 
suspension of the normal gravitational laws of politics; the dangers of a dominant 
government and opposition; and the weakness of legislative scrutiny. Consultation 
periods are abridged; committee reports are ignored; dissent is contained by the whip 
of party discipline.  
Two institutional deficiencies deserve special comment. First, the political under-
representation and exclusion of immigrants is mitigated by, but not cured by, the 
efforts of advocacy organisations. These groups perform a valuable but ultimately a 
surrogate function. Nothing is as effective at protecting rights as the vote itself,
560 as 
the  differential  treatment  of  terrorist  suspects  in  the  UK  (discussed  below) 
demonstrated. Second, the judicial advice given on the ouster clause was not only 
“naïve”,
561 but also starkly reveals the dangers of the co-operative approach of the 
British judiciary. In Australia, with its stricter doctrine of separation of powers and its 
constitutional  power  to  strike  down  legislation,  such  co-operation  would  be 
unthinkable. Unwritten constitutional arrangements depend more heavily upon the 
mutual  respect  of  the  government  and  the  judiciary,  but  it  renders  the  judiciary 
vulnerable when the respect is not, indeed, mutual.  
Finally, the success is qualified. The Australian ouster clause has forced lawyers 
into the narrow gateways of ‘jurisdictional error’, distorting immigration cases into 
procedural  disputes.
562  The  shift  in  immigration  jurisdiction  to  the  FMC  has 
effectively minimised the effect of a more liberal Federal Court. The UK ouster clause 
drew the heat and fire away from the abolition of the IAT. The transitional filter 
mechanism in the UK still provides lesser procedural protection, and has added an 
extraordinary  layer  of  legal  complexity.  Most  significantly,  the  governments  have 
found  other,  more  indirect,  ways  of  restricting  access  to  the  courts,  as  chapter  1 
described more fully.  
What, then, can we learn from the ouster clause sagas? We learn that in the face 
of a direct threat to the raison d’être of the courts, our legal and political systems are 
capable  of  mobilising  and  capturing  the  challenge  adequately,  but  not  without 
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difficulty. Even in this case, the legal constellation may prove haphazard and deficient 
in its formal reach, and may still point in different directions, making the outcomes 
far from inevitable. These legal deficiencies and tensions are most exposed when the 
usual  political  constraints  do  not  operate  effectively.  Worst  of  all,  once  the 
constitutional  heat  is  off,  smaller,  less  recognisable,  threats  tend  to  slip  past 
exhausted combatants.  
3  Exporting the border 
As already discussed, one more indirect, albeit highly visible, way of restricting 
access is through interception schemes. Here I compare the judicial examination of 
two interception schemes: the Tampa litigation in Australia, and the Prague Airport 
scheme, in which British immigration controls were performed prior to embarkation 
to preclude the arrival of Roma refugee claimants.
563 Although the schemes are not 
directly comparable, they share similar purposes and raise similar challenges. 
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  The  The  The  The Tampa  Tampa  Tampa  Tampa c c c case ase ase ase    
The facts of the infamous Tampa affair can be recounted briefly.
564 In late August 
2001,  the  Australian  government  refused  to  allow  a  Norwegian  freighter  (the  MV 
Tampa) into Australian waters, after having requested that it rescue 438
565 potential 
refugee  claimants  from  a  sinking  boat.  Facing  an  imminent  election,  the  Howard 
government  declared:  “We  will  decide  who  comes  to  this  country  and  the 
circumstances in which they come.” An international crisis brewed as the Tampa idled 
just  outside  Australian  waters,  with  the  Australian  government  hastily  cobbling 
together  the  ‘Pacific  Solution’,  until  on  29  August  an  Australian  military  squad 
boarded the Tampa as it attempted to enter Australian waters.  
The next day, Melbourne’s pro bono community applied to the Federal Court for 
habeas corpus on behalf of those on the Tampa. On 11 September, just hours before 
the Twin Towers fell, North J upheld the claim;
566 but a week later, a majority of the 
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Full  Federal Court  (Black  CJ  dissenting)  reversed  this  decision.
567  The High  Court 
refused special leave to appeal on 27 November.
568 
The twin Tampa judgments evidence extremely well both the haphazardness and 
deficiencies  of  the  legal  constellation,  and  the  influence  of  competing  normative 
paradigms on judicial reasoning. Before North J, the applicants had also claimed that 
the  government  had  infringed  the  constitutional  freedom  of  communication  by 
refusing the solicitors access to the refugee claimants, and argued that ss 245F(9) and 
189 of the Act required that the Tampa survivors be brought into, and detained, in 
Australia.
569 An unlikely coalition of arguments thus invoked the regimes of judicial 
review,  constitutional  law,  and  immigration  law.  However,  these  arguments  were 
never examined, because the applicants failed to satisfy the overly restrictive ‘special 
interest’ test of standing
570 and because the constitutional freedom did not require the 
facilitation  of  communication
571  —  exposing  two  deficiencies  of  the  legal 
constellation.  By  refusing  access  to  the  refugee  claimants,  the  government  could 
effectively  preclude  anyone  from  satisfying  the  standing  test,  and  thus  partly 
immunise its own actions. In a curious aside, Beaumont J exposed another deficiency: 
his  Honour  emphasised  that  the  Federal  Court,  as  a  statutory  court,  had  no 
jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus but rather orders in ‘the nature of’ habeas 
corpus, which (his Honour suggested) meant the Federal Court had greater discretion 
to refuse claims of habeas corpus.
572  
The challenge was more adequately captured by the key issues of habeas corpus: 
was there detention, and was it lawful? Here, North J and Black CJ disagreed with 
Beaumont and French JJ (as he then was).
573 North J’s approach was straightforward: 
on the evidence, the government “took to themselves the complete control over the 
bodies and destinies of the rescuees”,
574 and this restraint on liberty amounted to 
detention.  Black  CJ  found  this  conclusion  was  “inevitable”,  since  “viewed  as  a 
practical,  realistic  matter,  the  rescued  people  were  unable  to  leave  the  ship”.
575 
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French J,  with  whom  Beaumont  J  agreed,  questioned  this,  suggesting  that  the 
detention  was  “incidental”  to  the  main  objective  of  preventing  the  rescuees  from 
landing, and not in truth attributable to the Commonwealth’s actions.
576 
North J gave short shrift to the argument that the detention was authorised by 
prerogative  power,  holding  that  any  such  power  had  been  supplanted  by  the 
comprehensive  provisions  of  the  Act.
577  It  was  this  argument,  however,  that  held 
centre stage on appeal. 
French J, holding that the detention was authorised by the executive power in s 61 
of the Constitution, emphasised the centrality of exclusion to the sovereignty of the 
State:  
The power to determine who may come into Australia is so central to its sovereignty that 
it is not to be supposed that the Government of the nation would lack under the power 
conferred upon it directly by the Constitution, the ability to prevent people not part of the 
Australian community, from entering.
578 
Given this centrality, even the comprehensive scope of the Act did not manifest 
an  intention  to  displace  powers  in  this  “specific  area”.
579  Beaumont  J  made  the 
majority’s privileging of the normative model of immigration law even more explicit. 
His Honour also held that since there was no common law right to enter, there was 
no  foundation  for  habeas  corpus
580  —  evidencing  the  continued  vitality  of  the 
normative paradigm evidenced in Musgrove.  
In  contrast,  Black  CJ’s  dissent  adopted  a  ‘public  law’  normative  paradigm, 
favouring the transparency and accountability of statute over the prerogative, and 
thus subjecting to greater scrutiny the executive’s claims to an untrammelled power 
of coercion. Reviewing the historical record, Black CJ doubted whether a prerogative 
power to expel existed at the time of Federation, and had thus been incorporated into 
the executive power.
581 Even if it had, this power had been displaced by statute. Such a 
conclusion  was  favoured  by  several  factors:  the  coerciveness  of  the  power;  the 
doubtfulness of the existence of the prerogative power; the fact that immigration had 
“been  the  concern  of  the  Parliament  for  a  very  long  time”;  the  fact  that  no  such 
executive power had been exercised in a long time; and the fact that such a power 
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could be exercised incompatibly with treaty obligations.
582 Most importantly, the Act 
was  very  comprehensive,  evincing  no  gaps,  and  including  a  parallel  regime  for 
chasing, searching and detaining ships.
583 Thus, the eventual outcome in Tampa was 
resolved through the majority’s privileging of the immigration law model, with its 
focus on the ‘external’ perspective of the State and its relationship of sovereignty and 
subjection, at the expense of the ‘public law’ model, with its focus on the ‘internal’ 
perspective and its focus on executive accountability. 
These substantive issues were left unresolved by the High Court, which refused 
special leave to appeal because, by then, events had overtaken the claim. The rescuees 
had  all  been  transferred  to  Nauru  or  New  Zealand  and  were  outside  Australian 
jurisdiction,  including  the  control  of  Australian  officers.  There  was  no  longer  any 
present duty to found mandamus, and a bare declaration as to past conduct was not 
sufficient. Finally, any dispute as to whether the detention had in fact been unlawful 
was, in the Court’s view, now “hypothetical”.  
As luck would have it, however, the High Court had jurisdiction to hear appeals 
from the Supreme Court of Nauru, where most of the Tampa survivors ended up.
584 It 
was thus able to entertain, in Ruhani (No 2),
585 the claim that detention in Nauru 
under the Pacific Solution was unlawful. However, the claim was narrowly based on 
the  statutory  interpretation  of  the  power  to  detain,  and  ultimately  failed  (Kirby  J 
dissenting).  
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  The  The  The  The Prague Airport Prague Airport Prague Airport Prague Airport case  case  case  case    
Barely  a  month  prior  to  Tampa,  the  UK  had  begun  its  pre-clearance  pilot  in 
Prague Airport, and within 3 weeks, more than 110 people had been intercepted.
586 
While the European Roma Rights Centre (together with individual claimants) failed 
in its challenge to the scheme both at first instance
587 and on appeal,
588 it succeeded 
spectacularly  at  the  House  of  Lords,  which  ruled  unanimously  that  the  scheme 
violated the prohibition on racial discrimination.
589 
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Once again, an unlikely constellation of arguments was invoked. (Notably, the 
HRA was not engaged, because the agreed facts did not engage either Arts 2 or 3, and 
because  of  the  primarily  territorial  nature  of  the  jurisdiction.)
590  The  two  major 
grounds invoked anti-discrimination law and refugee law, while two lesser grounds 
concerned the interpretation of the Rules and the fettering of discretion.  
These lesser grounds evidenced the haphazardness and deficiencies of the legal 
constellation. The first argument was that asking for asylum was a ‘purpose covered 
by the Rules’, and thus the officers should have permitted those claimants who had 
openly  admitted  a  desire  to  claim  asylum  to  do  so  —  a  rather  ingenious  (and 
ingenuous)  legal  argument,  which  ultimately  could  not  be  reconciled  with  the 
‘exceptionality’  of  asylum  in  the  Rules.
591  The  second,  similarly  ingenious  and 
ingenuous, argument was that the officers had illegitimately fettered their discretion 
by  refusing  to  consider  requests  for  asylum  abroad  under  extra-statutory 
concessions
592 — revealing, in their exposure of these obscure concessions (one of 
which was entirely unwritten),
593 the inaccessibility of immigration law.  
The Prague Airport judgments also revealed clearly the limitations of the political 
structure  and  cardinal  text  of  refugee  law.  Counsel  argued  that  by  effectively 
precluding  the  obligation  of  non-refoulement  from  arising,  the  UK  breached  its 
obligation  of  good  faith.  Here,  again,  the  normative  logic  of  the  regime  —  the 
protection of people from persecution — extended beyond the text of the Convention, 
which  embedded  the  fateful  internal  compromise  that  the  person  be  ‘outside  his 
country’.  That  compromise,  so  ruled  all  the  judges,  could  not  be  defeated  by  the 
combination of a generous and purposive interpretation and the invocation of good 
faith. 
The plural sites of refugee law were also engaged, as the House of Lords was 
asked to consider the customary international legal status of the obligation of non-
refoulement beyond the frontiers of the State.
594 Here, too, the political structure of 
refugee law — in which State practices of interception and carriers’ sanctions readily 
pointed to the conclusion that there was no such customary international norm — 
defeated the claim.
595 
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Instead, it was the ground of racial discrimination that proved critical. In the 
Court  of  Appeal,  Laws  LJ  had  dissented  upon  this  issue,  while  Simon  Brown  LJ 
confessed he had changed his mind “more than once”.
596  
The  principal  claim  rested  on  the  extension  of  the  prohibition  of  racial 
discrimination to public authorities, including immigration officers, under s 19B of the 
Race Relations Act 1976, a section inserted by the early New Labour amendments of 
2000.
597 The success of this claim depended upon two strokes of luck: the fortuitous 
timing of this extension; and the even more fortuitous refusal of the government to 
rely on its ministerial authorisation permitting racial discrimination.
598  
Most crucially, it depended upon the logic of anti-discrimination law. As Laws LJ 
and the House of Lords identified, it was abundantly clear that in cases of direct 
discrimination the motive for acting on racial grounds was irrelevant.
599 Thus, the fact 
that the officers were discriminating against Roma because they were more likely to 
be refugee claimants, even though this stereotype may have been true, did not help 
the Home Office.
600 As Baroness Hale pointed out, “[t]he object of the legislation is to 
ensure that each person is treated as an individual and not assumed to be like other 
members of the group.”
601  
It  was  the  desire  to  reconcile  the  strong  principle  of  individual  equality  that 
structured anti-discrimination law with the premise of group-based controls inherent 
in immigration control that had swung Burton J and Simon Brown LJ the other way. 
Burton  J  considered  the  differences  were  referable  to  permissible  purposes  of 
immigration control; Simon Brown LJ found himself unable to accept that there could 
be racial discrimination when the “common sense”
602 view was that the officers were 
not rejecting “Roma as Roma”,
603 but rather as prospective asylum seekers.  
The eventual result was therefore broader than initially envisaged. Burton J had 
noted that success would affect only the mode of operation of the scheme
604 but, as 
Baroness Hale emphasised, such a scheme carried an inherently high risk of racial 
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discrimination,  and  would  require  “enormous  care”  to  be  operated  without  racial 
discrimination.
605 The Home Office has not run such operations since. 
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  The challenge of extraterritoriality The challenge of extraterritoriality The challenge of extraterritoriality The challenge of extraterritoriality    
These  two  cases  differed  significantly  in  terms  of  legal  frameworks,  judicial 
reasoning and eventual outcomes. In both cases, however, the principal challenge was 
effectively displaced and distorted by the legal constellation. 
3.3.1  DOING IT ELSEWHERE  
The principal challenge of interception schemes is that they enable States “to 
perpetrate violations [of the law elsewhere] … which it could not perpetrate on its 
own territory”
606 — to do things abroad that they could not do at home.
607 Here, the 
normative justifications for legal scrutiny stretch beyond the institutional limits (in 
the form of the jurisdictional reach) of the domestic legal order.  
Like the ouster clauses, these schemes precluded access to domestic systems of 
appeal and review. The Tampa affair also undermined the major legal value of liberty. 
These schemes also posed a challenge to legal coherence, exposing tensions between 
domestic  and  international  legal  obligations, and  revealing  the  gulf between  what 
States profess to do in treaties, and what they do in practice. It is hardly a morally 
coherent position to accept that refugees require protection from persecution, but 
only when they arrive and not a minute before. Finally, as the Prague Airport case 
manifests, these schemes expose the tension between the premise of inequality in 
immigration law, and the premise of equality in other legal regimes.  
These  are  challenges  which  cannot  ultimately  be  resolved  since  they  are 
embedded  in  the  legal  structure.  Like  all  empires,  law’s  empire  may  aspire  to 
universality but must exist, at least primarily, within territorial limits. We may also 
aspire to legal coherence, but the diversity of legal regimes, concepts, and histories 
precludes that. Extraterritorial schemes pose a more subtle and complex challenge 
than the ouster clauses, one that exposes fissures both in legal constellations and 
judicial reasoning.  
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3.3.2  CONFIGURING THE LEGAL CONSTELLATIONS 
An obvious effect of the legal constellations was the influence of the deficiencies 
of  its  legal  regimes,  such  as  the  restrictive  standing  test  and  the  limitations  on 
freedom of speech in the Tampa litigation, and in the treatment of the lesser grounds 
of appeal in Prague Airport. 
However, their most important effect was to obscure the nature of the challenge. 
In the Tampa case, the question of non-refoulement was only glancingly noticed,
608 
and the extra-territorial challenge emerged only in the High Court, since prior to that 
the refugee claimants were within territorial jurisdiction. However, in the High Court 
the  legal  constellation  rendered  the  challenge  of  extra-territoriality  “hypothetical”, 
and  thus  invisible.  The  procedural  limits  of  the  prerogative  writs  meant  that  the 
Australian legal system was finally unable to ‘see’ beyond its borders.  
Indeed, the Tampa judgments are remarkable for their insularity, especially when 
contrasted  to  the  extensive  reference  to  international  law  in  Prague  Airport.  The 
Tampa  judgments  focused  almost  exclusively  on  domestic  law,  and  emphasised 
governmental powers rather than individual rights. The legal constellation re-framed 
the challenge in terms of some of the more arcane questions of constitutional and 
administrative  law:  the  existence  of  the  royal  prerogative,  the  difference  between 
executive and prerogative power, the different rules of standing for habeas corpus and 
mandamus,  and  the  distinction  between  the  writ  of,  and  orders  in  the  nature  of, 
habeas corpus. 
 In stark contrast, the Prague Airport case invoked a more plural, rights-oriented 
framework  that  focused  on  the  constraints  on  State  power  —  in  the  form  of 
international  legal  obligations  and  customary  international  law,  including  the 
prohibition of racial discrimination. The principal challenge of extraterritoriality also 
emerged much more clearly in the refugee law ground in the Prague Airport case, 
although it was ultimately obscured by the conceded extraterritorial application of 
the Race Relations Act.
609  
The  second  important  effect  of  the  legal  constellations  was  the  way  their 
configuration  structured  both  the  fissures  within,  and  the  borders  between,  the 
different legal regimes. The different privileging of the immigration law and public 
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law  models  in  the  Tampa  litigation  constructed  different  borders  between  the 
regimes,  with  the  majority  constructing  a  constitutional  power  that  matched  the 
breadth of the foundational norm of immigration law, and the minority constructing 
immigration law as subject to the constraints of public law. In Prague Airport, the 
premise of equality in anti-discrimination law trumped the premise of inequality in 
immigration law. While anti-discrimination law demanded that all be treated equally 
on the merits, immigration law was premised on risk-based differentiation between 
ethnic  groups  and  nationalities,  creating  a  “wholly  inevitable”
610  tension.  Simon 
Brown LJ’s solution was to attempt to fudge the tension by taking somewhat distorted 
“jurisprudential  paths”,
611  while  the  House  of  Lords  and  Laws  LJ  took  the 
jurisprudentially straightforward, albeit politically sensitive, approach of ‘trumping’. 
The non-refoulement argument, on the other hand, was dealt with by drawing a 
horizontal  boundary  between  the  terms  of  the  Convention  and  its  larger 
humanitarian purpose,
612 a boundary between text and non-text which mapped both 
on  to  the  international  border  and  the  boundary  between  judicial  legitimacy  and 
illegitimacy. As Lord Bingham said: 
[T]he  court's  task  remains  one  of  interpreting  the  written  document  to  which  the 
contracting states have committed themselves. It must interpret what they have agreed. It 
has  no  warrant  to  give  effect  to  what  they  might,  or  in  an  ideal  world  would,  have 
agreed.
613  
The ‘vertical’ boundary between the non-refoulement obligation and domestic law 
was more contested. While Simon Brown LJ held that domestic law prevailed since 
the  Convention  was  not  fully  incorporated,
614  Lord  Steyn  considered  that  the 
Convention was in practice fully incorporated,
615 although this appears to have been 
rejected subsequently.
616 
Vertical boundaries were also involved in considering whether the obligation of 
non-refoulement,  and  the  prohibition  on  racial  discrimination,  had  the  status  of 
customary international law. These vertical boundaries reflect the tension between 
internal  and  external  perspectives  of  sovereignty,  since  the  incorporation  of 
customary international law defers to executive action in its external guise as State 
action, while the incorporation of treaties defers rather to the legislature. 
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Further, while the House of Lords held the extended version of non-refoulement 
had not attained the status of customary international law, the prohibition on racial 
discrimination was accorded such status, although it is almost certainly less respected 
in practice. This status was accorded because of the repetition of the norm in human 
rights  treaties,  and  also  because  the  International  Court  of  Justice  (‘ICJ’)  and 
commentators had pronounced it as such.
617 The reasoning therefore demonstrates 
the methodological respect of the law for text (in the form of treaties) and vertical 
hierarchies (in its deference to the ICJ). 
3.3.3  JUDICIAL REASONING 
The  above  analysis  demonstrates  how  legal  constellations  fissure  processes  of 
judicial reasoning. Tensions within legal constellations both produce and structure 
spaces  for  judicial  agency.  Judges  may  seek  to  reconcile  or  trump,  may  weight 
normative frameworks differently, and may perform vertical or horizontal boundary-
work. They may seek congruence between domestic, regional and international legal 
orders — as the House of Lords did in relation to racial discrimination — or they may 
emphasise the boundaries between them. They may descend into the subtleties of the 
differences between writs of habeas corpus, and orders in the nature of habeas corpus; 
or  they  may  prefer  the  uncompromising  but  clear  route  of  anti-discrimination 
principles. 
Judges  even,  occasionally,  seek  to  re-frame  the  question,  acknowledging  the 
distortions of the legal constellation. For example, Wilcox J in NAAV re-framed non-
citizens in inclusive terms, noting that these were people potentially “very close to 
home: the woman our son wishes to marry, the father of our daughter’s child”.
618  
Even more striking, however, is the re-framing engaged in by Kirby J in Ruhani 
(No 2). His Honour sought to re-frame the arguments more broadly, arguing that the 
extraordinary arrangements of the Pacific Solution were simply not contemplated by 
the  Nauruan  Act.
619  Further,  his  Honour  sought  to  take  advantage  of  both  the 
differences and the similarities between the domestic regimes of Nauru and Australia. 
On the one hand, these differences allowed him to follow the minority decision in Al-
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Kateb,
620 to rely upon Nauru’s constitutional guarantee of liberty,
621 and to invoke the 
interpretative presumption in favour of coherence with international law, a principle 
the “extent and application” of which had been disputed in Australia but was well-
established  “in  the  Commonwealth  of  Nations”.
622  On  the  other  hand,  the 
commonalities  evinced  the  fundamental  nature  of  the  protection  of liberty  in  the 
common law.
623  
Of  course,  judicial  agency  is  not  unconstrained.  Rather,  underlying  these 
different  approaches  is  the  desire  to  defend  law’s  empire,  differently  interpreted. 
While  North  J  and  Black  CJ  sought  to  defend  the  value  of  liberty  and  the 
accountability of the State, the majority sought to defend State sovereignty; while 
Simon Brown LJ sought to defend the law from counter-intuitive results, the House of 
Lords  and  Laws  LJ  sought  to  defend  anti-discrimination  law  from  tortuous 
jurisprudential paths.  
These contingent defences map on to an underlying tension between, on the one 
hand,  the  defence  of  the  institutional  legitimacy  of  the  law  —  as  manifested  in 
deference  to  the  political  branches,  respect  for  the  contractual  agreements  of  the 
States, and an acknowledgment of the territorial limits of the law — and, on the 
other, the defence of the normative legitimacy of the law, as manifested in underlying 
principles of equality, the rule of law, liberty, and human rights. While these two 
imperatives  are  not  always  in  competition,  at  times  —  and,  in  the  case  of 
immigration, quite often — their tensions are exposed. Those tensions are resolved 
not merely through judicial predispositions, but also through the configuration of the 
particular legal constellation. 
4   Indefinite detention 
The  role  of  judicial  agency  emerges  most  clearly  in  the  cases  on  indefinite 
detention because of the marked divergence between the two jurisdictions. In the UK, 
the path of judicial resistance to indefinite detention has been, since the seminal case 
of Hardial Singh,
624 onward and upward, culminating in the famous Belmarsh case.
625 
In  Australia,  judicial  resistance  has  been  more  fractured,  with  the  Federal  Court 
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following the Hardial Singh path,
626 but the High Court overruling this approach in 
Al-Kateb.
627 In that case, the High Court concluded indefinite detention was both 
constitutional and, in the circumstances of that case, mandated by the Act. 
This divergence cannot readily be accounted for by the nature of the challenge — 
that  of  protecting  the  value  of  liberty,  and  ensuring  judicial  supervision  of 
deprivations  of  liberty  —  since  that  challenge  is  both  common,  direct  and 
fundamental.  Indeed,  the  challenge  is  more  acute  because  the  justification  for 
immigration detention is mere administrative efficiency, and judicial supervision is 
relatively minimal.  
Indefinite detention does, however, expose a tension between immigration law 
and public law. Immigration law requires enforcement through deportation and thus, 
practically, requires detention in some cases. Up to a point, therefore, administrative 
detention  is  in  the  interests  of  the  law.  However,  it  is  not  this  tension  between 
administrative efficacy and legal control that accounts for the divergence between the 
two jurisdictions, but rather judicial agency, as structured by the legal constellation.  
4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1  From  From  From  From Singh  Singh  Singh  Singh to  to  to  to A A A A    
The trajectory of British case law is largely one of elevation. In Hardial Singh, 
Woolf  J  sought  to  resolve  the  tension  between  the  administrative  imperative  and 
constitutional  values  by  interpreting  the  statutory  power  to  detain  as  implicitly 
restricted to effecting the administrative imperative. Thus, the power of detention 
had to be exercised for the purpose of effecting removal. As a consequence, the power 
was  limited  to  a  period  reasonably  necessary  to  enable  deportation;  the  Secretary 
must exercise “all reasonable expedition” to ensure removal within a reasonable time; 
and the Secretary could not continue to detain if it became apparent that removal 
could not be effected within a reasonable period.
628 
The  six-page  judgment  is  strikingly  modest.  The  principles  are  simply  stated 
without any exegesis of the legislative text or policy, statements of high constitutional 
principle, or even invocations of statutory presumptions. However, subsequent cases 
have elevated and constitutionalised these principles.
629  
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Thus, in Re Wasfi Suleman Mahmod, Laws J held that powers to detain would be 
“narrowly and strictly construed” and supervised by the courts “according to high 
standards”.
630  In  Tan  Te  Lam,
631  the  Privy  Council  elevated  the  phrase  “pending 
removal” to a jurisdictional fact, and emphasised that “very clear”
632 words would be 
needed to exclude or modify the principles. In R(A),
633 the Court forcefully held that it 
would determine the reasonableness of detention for itself, rather than review the 
reasonableness of the Secretary’s decision. For Toulson LJ, this was mandated both by 
the common law libertarian tradition, and by the court’s duty to determine the issue 
of  proportionality  for  itself  under  the  HRA,  re-characterising  the  Singh 
‘reasonableness’ test as an exercise in proportionality, and thereby demonstrating the 
harmony of the common law and the ECHR.
634 
However, the tension between the administrative imperative and constitutional 
values  surfaces  in  judicial  disagreement  over  the  weighting  of  factors  in  the 
application  of  the  principles.  Differently  constituted  Courts  of  Appeal  have,  thus, 
disagreed about the weight to be given to the factors of a refusal to return voluntarily, 
and the risks of absconding and re-offending.
635  
This trajectory of constitutionalisation and convergence reached its apogee in the 
Belmarsh case. There was, however, a significant contextual difference, since Belmarsh 
concerned  legislation  which  authorised  potentially  indefinite  detention  of  non-
citizens  suspected  of  being  international  terrorists.
636  Thus,  although  the  regime 
depended upon immigration categories, and resulted from the constraint of Art 3 
ECHR on immigration policy,
637 its objective was not to enforce immigration law but 
to prevent crime.  
The case involved two key issues. On the first, the nine-member
638 House of the 
Lords, with the exception of Lord Hoffmann, held that the government’s derogation 
from Art 5(1) ECHR, on the basis that the Al-Qaeda threat amounted to an ‘emergency 
threatening the life of the nation’, was valid. On the second issue, however, eight 
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Lords,  reversing  the  Court  of  Appeal,  agreed  with  SIAC  below
639  that  the  regime 
violated  Art  5  ECHR  in  combination  with  Art  14  ECHR.  The  House  held  that 
distinguishing  between  suspected  terrorists  by  nationality  was  not  rationally 
connected to the purpose of protecting national security, and thus disproportionately 
interfered with non-citizens’ right to liberty.  
This case therefore exposed an acute tension between the executive’s privileged 
role  in  the  field  of  national  security,  and  the  constitutional  role  of  judges  in 
supervising deprivations of liberty.
640 This tension was sharpened by the heightened 
importance of terrorism; the prolonged political process and controversy involved in 
the development of the regime; and the fact that detention could be justified merely 
on ‘suspicion’ of terrorism. The different outcomes in the courts reflected different 
judicial  resolutions  of  this  tension,  as  well  as  the  tension  between  the  inequality 
implicit  in  immigration  law  and  the  premise  of  equality  in  human  rights  law 
(including  the  common  law’s  commitment  to  equality  in  the  context  of  habeas 
corpus).
641  
On  the  critical  question  of  discrimination,  the  Court  of  Appeal,  giving  due 
deference  to  the  executive  in  matters  of  national  security,
642  had  accepted  the 
Secretary’s submission that he considered it only necessary to detain non-national 
suspects.
643 Further, it accepted that there “were objective, justifiable and relevant 
grounds for selecting only the alien terrorists”,
644 namely that aliens had no right of 
abode.
645 Thus, the legally justifiable discrimination inherent in immigration law also 
justified the detention of non-nationals. The House of Lords found differently because 
the legislative object was the control of terrorism, not immigration. Thus, the correct 
comparison was between suspected terrorists who were nationals, and those were not, 
and in this context the equality-based model of human rights, including the common 
law tradition, applied.  
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 The House’s decision was promoted by the HRA in a number of ways. First, the 
HRA provided an explicit and apt formulation both of the principle of equality and of 
the constitutional value of liberty.
646  
Second, the ECHR itself re-weighted the balance between national security and 
liberty. As Lord Brooke noted, it was part of: 
a distinct movement away from the doctrine of the inherent power of the state to control 
the treatment of non-nationals within its borders as it will towards a regime, founded on 
modern  international  human  rights  norms,  which  is  infused  by  the  principle  that  any 
measures that are restrictive of liberty, whether they relate to nationals or non-nationals, 
must be such as are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society.
647  
This re-weighting is reflected in the more intense scrutiny of the proportionality 
standard, and also in the more sceptical attitude of the House of Lords based on 
“admonitory”
648  memories  of  the  historical  abdication  of  courts  in  cases  of 
internment,
649 and of the absence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
650  
Third, the HRA introduced into the legal constellation the traditions of European 
and  international  human  rights  law,  as  evidenced  by  Lord  Bingham’s  litany  of 
references to international instruments.
651 Here the preference for coherence between 
domestic  and  other  legal  orders  was  marked.  The  international,  regional  and 
comparative  perspectives  shed  light  on  the  adequacy  of  the  domestic  order,  as 
evidenced  in  the  weight  given  to  the  fact  that  the  UK  was  the  only  country  to 
derogate from the ECHR in the wake of September 2001.
652 
Fourth, the greater plurality of the human rights law regime, evidenced in the 
citations  of  the  reports  of  domestic,  international,  and  non-governmental 
organisations, both de-centres the discursive role of the State, and enables indirect 
judicial criticism of executive actions. Law becomes therefore more autonomous of 
the State, and of domestic politics. Normative legitimacy may be sourced not only 
from the democratic processes of the State, but also from international consensus in 
the international community. 
Fifth,  the  HRA  also  re-ordered  the  internal  balance  of  governmental  power, 
through its conferral of a democratically legitimated mandate upon the judiciary.
653 
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Even  Lord  Scott,  who  was  uncomfortable  with  the  fact  that  a  declaration  of 
incompatibility amounted to a ‘political’ act, felt that the court’s duty was thrust upon 
it by the HRA.
654 Like the High Court in Plaintiff S157, therefore, the House of Lords 
could characterise itself as obedient to its constitutional function. 
Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, the HRA’s position in the legal hierarchy 
allowed it to ‘trump’ domestic legislation, albeit through the political processes of the 
HRA. Although the content of the HRA was assumed to converge with the common 
law libertarian tradition, it was superior in re-ordering the legal hierarchy.  
The  importance  of  judicial  agency  becomes  most  evident,  however,  in  the 
contrast  between  the  judgments  of  Lords  Bingham  and  Hoffmann.  For  Lord 
Hoffmann, al-Qaeda was not a threat to the ancient, redoubtable British society, in 
the sense of its existence as a distinct society,
655 and thus there was no ‘emergency’ 
validly founding the derogation. 
The  keynote  of  Lord  Hoffmann’s  short  speech  was  a  highly  strategic,  highly 
rhetorical appeal to the common law libertarian tradition, in preference to the ECHR. 
Of indefinite detention without trial or charge, his Lordship proclaimed: “Nothing 
could be more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the United 
Kingdom.”
656 In his view, the interpretation of Art 15 ECHR was a “technical issue”,
657 
and the ECHR itself merely the gift bequeathed by the common law tradition to the 
oppressed countries of Europe: 
Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is a quintessentially British liberty, enjoyed 
by the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be thrown 
into prison at the whim of their rulers. It was incorporated into the European Convention 
in order to entrench the same liberty in countries which had recently been under Nazi 
occupation.
658  
As Poole suggests, the insistence upon congruence between human rights and 
common law involves a “judicial sleight-of-hand”.
659 The equation between human 
rights  and  common  law  constitutionalism grants  Lord  Hoffman  the advantages  of 
both.
660 On the one hand, the HRA enables a court’s declaration of incompatibility 
with “our constitutional traditions”,
661 although those constitutional traditions would 
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not have permitted such a declaration. On the other, the invocation of the common 
law has several benefits. Rhetorically, his Lordship reframes a case about (relatively 
new)  alien  rights  for  (terrorist)  aliens  as  a  case  about  the  distinctively  British 
libertarian tradition being threatened by overweening governments: 
The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with 
its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as 
these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. It is for Parliament to 
decide whether to give the terrorists such a victory.
662  
In a tabloid world where the HRA has become the “terrorists’ charter”,
663 this was 
clearly a strategic attempt to defend the legitimacy of the court’s action. 
There  are  legal  benefits  too.  By  insisting  on  the  ‘Britishness’  of  liberty,  Lord 
Hoffmann took advantage of the margin of appreciation to hold British laws — and, 
by implication, those of the common law world — to a higher standard.
664 Further, his 
reasoning  foreclosed  the  possibility  that  the  government  could  simply  extend  the 
detention regime to British nationals.
665 However, the most important benefit was 
recognising  that  the  key  challenge  was  indefinite  detention  itself,  rather  than 
irrationality or discrimination.  
Paradoxically, therefore, this judgment soaked in appeal to nation and tradition 
— the very instruments of anti-foreigner discourse — was an attempt to defend the 
rights of foreigners. It was an attempt to redeem the discourse of rights in indigenous 
terms, and to reclaim the patriotic prerogative from Parliament. Yet it is precisely this 
parochialism and emotionalism which jars with the legal model of human rights as 
universal and rational, as opening outwards rather than turning inwards, a model that 
is expressed so well by Lord Bingham’s judgment.  
While the Belmarsh case perfectly exemplifies the strategy of trumping in the face 
of a direct challenge, its aftermath illustrates the ways in which more complex and 
subtle challenges produce greater judicial divergence and agonising compromises. As 
is  well  known,  the  system  of  control  orders  that  replaced  the  detention  regime 
sparked its own voluminous body of litigation,
666 including three further House of 
Lords decisions.
667 The strong affirmation of the values of liberty and equality in the 
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Belmarsh case is diluted when it comes to drawing more precise boundaries — such 
as  whether  a  curfew  of  16,  as  opposed  to  18,  hours  amounts  to  a  deprivation  of 
liberty.
668 The strategy of ‘trumping’ becomes increasingly less viable as the challenge 
becomes increasingly less clear. 
4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2  From  From  From  From Al Ma Al Ma Al Ma Al Masri sri sri sri to   to   to   to Al Al Al Al- - - -Kateb Kateb Kateb Kateb        
While  the  original  Australian  legislation  providing  for  mandatory  detention 
capped the length of detention,
669 the present legislation does not. Subsection 196(1) 
of the Act provides instead:  
An  unlawful  non-citizen  detained  under  section 189  must  be  kept  in  immigration 
detention until he or she is:  
      (a) removed from Australia under section 198 or 199; or  
      (b) deported under section 200; or  
      (c) granted a visa.  
The  question  of  whether  this  mandated  indefinite  detention  first  arose  in  Al 
Masri,
670 when a Palestinian detainee was, despite his request, unable to be removed 
for eight months. Merkel J granted an order in the nature of habeas corpus, on the 
basis of the Hardial Singh principles, and supported by Chu Kheng Lim
671 and the US 
case of Zadvydas.
672  
Several judges disagreed with Merkel J’s reasoning before the Full Court ruled on 
the appeal.
673 The Full Court found that, while the Hardial Singh principles were not 
directly applicable, the power to detain must be used bona fide for removal, so that it 
could only be exercised where “there is a real likelihood or prospect of the removal of 
the person from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future”.
674 The Court held that 
the legislation proceeded upon the false assumption that removal would be possible. 
Both Al Masri judgments followed an orthodox ‘progressive’ path that cohered 
with the UK line of authority, relying upon restrictive statutory interpretation, and 
supplemented by reference to international, comparative and human rights law. This 
path obviated the more difficult constitutional issues, as I discuss later. However, in 
2004, the High Court rejected several legal challenges to the mandatory detention 
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regime,
675 including challenges to indefinite detention in the twin cases of Al-Kateb 
and Al Khafaji.
676  
The Al Masri judgments, and those of the minority in Al-Kateb, prove that the 
path  marked  out  by  the  UK  was  available  and  arguably  applicable  in  Australia. 
Instead, the difference in outcome is best explained by the use of judicial agency. 
Rather  than  defending  the  constitutional  value  of  liberty  and  grounding  the 
normative legitimacy of the law in human rights, the majority sought to defend the 
methodological legitimacy of law, in terms of a positivist vision of textual fidelity and 
judicial subservience.  
The legal constellation promoted this vision. Literally read, s 196 provided only 
three avenues by which detention could be terminated. This was not open-textured 
language, conditioned on the power to remove, and the majority gave short shrift to 
the statutory interpretation issue, holding that the language was simply “too clear” 
and “intractable”.
677 That conclusion is contestable, since seven other judges disagreed 
on the meaning of that ‘clear’ language. For the majority, however, textual fidelity 
trumped the value of liberty, for the text was ‘there’, visible and concrete, and the 
value at best vague and interstitial. 
This  ‘plain  meaning’  approach  to  statutory  interpretation  also  informed  the 
approach taken to the constitutional issue. The main difficulty was the absence of any 
straightforward  textual  route  for  the  protection  of  liberties  in  the  Australian 
Constitution.
678 The constitutional argument consisted of linking together a set of 
propositions. First, the doctrine of separation of powers required that judicial powers 
only be exercised by the judiciary; second, the power to judge criminal guilt and to 
detain  was  a  judicial  power;  third,  the  power  to  impose  punitive  detention  thus 
offended  the  exclusivity  of  judicial  power;  fourth,  the  Commonwealth’s  power  to 
detain was an incident of its executive power to deport; and fifth, if detention was no 
longer ‘appropriate or adapted’ or ‘reasonably necessary’ to achieve deportation, it 
became  punitive  and  thus  offended  the  exclusivity  of  judicial  power.  Part  of  this 
argument had been mapped out earlier in Chu Kheng Lim, but its ratio was far from 
clear and it had been subsequently criticised.
679 What is evident, however, is that the 
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constitutional path was tortuous rather than straightforward, and creative rather than 
literal.  As  McHugh  J  tartly  observed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  provision  of  a 
separate  chapter  devoted  to  judicial  power  may  have  the  result  of  invalidating 
indefinite executive detention of non-nationals.
680 
The closed language of the legislation and the glaring absence of rights in the 
written Constitution thus precluded any straightforward textual route to invalidity. 
Normatively, too, the outcome was shaped by an Australian constitutional framework 
that promoted a particular conception of the legal/political boundary, and a positivist 
methodology. 
The  virtually  exclusive  focus  of  the  Australian  constitution  on  governmental 
power  translated  the  issue  of  indefinite  detention  through  the  prism  of  the 
constitutional concepts of legislative power, the doctrine of separation of powers, and 
the interpretative role of the High Court. The central issue was thus not the law’s 
protection of individual vulnerability from State oppression, but rather the law’s role 
in  demarcating  governmental  power.  Coupled  with  the  omission  of  rights  in  the 
Australian Constitution, this placed rights on the wrong side of the boundary between 
politics and law. Instead, the majority asserted, legal protection of human rights must 
be achieved the “hard” way, through constitutional amendment.
681 
More subtly, the focus of the Constitution on governmental power rather than 
human rights enabled the majority to imagine the detainee not as a rights-bearer, but 
as a wrongdoer. It is the detainee’s arrival without permission that has triggered the 
eventual  situation.
682  Detainees  frustrate  removal  because  of  their  blameworthy 
conduct, such as destroying identity documents and refusing to co-operate.
683 As well, 
detainees take the ‘gamble’ when they arrive that they will not be admitted.
684 This is 
transformed into the language of contract: it is a “term of [their] admission” that such 
a thing may happen,
685 and thus their detention is “self-inflicted”.
686 
These  images  grow  naturally  out  of  the  exclusivist  tendencies  of  Federation, 
preserved in the broad immigration and aliens power in the Constitution and in the 
exclusivist doctrines of early judicial precedents. Thus, as Hayne J noted, the power to 
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detain  was  not  an  ‘incident’  of,  but  rather  at  the  ‘centre’,
687  of  the  constitutional 
legislative power with respect to aliens, so the formula of ‘appropriate and adapted’ 
(which determined whether a matter fell within legislative power) was irrelevant.
688 
Further,  when  Kirby  J  sought  to  argue  that  indefinite  detention  was  “alien  to 
Australia’s constitutional arrangements”,
689 McHugh J was able to point to a string of 
authorities permitting internment in wartime.
690 Similarly, the majority’s argument 
that  detention  also  served  purposes  of  ‘exclusion’  and  ‘segregation’
691  echoes  the 
exclusivist tendencies of earlier case law.
692 
The Australian Constitution is also a text that promotes an insular and parochial 
outlook. While the strategy of convergence and coherence was readily available in the 
issue of statutory interpretation, it was less readily applicable in relation to a ‘unique’ 
constitutional  context.
693  Foreign  and  international  law  was  thus  dismissed  as  not 
“part of the law of this country”,
694 and their use in aiding interpretation condemned 
as  a  heretical  attempt  to  amend  the  Constitution.
695  The  exclusivist  bias  of  the 
Australian  Constitution  thereby  matches  well  the  insularity  of  the  constitutional 
framework, in which Australia is constructed as a distinct and closed community, 
rather than as part of a fraternity of civilised nations.  
Finally,  the  written  Constitution  itself  enables  the  majority’s  positivist 
methodology. It is impossible to be faithful to the text of an unwritten constitution, 
and thus impossible to construct the judiciary as merely interpretative handmaidens 
of the über-text. The constitutional text becomes privileged as the ultimate ‘source’ of 
authority, even for progressive judges, displacing unwritten constitutional norms and 
traditions.
696 Judicial legitimacy thus rests upon the faithful interpretation of the text, 
and  judges  trespass  beyond  the  parameters  of  the  text  at  their  peril.  Thus,  the 
“tragic”
697 consequences of the decision, along with rights, foreign and international 
law, were firmly placed in the political, and not the legal, sphere. 
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Al-Kateb reveals the majority’s vision of the Australian legal order as an isolated 
island, remote from the constitutional contexts of the UK and the US. In this simpler 
legal world, the Constitution is the textual foundation of legal authority; and in this 
world, judges can imagine — and construct — a “clear” and “intractable” boundary 
between  victim  and  violator;  non-citizen  and  citizen;  text  and  non-text;  between 
judicial legitimacy and illegitimacy; and between law and politics. 
5   The scope of review 
Finally,  I  turn  to  a  more  recurrent  and  humdrum  challenge  of  immigration 
review,  the  pressures  to  expand  the  scope  of  judicial  review  generated  by  a  field 
notorious  for  maladministration,  hostility  and  opaqueness.  This  challenge  exposes 
another tension: while the common law origins of judicial review empower judges to 
shape  the  grounds  of  judicial  review,  there  must  be  constraints  on  that  power to 
ensure that judges do not become administrators themselves. Those constraints have 
traditionally comprised an attitude of deference; a distinction between legality and 
the  merits;  and  the  common  law  methodology  of  incrementalism  by  analogy  to 
precedent.  
This tension is most readily exposed, therefore, in cases where underlying norms 
are  not  covered  by  existing  heads  of  judicial  review.  Like  the  cases  on  indefinite 
detention,  this  manifests  a  tension  between  the  normative  and  methodological 
legitimacy of the law.  
In this section, I focus on two landmark cases, Rashid
698 and Teoh,
699 and the 
subsequent judicial criticism of these cases in R(S)
700 and Lam.
701 However, in the UK 
case of R(S) the judges, while criticising Rashid’s reasoning, applauded its result; while 
in Australia, the High Court went out of its way to bury the legacy of Teoh in Lam. 
These differing outcomes are, once again, explained by the influence of judicial 
agency as structured by the legal constellation. The shift to the domain of judicial 
review reduces constitutional tensions, given the judiciary’s virtually sole authorship 
of law in this ‘self-regulated’ field. However, the political controversy provoked by 
Teoh undermined this model, endangering the constitutional balance.  
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This  political  backlash,  along  with  other  examples  of  the  activist  Mason  era, 
provoked  the  Howard  government’s  appointment  of  judicial  conservatives.  Thus, 
while recently judicial review in the UK has become increasingly grounded in broader 
notions of fairness and the protection of the individual, the Australian High Court has 
staunchly resisted this trend, a resistance promoted by the disavowal of rights-based 
discourse  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  considered  both  foreign  and  late  to  the 
constitutional discourse.  
5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1  Rashid Rashid Rashid Rashid and   and   and   and R(S) R(S) R(S) R(S)    
Rashid vividly exposes the tension between this shift towards broader notions of 
normative legitimacy and common law incrementalism. When Rashid, an Iraqi Kurd, 
had arrived in the UK, he had been entitled to refugee status under an existing policy. 
However,  dramatically  illustrating  the  inaccessibility  of  immigration  law,  no-one 
involved in his claim or appeal was aware of this policy until an identical case was 
brought  before  the  Court  of  Appeal. Rashid’s  advisers  sought  reconsideration,  but 
shortly  afterward,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  Iraqi  war,  the  Home  Office  suspended 
processing. Rashid’s case was not reconsidered until nearly a year later, when the 
policy no longer applied. 
The legal difficulty was that the case fell outside the “typical case of legitimate 
expectations”.
702 There was no “promise of asylum”
703 — there was no representation, 
assurance, or departure from a pre-existing policy. At the time of the reconsideration, 
the policy no longer existed so no legitimate expectation could be generated. This 
much was recognised by Rashid’s counsel. He argued that the “court should not be 
fixated with labels and should take an overall view”,
704 seeking refuge instead in the 
general principle of “conspicuous unfairness” amounting to an “abuse of power”, of 
which the doctrine of legitimate expectations was only an application.
705  
The Court of Appeal accepted that argument, emphasising the “gross nature”
706 of 
the errors of the Home Office,
707 and noting that there was no countervailing public 
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interest,  excepting  that  refugee  status  depended  upon  future  risk.
708  Instead  of 
remitting the case, the Court declared that Rashid was entitled to ILR. 
The legal argument made plain the conflict between methodological legitimacy 
and the broader normative justification of fairness. Several aspects of the case were 
unfair, although these went largely unexamined.  
First, the person who makes the errors ought to bear the consequences. Second, 
the errors were peculiarly within the knowledge of the Home Office, especially as the 
Iraqi Kurd issue had been very prominent at the time.
709 Third, nearly four years had 
elapsed by the time Rashid reached the Court of Appeal. Perhaps most significantly, 
other people in identical situations had been granted refugee status, undermining the 
principle that like should be treated alike.  
However, the case did not fit neatly into any existing head of judicial review, and 
was not readily susceptible to analogical incrementalism. Counsel’s argument simply 
combined two very broad and vague notions, that of “conspicuous unfairness” and 
“abuse  of  power”.  These  notions  are  conclusory  labels  rather  than  methods  of 
reasoning,  and  their  combination  neither  increases  their  clarity  nor  generates  a 
rationale.  The  court  left  unarticulated  the  doctrinal  elements  that  made  this 
unfairness either conspicuous or an abuse of power. As Elliott suggested, the case 
could  therefore  be  analysed  as  suggesting  that  the  court  had  power  to  intervene 
because  “something has  gone  badly  wrong,  even  if  the  court  cannot quite  put  its 
finger on it”
710 — a power which would radically undermine the claim that judicial 
review is concerned with the legality, rather than the merits, of administrative action. 
The analysis preferred by Elliott, however, is one that characterises the strategy 
more narrowly, and more traditionally, as that of analogical incrementalism, in which 
the underlying principle may be used in exceptional circumstances:  
to liberalise the application of existing heads of review (thus ensuring the protection of the 
norms underpinning them) by facilitating intervention in circumstances closely analogous 
to, but technically outwith, those in which such heads of review would usually operate.
711 
However, as both Elliott and Clayton have persuasively argued, the unfairness lies 
not in the grossness of the errors, but rather in the failure to treat like cases alike, and 
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thus the better conceptual ground may be the principle of consistency.
712 This would, 
however, require the judges to abandon the methodological orthodoxy of analogical 
incrementalism,  demanding  a  further  degree  of  boldness.  Why  should  courts  be 
empowered to insist upon consistency (and to what extent)? At least “conspicuous 
unfairness”  and  “abuse  of  power”  have  the  merit  of  referring  to  the  courts’ 
legitimating principles. Any such principle would also be in tension with the principle 
of individualised justice underlying the rule prohibiting the fettering of discretion. 
These methodological difficulties were exposed in R(S). In this case, an Afghani 
was deprived of the benefit of a policy that would have resulted in ELR status because 
of the government’s prolonged administrative delay. The unfairness was made vivid 
by the fact that his cousin, who had entered the UK at the same time, had received 
ELR and subsequently ILR status. 
Immigration cases frequently raise problems of administrative delay, in which 
maladministration  (typically  considered  an  issue  for  the  executive)  shades  into 
injustice,  most  acutely  in  the  case  of  immigration  since  delay  results  in  great 
insecurity  and  disruption.  These  tensions  are  dealt  with  in  judicial  review  by  the 
establishment of a nexus between delay and an accepted ground of judicial review (or 
under the HRA), including an assessment of the responsibilities for and effects of 
delay,  and  in  particular  their  proximity  to  the  border  between  law  and  politics.
713 
However, this re-working can distort both the complaint of delay and the doctrine, as 
R(S) illustrates.  
In R(S), several factors weighed in favour of protection: the inordinate length of 
the delay (nearly eight years);
714 the fact that the cause was an “arbitrary” policy to 
pursue a Public Service Agreement target for timely decisions on new claims, at the 
expense of older claims;
715 the potential consequences of return to Afghanistan; and 
the  contrast  with  the  cousin.
716  As  in  Rashid,  however,  there  was  no  legitimate 
expectation at the time of the later decision, because it was clear by then that the 
policy had changed.
717  
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The judges in R(S) were candid both about their desire to reach a favourable 
outcome,
718 and their unease with Rashid, which they felt blurred the line between 
illegality and maladministration.
719 Carnwath LJ rejected its transformation of ‘abuse 
of power’ into a “magic ingredient” and its “considerable extension of the existing 
authorities”.
720  The  Court  instead  characterised  the  decision  as  one  in  which  the 
decision  to  put on  hold  earlier  applications  amounted  to  an  unlawful  fettering  of 
discretion.
721 The unsatisfactory nature of this solution is illuminated by the fact that 
Elliott’s reading of Rashid as grounded in a principle of consistency is here re-framed 
as unfairness grounded in the opposing principle of individualised justice.  
The Court also re-interpreted the unusual remedy in Rashid of granting ILR as a 
decision that it was “plain and obvious” that the exercise of the discretion, in which 
correction of justice was a legally material factor, could only be exercised by the grant 
of ILR.
722 It is, however, perhaps more natural to infer that the remedy was chosen to 
relieve the poor claimant of the necessity of dealing with the administration once 
again. 
Rashid  and  R(S)  are  graphic  examples  of  the  tension  between  normative  and 
methodological  concerns  in  judicial  review,  manifested  in  the  desire  to  achieve 
administrative justice and the limitations of the heads of judicial review. While R(S) 
attempted  to  reconcile  the  tension  by  paying  greater  attention  to  the  doctrinal 
concerns, ultimately neither judgment resolved the tension satisfactorily. 
5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2  Teoh Teoh Teoh Teoh and   and   and   and Lam Lam Lam Lam    
A similar tension is evident in the Australian cases of Teoh and Lam, again in the 
field of legitimate expectations. However, these cases were further complicated by the 
interaction of judicial review with international human rights law.  
In  Teoh,  the  government  sought  to  deport  Teoh  on  the  basis  of  his  criminal 
convictions. Teoh was the sole breadwinner of a large Australian family, and it was 
acknowledged that the family would face a “very bleak and difficult future” if Teoh 
were deported.
723 The Full Federal Court, by majority, upheld the argument that there 
was a want of procedural fairness in the failure to fulfil the legitimate expectation that 
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the  decision-maker  would  regard  “the  best  interests  of  the  child”  as  a  primary 
consideration, as required by Art 3 of CROC, a treaty which Australia had ratified but 
not incorporated into domestic law.
724  
In the High Court, the majority (McHugh J dissenting) upheld the judgment, 
albeit  on  slightly  different  grounds.  All  the  judges  rejected  the  finding  that  the 
decision-maker was required to initiate inquiries, but the majority agreed a legitimate 
expectation had been generated which required procedural protection.  
Two aspects of the case posed challenges to the law. First, it is desirable in the 
interests of ‘good administration’ that governments comply with their international 
legal obligations in exercising their discretionary powers. More fundamentally, the 
failure to comply with international legal obligations undermines the binding nature 
of laws, making international law mere “window-dressing”.
725 The reasoning of the 
majority posed a challenge, however, to the methodological legitimacy of the law, 
because it significantly extended the doctrine of legitimate expectations.  
First,  the  source  of  the  legitimate  expectation  extended  the  sphere  of  the 
application of the doctrine in three ways: because the audience of the representation 
was “the world at large”;
726 because it could potentially apply to any decision that 
affected the interests of children;
727 and because it could also extend to over 900 other 
unincorporated  treaties.
728  Second,  an  unincorporated  treaty  could  engender 
legitimate  expectations  even  though  neither the  affected  person nor  the  decision-
maker  had  actual  knowledge  of  that  treaty.  This  extended  the  rationale  of  the 
doctrine from protecting the actual and induced expectations of people.
729 Third, the 
doctrine was used here not to extend the application of natural justice, or mitigate the 
effects of the reluctance to permit estoppel in public law, but rather to determine the 
content of the duty of procedural fairness.
730 Fourth, the source of the expectation was 
a legal norm, rather than conduct or representations.  
The  majority  judgments  did  not  clearly  address  these  doctrinal  difficulties. 
Rather,  the  principal  debate  concerned  the  challenge  to  the  legal  status  of 
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international law, with Mason CJ and Deane J emphasising that international law was 
to be given some weight rather than becoming “a merely platitudinous or ineffectual 
act”.
731  
Gaudron  J  sought  to  overcome  the  objections  as  to  the  ‘foreign’  source  by 
indigenising the expectation. She posited that there may be a “common law right” 
deriving  from  citizenship  to  have  the  child’s  best  interests  taken  into  account, 
relegating the Convention to “subsidiary status”.
732 Her Honour considered that “quite 
apart from the Convention” there would have been a reasonable expectation that the 
best  interests  of  the  child  would  be  a  primary  consideration.
733  Thus,  not  all 
unincorporated treaties would be capable of giving rise to such an expectation, but 
only those “in harmony with community values and expectations”.
734 
McHugh J, in dissent, took the historic, State-centric, view of international law. In 
his view, the ratification of a treaty was not a representation to the Australian people, 
but rather “a statement to the international community”.
735 This simplistic ‘external’ 
perspective  of  international  law  also  fatefully  combined  with  the  crudity  of  the 
vertical  hierarchy:  since  treaties  have  formally  equal  legal  status,  all  treaties  are 
capable of generating legitimate expectations. 
Underlying McHugh J’s dissent, however, is an inverse concern with the internal 
complexity of the State, in the form of the separation of powers. If ratification has the 
consequence of engendering legitimate expectations, the executive may by ratifying a 
treaty “effectively amend … the law”.
736 Further, this could have federal complications, 
for if the doctrine was extended to State officials then the federal executive could bind 
the States.
737  
Teoh  illustrates  not  only  the  doctrinal  complexities  but  also  the  political 
sensitivities  involved  in  such  judicial  extensions.  Both  the  Labor  and  succeeding 
Liberal governments issued executive statements intended to reverse its effect,
738 and 
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legislation overturning Teoh was passed in South Australia, and proposed federally.
739 
While Teoh has been embraced elsewhere,
740 it has not attracted universal support.
741  
Most significantly, Teoh was effectively buried by a more conservative Australian 
High  Court  in  Lam.  Lam’s  case  against  the  government  was  less  compelling  than 
Teoh’s. The ‘best interests’ of his Australian children had been addressed specifically 
in the decision to deport, and his claim was based instead on a legitimate expectation 
that  his  children’s  carer  would  be  contacted,  although  the  carer  had  already 
submitted a letter in support. Lam, therefore, could point to no unfairness, in the 
sense of a loss of an opportunity to make representations or detrimental reliance, a 
point upon which the High Court unanimously agreed. 
Although  reliance  upon  Teoh  was  expressly  disclaimed,
742  four  judges 
nevertheless severely questioned Teoh. They suggested that the doctrine of legitimate 
expectations served little purpose in Australian law, since it had historically developed 
as a way of extending the application of natural justice, and had thus lost its purpose 
since  Kioa  held  that  natural  justice  “presumptively  applied”.
743  Their  Honours 
considered  that  the  doctrine  should  not  be  used  to  determine  the  content  of  the 
duty,
744 and appeared to endorse McHugh J’s concerns in Teoh about separation of 
powers.
745 Callinan J further endorsed the criticism that Teoh was not justified by the 
underlying  rationale,  namely  that  of  actual  or  at  least  reasonably  inferred 
expectations.
746 Indeed, Callinan J dismissed Teoh in most forthright terms, calling 
the use of legitimate expectations in Teoh “a complete misnomer”.
747  
Their  Honours  also  expressly  rejected  the  doctrine  of  substantive  legitimate 
expectations,  considering  that  this  had  emerged  in  the  UK  as  a  result  of  an 
uncomfortable  assimilation  of  European  doctrines.
748  The  case  thus  reflects  a 
widening gap between Australian and British principles of judicial review. 
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These four cases illustrate the challenge of forms of administrative unfairness that 
fall between the gaps of judicial review. Partly, this dilemma results from the common 
law method of analogical incrementalism, since the piecemeal development of judicial 
review  makes  lacunae  in  the  law  inevitable.  Partly,  too,  the  problem  reflects  the 
unsettled nature of the normative foundations of judicial review.  
Most  importantly,  however,  the  dilemma  arises  because  the  legitimating 
principles  of  the  law  are  often  in  tension.  Methodological  legitimacy  may  be 
preserved,  but  at  the  expense  of  securing  fairness,  or  vice  versa.  In  resolving  the 
tensions between these principles, the classic judicial strategy is to fudge.  
6  Conclusion 
These four landmarks reveal the multiple ways in which immigration exposes 
tensions  between  competing  interests  and  visions  of  the  law,  inviting  competing 
defences of law’s empire. These defences are largely the product of three factors: the 
nature of the challenge; the legal constellation involved; and judicial agency. 
As we have seen, the more direct the challenge, the more coherent the response 
tends to be. However, challenges are rarely one-sided, more often exposing tensions 
between  legal  regimes,  within  legal  regimes,  between  normative  legitimacy  and 
institutional  limits,  and  between  normative  legitimacy  and  methodological 
legitimacy.  
Judges may respond to tensions between and within legal regimes, and between 
normative  and  methodological  legitimacy,  by  privileging  one  over  another, 
attempting to reconcile the two, identifying horizontal and vertical boundaries, or 
simply ‘trumping’ one legal regime with another. Judges may also be confronted by 
the institutional limits of their power, and be unable to ‘see’ beyond its borders, or 
may be able to extend law’s empire beyond those borders.  
These  judicial  responses,  however,  are  structured  by  the  legal  constellation, 
which creates the architecture within which judges navigate. The legal constellation 
may capture the challenge directly, as in the ouster clause sagas. Or it may distort the 
dispute, an effect that is particularly obvious in the constitutional configuration in 
Australia. 
However, judicial agency is not only structured by the legal constellation, but 
structured by the competing interests and visions of law. This is most vividly revealed 
in Al-Kateb, in which the High Court articulates clearly a tension between the vision 
of law as text, with judges as faithful interpreters, and a ‘progressive’ vision of law in   134 
which the text is interpreted by judges within a matrix of constitutional values that 
converge and cohere with an international consensus on liberal democratic principles.  
The battle here is over the construction of a defensible boundary between the 
role of the judiciary and the executive, and more broadly between law and politics. 
However, that boundary shifts between different legal regimes, mapping on to a series 
of other boundaries, both specific to regimes (such as the fundamental compromises 
of refugee law) and more general ones such as the one between text and non-text; 
between ‘hard’ legal validity and ‘soft’ political desirability; and between legitimacy in 
the  form  of  democratic  process  (or,  in  the  international  sphere,  the  contractual 
bargain), and the normative principles of law. 
Like most international boundaries, these boundaries are fiction rather than fact, 
constructed rather than natural, selectively recognised and negotiable. Yet, as with 
international boundaries, when these boundaries become more tenuous, imprecise or 
contestable because of increasing legal complexity and normative evolutions, these 
boundaries are paradoxically insisted upon all the more strongly. 
Traced at the micro-level, we can see the interaction of these different elements 
in the key landmarks of immigration review. What is also revealed is how this judicial 
management  is,  in  the  end,  normatively  unsatisfactory.  Too  often,  immigration 
fissures  judicial  responses,  and  too  often  judicial  responses  fudge  competing 
normative  paradigms.  Multiple,  and  normatively  incoherent,  legal  answers  are 
produced,  created  by  normative  tensions  within  and  between  regimes,  and  by 
competing visions of the boundaries of, and justifications for, law’s empire.  
The story of immigration review, traced at the judicial level, is captured best in 
the  geographical  metaphor  of  empire,  in  stories  of  advances  and  retreats, 
consolidation and abandonment, and the digging of new trenches behind shifting 
boundaries.  Thinking  of  the  British  empire,  we  might  see  analogies  between  the 
unstable paradox of imperial brotherhood, and imperial superiority; between empire 
as  brute  force  for  the  pursuit  of  commercial  interests,  and  between  empire  as 
civilising mission. These competing visions of law’s empire leave judges vulnerable to 
attacks  from  all  sides:  open  to  charges  of  hypocrisy  and  bad  faith;  of  political 
insensitivity,  liberalism  or  conservatism;  and  of  formalist  decision-making  that 
ignores the underlying political sensitivities or normative difficulties. This, of course, 
is  true  to  a  certain  degree  of  all  judicial  resolutions,  but  is  particularly  acute  in   135
immigration, partly because of the challenge of coherence, and partly (as is discussed 
next) because of the challenge of competition. 
Chapter 4 — The law imagines 
1  Introduction 
In this and the next chapter, we turn to the challenge of competition. I argue that 
a significant, neglected, aspect of the story of immigration review is the impoverished 
nature  of  legal  language,  and  the  consequent  difficulty  legal  language  has  in 
establishing normative authority over competing, more socially powerful, discourses.  
Again, while the challenge of competition is not unique to immigration law, it is 
unusually acute in it for several reasons. As is explored in the next chapter, these 
include the mobility and multiplicity of the connotations of immigration; the salience 
of immigration in the construction of individual, group, State and global identities; 
and the relationship of immigration to two most important sources of anxiety: change 
and difference. 
The contrast between the discursive complexity and richness of the phenomenon 
of immigration, and the reductiveness of legal language, is thus especially stark. The 
legal  imagination  of  immigration,  just  like  the  judicial  management  of  normative 
incoherence, ultimately fails to convince.  
This chapter employs the key insights of disparate branches of legal scholarship 
in  a  textual  reading  of  three  primary  forms  of  legal  text  in  the  migration  field: 
legislation, the Refugee Convention, and case law. This analysis focuses on the ways in 
which legal language constructs and frames people, migration, the State and power 
relations within the community, allowing a comparison with the same elements in the 
competing social discourses discussed in the following chapter. While this chapter 
seeks  to  substantiate  the  claim  that  the  legal  imagination  of  immigration  is 
impoverished, the next chapter examines how this impoverished language compares 
and competes badly with other, more powerful, social discourses.    136 
2  Legal language 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  Legal scholarship Legal scholarship Legal scholarship Legal scholarship        
Although  legal  language  appears  unproblematic  in  orthodox  legal  scholarship, 
legal  language  has  been  subjected  to  greater  scrutiny  in  several  branches  of  legal 
scholarship, including linguistic analyses of the law, law and literature, the sociology 
of law, and law and economics.  
Linguistic  analyses  of  the  law  have  drawn  attention  to  legal  language  as  a 
‘register’ or genre of language, formed in a specific historical and social context, with 
its  own  distinctive  features.
749  In  particular,  the  common  law  judgment  and 
legislation  share  distinctive  linguistic  features.
750  They  are  characterised  by 
monologue;  by  an  authoritative  tone;  by  an  appearance  of  autonomy  from  the 
political, moral and ethical sphere; and by their translation of the infinite variety of 
context into the abstractions of relevant classifications, rules, principles, and doctrine.  
Law and literature has also focused on the textual nature of the law, by ‘reading’ 
law using literary techniques, highlighting the rhetorical nature of the judgment, and 
(more  importantly,  for  present  purposes)  emphasising  the  limitations  of  judicial 
language.
751 These limitations are especially apparent if we compare it with literature, 
which constructs denser and more sophisticated understandings of the self and our 
relations with the outside world. Literature can draw upon a much wider range of our 
human faculties, most prominently our emotions, aesthetics, and ‘common sense’ or 
even ‘uncommon sense’ ways of viewing the world. The literary reader is not required 
to  abstract,  weigh,  eliminate  irrelevancies,  reason,  classify  or,  ultimately,  judge. 
Rather, the reader is usually invited to empathise, to share in it and understand it 
from the inside. Literature can live inside the paradox, tension or ambivalence; it need 
not come to an ultimate result or have tangible effects in the social world.  
                                                   
749 See especially Peter Goodrich, Reading the Law: A Critical Introduction to Legal Method and 
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The sociology of law has also recently turned to the ‘constitutive’ aspect of legal 
language. Legal language provides “a way of organizing the world into categories and 
concepts which, while providing spaces and opportunities, also constrains behaviour 
and  serves  to  legitimate  authority.”
752  Scholars  have  examined  the  communicative 
aspect of law,
753 including prominently through the analysis of ‘legal consciousness’, 
or the prevailing cultural ideas and beliefs about law. Legal language is envisaged as 
symbolically  central  “in  the  struggle  among social  groups  to  develop authoritative 
definitions of community, of social order and belonging, of appropriate behaviour, 
and of law itself.”
754 
In particular, the analyses of Cotterrell and Teubner
755 (drawing on Luhmann’s 
theory of autopoeisis)
756 tie together the characteristics of law as a linguistic genre 
with its sociological function in relation to other fields of knowledge. Cotterrell argues 
that legal thinking (and, implicitly, language) is distinguished by the appearance of 
unity and autonomy. Legal language speaks “unilaterally and without consideration of 
other knowledge fields; by seeing the world from within a self-contained framework 
of  discourse  which  constructs  its  own  objects  of  analysis  and  declares  irrelevant, 
because it cannot even recognize (let alone comprehend), other discourses and their 
objects.”
757 This appearance of unity and autonomy is caused by a “discipline effect”,
758 
in which legal language seeks to construct itself as an autonomous discipline, as part 
of the historically situated struggle for power between academic disciplines.  
More radically, Teubner conceives law as normatively ‘closed’, in the sense that 
law responds only to parts of its environment that it recognises as constituting legal 
norms. In this sophisticated theory, this selectivity enables the management of legal 
complexity  and  the  development  of  legal  autonomy.  However,  law  remains 
‘cognitively  open’,  in  that  it  is  capable  of  responding  to  its  environment,  such  as 
scientific  advances.  Legal  language,  therefore,  is  limited  in  the  range  of  inputs  it 
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recognises  as  ‘legal’.  Its  impoverished  nature  is  caused  by  a  filtering  process  that 
enables  law  to  manage  the  irreducible  complexity  of  life,  and  to  gain  its  own 
autonomy.  
Lastly,  another  (somewhat  unlikely)  branch  of  scholarship,  that  of  law  and 
economics,  has  stimulated  research  into  the  ‘expressive  function’  of  the  law.
759 
Turning  away  from  the  traditional  emphasis  of  law  and  economics  on  sanctions, 
expressive  theorists  focus  on  the  way  the  law’s  expression  of  values  may  affect 
attitudes, norms and social meanings, and the way the law recognises ‘expressive’ 
harms, such as discrimination.  
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  Insights Insights Insights Insights    
Increasing focus on legal language has thus come from different directions, with 
different emphases and concerns. It is not my purpose here to evaluate or engage 
theoretically with these diverse and difficult topics. Instead, I draw upon some of the 
key insights as a foundation for what is, ultimately, a straightforward argument about 
the limitations of legal language. 
The first insight is that language is central to the work of the law. Legal texts 
speak, as well as act. Language and power are at the core of the law; the normative 
and  coercive  aspects  of  law  work  together  to  produce  its  authority.
760  These 
approaches remind us that language is not a transparent or neutral medium; instead, 
the way we speak constrains the way we think, and constrains how we act.  
However,  law  cannot  be  treated  simply  as  a  text.  Rather,  legal  texts are  both 
‘constitutive’, in the sense that it creates actors, relations, rules, and mechanisms, or 
changes  relationships  between  them;  and  communicative,  in  the  sense  that  they 
communicate the concerns, values, and views of the political or legal community (or, 
more  accurately,  various  segments  of  it).  The  communication  is  not,  however, 
straightforward — it may be ambivalent, incoherent, and unconscious. Nor does it 
emanate in a straightforward way from a ‘community’, however defined. Rather, the 
legislation is shaped and mediated by institutions, cultures, and processes. 
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The second point is that legal language is distinctive. This distinctiveness serves 
particular purposes and has particular effects. The unity and autonomy of law, and 
the claim to authority implicit in its style, are designed to legitimate the law.  
The  third  point  is  that  one  of  the  distinctive  features  of  legal  language  is  its 
selectivity. Often, what is noteworthy in a judgment or in legislation is what is left 
out.  Complex  relations  are  simplified,  contextual  features  of  cases  are  eliminated, 
matters of degree are converted into binary judgments. This simplification ultimately 
derives from the structural logic of the law. The purpose of legislation is to classify 
and apply general rules to individuals; the purpose of cases is to enable judgments 
and resolve disputes. Therefore, the complex reality of the world must be flattened 
out in order to attain clear or binary results.  
 There are three prominent ways in which legal language achieves this selectivity. 
The  first  is  the  application  of  the  test  for  ‘relevance’.  This  may  raise  problems  at 
different  levels.  As  the  previous  chapter  demonstrated,  the  legal  framework 
determines  what  facts  are  or  are  not  relevant,  and  it  may  be  deficient  in  its 
identification of such facts. For example, the roots a migrant has established in a 
community may be irrelevant in an immigration law framework, but highly relevant 
in  a  human  rights  framework.  Judges  may  also  frame  the  question  of  relevance 
narrowly  or  widely.  In  Al-Kateb,  as  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  McHugh  J 
considered  the  possibility  of  indefinite  detention  irrelevant  to  the  question  of 
statutory interpretation, whereas Gleeson CJ thought the issue central.  
Legal language also achieves its selectivity through its simplification of power 
relations. An immigrant is subject to the sovereign power of the State; the judiciary 
must defer to the democratically legitimated policies of the government; the State’s 
obligations to the international community can be defined (in relation to treaties) by 
its consent in express language. Further, the coercive power of law is generally effaced 
in the language of the law: the law is portrayed not as might, but as right. Judges 
typically present their reasoning as ineluctable, the outcome of unassailable logic, and 
therefore render invisible the manifold choices that are available.  
A  particularly  important  mode  of  simplification  is  the  way  legal  language 
abstracts  and  universalises.  Individuals  are  abstracted  from  their  rich  individual 
context,  and  generalised:  people  become  ‘non-citizens’  and  ‘aliens’,  attached  to  a 
small set of relevant legal attributes. The phenomenon of migration is shrunk to the   140 
fact of crossing a legal border; a community is homogenised into an undifferentiated 
nation.  
Finally, legal language achieves its selectivity through the hierarchy of sources of 
authority. Above all else, legal language privileges the text; and it privileges them in 
accordance not with their content, but with the authoritativeness of their form. As 
chapter 2 stressed, this privileging of authority and the text constructs and reinforces 
certain power relations, with different creators of the law empowered in different 
legal regimes.  
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3  The structure of the argument The structure of the argument The structure of the argument The structure of the argument    
These preliminary comments set the foundation stone for the argument to follow. 
In essence, the critique is that the language of law is too simplistic to capture the 
complexity of the situations that give rise to immigration review; and that this failure 
to capture complexity undermines the claim of law to normative authority, when set 
in the context of the competition between social discourses. The law is legitimated by 
the perception that it acts fairly, is right, and accords with ideas of justice. When the 
language of the law is unable to capture important dimensions of a dispute that affect 
people’s perceptions of fairness and justice, its normative power is weakened.  
In order to make good this argument, it is necessary first to detail the discursive 
features of law. Given the limitations of space, I will proceed by way of example and 
generalisation,  analysing  immigration  legislation,  the  Convention,  and  selected 
judgments.  
The  approach  I  take  merely  extends  a  common  technique  in  standard  legal 
literature:  that  of  examining  a  way  a  legal  text  is  constructed  upon  particular 
assumptions, and itself constructs the objects within the legal text and the relations 
within them. What are the premises of the legal text? What assumptions does it make 
about people, norms, and concepts? How does it conceive of relations between them? 
This  kind  of  approach  takes  seriously  the  claim  that  law  ‘expresses’  (in  various 
complicated ways) our society; a claim quite commonly made especially in relation to 
immigration  law,  as  elaborated  by  Dauvergne.
761  The  technique  is  in  essence  that 
performed by most literary analyses, and thus requires no theoretical expertise.  
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3  Legislation 
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  The shape of legislation The shape of legislation The shape of legislation The shape of legislation    
In this section, I focus only upon legislation as a text, ignoring for the moment 
the way the legislation may work in practice. The text of legislation, regardless of its 
legal  validity  or  practical  utility,  remains  important  as  an  expression  and 
communication.  
Of all legal texts, legislation is the most discursively constrained. Authorship is 
collective, and signs of individuality are deliberately erased in favour of an endorsed 
drafting style. Drafting styles, of course, have changed over time, as is evident in the 
much  amended  immigration  legislation  of  both  jurisdictions.  In  the  early  stages, 
immigration legislation tended to set broader rules, rely heavily on prescriptions and 
the  criminal  law,  and  submerge  the  expression  of  values  and  attitudes  into  a 
deliberately mechanical and objective language. The legislation has tended to become 
more specific over time, and the modalities of regulation much more complex, while 
the  language  has  become  less  neutral,  with  emotive  language  and  declarations  of 
values  becoming  more  prevalent.  Yet  there  is  no  doubt  that,  notwithstanding 
movements to plain English, legislation is predominantly dull and difficult.  
This partly results from the fact that the style is directed towards producing legal 
certainty, through the creation of (to the extent linguistically possible) a clear and 
singular legal meaning.
762 The drafting style is designed to create a text that is “logical 
and  reasonable,  impersonal  and  impartial”.
763  As  a  result,  the  language  tends  to 
complexity and over-precision.
764 
Legislation also enjoys unique authority since, provided it is properly enacted and 
within constitutional limits, it has the unchallenged force of law. In contrast, what 
counts as ‘law’ in case law depends on the determination of its ratio, its conflict with 
other  authority,  and  other  indicators  of  its  authority.  The  unique  authority  of 
legislation also derives from its legitimation by the democratically elected legislature; 
and  thus  it  claims  to  represent,  or  express,  the  views  of  Parliament, and  through 
Parliament, the people — although that claim is, of course, made problematic by the 
workings  of  the  political  process.  Thus  a  citizen,  although  having  no  personal 
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involvement in the matter, can claim to be ‘ashamed’ of the passing of an Act, and be 
understood.  
Nevertheless, the primary function of immigration legislation is instrumental: it 
seeks, inter alia, to create, regulate, and empower; and to prohibit, invalidate, and 
constrain. Its discursive power is rarely directly utilised; indeed, the drafting style 
seeks to make its discursive power ‘invisible’. The image of the law therefore created is 
one of unquestioned authority and power: the State says it should be so, and it is. The 
authority relied upon is that of the State, and only to a lesser extent that of language. 
Lastly, legislation has multiple audiences. In a very general sense, its audience is 
the community: thus, for example, immigration legislation is often proposed as a way 
of being ‘seen’ to be taking political action. In a fairly general sense, too, its audience 
is those that it proposes to regulate: for the most part, this audience is barely aware of 
the detail, although this naturally varies with the audience. In a much more specific 
sense, it also has three quite important but disparate audiences: the bureaucracy, the 
legal profession, and the judiciary. Again, the bureaucracy’s reception of the law will 
vary  depending  on  context,  but  bureaucrats  generally  rely  upon  administrative 
guidance rather than on the text of the legislation itself. Much of the detail of the law, 
therefore, is directed towards the legal profession and the judiciary, and thus encoded 
in legal language for the purposes of decoding by specialised readers. The purpose of 
this  is  to  constrain  the  possible  readings  of  the  text  —  to  corral  the  infinite 
ambiguities of language.  
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  The  The  The  The Migration Act 1958 Migration Act 1958 Migration Act 1958 Migration Act 1958 (Cth)  (Cth)  (Cth)  (Cth)    
The Australian Act is, as I have already noted, enormous, complex and frequently 
amended. Distinctive changes in the style of language, and the mode of regulation, 
are discernible through the amending history.  
We can usefully compare this behemoth with the first ‘immigration’ legislation in 
Australia, the Chinese Exclusion Act 1855 (Vic). This consisted of fourteen provisions, 
prescribing a landing fee for Chinese immigrants and a Chinese immigrant tax, with 
attached criminal sanctions. We should note four points: the brevity of the provisions; 
the  transformation  of  the  racist  policy  into  a  mechanical  one,  such  that  the  Act 
purported to concern ‘immigration’ but defined ‘immigrants’ solely as Chinese; the 
open identification of the persons to be regulated by way of race; and the simple 
modes of regulation — a financial penalty enforced by the criminal law, and a tax.   143 
The legislation thus constructs ‘the person’ solely in terms of race; immigration as 
the arrival of persons on to the territory; and the ‘community’ as non-Chinese. The 
legislation also constructs the interrelations between the various manifestations of 
State (the Governor, the Legislative Council, the Collector or Customs Officer), the 
masters of the ships, and the immigrant as one of hierarchical command. Finally, the 
Supreme Court is excluded from exercising its jurisdiction to issue certiorari and “or 
any other writ or process whatsoever”.
765 This is a top-down society, in which the 
judiciary is expressly excluded.  
3.2.1  PERSONS 
In contrast, the current Act presents a much more complex picture. The persons 
who  are  subject  to  regulation  are  identified,  principally,  by  two  binary  legal 
classifications: 1) citizen and non-citizen; and 2) ‘lawful non-citizen’ (one holding a 
visa in effect) and ‘unlawful non-citizen’.
766  
This fundamental structure is muddled by a range of intermediate categories, 
most  prominently  that  of  ‘denizens’.
767  More  recently,  specific  classes  of 
‘undesirables’, with quite strange names, have also been created. Examples include 
the  ‘behaviour  concern  non-citizen’  (those  convicted  of  certain  crimes);  a  ‘health 
concern non-citizen’ (a person suffering from prescribed disease, mental or physical 
condition); and an ‘offshore entry person’ (a person entering Australian territory that 
has been excised for the purpose of migration).
768 The criteria for these categories are 
based on empirically verifiable facts or upon anterior legal definitions. For example, 
whether a person is a ‘transitory person’ depends upon whether they are either an 
‘offshore entry’ person; or a person taken outside Australia upon a specified legal base; 
or, most interestingly, a non-citizen during “the period 27 August 2001 to 6 October 
2001”, transferred to a named ship from the Tampa or the Aceng; and then taken by 
the named ship and disembarked in another country. Thus the controversial events of 
the Tampa are rendered into the language of legislation: the identities of the Tampa 
refugee claimants are reduced to the mundane questions of time, presence on certain 
named ships, and movement therefrom. 
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The person is also constructed by visa criteria. For example, the criteria for a 
‘visiting  academic’
769  include  the  place  of  application;  current  visas;  his  or  her 
academic  status;  evidence  of  an  ‘invitation’  by  a  specified  kind  of  institution;  the 
purpose of the visit; financial conditions; and the validity of passport.
770 In addition, 
other general elements are prescribed: character (assessed in various ways); financial 
obligations  to  the  Commonwealth;  health;  ability  to  become  established  without 
‘undue difficulty’, if the person remains for 12 months; previous visa history; and the 
legal status of an accompanying child. 
The  person  constructed  here  is  much  more  multi-dimensional,  but  these 
dimensions are disaggregated into minutely specified elements. In place of ‘race’ as 
the identifying attribute, we have a series of carefully calibrated ‘conditions’ that may, 
in general, be satisfied by empirical evidence rather than subjective appraisal. 
Clearly, the criteria are based on the idea of ‘national interest’: that the purpose of 
stay is of benefit to Australia, serving the interests of Australians (such as tertiary 
institutions); that the person does not impose undue burdens; and that the person is 
likely  to  obey  the  visa  terms.  Thus,  the  person  is  assessed  in  terms  of  their 
relationship to Australia by the gold standard of a ‘perfect’ migrant as one who adds 
to Australia, without taking anything away.  
Even the more open-textured refugee definition is transformed. Section 36 of the 
Act requires that “the Minister is satisfied that Australia has protection obligations” to 
the person under the Convention,
771 omitting entirely the focus on protection and 
persecution at the heart of the refugee definition. Again, it is their relationship to 
Australia, as determined by the Minister, which is key; the State, and the text of a 
treaty, subsume the person involved.  
More emotive language comes into play with refugee claimants. In Subdivision 
AI-AK, it is declared that these subdivisions have been enacted because “Parliament 
considers that certain non-citizens … should not be allowed to apply for protection 
visa or, in some cases, any other visa.”
772 Here, an implicit moral claim is made: that 
these people do not deserve protection or even access to the visa system. Nor are they 
to be trusted: s 91V provides various ways in which adverse credibility inferences may 
be drawn. 
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Most remarkable is the complete absence of race from the legislation, in stark 
contrast  to  the  Chinese  Exclusion  Act.  In  fact,  the  person  here  is  genderless, 
nationless, ageless (almost), and, if homosexual, sexless. (The class of visa providing 
for  homosexual  partners  labels  them  ‘interdependent’.)
773  All  of  these  elements  of 
identity are eliminated in the text of the legislation, if not in its application. So, for 
example, the recognition of overseas qualifications, English language proficiency, and 
the ‘risk factors’ invoked for certain categories of applicants do the work of filtering 
through  ‘neutral’  mechanisms:  continuing  the  tradition  begun  by  the  infamous 
dictation test in the 1901 Act.  
Other actors are identified solely by their formal status as ‘officer’, ‘Minister’, or 
tribunal  ‘member’.  They  exist  in  relation  only  to  their  relation  to  the  State,  a 
relationship  composed largely  of  powers  and  duties.  However,  the  simple  faith  in 
bureaucracy in the Chinese Exclusion Act has been transformed, in stages. Parts 3-8C, 
which establish the immigration review regime, constructs official actors as subject to 
oversight and the discipline of the law. The suspicion that underlay the exclusion of 
the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in the Chinese Exclusion Act, however, resurfaced in 
the addition of Part 8 and the ouster clause. The repeated formula that a section is an 
‘exhaustive statement of the natural justice rule’,
774 strict non-extendable time limits, 
and provisions directing courts on the interpretation of ‘particular social group’
775 are 
other examples of this mistrust.  
3.2.2  MIGRATION 
The  first,  often  overlooked,  point  about  the  construction  of  migration  is  that 
while the title refers to migration, its sole focus is immigration.
776 People appear to 
come  from  ‘nowhere’,  voluntarily.  As  already  discussed,  there  is  no  mention  of 
nationality,  and  the  reference  to  persecution  in  the  refugee  definition  is  rendered 
invisible. This image is in stark contrast to that evoked by policy documents, in which 
Australia constructs itself as actively seeking migrants to contribute to its community, 
setting huge numerical targets, and collating world-leading amounts of information 
as to the characteristics of its intake.  
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Second,  migration  is  defined  as  “the  arrival  and  presence  of  non-citizens”,
777 
namely  confined  to  the  activity  of  border  crossing. This  both  extends  beyond  the 
popular understanding of migration as involving permanent arrival; and excludes the 
broader migration process such as integration, the limited reference there was having 
been  repealed.
778  Nor  is  immigration  expressly  connected  to  citizenship,  both 
appearing as self-contained Acts with no relation to each other. 
Nor is migration conceived of as primarily a group activity, since applications are 
dealt  with  individually,  or  at  the  family  level.  There  are  notable  exceptions:  the 
exclusion of the Sino-Vietnamese under the ‘safe third country’ provision;
779 and the 
grant of ‘temporary safe haven’ to groups such as the East Timorese and Kosovars.
780  
Migration streams appear relatively undifferentiated in the Act itself. It is only in 
the Schedules that one might discern that there are different streams of migration, 
but even then this is obscured by the specificity of the criteria. Moreover, streams are 
differentiated  solely  by  the  sanctioned  purpose  of  entry,  effacing  the  causes  of 
emigration, the nationalities of group movements, the historical or communal ties to 
Australia, and the incentives for coming.  
Third, the purpose of immigration itself is never enunciated. Section 4 states that 
the “object of the Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and 
presence in, Australia of non-citizens.” The three following paragraphs state that the 
Act  provides  for  visas,  requires  person  to  identify  themselves,  and  provides  for 
removal or deportation “to advance its object.” The object of the Act, therefore, is the 
control  of  immigration;  immigration  itself  serves  some  numinous  purpose  in  the 
‘national interest’, an all-encompassing and almost meaningless reference. However, 
the implicit formula of national interest has already been noted: ‘Australia gains, and 
doesn’t lose anything’. The national interest is also discernible amid the morass of visa 
conditions:  the  interests  of  family  reunion,  economic  productivity  in  relation  to 
businesspeople, investors, the highly skilled and those in under-populated areas, and 
(most dimly) as providers of compassionate refuge. The absence of any statement of 
principle  was  criticised  in  the  1980s,  but  never  remedied.
781  However,  s  4  is  more 
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revealing in its present form: as commentators have noted, it is control itself that is 
the obsession of the government.
782 
Indeed, the legislation assumes perfect control is possible, mostly through tight 
management  and  rigid  application  of rules.  The  never-ending  list  of  subclasses  of 
visas  in  Schedule  2  implies  that  the  phenomenon  of  migration  can  be  minutely 
differentiated. The proliferation of visa conditions assumes an ongoing and detailed 
management of entry and presence. The universal visa system is premised on, and 
desirous of, complete control, while the points mechanism allows Australia to achieve 
substantially its numerical annual ‘targets’ for migrants. 
Although  the  basic  structure  is  one  of  mind-boggling  prescription,  there  are 
‘pockets’  of  Ministerial  discretion,  most  prominently  the  powers  of  ministerial 
intervention.
783  On  the  one  hand,  the  minutely  detailed  legislative  prescription 
evinces a belief in the value of confining official discretion through law; on the other, 
the legislation also testifies to the need for unconfined political discretion.  
More recent legislation evinces a belief in ongoing regimes of regulation as an 
alternative.  The  shift  to  a  self-regulatory  system  for  migration  agents;  the 
strengthening  of  the  sponsorship  system;  the  ‘supervisory’  system  in  relation  to 
fingerprinting; and the creation of a ‘cancel-now-question-later’ approach to student 
visas are examples.
784  
Finally,  the  legislation  renders  invisible  particularly  problematic  types  of 
migration through the ‘invalidating clauses’ discussed in chapter 1.
785 These people 
become phantoms in the system of information-gathering, ghosts in the legislation.  
3.2.3  COMMUNITY 
The image of the community in the Act is dim. To the extent that the community 
figures, it is largely to be protected from undesirable migrants. For example, the word 
“community” arises in the power to exclude people who might (inter alia) represent a 
danger to the Australian community.
786  
The legislation emphasises instead the institutions of the State. For example, s 7A 
provides: 
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The existence of statutory powers under this Act does not prevent the exercise of any 
executive power of the Commonwealth to protect Australia's borders, including, where 
necessary, by ejecting persons who have crossed those borders. 
Here,  it  is  the  Commonwealth,  and  specifically  the  executive,  which  are 
identified; and it is the borders of the State rather than the community that are to be 
protected. The State is simply equated with the community. 
One might compare this to the proclamation of Canadian identity in s 3 of their 
Act.
787  This  proclaims  Canada’s  “federal,  bilingual  and  multicultural  character”,  its 
aspirations  to  a  “strong  and  prosperous  …  economy,  in  which  the  benefits  of 
immigration  are  shared  across  all  regions  of  Canada”;  its  aim  to  facilitate  “trade, 
commerce,  tourism,  international  understanding  and  cultural,  educational  and 
scientific activities”; and its desire to promote “international justice … by fostering 
respect for human rights”. In respect of refugees, Canada recognises that the “refugee 
program  is  in  the  first  instance  about  saving  lives  and  offering  protection  to  the 
displaced and persecuted”; aims to “fulfil Canada’s international legal obligations … 
and  affirm  Canada’s  commitment  to  international  efforts  to  provide  assistance  to 
those  in  need  of  resettlement”,  to  grant  “fair  consideration”  to  those  claiming 
persecution  “as  a  fundamental  expression  of  Canada’s  humanitarian  ideals”  and 
uphold  Canada’s  “respect  for  the  human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  of  all 
human beings”. This is, despite its tensions,
788 a much more articulate and positive 
construction of the Canadian community. 
Cotterrell, in an illuminating analysis, contrasts the American image of society as 
a  “morally  cohesive  association  of  politically  autonomous  people”,  which  he  calls 
community,  with  the  English  “image  of  individual  subjects  of  superior  political 
authority”, which he calls imperium.
789 Neither of these seems to pertain here: the 
relationship is not between the community and strangers, but the State and non-
citizens; and to the extent that a community is envisaged, it is a dimly perceived, 
numinous entity that is equated with, or protected by, the State.  
3.2.4  INTERRELATIONS 
Many features of the model of relations in the Chinese Exclusion Act remain: the 
migrant or refugee is still entirely an object, and is indeed subject to scrutiny on more 
levels than ever before. Ultimate power still resides in the State, from which power 
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flows  downward.  The  judiciary  is  still  conceived  of  as  an unruly  beast,  as  are  the 
tribunals through the elaborate codification of procedures.  
Power  flows  primarily  to  officers,  but  those  powers  have  massively  increased. 
Officers are given powers to fingerprint, chase and board vessels, and detain people 
and property.
790 However, regimes of accountability (most prominently, immigration 
review itself) circumscribe their power.  
Increasingly, as already described, secondary actors are co-opted into the regime 
of immigration controls, extending State power insidiously. Least visible, but most 
remarkable, is the extension of regulation outside of law, as discussed in chapter 1.  
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  The UK legislation The UK legislation The UK legislation The UK legislation    
The  UK’s  failure  to  consolidate  its  legislation  means  its  legislation  bears  its 
historical  marks  more  clearly.  Much  of  the  detail  in  the  Australian  Act  is,  in  UK 
legislation, left to Schedules and Statutory Instruments. The lack of consolidation also 
imbues the legislation with an air of chaos, exacerbated by the cross-cutting nature of 
much of the legislation.  
The  1971  Act  stands  as  a  model  of  clarity  in  comparison  to  the  later  Acts.  It 
presented itself as a largely mechanical, and comprehensive, set of rules creating a 
new regime. The 1988 Act was a miscellany, but defined the community negatively, in 
the form of excluding polygamous wives;
791 and, in a muted fashion, indicated the 
shifting alignment of the State in its provision for EEA freedom of movement.
792 The 
1993 Act and its successors have been more explicitly normative, albeit in a cross-
cutting way, so that (for example) the primacy of the Refugee Convention is wedded 
to a concept of the ‘unfounded’ application;
793 and the introduction of human rights 
appeals comes with a barely concealed attack on fraudulent claimants.
794  
3.3.1  PERSONS 
A key difference in the UK legislation is that it expresses a much more complex 
formula  of  belonging,  reflecting  the  categories  of  nationality  and  regional  and 
imperial  arrangements.  Further,  the  categories  of  ILR  and  settlement  mark 
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intermediate points of belonging. Nor is the person who does not belong marked out 
as such: instead of being a ‘non-citizen’, the British phrase is the person ‘subject to 
immigration control’.
795 The prominence of territory and blood in the categories of 
British  nationality  and  in  the  former  category  of  ‘patrials’  and  the  existence  of 
ancestry visas
796 means that belonging is also a matter of place, blood, and residence.  
With this more fluid conception of belonging, however, is a more limited vision 
of the potential of the migrant. Whereas Australia grants permanent residence visas 
from  the  outset,  the  British  legislation  generally  conditions  longer-term  residence 
upon prior residence; and in so doing marks all persons as ‘transitory’, visitors rather 
than members of the community.  
Unlike in Australia, there are rival conceptions of the person. The incorporation 
of human rights imports the conception of a person as a rights-holder, and the State 
as owing obligations such as financial support and accommodation.
797 This at times 
jars with the earlier conception, as in Australia, of these persons as mere objects of 
regulation,  although  this  conception  has  also been  reinforced  in  the  UK  with  the 
massive extension of powers.  
In  contrast  to  Australia,  the  person  is  not  divested  of  nationality,  gender, 
sexuality,  or  race.  Nationality  is  crucial  to  the  immigration  hierarchy,  with  EEA 
nationals and Commonwealth citizens at the top. The nationality of refugee claimants 
is also important for the purposes of the White List and the visa list. The ban on 
polygamous wives remains. Race is still evident in the general prohibition on racial 
discrimination. 
The  Rules  differentiate  between  persons  on  the  basis  of  purpose,  as  with  the 
Australian  Regulations.  The  list  of  categories,  while  substantial  and  at  times  very 
specific, is not nearly as long or as prescriptive as in Australia. The language is much 
more  accessible,  less  bureaucratic,  and  more  subjective  than  in  the  Australian 
equivalent, although it is moving towards the objectivity of the Australian model, 
most obviously in its focus on ‘points’. The construction of persons is therefore quite 
different than in the Australian version: the person is not disaggregated into various 
dimensions  and  subjected  to  binary  and  objective  tests,  but  rather  sorted  into 
administrative categories, allowing room for broader assessments. 
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Another  important  difference  is  that  the  close  connection  with  the  ‘national 
interest’ in the Australian legislation is much less evident. Clearly, grounds mandating 
or permitting exclusion are motivated by national interest, as is the introduction of 
independently skilled migration. However, many of the Rules, particularly the older 
parts, evince no such connection.  
Despite this generally more inclusive picture, more recent legislation constructs 
the  refugee  claimant  negatively,  with  the  use  of  pejorative  labels  such  as  ‘failed 
asylum-seeker’
798  and  ‘unfounded  claims’.
799  New  offences  of  failing  to  have  an 
identity  document  at  a  leave  or  asylum  interview,
800  provisions  requiring  adverse 
credibility inferences
801 and electronic monitoring,
802 and a new regime for ‘suspicious 
marriages’  all  construct  migrants  as  untrustworthy.
803  As  well,  the  increasingly 
Byzantine structure of appeal rights indicates the creation of new hierarchies.  
As in the Australian legislation, the British legislation identifies other actors by 
their  formal  status.  The  lack  of  elaborate  codes  of  procedure  paints  a  picture  of 
somewhat greater confidence in bureaucrats. However, the merging of the two tiers of 
the  IAT,  and  the  move  towards  monitors  and  advisory  groups,  betray  a  similar 
suspicion of immigration review, although it is much less discernible in the text.  
3.3.2  MIGRATION 
The UK legislation, like the Australian equivalent, imagines migration primarily 
as  an  activity  of  individualised  border-crossing.  However,  more  recent  legislation 
evidence a vision of migration as a longer-term process, through the provisions for 
refugee ‘integration loans’,
804 accommodation and asylum support,
805 and the direct 
linkage with citizenship and the emphasis on knowledge of the ‘life in the UK’.
806 This 
has  its  darker  side,  such  as  in  the  linkage  between  the  legislation  and  the  Race 
Relations Act; namely, that the problem with migration is one of race relations, and a 
lack of ‘integration’ on the part of migrants. 
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More  recent  legislation  also  evidences  a  vision  of  refugee  flows  through  the 
continuing addition of visa requirements on certain countries, the ‘safe third country’ 
provisions and the White List. The removal of support for some refugee claimants 
constructs  a  view  of  the  refugee  as  an  economic  migrant.  So,  too,  the  ban  on 
polygamous wives is directed towards a specific group movement.
807 The restrictions 
on refugee claimants also help create clear hierarchies of migration. Highly skilled 
migrants are one thing; asylum-seekers quite another.  
In contrast to the firm emphasis on control in Australia, the UK attitude towards 
immigration is more complex. As already noted, the traditional phraseology of ‘leave 
to  enter’  indicates  an  earlier  attitude  of  ‘discretionary  benevolence’,  although  the 
infusion of EEA rights and human rights juxtaposes this with the image of ‘rights-
holder’.  
The patchwork of legislation, and the pattern of recurrent legislation in recent 
years, also presents immigration as chaotic and fast-changing, and the State as trying, 
through a panoply of shifting, proliferating and ever more drastic policies, to reassert 
‘management’ or control. Like the Australian legislation, there is no enunciation of 
the  object  of  the  legislation;  but  lacking  even  the  guiding  concept  of  ‘national 
interest’, and with the cross-cutting purposes of more recent legislation, the picture is 
one of incoherence rather than control. 
3.3.3  COMMUNITY 
Given  the  multiple  immigration  statuses  in  the  UK  legislation,  the  sense  of 
community here is not of a unified community of citizens, but rather of a stratified 
community enmeshed in regional and imperial arrangements. Further, the legislative 
provision  for  Scotland’s  legal  system  and  devolution  reminds  us  of  the  distinct 
national identities within the UK itself.  
However, a sense of community is figured in the requirement of knowledge of 
‘life  in  the  UK’,  in  the  ban  on  polygamous  wives,  the  introduction  of  citizenship 
ceremonies,  and  in  the  recent  proposals  for  ‘earned  citizenship’.  None  of  these, 
however, provides a coherent vision of a community. The questions on the citizenship 
tests range from the mundane (such as the numbers for emergency services) to the 
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bizarre (the number of bank holidays).
808 Citizenship ceremonies celebrate the fact of 
citizenship  without  giving  it  any  real  content.  More  significant  is  in  the  negative 
identification  with  polygamous  wives,  and  the  conception  of  ‘active  (civic) 
participation’ underlying the recent proposals for ‘earned citizenship’. 
In  contrast  to  the  Canadian  legislation,  no  sense  of  community  is  developed 
around  the  principles  of  human  rights  and  racial  discrimination.  Instead,  human 
rights are awkwardly fitted into the pre-existing structure, and the discursive effect is 
undermined by the whittling away of asylum support until the point of a breach of 
human rights.
809  
The image of community, then, is less one of ‘imperium’ than of the growing 
pains  of  a  society  based  on  formalist  bonds  of  State  moving  towards  a  more 
normatively substantive conception of community: an uneasy mix of human rights 
and  high  principle,  combined  with  a  very  unfocused  sense  of  a  distinctive  British 
identity.  
3.3.4  INTERRELATIONS 
As with the Australian legislation, British legislation is structured by the triad of 
command,  duty  and  power,  but  this  has  become  increasingly  complicated  by  the 
vision  of  a  State  limited  by  human  rights,  international  obligations,  and  a 
strengthened commitment against racial discrimination. This has produced a more 
dialogic view of authority: unlike in Australia, authority does not all rest in the State, 
for the State owes specific obligations to the international community and directly to 
individuals on its territory.  
Simultaneously, however, the State’s powers have expanded enormously, often by 
strengthened  criminal  or  financial  sanctions,  but  also  (as  in  Australia)  by  the 
introduction of new forms of regulation, such as subsidiary regulatory regimes for 
carriers and migration advisers as well as the use of monitors.  
While  the  internal  dimension  of  immigration  legislation  becomes  more 
complicated,  with  devolution,  human  rights,  and  more  polycentric  forms  of 
regulation, so too does its external dimension — that is, the relation of the State to 
actors outside it. The primacy of the Refugee Convention asserted in the 1993 Act, the 
introduction  of  human  rights,  and  multiple  references  to  the  EEA  and  the 
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Commonwealth  construct  the  State  as  located  within  several  overlapping 
international regimes: the EU, the Commonwealth, the Council of Europe, and the 
UN.  This  construction of  the  State  within  a web  of  international  commitments  is 
significantly more polycentric than the insular construction of Australia, although (as 
the safe third country provisions indicate) its benefits for refugees are not all one way. 
3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4  The Refugee Convention The Refugee Convention The Refugee Convention The Refugee Convention    
This legislation may be contrasted with the Refugee Convention, discussed in 
chapter 1. As discussed there, the refugee definition in the Convention is both rooted 
in an individualistic, gendered paradigm of persecution; and the relationship between 
the State and the refugee remains one of benevolent sovereignty premised on the 
exceptional failure of the State to protect. Nevertheless, it does at least imagine the 
person both as central, and as a rights-holder. Moreover, it is their attributes of fear 
and persecution which are relevant, not their suitability for the nation or conformity 
with prescribed purposes. 
As also discussed in chapter 1, the Refugee Convention is more open-textured 
than domestic legislation, since a treaty aims for sufficient ambiguity to enable States 
to agree; and the basis of its legitimacy is not ‘the people’, but the observance and 
participation of States and, in the case of humanitarian treaties, upon the validity of 
humanitarian  norms.  In  this  respect,  unlike  domestic  legislation,  it  constructs  an 
international moral community.  
3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5  The judgment The judgment The judgment The judgment    
The common law judgment is obviously a more fluid genre, exhibiting greater 
variety between jurisdictions, courts, and individual judges. However, they share a 
tone  of  authority,  and  characteristics  of  coherence,  logic,  and  impartiality.  The 
structure of most judgments is similar: isolating a legal issue, setting out the facts, 
reviewing the legal context, and logically organising the arguments. The judgment, 
however, allows room for discussion, opinion and justification, for obiter dicta as well 
as ratio, and even occasionally for doubt. It also marries the facts of the individual 
case with the identification and application of a general rule, thus demanding more 
contextualisation than legislation.  
The audiences of a judgment vary with its position in the legal hierarchy, with 
lower-level judgments primarily addressed to the parties and appellate judges, and 
higher-level judgments addressing also the legal profession, other judges, and (less   155 
commonly) the general public. In administrative law, the government and its officials 
are clearly part of the audience. The different audiences may be observable in the 
style of address: statements of high principle are often self-contained, and in plainer 
language, for the benefit of a wider audience.  
As  demonstrated  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  legal  constellation  engaged  is 
critical to the kind of perspective and language used. A broad distinction may be 
drawn between human rights and Refugee Convention appeals; constitutional claims; 
and appeals based on other legal matters, such as evidence or procedure. Human 
rights  and  Refugee  Convention  cases  focus  upon  the  person  (and  their  rights); 
constitutional claims focus upon the allocation of governmental power; while other 
appeals typically focus upon internal features of the legal system.  
The change in focus entails different sets of relations, and different constructions 
of the actors. In a judgment concerning procedure, the person is almost effaced, in 
favour of a detailed reading of the principles and texts of procedure. In a judgment 
concerning the Constitution, the key relationship is almost inevitably that between 
the branches of government. In a Refugee Convention judgment, the person is more 
visible, but abstracted into the particular characteristic that is the subject of legal 
interpretation (for example, whether she is part of a ‘particular social group’); and the 
key relationship is between the State and the international community. In a judgment 
concerning human rights, however, the circumstances and facts of the person are 
detailed in much greater depth, albeit in relation to a confined ‘box’ representing the 
relevant Article. The person is recognised as an individual, deserving of treatment as 
such;  the  relationship  between  the  State  and  the  international  community  is 
transformed into a triad, with the person constituted as the moral unit of both State 
and international community. 
There  are  also  clear  differences  between  jurisdictions,  with  a  remarkable 
divergence between the present Australian High Court and the House of Lords. These 
differences, of course, are not eternal: the language of the present High Court can 
readily be contrasted with that of the Mason High Court in the late 1980s and early 
1990s; and the House of Lords has also seen a sea-change in the opposite direction.
810 
As  the  previous  chapter  highlighted,  the  most  dramatic  differences relate  to their 
receptiveness to international law, and the breadth of their rhetorical style.  
                                                   
810 Legomsky, n10.   156 
3.5.1  KHADIR AND SZAYW 
I illustrate here some fairly typical features of judgments, beginning with two 
cases that do not deal with human rights or the Convention, Khadir
811 and SZAYW v 
MIMIA.
812  
In  Khadir,  an  Iraqi  Kurd  challenged  the  Secretary’s  refusal  to  grant  him 
exceptional  leave  to  enter,  arguing  the  Secretary  could  not  indefinitely  renew  his 
temporary admission. Khadir succeeded at the High Court, but this judgment was 
legislatively overturned,
813 which the Court of Appeal (reversing) found decisive. The 
House  of  Lords  ruled  unanimously,  however,  that  the  extension  of  temporary 
permission had been lawful even prior to legislative reversal. Lord Brown of Eaton-
under-Heywood,  giving  the  leading  judgment,  held  that  the  power  to  detain 
“pending” removal, which founded the power to grant temporary admission, meant 
that  there  was  a  power  to  detain  until  removal,  which  did  not  lapse  although 
detention itself might become unlawful after a period.
814  
Lord  Brown  began  by  describing  the  appellant.  The  key  facts  were  his  age, 
nationality and ethnicity, his date and mode of arrival, and his legal history. 
This is the standard construction of the person in immigration cases. Nationality 
and date of arrival are invariable elements of the description, and the introduction of 
other elements depends almost entirely upon their subsequent legal relevance. The 
ethnicity of the appellant is relevant to the ground of refusal and the subsequent 
practical problem of removal; his mode of arrival is relevant to subsequent attempts 
to deport him as an illegal entrant. This de-emphasis of the person is reinforced by 
the rest of the judgment, which makes no reference to him at all and rather (as is 
inevitable in a case on statutory interpretation, but standard elsewhere) focused on 
the statutory text.  
The person, therefore, is constructed as a set of legally cognisable attributes that 
frame a particular legal question. The background of migration, the context of the 
person’s circumstances, and the social phenomenon of migration itself are excised. In 
her very brief judgment, Baroness Hale however points in a different direction:  
There may come a time when the prospects of the person ever being able safely to return, 
whether voluntarily or compulsorily, are so remote that it would irrational to deny him the 
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status which would enable him to make a proper contribution to the community here, but 
that is another question.
815  
Here, there is an indication, albeit slight, of an awareness that conditions in the 
country of origin may prevent return; and a construction of a relationship between 
the appellant and the community. That relationship, presently, is one of exclusion; 
but could be more positive in the future. Here, immigration is a phenomenon with 
causes,  and  long-term  consequences,  including  ultimately  the  need  to  accept 
integration and inclusion of those unable to return. 
Lord  Brown  was  not  unaware  of  the  implications  for  the  appellant.  As  his 
Lordship noted, a person temporarily admitted would not receive cash benefits, be 
able to work, or be able to choose where to live.
816 After stating his reasoning on the 
interpretation, Lord Brown stated:  
None  of  this,  of  course,  is  to  say  that  the  regime  governing  temporary  admission  as 
presently administered is other than harsh. But that harshness has been sanctioned by 
Parliament and cannot affect the true construction and application of paragraphs 16(2) and 
21 of Schedule 2.
817  
The case law is littered with this kind of statement, expressing the orthodox view 
of the limited function of the courts. The courts are not there to provide justice, in 
any substantive sense. Rather, the courts are the handmaidens of the legislature. The 
text, therefore, is framed as an explication of a superior text, the legislation, and the 
focus  is  switched  from  the  relation  of  the  person  to  the  community,  to  the 
appropriate relationship of the courts to the legislature.  
The key relations within the judgment, therefore, are between the legal texts — 
the  legislation,  and  prior  judgments  —  and  between  the  various  branches  of 
government. The relationship between the appellant and the community (equated 
with the State), on the other hand, is conceptualised as one of complete power: the 
State has the undoubted right to control the life of the appellant, including his place 
of residence, his ability to work, and his dignity; the appellant has no enforceable 
rights. The problem of the failure of state power — that is, the inability of the State to 
remove the person — is transformed into an administrative hiccup. 
In SZAYW, the complaint was that the appellant’s application for review by the 
RRT had not been heard “in private”, as required by s 429 of the Act, and that this 
amounted to a jurisdictional error. The applicant’s case had been heard together with 
three friends, with whom he had travelled to Australia, and who were represented 
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together. No objection had been made to the hearing being conducted together, and 
each  appellant  had  been  questioned  separately  and  given  an  opportunity  to  raise 
issues privately. The High Court unanimously dismissed the case. 
The appellant first appears briefly, after the statutory framework, in the same 
format as in Khadir: nationality, date of arrival, legal history.
818 The appellant then 
reappears in the facts at more length:  
The appellant, and three of his friends who were described as applicants 226, 228 and 229, 
were stateless Palestinians who had been living in Lebanon. They all left Lebanon and 
travelled to Australia. They all  claimed to fear  that,  if they returned  to Lebanon,  they 
would be persecuted by Hezbollah or Islamic Jihad. The basis of that fear was said to be 
that  together  they  had  become  involved  with  Hezbollah,  and  had  received  military 
training for the purpose of attacking Israel or Israeli interests in South Lebanon. They had 
lost their enthusiasm for the conflict, and left Lebanon. They feared that, if they returned, 
they would suffer reprisals for desertion. The Tribunal rejected their claims that they had a 
well-founded  fear  of  persecution.  The  Tribunal’s  reasons  for  that  conclusion  are  not 
presently material. A substantial part of their evidence was disbelieved.
819 
 There  is  the  germ  of  an  interesting  story  here,  but  the  language  forecloses 
exploration of it. Again, the facts are selected for their legal relevance. It is relevant 
that the appellant travelled with these three people and had a common story with 
them,  as  this  explained  why  the  hearing  was  still  “in  private”.  The  language  also 
frames the context entirely within the terms of the Convention: that is, the ‘well-
founded fear of persecution’. There is something jarring about the forced neutrality of 
the language: the appellant “lives in Lebanon” (rather than seeks refuge there); they 
“travelled” to Australia (rather than ‘fled’ or ‘escaped’); they “had become involved” 
with  (rather  than  recruited  by)  Hezbollah;  and,  most  notably,  they  “had  lost 
enthusiasm for the conflict” (rather than realised its evils). The language re-frames 
this  story  almost  as  a  Boy’s  Own  adventure,  with  its  persistent  language  of  free 
agency,  and  with  its  individualisation  and  decontextualisation  of  the  situation  of 
Palestinians. In any event, the story is “not presently material”; and, undermining the 
germ of sympathy that may have been generated, the paragraph concludes abruptly 
with the blunt suggestion that much of the story had been fabricated. 
The judgment then returns to the powerful legal actors: the Tribunal member, 
the Federal Magistrate, their migration agents, and counsel, submerging the appellant 
again  in  a  sea  of  more  authoritative  voices  and  in  the  key  segment  of  text,  the 
legislative phrase “in private”. Once again, the context is framed in terms of the legal 
background,  in  a  world  of  individualised  free  agents.  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
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appellant arrived in 1998, and the case was heard in 2006, there is no hint of the 
appellant having any kind of a relationship with the community. Nor is the fact that 
the  appellant  is  stateless  warrant  any  extra  thought.  Throughout,  there  is  an 
assumption that now the appellant has gone through the relevant procedures, the role 
of  the  courts  is  finished.  The  authority  of  the  government  and  the  courts  is 
untroubled, and the argument of the appellants dismissed with force, in a series of 
clipped sentences, and perhaps even a touch of tetchiness: 
The procedure adopted by the Tribunal member in the present case did not infringe the 
privacy  to  which  the  appellant  was  entitled  under  the  Act.  It  was  consistent  with  the 
purpose of s 429. The proceedings were not open to the public. The other applicants were 
witnesses  upon  whose  evidence  the  appellant  intended  to  rely.  Their  presence  at  the 
hearing of his application was necessary at least for the purpose of enabling them to give 
evidence in his support. He knew that his evidence was intended to be used in support of 
their  claims.  As  Weinberg J  pointed  out  in  the  Federal  Court,  the  argument  for  the 
appellant  seems  to  contemplate  the  use  of  some  kind  of  "revolving  door"  process  to 
accommodate the requirements of procedural fairness. This seems impossible to reconcile 
with the objectives stated in s 420.
820  
Thus,  outside  the  context  of  constitutions,  human  rights,  or  the  Convention, 
immigration judgments construct the person as a small set of attributes, filtered by 
relevance. Even where some context is necessarily drawn in, it is constrained by a 
legal framework and transmuted into the liberal language of the law — a language 
that presumes agency, that foregrounds the individual at the expense of the social, 
and  that  presumes  the  ability  to  judge  and  determine  the  truth  of  the  person, 
notwithstanding widely differing social and cultural backgrounds.  
Here, too, immigration is an activity of border crossing, in which people ‘arrive’ 
and are processed by the legal system. The assumption is that there can be a relatively 
trouble-free  application  of  state  power  to  the  problems  that  do  arise.  Nor  is  ‘the 
appellant’ conceived of as a person in relation to the community. If the community 
arises, it does so solely in the form of the State. In doing so, the interrelation that is 
the subject of focus is that between the court, the executive and the legislature. The 
focus of the judgment is always, squarely, on the law itself — on its manifestations as 
text (legislation, case law, counsel’s arguments) and procedure.  
3.5.2  K AND AL-KATEB 
The picture changes significantly when one turns to Refugee Convention cases, 
such as the recent House of Lords decision in K.
821 This involved two joined appeals 
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concerning  the  interpretation  of  the  ‘particular  social  group’  part  of  the  refugee 
definition. In the first appeal, an Iranian woman claimed persecution as the wife of a 
man  who  had  been  detained  for  no  apparent  reason  without  charge  or  trial.  The 
question was whether she could claim persecution as a family member, where there 
was  no  evidence  her  husband  was  detained  for  a  Convention  reason.  The  second 
appeal concerned a 15-year-old girl from Sierra Leone, who claimed persecution in 
relation to the practice of female genital mutilation (‘FGM’) in her home country, the 
legal question turning on which ‘particular social group’ she belonged to. The House 
of Lords unanimously held that both women could avail themselves of the ‘particular 
social group’ category. 
Lord  Bingham’s  judgment  provides  an  elegant  example  of  the  format  of  legal 
reasoning. He begins by concisely isolating the legal issue, and notes the superior 
benefits of Refugee Convention status. He then turns to the facts of the first appeal in 
some detail, before continuing: 
About two or three weeks after B's disappearance Revolutionary Guards, agents of the 
Islamic Iranian state, searched the first appellant's house and took away books and papers. 
About a week later the Revolutionary Guards again visited the first appellant's house: they 
searched the house further, and insulted and raped her. Following this incident the first 
appellant made herself scarce. She was not again approached by Revolutionary Guards and 
nor were members of her family. But the school year began on 23 September 2001 and on 
the following day the headmaster of the school attended by her son, then aged 7, told her 
that the Revolutionary Guard had been to the school to make enquiries about the boy. The 
Adjudicator found that the Revolutionary Guards had approached the school in an open 
manner knowing that this would come to the attention of the first appellant and that it 
would cause her great fear. She was indeed very frightened, and fled from Iran with her 
son.
822 
The language of this is clearly sympathetic, with the occasional use of emotive 
language (“insulted and raped”, “very frightened, and fled”), the detailing of the events 
of persecution; and the emphasis on the appellant as wife and mother.  
The language is even more sympathetic in the case of the second appellant: 
In 1998 the second appellant and her mother were living in her father's family village to 
escape the civil war, and she overheard discussions of her undergoing FGM as part of her 
initiation into womanhood. In order to avoid this she ran away, but she was captured by 
rebels and repeatedly raped by a rebel leader, by whom she became pregnant. An uncle 
had arranged her departure from Sierra Leone to the United Kingdom. She resisted return 
on the ground that, if returned, she would have nowhere to live but her father's village, 
where she feared she would be subjected to FGM.
823  
This language tells the story of a girl suffering multiple forms of harm: the civil 
war, the prospect of FGM, rape and a consequent pregnancy. She is the agent of the 
story: “she overheard”, “she ran away”, “she resisted return”. Even more interesting, 
                                                   
822 [2]. 
823 [5].   161 
however, is that this story is then immediately located within the wider context of the 
practice of FGM. We are told where and whom is involved in the practice; we are told 
of  the  pain  and  the  consequences  of  the  practice;  and  of  its  perception  by  the 
community. The next paragraph shifts powerfully into a normative tone: 
The practice of FGM powerfully reinforces and expresses the inferior status of women as 
compared with men in Sierra Leonean society. The evidence is that despite constitutional 
guarantees  against  discrimination,  the  rights  of  married  women,  particularly  those 
married under customary and Islamic laws, are limited. Their position is comparable with 
that of a minor. Under customary law, a wife is obliged always to obey her husband, with 
whom she can refuse sexual intercourse only in limited circumstances. She is subject to 
chastisement at his hands.
824  
Thus, FGM is squarely put into the context of pervasive sex discrimination within 
that society, and also framed by a strong commitment to gender equality. In contrast 
to the earlier cases, in this case the appellants are conceived of within their social 
context — as women, as members of families, as members of particular societies — 
and their actions are explained in terms of circumstance as well as free will. These 
people  come  from  somewhere,  and  are  not  merely  a  set  of  attributes  for  legal 
categorisation.  Moreover,  the  causes  of  migration  are  the  centre  of  focus,  and, 
certainly  in  the  case of  the second  appellant, migration  is  partly  caused  by  social 
conditions  in  other  countries.  These  changes  are  driven  by  the  change  in  legal 
framework:  almost  all  of  the  facts  are  legally  relevant,  because  the  Refugee 
Convention requires a more holistic assessment of the circumstances.  
The judgment still devotes the bulk of its attention to texts, beginning with the 
refugee definition and the leading cases. The texts called in aid extend well beyond 
the traditional range of legal materials, reflecting the more pluralistic nature of the 
legal regime. The ICCPR; CAT; CROC; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of  Discrimination  against  Women;
825  the  Qualification  Directive;  and  the  Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties
826 are cited, as are the legal interpretations of the 
US, NZ, Canada and Australia. What is truly remarkable, however, is the range of ‘soft 
law’  cited,  including  reports  by  UN  Special  Rapporteurs,
827  UNHCR  materials,
828 
resolutions  by  the  European  Parliament,
829  gender  guidelines  in  Canada  and 
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Australia,
830  and  the  Michigan  Guidelines,
831  as  well  as  leading  refugee  law 
textbooks.
832  
The  authority  of  the  judgment,  however,  principally  rested  on  the  ‘common 
sense’ approach taken to interpretation. It was clear beyond doubt that a family was a 
‘particular  social  group’.  If  the  first  appellant  was  persecuted  because  she  was  a 
member  of  a  family,  then  that  satisfied  the  causal  link.  The  Convention  did  not 
additionally  require  that  the  family  member  was  also  targeted  for  a  Convention 
reason.
833 In relation to the second appeal, it was agreed by the parties that FGM 
could  constitute  persecution,  which  was,  as  Lord  Bingham  emphasised,  “all  but 
inevitable”.
834  The  only  question  was  whether  the  second  appellant  fell  within  a 
‘particular social group’. Lord Bingham’s approach was that a social group could be 
widely defined, and that the evidence made it clear that “women in Sierra Leone are a 
group  of  persons  sharing  a  common  characteristic  which,  without  a  fundamental 
change in social mores, is unchangeable, namely a position of social inferiority as 
compared with men.”
835 Indeed, Lord Bingham saved his strongest rhetoric for this 
aspect of gender inequality:  
The  contrast  with  male  circumcision  is  obvious:  where  performed  for  ritualistic  rather 
than health reasons, male circumcision may be seen as symbolising the dominance of the 
male. FGM may ensure a young woman's acceptance in Sierra Leonean society, but she is 
accepted on the basis of institutionalised inferiority. … FGM is an extreme expression of 
the discrimination to which all women in Sierra Leone are subject …
836 
Lord Bingham’s judgment is an exemplar of what might be called ‘progressive 
jurisprudence’,  in  its  reliance  on  international  norms  and  a  diverse  range  of  legal 
materials,  in  its  sympathetic  engagement  with  the  facts,  and  in  its  affirmation  of 
strong norms such as gender equality. However, this occurs largely because of the 
change  in  legal  framework.  The  humanitarian  and  human  rights  law  framework 
require a focus on individual circumstances; the purposes of the law invite a human-
oriented  and  sympathetic  approach;  and  the  international  character  of  the  law 
demands an engagement with international norms. Of course, such an approach is 
not inevitable, and can only go so far. 
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The person is more visible, more complex, but must still ‘fit’ into the boxes of the 
refugee definition. Text remains central, albeit a greater diversity of texts. The causes 
and  consequences  of  migration  must  still  be  processed  through  the  abstract 
categories of the limited exceptions to sovereignty. Here, however, the community is 
constructed as part of an international moral, human rights-respecting, community, 
which finds FGM an “abhorrent”
837 practice. Finally, this community is conceived of as 
primarily  a  network  of  norms,  rights  and self-limited  sovereignty,  rather  than  the 
sovereign-object paradigm of immigration law. 
Lord  Bingham’s  approach  can  be  contrasted  neatly  with  Baroness  Hale’s 
‘empathetic jurisprudence’ in the same case. While Lord Bingham’s prose is lucid, 
Baroness Hale’s tone is refreshingly frank: “The answer in each case is so blindingly 
obvious that it must be a mystery to some why either of them had to reach this 
House.”
838 Baroness Hale then launched straight into what was, for her, the key to the 
case: the gender-specific nature of the persecution. Unlike Lord Bingham, Baroness 
Hale drew attention to the partial and gendered nature of the Refugee Convention, 
and to the progress since made on the question of sex equality.
839  
As a result, the judgment emphasises the gender-specific elements of the facts, 
such as the rape so quaintly de-emphasised in Lord Bingham’s reference to being 
“insulted and raped”, and the gender-sensitive approach taken by the adjudicator.
840 
Unusually,  Baroness  Hale  quotes  from  the  appellant  herself,  giving  the  woman  a 
‘voice’ in the text.
841  
Even  more  remarkable  is  the  treatment  of  FGM.  Whereas  Lord  Bingham  had 
noted the operation caused “excruciating pain”,
842 Baroness Hale does not let us off so 
easily. She excerpts a statement by the World Health Organisation, UNICEF and the 
United  Nations  Population  Fund,  detailing  the  types  of  FGM  in  graphic  detail 
(“includes  cauterization  by  burning  of  the  clitoris  and  surrounding  tissue  … 
introduction of corrosive substances or herbs into the vagina to cause bleedings or for 
the purposes of tightening or narrowing it”), and its horrific consequences (“cysts and 
abscesses,  keloid  scar  formation,  damage  to  the  urethra  resulting  in  urinary 
incontinence, dyspareunia (painful sexual intercourse) and sexual dysfunction”, not to 
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mention cutting open to enable birth or intercourse, and risk of maternal death or 
still  birth).
843  Moreover,  she  states  explicitly  the  purposes  of  FGM:  “to  lessen  the 
woman’s sexual desire, maintain her chastity and virginity before marriage and her 
fidelity  within  it,  and  possibly  to  increase  male  sexual  pleasure.”
844  Finally,  she 
situates the practice in its historical context: its re-assertion after the civil war to re-
establish the traditional social order.
845  
This aspect of the judgment highlights a consequence of the privileging of the 
text in legal language — the invisibility of the body. As Scarry has eloquently argued, 
the practice of torture is frequently transformed from the primary fact of bodily pain 
into  speech  ‘about’  torture,  and  attention  is  thereby  switched  from  the  victim  of 
torture to those in authority.
846 Baroness Hale’s judgment is remarkable because it 
resists this shift from body to speech, in its attempt to draw our reluctant attention to 
the  fact  of  bodily  pain  (albeit  through  the  speech  of  international  institutions). 
However, the more orthodox judicial approach is that of Bingham LJ, who refers to 
authoritative texts condemning the practice of female genital mutilation.
847 
While this detail may not be ‘legally necessary’, it enriches the context in which 
one  reads  the  judgment.  The  appellants’  gender,  and  its  social  significance  and 
consequences,  are  emphasised.  The  textual  limits  of  the  Refugee  Convention  are 
emphasised. Social practices are put into social and historical context. We hear the 
voice of the person. In forcing us to confront the graphic details of the practice of 
FGM, the judgment gives the female body real significance. The gender relations of 
this society are highlighted. In these ways, Baroness Hale’s judgment stretches the 
boundaries of judgment-writing. We are invited to endorse the judgments not simply 
on  the  authority  of  the  welter  of  texts,  or  on  the  basis  of  strong  arguments  of 
linguistic interpretation. We are instead drawn into a position of empathy with the 
women;  we  are  forced  to  gaze  on  the  female body  in  pain.  We  are drawn  into  a 
relation  with  the  appellant,  not  as  part  of  a  community  that  owes  obligations  as 
defined by an authoritative text, but as humans.  
The jurisprudence of the House of Lords has been far from uniformly progressive, 
but it is currently distinguished by an openness to international law and statements of 
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values. By contrast, the constitutional jurisprudence of the present Australian High 
Court  is  marked  by  an  insularity,  nowhere  better  demonstrated  than  in  Al-Kateb, 
discussed in the previous chapter. That case evinced a plurality of approaches, with 
the dissenting Kirby J exhibiting a ‘progressive jurisprudence’ akin to Lord Bingham’s 
at one extreme, and McHugh J’s textual approach at the other. For the purposes of 
illustration, I focus on McHugh J’s ‘textual approach’. 
McHugh J simply adopts the facts recited by Gummow J.
848 As such, the person is 
rendered entirely invisible in his judgment. This is reinforced by his framing of the 
legal question:  
The  principal  issue  in  this  appeal  concerns  the  power  of  the  Parliament  to  order  the 
detention of an unlawful non-citizen in circumstances where there is no prospect of him 
being removed from Australia in the reasonably foreseeable future.
849  
The focus, therefore, is on the power of the Parliament, not the restraint on the 
individual, who is submerged entirely into his legal classification. 
Most interestingly, for the purposes of this analysis, his Honour observed: 
Nor is it possible to  hold  that  detention of unlawful non-citizens — even where their 
deportation is not achievable — cannot be reasonably regarded as effectuating the purpose 
of  preventing  them  from  entering  Australia  or  entering  or  remaining  in  the  Australian 
community. Indeed, detention is the surest way of achieving that object. If the Parliament 
of the Commonwealth enacts laws that direct the executive government to detain unlawful 
non-citizens in circumstances that prevent them from having contact with members of or 
removing them from the Australian community, nothing in the Constitution — including 
Ch III — prevents the Parliament doing so. For such laws, the Parliament and those who 
introduce them must answer to the electors, to the international bodies who supervise 
human rights treaties to which Australia is a party and to history. Whatever criticism some 
— maybe a great many — Australians make of such laws, their constitutionality is not 
open to doubt.
850 (emphasis added) 
 In this paragraph, we have a neat summary of McHugh J’s approach. A person is 
merely  ‘an  unlawful  non-citizen’,  divested  of  any  other  characteristics.  More 
disturbingly, the purpose of detention is envisaged as keeping the ‘foreign person’ 
away  from  the  Australian  community.  This  is  a  relatively  rare  invocation  of  the 
community in immigration jurisprudence, and it is invoked in the sense of ‘protecting’ 
the  community  from  “unwanted  entrants”,
851  a  phrase  redolent  of  ‘undesirable 
elements’. The purpose of detention is not punitive, but protective, and in a later 
analogy the ‘protection’ of the community from stateless Palestinians is equated to 
the ‘protection’ of the community during the World Wars from enemy aliens.
852 A 
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radical  separation  is  required,  and  the  borders  are  clear.  The  community  is  given 
unquestioned  priority  and  is  specifically  conceived  of  as  autonomous  from  the 
international community. It is not, indeed, the international community that we are 
linked to, but only the monitoring bodies of treaties “to which Australia is a party to”. 
The community, however, is not unified in their views, as McHugh J acknowledges. 
However, the appropriate way for such views to be expressed is through the electoral 
process; the democratic legitimacy of Parliament is prevailed upon. For McHugh J, the 
text  of  the  Constitution  constitutes  the  four  square  corners  of  the  limits  of  its 
protection, and he is merely obedient to this text, and the lines of power it draws.  
McHugh  J  stamps  his  authority  in  terms  of  unequivocality.  The  text  is  “too 
clear”,
853 there “is nothing in the Constitution”, and his analysis of it is (presumably) 
“not open to doubt”. In his view, there is nothing fuzzy about power relations.  
Of  course,  these  analyses  are  but  a  very  small  selection  of  the  divergent 
approaches available. The divergence emphasises the plasticity of the judgment, but 
the plasticity is limited.  
3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6  Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion    
Some general points may be drawn out about the limits of the legal imagination. 
Where the law does not require it, the person is often rendered invisible, excepting a 
set of legally relevant attributes. The community exists very dimly, for the most part, 
whereas  the  State  and  its  institutions  dominate  legal  thought.  Migration  is  not 
conceived of as a social phenomenon, but rather as an activity of border-crossing, 
although other elements may emerge depending on the legal context and upon the 
approach  to  judgment-writing.  Thus,  much  of  the  context  is  submerged  in  the 
judgments, presenting a distorted view of human actions and interrelations. 
The focus of the text is on the law, as manifested especially in texts; and the mode 
of discourse is one of authority, of marking authority and also of demarcating spheres 
of authority. Law is clearly differentiated from justice, compassion, or sympathy; it is 
in  general  a  positivist  law,  a  law  that  at  least  begins  (and,  in  some  approaches, 
practically  ends)  with  the  authoritative  text.  However,  values  or  principles, 
particularly  those  that  are  near  to  the  legal  heart  (such  as  certainty,  procedural 
fairness,  or  equality)  may  well  inform  interpretations,  although  such  values  or 
principles  are  usually  transformed  into  textual  authorities  as  well.  The  focus  on 
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interrelations  therefore  is  primarily  between  texts.  The  focus  may  also  be  on  the 
relation  between  the  State  and  the  international  community,  and  between  the 
domestic community and the State, but the connections are generally articulated in 
orthodox conceptions of the separation of powers, of the democratic legitimacy of 
Parliament, and of the self-limited sovereignty of States.  
As the short analysis of Baroness Hale’s judgment demonstrated, these widely 
accepted structures, and indeed constraints, of thought can be challenged in judicial 
discourse. Such challenges are more likely where the legal context demands a re-
orientation to the human. However, they remain exceptional, and cannot overturn 
the  three  fundamental  limitations  of  legal  language:  the  filter  of  relevance,  the 
simplification of power relations, and the privileging of text and authority.  
In exposing these limitations, I do not mean to suggest merely that the law could 
be written better. Rather, these limitations arise out of the structural logic of the law. 
In order to create rules, one must abstract and generalise. In order to resolve disputes, 
one must reduce the complexity of social life by filtering out the legally irrelevant. 
Ultimately,  what  I  call  the  limitations  of  legal  language  are  necessary  in  order  to 
achieve the primary objects of legislation or judgments: to regulate and to decide.  
However,  although  this  filtering  enables  these  purposes,  it  does  raise  a  real 
problem. The law’s authority is premised largely on its normative authority, as the 
expression of reason and right, although backed up in the last instance by might. The 
ultimate aim of a judgment is to convince its audience of its rightness; and so too we 
evaluate legislation in terms of right rather than might.  
This general limitation of law is accentuated in immigration by the challenge of 
coherence. The deficiencies of the legal regimes often result in important matters 
being rendered irrelevant or de-emphasised. The normative incoherence of the legal 
constellation embeds competing normative paradigms that are exposed by judicial 
resolutions between them. 
The challenge of coherence thus exacerbates the challenge of competition. Legal 
discourse is intuitively compared with other available social models, as is recognised 
in judgments that stress the separation of law from justice, and that acknowledge the 
‘harshness’ of the law and its ‘tragic’ consequences. We all evaluate legislation and 
judgments from within a social context in which different discourses circulate and 
compete. We commonly complain that a decision is ‘legalistic’, ‘technical’, ‘unrealistic’   168 
and ‘simplistic’. Legal language, in its reduction of the complexity of the world, simply 
misdescribes the issues at stake, enabling outcomes but failing to convince. 
  
Chapter 5 — The discursive constellation 
1  Introduction 
The  impoverishment  of  legal  language  poses  an  acute  challenge  of  discursive 
competition because of the richness, diversity and greater social power of competing 
social  discourses.  This  chapter  examines  this  broader  discursive  constellation, 
surveying in turn the political, historical, and geographical perspectives on migration, 
and  the  disciplinary  perspectives  of  migration  studies,  contemporary  political 
philosophy, and postcolonial studies.  
As in the previous chapter, I focus here on the ways these discourses construct 
different  models  of  people,  migration,  the  State,  and  power  relations  within  the 
community.  These  discourses,  I  argue,  do  not  merely  give  colour,  texture  and 
background  to  immigration  law.  Rather,  they  provide  alternative  and  more 
convincing  ways  of  capturing  and  understanding  the  world,  which  therefore  both 
greatly  complicate  and  undermine  the  premises  of  legal  discourse.  Further,  these 
competing discourses are also more socially powerful than legal discourse, making the 
competition structurally unequal.  
2  The hi(story) of migration 
Of the three broader perspectives, the historical account of migration provides 
the greatest contrast to the legal account, in its emphasis on specificity, diversity and 
complexity. In the historical account, diverse groups of people come, and go, for a 
variety of overlapping reasons; communities, States and power relations within and 
without  them  are  continually  reconfigured  and  redefined;  and  the  causes  and 
consequences of migration are the product of unique combinations of structure and 
agency.
854 
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2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  Empire and colony: A story of divergence and convergence Empire and colony: A story of divergence and convergence Empire and colony: A story of divergence and convergence Empire and colony: A story of divergence and convergence    
The British historical account of migration exemplifies these characteristics. In 
the  early  period,  immigration  is  an  incident  of  waves  of  invasion,  conquest  and 
settlement.  Celts,  Romans,  Angles,  Saxons,  Jutes,  Frisians,  Franks,  Vikings  and 
Normans  come,  settle,  and  sometimes  leave.  These  waves  partly  define  the 
community as part of a wider community — as a Roman colony, as part of the Viking 
domain, or as part of the Norman realm. These waves also constitute the community 
as an ethnically mixed populace, a ‘mongrel’ community bound by political rather 
than racial ties — an orientation that is reinforced by the later unions with Scotland 
and Ireland.  
In the medieval era, immigration appears as an incident of foreign policy, read 
through a prism of religious community and commercial interest. Thus, the French 
Huguenots  were  welcomed  as  fellow  Protestants;  Jews  originally  arrived  as  the 
financial backers of the Norman Conquest; merchants from the Low Countries and 
the Hanseatic League were welcomed as part of a trading network; and Africans were 
imported by British slaving interests. Here, the British community is configured as 
part of a wider Protestant community, and a wider commercial network.  
The era of the British Empire, however, heralds a quantitative shift in migration, 
and a global expansion of its reach. It is within this era that Australia is born, and it is 
the logic of Empire that accounts for the historical divergence between Australian and 
British immigration patterns and controls. Mass emigration from the UK meant there 
was no need for immigration controls; mass immigration into Australia required early 
governmental  control,  and  fostered  a  conception  of  immigration  as  permanent 
nation-building. Here, again, the community is reconfigured into an imperial, multi-
ethnic, community, tied by financial and political bonds. 
This  imperial  model,  however,  was  increasingly  challenged  by  nation-building 
movements.  Nation-building  in  Eastern  Europe  prompted  the  influx  of  Eastern 
European Jews into the UK that precipitated the 1905 Act. The emergence of a radical 
nationalist movement in Australia, based on strong labour and economic controls, 
was directly responsible for the development of the White Australia Policy in the 19
th 
century, and its most famous product, the 1901 Act. Drawing together the threads of a 
belief in racial superiority, fear of labour competition, and the political harmony of an 
ethnically homogeneous democracy, the White Australia Policy forged an indissoluble   170 
link  between  immigration,  nation-building,  the  labour  market,  and  racism.
855  In 
contrast, British immigration policy remained tempered by the model of capitalist 
imperialism and minimalist government, a model whose slow decline was manifested 
in the tortuous disentanglement of empire in immigration and nationality law.  
This  slow  decline  was  hastened  by  the  irresistible  momentum  of  the 
independence movements during the World Wars, a period which also strengthened 
the nexus between immigration and security, and thus fostered traditions of executive 
discretion and administrative control.
856 Passport controls were entrenched,
857 work 
permits invented,
858 enemy aliens interned
859 and wartime refugees expelled.
860 Post-
war, fears of Japanese invasion and the under-development of the economy (aptly 
described by the slogan ‘populate or perish’) drove a policy of massive immigration in 
Australia.
861 The rise of industrial economies and post-war labour shortages prompted 
more diverse immigration into both jurisdictions, with Southern Europeans arriving 
in Australia and Caribbean labour arriving in the UK.  
The increasing racial diversity of immigration — stimulated in Australia by the 
belated  abolition  of  the  White  Australia  Policy  in  1973,
862  and  by  the  break-up  of 
Empire in the UK — inflamed racial tensions in both jurisdictions. The 1958 Notting 
Hill riots and Enoch Powell’s 1968 ‘rivers of blood’ speech formed the background for 
legislative  controls  on  Commonwealth  immigration  in  the  Commonwealth 
Immigrants Acts 1962 and 1968.
863 In Australia, the 1980s were dominated by a debate 
over  the  ‘Asianisation’  of  Australia,  and  the  Hawke  government’s  ‘multicultural’ 
policies.
864 
The 1990s and onwards, however, were dominated by a different kind of debate, 
caused  both  by  increased  and  increasingly  diverse  refugee  movements,
865  and  by 
increasing  convergences  in  patterns  of  skilled  migration  as  Australia  and  the  UK 
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moved to post-industrial economies and embraced free trade ideologies. The causes 
of  this  rise  in  refugees  have  been  much  debated,  but  include  the  collapse  of  the 
Communist  bloc,  increasing  immigration  restrictions,  continuing  and  increasing 
repression and conflict, the demographic and economic demand for labour, and the 
increasing division between poor and rich countries.
866 Yet, at the same time, both the 
UK and Australia have encouraged historically unprecedented levels of legal (largely 
skilled) migration (see Appendices, Figs 1 and 2), including the strong promotion of 
overseas education. Australian and British immigration patterns are also converging, 
as  Australians  increasingly  emigrate
867  and  promote  temporary,  rather  than 
permanent,  immigration.
868  Importantly,  immigrants  in  both  jurisdictions  are now 
much more ethnically diverse, although almost a third of Australian immigrants come 
from the UK and New Zealand,
869 and both Europe and the Commonwealth remain 
substantial contributors to UK immigration.
870 Indeed, the accession of countries to 
the EU was responsible for a recent large, but apparently more transient, wave of 
immigration from Poland.
871  
Finally,  the  politics  of  immigration  has  also  increasingly  converged,  with  the 
heightened  fear  of  terrorism  and  military  intervention  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq 
coinciding with increased flows of refugees and the increasing prominence and power 
of far-right parties.
872 This has produced a highly visible backlash against Muslims in 
the  UK,  which  was  more  than  matched  by  the  spectacular  enactment  of  popular 
racism in the Sydney beach riots in December 2005.
873  
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  The story of history The story of history The story of history The story of history    
The  specificity,  diversity  and  complexity  of  people,  communities,  States,  and 
power relations within them are evident even in this brief historical account. In this 
account, the nationality, ethnicity, age and religion of people are significant, since 
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migratory  movements  are  patterned,  the  products  of  both  structure  and  agency. 
Although  people  move  in  groups,  their  individuality  —  the  multiplicity  of  their 
motivations, diversity of reactions, their accidental migrations and reluctant returns 
— are attested to through their testimony, artefacts, anecdotes and life stories. This 
individuality highlights the subjectivity and complexity of self-identity.  
Similarly,  the  nation-State  is  a  specific  historical  phenomenon,  with  different 
models of community having prevailed and competed in different eras. States are not 
singular, monolithic entities but rather individual, contingent and ‘imagined’ political 
communities,  riven  by  cleavages.  The  reactions  of  governments  are  far  from 
inevitable,  resting  on  a  constellation  of  factors  including  foreign  policy,  political 
ideology,  and  the  complexion  of  those  who  come.  While  the  longer  historical 
perspective  illuminates  the  continuity  of  xenophobic  reactions,  this  pattern  is 
mediated by human agency and historical accident. The Fraser government’s reaction 
towards the Indochinese,
874 and the Liberal government’s implementation of the 1905 
Act,
875 exemplify this mix of happenstance and fundamentals. 
The historical account also highlights the diversity of communities, and the role 
of migration in forming nations and communities. Historical examination reveals the 
weakness of a unified ‘British’ identity as both a historical and contemporary concept. 
Rather, the historical account emphasises how different segments of a community 
have differing attitudes to, and effects on, immigration policy, and how immigration 
itself renegotiates relations between, and redefines, the communities within a State. 
Tensions and ambivalences are revealed. Australia is a ‘nation of migrants’, albeit one 
that  insists  on  ‘controlling  who  comes’.  The  UK  boasts  of  its  long  tradition  of 
humanitarian refuge and tolerance, and has undergone a process of re-inventing itself 
as a State of immigration rather than emigration, and as a (somewhat ambivalent) 
European State rather than the heart of Empire.  
Finally, the historical account is premised on a view of power relations as highly 
specific, complex and diverse. Immigrants are differently received depending on a 
range  of  factors,  including  class,  race,  religion,  age,  economic  and  demographic 
context, and political leadership. Similarly, the power exercised by immigrants, and 
the power of States is highly varied and contingent. The internal diversity of States is 
complemented by the diversity of relationships of States to other States (Empire to 
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colony; allies to enemies), in contrast to the legal imagination of the formal equality 
and sovereignty of States.  
3  The islands 
At its heart, migration is about space, and place. The oft-overlooked geographical 
account of migration adds to the historical account, by contributing this specificity of 
place, and its effects on identities and on the constraints on States. 
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  No island is only an  No island is only an  No island is only an  No island is only an island island island island    
Australia  and  the  UK  are  both  islands;  but,  while  Australia  is  a  vast, 
underpopulated island, with few close neighbours, the UK is a relatively small island 
and a half, overshadowed by its continental neighbour.  
The first consequence of these differences is their effect on immigration flows. 
Many immigrants come from neighbouring countries, in both Australia and the UK; 
and  neighbouring  countries  profoundly  influence  foreign  and  immigration  policy, 
with  fear  of  invasion  justifying  high  immigration  intakes  in  Australia  and  the  UK 
increasingly enmeshed in Europe-wide immigration arrangements. 
Geography  also  shapes  the  parameters  of  immigration  policy.  As  islands, 
Australia  and  the  UK  are  relatively  insulated  from  immigration  flows.  The  great 
cordon of sea around Australia has made it physically possible to retain a tight control 
over its borders, since almost all arrivals are by plane. This used to apply to the UK, 
until the opening of the Channel Tunnel, which as a significant channel of refugee 
flows proved an apt symbol of the UK’s erosion of independence from Europe.  
Australia’s  physical  isolation  is  also  largely  responsible  for  the  tradition  of 
subsidised  passages  and  orientation  towards  permanent  immigration,  while  the 
relative  proximity  of  the  UK  accounts  partly  for  its  historically  laissez-faire 
immigration policies. The UK’s land borders with Ireland and the physical proximity 
of other islands also accounts for the Common Travel Area.
876 
Third, geography has also shaped the attitudes of immigrants. Immigrants who 
were willing to move permanently to Australia tended to be young and adventurous, 
and often driven by economic circumstances.
877 As well, migrants were drawn by the 
image of Australia as the bountiful sunny land, rich in agriculture and minerals and 
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bathed in sunshine. In contrast, the relative proximity of the UK to major sources of 
immigration  made  transient  migration  more  likely,  while  its  image  as  a  cramped, 
damp  country  made  it  a  less  attractive  destination  than  the  major  immigration 
countries.  
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  Exile and home, insider and outsider Exile and home, insider and outsider Exile and home, insider and outsider Exile and home, insider and outsider    
Geography has also shaped reactions to immigration. Although the sea enables 
Australia’s tight immigration control, paradoxically the sheer size of the coastline also 
creates  a  feeling  of  insecurity,  for  it  is  impossible  to  patrol  such  a  large  space 
effectively. This feeling of insecurity fuels the desire to retain a tight control over the 
borders. A nation is protected by being an island; yet it is also ever-aware of the threat 
from outside. The proximity of the UK to Europe has also led to a similar sense of 
threat,  one  that  has  a  strong  factual  basis  given  the  history  of  invasions  and 
migrations,  with  the  sea  often  acting  less  as  a  barrier  than  as  a  channel  of 
communication.
878 
On  the  other  hand,  the  two  States  differ  in  the  relationship  between  the 
geographical and political community. Unlike most nations, the natural borders of 
Australia mirror its political borders. The nation, thus, is ‘naturalised’, the political 
fiction obscured by the physical fact. There is a very tangible, and permanent, divide 
between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
In contrast, the UK’s borders — internal and external — have waxed and waned 
during its long history, and thus the political entity is neither naturalised nor unified. 
This complexity and contingency of the political state is most obviously reflected in 
the loose and varied terminology adopted to describe it: Great Britain, England, the 
UK,  confusing  even  historians.
879  Devolution  has  only  underlined  that  the  United 
Kingdom is not a nation-state, but rather a State of nations.  
The political construction of the UK reveals itself vividly in the debate about the 
existence of a ‘British’ identity, and its competition with English, Scottish, Welsh and 
Irish identities. The vagueness and contested nature of this identity is manifest in the 
handbook for the UK citizenship test, both in its careful attention to Scottish and 
Welsh traditions, and in its branding as a practical document for learning about ‘Life 
in the UK’. Immigration, thus, exposes the soft centre of British identity. 
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The landscape itself has also influenced reactions to immigration. In Australia, 
there is a deep-seated ambivalence to the austere geography of the land, dramatically 
manifested  in  the  predominantly  coastal  patterns  of  settlement.  The  ‘outback’ 
remains  a  figure  of  menace,  a  place  of  mystery  and  danger.  These  geographical 
features account for the official encouragement of migration to rural areas, and for 
the environmental argument that the large areas of desert and dwindling supply of 
water preclude higher levels of immigration.
880 
This image of the harsh and hostile continent is also intimately linked with the 
pioneers’ fear of the Aborigines’ spiritual relationship with the land, and thus evokes 
the shameful dispossession of the Aborigines upon which modern Australia rests. The 
Aborigines’ strong attachment to the land contrasts with the uneasy relationship of 
immigrants  to  their  new  country.  Almost  a  quarter  of  Australians  were  born 
overseas;
881 most Australians can claim a pedigree only, at best, a few generations 
long.  Australians  continue  to  go  ‘home’,  permanently  or  temporarily,  in  large 
numbers. Our attachments to the land, therefore, are shallower; and our experiences 
of it often shaped by knowledge of other ancestral lands. The feeling of exile recurs in 
pro-immigration  discourse,  with  the  theme  ‘we  are  all  migrants’.  Importantly, 
immigration is not perceived as a threat to the right to land; rather, it is a threat to 
the political and social community.  
In contrast, in the UK immigration is not a foundational part of the national 
mythology. Instead, as the title of a splendid account of British immigration history 
has it, immigrants are “[b]loody foreigners”
882 — evincing a ready dislike, perhaps a 
grudging acceptance, but not a self-identification.  
There is a paradox here. Although the congruence of the natural and political 
borders in Australia tends to naturalise the nation, the fictiveness of the relatively 
new nation is still all too apparent. Australia does not have a historical core; rather, it 
is  a  mongrel  offshoot  of  a  mongrel  empire.  What  binds  the  nation  is  a  common 
territory, not a common people. In contrast, the United Kingdom may be a state of 
nations,  but  it  is  composed  of  distinctive  peoples  who  experience  themselves  as 
English,  Scottish,  Welsh,  and  (more  problematically)  as  Ulstermen.  These  felt 
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nationalities influence the perception of immigration paradoxically: on the one hand, 
immigration  is  a  threat  to  an  established  identity,  and  thus  may  be  a  greater 
challenge; yet on the other, the established identity may be more secure and thus may 
be more resistant to the threat.  
Further,  long  feudal  traditions  and  agricultural  history  have  fostered  a  deep 
attachment to the land itself. The most famous encomium of England, for example, 
emphasises its character as territory: “This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this 
England.”
883  Land  has  been  an  important  element  of  class.  This  longer,  more 
regionalised, attachment to the land results in paradoxical reactions to immigration: 
it may threaten one’s ‘homeland’, on the one hand, and yet, since most immigration 
takes place in London, it may be experienced as a threat to the State rather than ‘my 
place’. Thus, a distinctive attribute of the recent Polish migration is that the Polish 
moved to non-traditional migrant areas, exposing some communities to migration for 
the first time, and thus threatening their sense of place.
884 
It is in the cultural effects of geography, however, that the starkest difference 
between  the  two  States  lies.  Australia  feels  very  far  away  from  the  sources  of  its 
cultural inspiration, mostly British but latterly also American — perhaps most vividly 
illustrated by the reported declaration of a former Prime Minister that Australia was 
“at the arse end of the world”.
885 Australia, it seems, is in Asia (just barely), but its 
heart is elsewhere.  
In  contrast,  the  UK’s  proximity  to  Europe  and  North  America,  and  its  own 
historical role as the heart of a far-flung Empire, has made it seem at the ‘heart’ of 
things. This has been reinforced by its accession to the EU, although its ambivalent 
relationship  to  the  EU  is  manifested  most  clearly  in  its  ‘opt-out’  on  immigration 
matters. 
These  distinctive  geographical  contexts  have  created  distinctive  national 
identities, identities that have been shaped by the isolationist tendencies of island 
nations; by their relationships with their neighbours and with the colonial network; 
and by the contrasting sense of exile and home, of outsider and insider. 
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3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  The story of geography The story of geography The story of geography The story of geography    
The  geographical  story  highlights  the  specificity  of  place  and  space,  and  its 
relations  to  personal  and  national  identity.  Migration  is  not  only  the  activity  of 
crossing a border, but also the experience of moving home, of being elsewhere. People 
relate to States, and land, differently, depending partly upon geography, and these 
different reactions influence reactions to immigration. Borders are not merely legal 
constructs, but also physical barriers; countries are not merely interchangeable States, 
but different lands. Power relations between and within countries are also affected by 
proximity and distance, by under-settlement and overcrowding, and by harsh and 
temperate climates. 
The  geographical  story  also  highlights  the  constraints  of  geography  on 
immigration policy, as well as the ways which immigration flows, and the reactions 
they  provoke,  are  shaped  by  geography.  In  doing  so,  it  highlights  the  localised 
experience of immigration. 
The geographical story therefore highlights both the physicality of the State and 
our existences within them. This is in contrast to legal discourse, in which borders are 
legal fictions, a ‘safe third country’ can be exchanged readily for another, and in which 
land, community and State are conflated.  
4  The politics of migration 
The most prominent, and socially powerful, discourse in competition with legal 
discourse is political discourse. Of course, the divide between the two is far from 
watertight. Legal discourse includes within it elements of political discourse, and vice 
versa.  Legal  and  political  discourse  in  the  two  jurisdictions  share  certain  political 
premises, and both tend to abstraction and simplification. It is sometimes hard, and 
sometimes impossible, to distinguish between immigration policy and immigration 
law, and between the politics of immigration and the politics of immigration law. 
Indeed, as I elaborate later, it is the very slipperiness of this divide that constitutes a 
key anxiety in the story of immigration review. 
Nevertheless,  political accounts  of  migration offer  a  richer  and  more  complex 
account  of  the  internal  complexities  of  people,  and  of  the  contemporary 
configurations of the State that are implicated in, and complicated by, immigration. I 
offer here four (overlapping) political accounts pitched at different levels of analysis, 
beginning with the most specific account, namely that of the politics of scandal.    178 
4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1  The politics of scandal The politics of scandal The politics of scandal The politics of scandal    
The  account  of  the  politics  of  scandal  is  a  portrayal  of  (mal)administration, 
scandals, ministerial oustings and incessant reform.  
Reference has already been made to the Australian scandals of the Tampa affair, 
the alleged abuse of ministerial discretion, and wrongful detention. This picture is 
incomplete  without  reference  also  to  the  ‘children  overboard’  affair,  when  the 
government  falsely  alleged  that  refugee  claimants  aboard  a  sinking  boat  had 
deliberately thrown their children into the ocean, and the drowning of people aboard 
the SIEV X.
886 More recently, there has been scandal over the apparent misuse of 
ministerial  powers  to  detain  a  suspected  terrorist,  despite  there  being  insufficient 
evidence to prosecute. The Federal Court reversed that decision,
887 and the incoming 
Rudd government has commenced an inquiry into the matter.
888  
In the UK, two scandals led directly to the ousting of Ministers — Blunkett’s fast-
tracking  of  a  visa  for  a  nanny;
889  and  the  breakdown  of  the  system for  deporting 
foreign  prisoners,  which  led  to  the  downfall  of  Charles  Clarke.
890  More  generally, 
long-term  incompetence  was  vividly  demonstrated  by  the  failure  to  stem  cross-
Channel  irregular  migration  (symbolised  by  the  Sangatte  Red  Cross  camp);
891  the 
woeful underestimation of the numbers of East European migrants likely to arrive as a 
result  of  the  enlargement  of  the  EU;
892  the  growth  of  the  asylum  backlog;
893  the 
allegations  that  visas  were  traded  for  sex;
894  and  the  tragic  deaths  of  irregular 
migrants at Morecambe Bay.
895 These scandals have led to ministerial oustings and 
incessant reform. During the lifetime of this thesis, the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate (‘IND’) has been replaced first by the Borders and Immigration Agency 
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(‘BIA’), and then by the UK Border Agency, while the Home Office itself has split in 
two.  
The politics of scandal has undermined public confidence in the Department and 
Home  Office,  as  the  story  of  immigration  review  revealed.  Meanwhile,  the 
administration  feels  besieged,  demoralised  and  defensive.  This  political  account 
therefore complicates the legal image of the bureaucracy as the faceless and neutral 
administrators  of  policies.  While  the  law  clearly  recognises,  and  can  remedy, 
instances of maladministration through the heads of judicial review, these heads of 
judicial  review  also  implicitly  assume  that  such  maladministration  is  exceptional, 
rather than endemic.  
This  political  account  also  reveals  the  institutional  dependence  of  the  legal 
system on a functional administration. Backlogs, lost appeal files, failures to provide 
enough  Home  Office  representatives,  and  failures  to  enforce  judgments  through 
removal all undermine the credibility of the system of immigration review, as the 
story of immigration review revealed. 
Finally,  and  most  importantly,  this  political  account  calls  into  question  the 
constitutional commonplaces of the law. Judges commonly defer to the executive on 
the  basis  of  its  democratic  accountability  and  on  the  basis  of  their  superior 
competence;  but  this  story  of  administrative  chaos  undermines  both  claims. 
Decreasing judicial faith in these commonplaces is evident in the House of Lords’ 
reference to the weakness of the democratic claim in the immigration context,
896 and 
in the IAT’s condemnation of backlogs as a “public disgrace”.
897 However, while this 
decreasing faith is seeping into judicial language, it has not led to any serious revision 
of  these  constitutional  commonplaces.  To  call  into  question  the  truth  of  these 
constitutional commonplaces would, after all, greatly complicate the judicial task and 
threaten  to  undermine  the  distinction  between  the  legal  and  political  sphere.  Yet 
what the politics of scandal reveals so vividly is the inadequacy of these constitutional 
commonplaces.  
4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2  Governments without opposition Governments without opposition Governments without opposition Governments without opposition    
At  the structural  level,  another political  account  may  be  written.  In  the  mid-
1990s, both jurisdictions exchanged one dominant government for another. Strong 
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governments have also been complemented by dominant Prime Ministers, supported 
by a long economic boom. Further, the policy convergence of both dominant parties 
has  disenfranchised  and  disaffected  voters  on  both  left  and  right.
898  Widespread 
cynicism and distrust
899 have encouraged politicians to displace that cynicism and 
distrust  elsewhere,  including  on  migrants.  These  general  trends  are  manifested  in 
immigration: in the convergence of immigration policies, the relative ineffectiveness 
of parliamentary scrutiny, and in the prominence of ‘sound-bite’ policies, such as the 
‘tipping point’ target.  
Thus, this is a story of the weaknesses and failures of democracy, embedded in 
the larger story of political malaise — a story of the demise of political parties and of 
class-conscious political engagements, of the rise of the authoritarian right, of mass 
apathy and complacency, and of the declining influence of liberal elites.  
This  story,  too,  undermines  the  constitutional  commonplaces  of  the  law.  The 
absence of real policy choices; the lack of public engagement with the democratic 
process; the weakness of parliamentary accountability and scrutiny; and the political 
motivations that drive the passage of controversial legislation all undermine the claim 
to  normative  authority  underpinning  legislation.  The  counter-majoritarian 
democratic principle of the protection of minorities, always more vulnerable to the 
majoritarian bias of the legislative process, warrants less respect for the constitutional 
competence  of  the  Parliament.  As  with  the  first  story,  therefore,  these  factors 
influence legal decisions, and even occasionally inflect legal discourse, but cannot be 
fully acknowledged without undermining the constitutional compact. 
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3  Secure borders, safe havens Secure borders, safe havens Secure borders, safe havens Secure borders, safe havens    
Another political account may be told at the level of the complex and shifting 
debates in which immigration is located or invoked. Of these, the four most constant 
themes are race, national identity, control, and the economy. 
As  the  historical  account  emphasises,  the  politics  of  race  has  always  been 
entangled with the politics of immigration.
900 Racism underlay the White Australia 
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Policy, and British responses to ‘new’ Commonwealth migration. The influence of race 
continues today to inflect debates about cultural integration, and in the anti-racist 
rhetoric of pro-immigration advocates. 
The  debate  about  race  feeds  into  the  wider  debate  about  national  identity. 
Immigration  forces  a re-assessment of self,  forcing  us  to  redefine  the  community. 
Those  who  welcome  immigration  use  it  to  define  their  country  as  a  non-
discriminatory  society  with  a  proud  humanitarian  heritage,
901  with  a  dynamic 
economy and a hospitable people.
902 Those who wish to restrict immigration perceive 
it,  conversely,  as  a  threat  to  national  identity,  since  it  dilutes  homogeneity; 
undermines the special obligations ties to, and bonds of, citizens; and exposes the 
weakness of the community.  
Immigration’s highly symbolic role in the formation of identities drives States to 
demonstrate  ‘control’  or  ‘management’  of  immigration:
903  to  demonstrate  the 
competence and capacity of governments to defend their communities. This defensive 
element  has  been  underlined  by  increasing  irregular  immigration,  and  the 
strengthened  nexus  between  crime  and  immigration  in  the  forms  of  human 
smuggling and trafficking, and international terrorism — a shift marked well by the 
(post-September 2001) title of the White Paper, ‘Secure Borders, Safe Haven’.  
However, restrictionist policies may also threaten the State’s economic interest. 
Long-term economic prosperity, ageing populations, sector-specific labour shortages, 
and the economic potential of tourism and overseas education bolster the economic 
argument for migration.
904  
In  this  political  account,  like  the  historical  account,  the  racial,  cultural  and 
economic identity of the person — the specificity of the individual — is of crucial 
significance. It also reveals the internal complexity of the State — in particular, its 
diverse  and  conflicting  imperatives;  and  the  competition  between  different 
conceptions of the State. 
Most importantly, however, this political account reveals that migration is not 
only an objective, and global, fact of movement across international borders, but also 
a subjective, highly localised, experience, varying across time and nations. Migration 
                                                   
901 Dauvergne, Humanitarianism, n761. 
902 See, eg, Home Office, Fairer, Faster, Firmer, n108; Home Office, Secure Borders, Safe Haven, 
n108. 
903 Cronin, n782. 
904 Schuster and Solmos, ‘New Labour’s agenda,’ n900.   182 
both denotes, and connotes. The Polish worker provokes not only the very common 
anxieties  of  job  competition,  pressure  on  local  services,  and  integration,  but  also 
specific anxieties about the role of Britain in the EU; the ideology of free trade; and 
concerns about the drive and work ethic of local workers. Refugees from areas of 
protracted conflict symbolise the fragility of our own peace and stability, and remind 
us of the unjust distribution of resources and power that structure our world. It is this 
very  multiplicity,  and  mobility,  of  connotations  that  makes  migration  such  a 
prominent  signifier  of  broader  anxieties,  and  thus  amplifies  the  challenge  of 
discursive competition in migration law. 
Significantly, migration in this political story is constructed as a problem, largely 
one  of  North-South  immigration.  Immigrants  from  the  South  are  less  readily 
integrated and more of a burden on resources, while the sheer weight of numbers of 
those in the South evoke fears of being ‘flooded’. Compassion for their plight, and 
recognition of the injustice pulls one way; but on the other hand, excepting some 
radical advocates,
905 we think we need to draw a ‘line’ on the acceptable limits of 
immigration from the South, in order to preserve the benefits of the North. Yet, as is 
discussed below, contemporary political philosophy has struggled to come up with 
satisfactory justifications, or criteria, for this approach, leaving us in the realm of pure 
political pragmatism. 
4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4  Anxiety in the age of glo Anxiety in the age of glo Anxiety in the age of glo Anxiety in the age of globalisation balisation balisation balisation    
While the first three stories focus on the internal complexity of the States and the 
communities that constitute them, the last story concerns the relationship of States to 
other States, and the present refashioning of the international system. Globalisation 
has become the catch-all buzzword of these changes, but allied to this are equally 
profound changes in the deregulation and privatisation of world economies, and the 
re-badging of States as multicultural civic States, bound by formal ties of citizenship. 
As immigration has been one of the most visible accompaniments, and drivers, of 
these enormously significant changes, it is thus also a symbol of the changing place 
and shape of the State in a (relatively) new world order.  
The  paradoxical  effects  of  globalisation  have  influenced  the  paradoxical 
structuring  of  this  symbol.  The  facilitation  of  international  travel,  international 
communications, and exposure to immigrants (particularly in global cities) has made 
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more  people  aware  and  appreciative  of  cultural  diversity.  Globalisation  has  thus 
emphasised our common humanity, and promoted deeper and stronger international 
and  transnational  linkages.  However,  these  benefits  of  globalisation  are 
predominantly enjoyed by social elites, whose education, job mobility and financial 
status allow them to take advantage of the flexibility and opportunities offered by 
globalisation.  
However,  these  enormous  changes  have  also  undermined  the  stability  and 
security of citizens. We see a more insecure world, in the virtual elimination of the 
‘job  for  life’;  the  weakening  of  trade  unions;  the  increasing  divergences  between 
classes; and the rapidity of technological changes. The social and cultural changes 
implicit in more diverse forms of immigration compound this instability. These larger 
anxieties  are  often  displaced  upon  the  outsider;  and  control  over  immigration, 
therefore, also signifies a desire to control the pace and direction of change.  
The  responses  to  these  changes  in  the  two  jurisdictions  have  partly  been 
structured by the place of the State in the international order. The UK’s enmeshment 
within Europe and the Anglo-American alliance enables it to benefit more from, and 
help  shape  the  structure  of,  globalisation.  These  factors  tend  to  constrain  an 
isolationist  approach,  as  the  failure  of  its  proposals  for  ‘regional  protection’ 
exemplify.
906 In contrast, Australia’s neighbours are largely in the global South, and it 
has no obvious regional partners, with the consequence that its policy options are less 
constrained. For example, while a version of the Pacific Solution was later adopted as 
Conservative immigration policy, this was derided as the ‘fantasy island’ policy, since 
the  UK  did  not  have  Australia’s  choice  of  weaker  and  impoverished  nations  as 
potential sites.
907  
The other major factor has been the differing strategies of the political parties. 
The Hawke government’s strategy of re-orienting Australian identity towards a more 
open,  multicultural,  civic  society,  managed  through  consultative  mechanisms  and 
peak institutions, sparked a backlash which favoured the Howard government and led 
to its promotion of a less inclusive sense of national identity. While this was clearly a 
more popular strategy, liberal elites were often disillusioned and hostile to this move 
back to insularity and isolationism. 
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The shift has largely been in the other direction in the UK, with the isolationist 
tendencies of the Thatcher government — most prominent in its ambivalent attitude 
towards the EU — reversed by New Labour’s more inclusive policies. Further, the 
early  push  to  create  more  plural  political  structures,  through  devolution,  the 
reinvigoration  of  local  government,  greater  public  consultation,  and  greater 
engagement with Europe, pulled at the power of central government from opposite 
ends.  
In this political account, migration is affiliated with globalisation and an unequal 
international order; people are redefined by their interactions with outsiders; and the 
community is an anxious and divided community, subjected to rapid and constant 
change in its mode of governance and in the way its people understand the world. 
Finally, this story ‘de-centres’ the State. Globalisation, deregulation, and devolution 
create a polycentric regime of multiple and competing powers, as reflected in the 
increasingly polycentric structure of law.  
This political account therefore importantly challenges the predominance of, and 
the monolithic nature of, the State in the legal imagination. It also exposes the gap 
between the foundational principle of the formal equality and sovereignty of States, 
and the real inequalities of the international order and the political constraints on the 
exercise of sovereignty.  
Finally,  even  where  legal  discourse  reveals  the  competition  between  differing 
visions of national identity — most vividly in the divergence between the minority 
and  the  majority  in  Al-Kateb  —  these  judicial  responses  do  not  recognise  these 
competing strands as such, rather assuming the correctness of one or another. While 
the political accounts emphasise complexity, divergence and competition, therefore, 
the legal account subsumes, obscures and ignores them. 
4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5  The political imagination The political imagination The political imagination The political imagination    
While  the  political  imagination  generalises  and  categorises  more  than  the 
historical story, it nevertheless produces a much more complex picture of migration, 
people, communities, the State, and power relations. 
In particular, it offers a rich account of the connotative aspects of migration, as a 
highly visible symbol of anxieties about the adequacy and efficiency of the political 
system; about personal, communal and national identities; about race, government 
control, and the economy; and about the changing shape and place of the State in the   185 
international  order.  The  discursive  competition  is  much  more  challenging  for  law 
because of the way migration is located on the fault lines of so many significant and 
changing anxieties. 
It also offers a more complex account of the diversity and motivations of people, 
and  the  changing  structure  of  the  relationships  between  them.  Like  the  historical 
story, the political story emphasises the significance of differences between people — 
differences of race, culture, and social status — and accounts for their differential 
reactions to immigration. The political story emphasises the way in which changes in 
global,  economic  and  political  structures  continue  to  shape  relationships  between 
people, creating diverse communities that increasingly correspond less well to nations 
or States, and which create significant cleavages within States. 
Most  importantly,  however,  the  political  story  emphasises  the  internal  and 
external complexity of States, and how these relations do not work, in practice, as 
legal discourse assumes. The simple assumption of the democratic legitimacy of the 
legislature is weakened by evidence of democratic deficits, functional incompetence, 
and internal contradictions and tensions. Externally, States are located in an unequal 
and unjust international order, which both significantly constrains and enables the 
direction of immigration policy. These external and internal aspects of States also 
have consequences for personal identities, and for the felt, localised, experience of 
migration. 
5  Migration studies 
As  well  as  these  three  broader  perspectives,  three  disciplinary  perspectives 
importantly  challenge  the  assumptions  of  legal  discourse.  The  most  obviously 
relevant of these is migration studies, an interdisciplinary field that brings together 
geography, sociology, anthropology and political science. Somewhat surprisingly, this 
field has only penetrated migration law scholarship to a limited extent, but it has 
significantly penetrated the public policy debate.  
 I discuss here three major aspects of migration studies: the measurement and 
mapping  of  migration  flows;  theories  about  the  causes  of  migration  and  its 
perpetuation;  and  the  implications  of  migration  for  nation-states  and  the 
international order.
908 
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5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1  Mapping migration Mapping migration Mapping migration Mapping migration    
Mapping who goes where is a foundational part of migration studies. Broadly 
speaking,  a  global  map  of  migration  flows
909  demonstrates  the  variability  and 
increasing complexity of migration patterns, consisting partly of ‘regional systems’ 
and a “truly global movement”.
910 The latter is most evident in the classical countries 
of immigration, including Australia, which have the highest proportions of foreign-
born residents and immigration flows, and the most diverse migrant stock.  
However, for the most part immigration patterns are regionally patterned. The 
Arab region and Asia experience significant streams of immigration, emigration, and 
regional and circular migration. Africa remains a major area of emigration, although 
with  significant  regional  migration  caused  in  part  by  conflict  and  socio-economic 
circumstances.  Europe  is  an  area  of  net  immigration,  with  varying  patterns  of 
immigration from former colonies and labour migration. These broad outlines are 
increasingly complicated, however, by increases in temporary and circular migration, 
and an increasing diversity in source countries.  
Like  the  historical  story,  this  mapping  of  flows  depicts  migration  as  a  highly 
complex, patterned system of group movements, with widely differing impacts. In 
doing so, it provides an important corrective to a number of migration myths. For 
example,  the  quantitative  effect  of  migration  is  smaller  than  popularly  imagined, 
involving only 3% of the world’s population, with only a small proportional rise in the 
last  few  decades  although  the  absolute  number  has  doubled.
911  It  corrects  the 
impression of migration as predominantly a North-South problem. It also provides an 
important corrective to the popular belief that most refugees come to Europe, with 
the developed countries having the smallest proportion of the 32.9 million ‘persons of 
concern’  to  the  UNHCR.
912  Migration  studies  therefore  evidences  the  disjuncture 
between  the  denotative  and  connotative  phenomenon  of  migration,  and  the  gap 
between the global and localised experience. It also provides evidence of the powerful 
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influence  of  geography  and  colonial  links  on  immigration  flows,  emphasising  the 
specificity of place. 
Migration  studies  also  supports  the  historical  and  political  stories  in  the 
conclusion that it is the type of immigration and the type of receiving State, rather 
than the act of immigration itself, that proves politically challenging. Despite large 
volumes of immigration in the Arab States, for example, there is little political fallout 
over the very limited freedoms and rights of its immigrants. Immigration is also much 
less of a salient political issue where immigrants do not threaten ethnic homogeneity, 
weaken the economy (or particular subclasses of it), or conflict with basic structural 
values. 
5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2   Migration theory  Migration theory  Migration theory  Migration theory    
In migration studies, migration is conceived of as a complex and dynamic social 
process,  a  conception  most  evident  in  the  development  of  migration  theory.
913 
Migration  theory  began  with  a  simple  economic  model  of  migration,  in  which 
migrants were ‘pushed’ by shifts in capital and ‘pulled’ by wage differentials, making 
voluntary individual choices on a rational cost-benefit basis. This was modified in the 
‘new economics of migration’ in the 1980s which reframed this as a choice taken by 
families, partly to diversify risk. Later theories implicated developed countries into a 
global economy that perpetuated and fostered inequalities, with ‘dual’ or ‘segmented’ 
labour market theory suggesting immigration was caused by a permanent structural 
demand  for  immigrant  labour,  and  ‘world  systems  theory’ positing  that  migration 
grew out of the uneven process of capitalist development.  
Other disciplines focused on the role of human agency, with an emphasis on 
migration histories and the cultural dimension of migration, and a focus on the role of 
human ‘chains’ or ‘networks’ and a ‘culture of migration’ in perpetuating migration. 
Political scientists emphasised the political dimension, including the effects of nation-
building; the need for flexible labour markets and the political demand for integration 
in  liberal  welfare  States;  and  the  effect  and  consequences  of  immigration  on 
international relations.
914 
The increasing direction of complexity and multidisciplinarity is reflected well in 
Weiner’s  analysis  of  four  ‘clusters’  of  variables  affecting  international  migration: 
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1) economic differentials; 2) spatial variables (the province of geography); 3) ‘affinity’ 
variables such as religion, race and national identity (the province of sociological and 
anthropological research) and 4) ‘access’ variables, focusing on entry and exit rules 
(the province of political scientists).
915 
This multi-variable approach offers a multidimensional picture of the person, and 
mediates between the role of structure and agency in the shaping of migration flows. 
Similarly,  it  offers  a  much  richer  and  more  complex  account  of  migration  as  an 
interaction  of  economic,  social,  political  and  psychological  processes.  This  is 
reinforced  by  other  work  done  on  the  long-term  impact  of  migrants  in  society, 
including  their  economic  impact  (especially  the  role  of  remittances  and  ethnic 
entrepreneurship);  their  legal,  political  and  social  incorporation;
916  and  the  lived 
experiences of migrants.
917  
The  State  is  also  much  more  closely  implicated  in  its  immigration  flows. 
Migration  flows  are  produced  by,  inter  alia,  nation-building  processes,  structural 
reliance on immigrant labour, and patterns of colonial and neo-colonial exploitation 
and impoverishment. Developed nations are thus not innocent victims of unwanted 
flows of labour, but deeply implicated in patterns of economic injustice that render so 
much  of  that  migration  unstable,  irregular  and  exploitative.  This  requires  us  to 
rethink the image of immigration as an act of benevolence and privilege, as explicitly 
recognised by Sedley LJ in the context of overseas students,
918 and reveals the gap 
between  the  State’s  legal  and  moral  responsibility  for  immigration.  This  gap  is 
particularly glaring when the UK condemns genocide in Darfur and oppression in 
Zimbabwe,  and  considers  Iraq  and  Afghanistan  too  unstable  to  pull  out  of,  yet 
continues to attempt to deport their citizens.
919  
5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3  States of migrati States of migrati States of migrati States of migration on on on    
Similarly,  the  debate  over  the  capacity  of  States  to  regulate  immigration  has 
emphasised both the internal and external complexity of States. Most prominently, 
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some have argued that globalisation has diminished this capacity, pointing to the way 
liberal  welfare  states  have  accorded  many  of  the  political  and  social  benefits  of 
citizenship to non-citizens, and accommodate large numbers of ‘denizens’.
920  
Others have pointed to the internal complexity of States. Freeman has focused on 
the  structure  of  the  competing  interests  within  the  US  policy-making  process  to 
explain  the  failure  of  immigration  policy  to  reflect  the  restrictive  temper  of  the 
electorate.
921 Hollifield has focused on the ‘liberal paradox’: international economic 
forces push states towards greater openness, while the international state system and 
domestic forces push states towards greater closure.
922 Joppke argued that the legal 
sphere,  shielded  from  populist  pressure  and  wedded  to  non-discrimination  and 
universalism,  accounts  for  the  expansiveness  of  immigration  policies  in  liberal 
States.
923 Liberal states accept unwanted immigration because they have limited their 
own sovereignty, not because of a lack of capacity to manage borders.
924 As noted in 
the Introduction, Christina Boswell focuses on the conflicting imperatives of States to 
explain the failures of immigration policy.
925 
Like the political story, then, this aspect of migration studies provides a more 
complex model of the State, both in relation to the external effects of globalisation, 
and in relation to the internal interplay between different arms of government and 
the  electorate,  and  between  the  multiple  roles  and  underlying  imperatives  of  the 
State.  
6  Contemporary political philosophy 
The  anxieties  and  increased  complexity  of  the  State  are  also  centre  stage  in 
contemporary political philosophy, of which four aspects are highly pertinent here. 
First, as already noted, the re-theorising of the relationship between the nation-state 
and the international order provoked by globalisation has provided an account of the 
increased external complexity of States. Second, this has provoked re-theorising of the 
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boundaries of justice, and the justifications for borders. Third, it has also provoked re-
theorising of the nature of personal identities and their relationship to communities. 
Fourth, investigation into the increased diversity of many states and the increased 
prominence  of  group-related  conflict  has  provided  an  account  of  the  increased 
internal complexity of States. 
6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1  Globalisation Globalisation Globalisation Globalisation    
Much  debate  in  globalisation  theory  has  centred  on  whether  globalisation 
weakens or strengthens the power of States.
926 In this debate, migration is a key case 
study.
927 On the one hand, the rise of free trade agreements, multinational corporate 
structures, global migration movements and irregular migration suggest a weakening 
of  State  capacity  to  control  migration.  On  the  other  hand,  strengthened  border 
control policies evidence the continuation of, or even the increase of, State power in 
this  area.  Multilevel  governance  structures,  such  as  the  EU,  the  UN,  and  the 
proliferation  of  intergovernmental  fora,  tend  to  supplement  rather  than  diminish 
State power in this area. 
These multilevel governance structures point to another effect of globalisation — 
the  movement  of  decision-making  and  control  both  upward  to  international  or 
transnational actors, and downward to smaller regional or local units. Slaughter, for 
example, argues that the State is not disappearing, but “disaggregated” and “hydra-
headed”.
928 Mathews argues that hierarchies are being replaced by networks, as the 
communications  revolution  multiplies  players  and  increases  the  power  of 
information.
929  Rosenau  argues  that  the  clash  between  forces  of  globalisation, 
centralisation and integration, on the one hand, and localisation, decentralisation and 
fragmentation  (what  he  calls  ‘fragmegrative’  forces)  are  responsible  for  these  new 
global governance structures.
930 
These accounts of the contemporary State help account for some aspects of the 
legal  constellation,  and  some  aspects  of  the  politics  of  immigration.  Globalisation 
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theory accounts better for some aspects of the legal constellation — the plurality of 
actors in newer legal regimes, and the increased involvement of international and 
regional actors — and explains why States are desperate to be seen as in ‘control of’, 
or ‘managing’ migration, in order to demonstrate the continued power and authority 
of  the  State  in  the  face  of  globalisation.  The  growth  of  local  and  transnational 
identities, meanwhile, contributes to the contested nature of immigration politics. 
Most importantly, however, these more sophisticated accounts of the contemporary 
State challenge the simplistic image of the sovereign State, with its absolute power to 
expel, at the heart of immigration law. 
6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2  Global justice Global justice Global justice Global justice and open borders  and open borders  and open borders  and open borders    
Globalisation also impeaches immigration law’s account of sovereignty in another 
way, for globalisation both makes outsiders more proximate, and enables us to affect 
increasingly distant others in increasingly important ways.
931 This has undermined the 
assumption of immigration law that immigration is a mere ‘privilege’. 
It has thus become possible to argue for ‘global justice’, in the sense of a global 
redistribution, with Beitz and Pogge for example adapting Rawls’ theory of justice to a 
global  plane,
932  although Rawls  himself  has  disagreed  with  this.
933  This moves  the 
question of our relations with outsiders from the realm of charity and compassion to 
that of justice and obligations, moving closer to the sphere of rights and law. Others 
have  argued  against  this  shift,  preferring  instead  ‘humanitarianism’  as  a  less 
contentious middle ground.
934  
This wider shift has translated specifically into the field of migration through the 
‘open  borders’  debate,  with  Joseph  Carens  the  most  prominent  exponent  of  the 
argument that liberalism requires open borders, subject to qualifications based on 
public  order.
935  This  argument  takes  the  liberal  principles  of  equality  and  non-
discrimination to an (apparently) logical conclusion — after all, it is difficult to justify 
in the abstract the huge global inequalities in resources. This has challenged other 
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liberal thinkers to justify restrictions on immigration, principally by way of the self-
determination and preservation of distinctive political communities and the special 
obligations owed to citizens.
936  
The  theoretical  justifications  for  immigration  restrictions,  however  plausible, 
suffer  from  a  major  defect:  they  gloss  over  many  of  the  factors  that  have  in  fact 
influenced the imposition of immigration restrictions, such as racial prejudice, fears 
and  anxieties  over  globalisation  and  declining  political  faith.  They  sacrifice  the 
specificity of these other stories, compartmentalising instead the ‘ideal type’ liberal 
state from ‘real world’ political constraints.
937 
Nevertheless,  this  wider  re-theorising  of  the  insider/outsider  relationship  is 
important, because it competes with legal discourse in the following ways. First, the 
clear  dichotomy  of  citizen/non-citizen,  structured  around  benefit  and  privilege,  is 
undermined by an account that suggests there may be some normative obligations 
towards outsiders. Rather, the unsettled state of the debate suggests that there is no 
consensus  on  how  we  reconcile  liberal  principles  with  immigration  restrictions. 
Contemporary liberal values sit uneasily with, and do not convincingly account for, 
the assertion of a State’s sovereign right to expel.  
Second, the vocabulary of justice highlights the weak normative legitimacy of the 
law  in  this  arena,  undermining  the  strong  association  of  law  and  justice  in  its 
heartlands — in criminal law and civil law, most prominently. Immigration law may 
have the formal status of law, but it has very little to do with the idea of just relations 
between people. 
Third, the weakness of the philosophical foundation for immigration restrictions 
can be used to openly challenge the foundation of immigration law.
938 It highlights 
the  discrepancy  between  our  commitment  to  equality  within  a  bounded  political 
community,  and  the  presumption  of  inequality  embedded  in  immigration  law.  It 
highlights the arbitrary nature of borders and States, and questions our entitlement to 
the lion’s share of resources. The open borders debate thus provides a more powerful 
rhetoric  with  which  to  contest  immigration  restrictions,  since  it  invokes  and 
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translates pre-existing political commitments, and challenges us to demonstrate our 
good faith.  
By emphasising the increasing proximity and entanglement of communities and 
the normative dimension of States’ obligations to outsiders, the global justice and 
opens borders debate openly challenges the model of immigration law, and pinpoints 
the normative void within it — making it the most direct discursive competitor to 
legal discourse. 
6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3  Liberals, communitarians and cosmopolitans Liberals, communitarians and cosmopolitans Liberals, communitarians and cosmopolitans Liberals, communitarians and cosmopolitans    
Allied  to  this  is  a  broader  shift  in  the  conceptions  of  personal  identity,  with 
competition between three models of the self. First, the liberal model of self is often 
caricatured as a highly individualist, abstract and pre-social sense of self, said to be 
typified by Rawls’ thought-experiment of a person ‘in the original position’ without 
any cultural, religious or other identity characteristic.
939 Despite these critiques, this 
liberal self remains the basis for much public policy and political discussion. 
The cosmopolitan model of self is inspired by, but not a necessary corollary of, 
this liberal approach. The cosmopolitan position, as Pogge puts it, is premised on the 
belief that the ultimate units of moral concern are individual human beings; that this 
status attaches to every living human being equally; and that this status has global 
force, with the person as the ultimate unit of moral concern for everyone.
940  
On the other hand, a range of other people, loosely but not uncontroversially 
labelled ‘communitarians’, have emphasised that individuals exist not in the abstract, 
but are constituted in part by communities, and that the aspirations and attachments 
of individuals were central to that sense of self and thus could not be discarded in the 
‘original position’.
941 
Of course, we can recognise truths in each of these perspectives, and we may 
experience each of these senses of selves.
942 The relevance of this debate is that they 
provide  different  models  of  personal  identities  which  partly  underlie  the  different 
legal regimes, and also explicate the politics of immigration. As political scientists 
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have evidenced, cosmopolitans tend to be pro-immigration,
943 partly explaining the 
pro-immigrant bias in the scholarly world.
944 
This debate therefore provides a richer account of people and their affiliations, 
one  that  highlights  the  different  attitudes  and  orientations  of  people  towards 
immigration  policy,  and  which  helps  explain  the  irresolvable  nature  of  the 
immigration  debate.  Here,  too,  globalisation  may  play  a  paradoxical  role,  with 
increased  travel  and  international  communication  promoting  a  cosmopolitan 
perspective in social elites on the one hand, and fostering a stronger communitarian 
sense of self among those whose ways of life are irreversibly changing. 
6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4   Multiculturalism  Multiculturalism  Multiculturalism  Multiculturalism    
Both  the  fact  and  theory  of  multiculturalism also  provide  a  richer  account  of 
people,  and  of  the  internal  complexity  of  States.  The  increased  cultural  diversity 
caused by immigration, combined with increasing recognition of indigenous peoples 
and minorities, has forced recognition of the special claims of cultural identity. States 
have thus developed policies on language, recognised different religious holidays and 
customs, and debated political recognition of, and empowerment of, different cultural 
groups.  
The  importance  of  cultural  affinities  has  been  articulated  more  clearly  in 
multicultural  theory.  Liberals  have  justified  minority  rights  in  terms  of  the 
importance of cultural membership in framing choices and enabling the exercise of 
autonomy.
945  While  these  claims  for  the  distinctiveness  and  necessity  of  cultural 
membership have not gone uncriticised,
946 the general insight of the importance of 
cultural membership both complicates our understanding of personal identity, and 
our understanding of community. People are not merely individuals, but members of 
cultural groups. Immigrants form their own ethnic communities, but they have ties to 
their host State as well as to their home States and communities. Multiculturalism 
thus points to the cleavages and power relations within States, and highlights the way 
immigrants are both inside and outside the State. 
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The  importance  of  cultural  identity  also  points  to  the  way  various  brands  of 
liberalism, including cosmopolitanism, and human rights discourse, tend to under-
emphasise our stake in cultural identities, and thus fail to generate the emotional 
charge of identity politics.
947 The language of liberalism, in which legal discourse is 
embedded, thus tends both to neglect the need for cultural recognition, and to gloss 
over the real anxieties of cultural threat.  
The  sense  of  threat  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  contemporary  liberal 
orthodoxy precludes the use of race or ethnic homogeneity to justify political closure. 
Further,  the  fact  of  cultural  diversity  undermines  the  ethnic  justification  of 
community, with the result that ‘British’ and ‘Australian’ identity are formally tied 
instead to vague civic ideals. The felt threat to an ethno-cultural community thus also 
invokes the fragility and amorphousness of State-sponsored identities.  
This  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that,  as  multicultural  theory  has  pinpointed, 
group rights fit awkwardly into the individualistic discourse of liberalism.
948 Liberal 
theorists of multiculturalism have, as described above, sought to retain the primacy of 
individuals as the ultimate units of moral concern, deriving the need for group rights 
not  from  the  moral  status  of  the group  but  rather  from  the  importance  of  group 
membership  for  individuals.  Thus,  multicultural  theory  points  to  a  dimension  of 
communities  and  States  missing  from  the  orthodox  legal  description,  namely  the 
composition  of  the  State  by  various,  overlapping,  groups  which  are  not  entirely 
reducible to groups of individuals. 
7  Postcolonial studies 
Finally,  postcolonial  studies  moves  away  from  the  abstractions  of  liberal 
language,  and  back  to  the  specificity,  complexity  and  diversity  of  the  historical 
perspective. Its foundation was the examination of the historical encounter of the 
coloniser  and  the  colonised,  emphasising  its  discursive  dimension  and  effects  on 
subjectivity.  Authors  such  as  Frantz  Fanon,  Chinua  Achebe  and  Salman  Rushdie 
spoke eloquently of their complex relationship with the English language and the 
power relations embedded in it, exploring the interrelation between economic and 
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political  structures  and  human  agency  within  the  context  of  their  own  unique 
identities.
949  
Here, the competition between, and the dynamism of, the different ‘selves’ of 
contemporary  political  philosophy  is  traced  at  the  micro-level.  The  person  in 
postcolonial  studies  is  always  and  everywhere  politically,  economically,  and 
historically inscribed. Identity becomes a site in which hegemony and resistance are 
played out. The person of postcolonial studies is particular and specific, irreducibly 
and holistically complex and constantly renegotiated — a matter of “‘becoming’ as 
well as of ‘being’”.
950  
Crucial to this project is the notion that our selves are constructed in relation to 
an  ‘Other’,  founded  on  a  dynamic  of  desire  and  fear.
951  This  encounter  may,  like 
globalisation, paradoxically promote both the affinity of common humanity, and the 
rejection  of  the  stranger  through  non-identification.  This  insight  is  now  broadly 
shared  by  a  range  of  disciplines,
952  and  has  obvious  implications  for  the  nexus 
between  immigration  and  citizenship  law.  This  relational  formation  of  identity  is 
embedded in, but not recognised explicitly by, the language of immigration law. In 
determining who is or is not an “immigrant”, or a “non-citizen”, we implicitly define 
the political community; but legal discourse treats these categories as self-evident 
truths, rather than contingent, constructed and dynamic.  
Postcolonial  studies,  moreover,  provides  a  much  more  complicated  vision  of 
power  relations.  Contemporary  postcolonial  studies  is  founded  on  post-
structuralism’s examination of the nexus between power, language and knowledge, 
emphasising  the  way  language  is  used  to  assert,  establish,  and  reinforce  colonial 
power. Language, therefore, is deeply implicated in the construction of hierarchies 
and in the structures of oppression. This contrasts with conventional judicial rhetoric 
(as discussed in chapter 4) which aims at logic and clarity, and appeals to reason, the 
lucidity of language and the neutrality of the arbiter.  
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This insight also explains the significance of legal language. The law is language 
buttressed by the power (or, as de Sousa Santos would have it, the violence)
953 of the 
State. It is therefore a coercive form of discourse, a discourse that not only centrally 
frames our reality but one that can delegitimise or undermine other discourses; and 
one that can be enforced and imposed. The power of the law is in its combination of 
discursive and coercive power.  
This explains why the language in which refugees and migrants are described are 
of such importance, because it frames the way we think of them, and thereby enables 
certain  responses.  Governments  have  consistently  framed  refugees  as  ‘asylum-
seekers’,  ‘bogus’  refugees,  and  ‘queue  jumpers’;  whereas  critics  have  tended  to 
emphasise the humanity of such people, and their relationships with ‘insiders’ (wives, 
neighbours, friends). The legal definition of refugee competes with broader notions of 
refugee in popular discourse; and our legal obligations compete with the popular view 
of asylum as an act of unilateral generosity. Thus, the story of immigration review is 
in part a battle over discursive primacy, and the language of the law itself acts to 
maintain, reinforce and legitimise unequal global structures.  
Further,  in  its  investigation  of  power  relations,  postcolonial  studies  is 
theoretically biased in favour of the suppressed and oppressed; of the peripheral and 
marginal, and of ambivalences, tensions and paradox. Part of the project involved 
‘writing back to the Empire’ through, for example, re-writing canonical texts from the 
perspective of the colonial subject, or re-examining canonical texts in the light of 
colonialism.
954 This focus on ‘reading against the grain’ makes us question omissions 
and de-emphasis, makes us ask who speaks with authority, and what entitles them to 
it — an orientation that informed the analysis of the previous chapter. A postcolonial 
reading of immigration law, thus, is alert to the tendency of academic scholarship and 
public policy to ‘write’ over, and drown out, the voices of migrants themselves,
955 and 
to de-emphasise human agency and over-privilege structure. Such a reading would 
also  recognise  the  ambivalences  and  paradoxes  within  legal  language,  and  within 
liberal accounts of identity, community, and the State. It would support the insight 
that we all, daily, live with apparent contradictions and incoherence, and that this 
                                                   
953 de Sousa Santos, n760. 
954 Bill Ashcroft et al, The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures (2nd 
ed, 2002). 
955  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak,  ‘Can  the  subaltern  speak?’  in  Gayatri  Chakravorty  Spivak  (ed), 
Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (1999).   198 
normative incoherence is an inescapable social fact that cannot ultimately be resolved 
by philosophical debate.
956  
Finally,  postcolonial  studies  is  also  biased  towards  the  experiential  and 
subjectivity,  focusing  on  the  exercise  of  power  as  an  intimate  and  subjective 
experience with profound effects on our own self-identity. Adopting the Foucauldian 
vision of power, postcolonial studies focuses on the percolating and pervasive nature 
of  power,  and  especially  on  the power  of  disciplines  to  construct  our  view  of  the 
world.
957 It thus highlights the politically loaded preference of the social sciences for 
objectivity and data, over subjectivity and experience, which is translated in refugee 
law in the preference of ‘objective’ country information to the lived experience of the 
refugee.  
More radically, an experiential bias (evident also in the ‘bottom-up’ approach to 
administrative  law,
958  and  studies  of  ‘legal  consciousness’
959)  re-frames  the  power 
relations  inherent  in  immigration  review.  Viewing  immigration  review  from  the 
immigrant’s perspective provides an important corrective to arguments about ‘legal 
merit’. As an Australian practitioner argued:  
You  have  someone  who  genuinely  feels  that  they  should  have  been  granted  refugee 
status—because they have not got access to lawyers and because they were tortured, for 
example—and the tribunal is telling them, ‘Everything is all right back in the Punjab now.’ 
To say that is a frivolous case is really straining the meaning of the word ‘frivolous’.
960 
Similarly, the experiences of practitioners and judges are also obscured in legal 
discourse.  Part  of  the  story  of  immigration  review  is  explained  by  the  frustration 
practitioners and judges feel with the lived contradiction between the upholding of 
legal values, and the experience of a system that generates serious challenges to those 
values. 
Postcolonial studies, therefore, provides an account of people and power relations 
that  challenges  the  biases  of  legal  discourse  —  that  insists  on  the  irreducible 
complexity  of  people,  that  emphasises  their  subjectivity,  and,  most  importantly, 
critiques  the  linguistic  and  political  biases  of  law.  As  will  already  be  evident,  the 
argument  of  this  thesis  (especially  in  chapter  4)  is  partly  inspired  by  these 
postcolonial orientations.  
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8  The social power of discourses 
The discursive competition between these accounts and the legal account is also, 
and importantly, unequal because of the greater social power of these discourses. Part 
of this is due to the greater complexity of these competing accounts, which capture a 
greater range of truths. 
However, other factors also promote the social power of these discourses. First, 
these discourses have a broader range of circulation. The political story, for example, 
is  repeated  ad  nauseam  in  the  media,  and  migration  studies  and  contemporary 
political philosophy are translated readily into public policy. Both the historical and 
geographical  accounts  also  circulate  in  popular  narratives  of  immigration. 
Postcolonial studies has been hugely influential in the academy, and has perceptibly 
infiltrated public discourse. Legal discourse circulates more narrowly. Few ordinary 
people read judgments or legislation, and instead these are re-interpreted and often 
misinterpreted by the media.  
A second, related, point is that the competing discourses are more accessible to 
the  ordinary  public,  and  pollinate  each  other  more  readily.  No  special  training  is 
required  to  understand  the  historical,  political  or  geographical  stories.  While  the 
disciplinary perspectives are more specialised, both contemporary political language 
and migration studies speak in a relatively accessible fashion. Postcolonial studies, 
however, is frequently jargon-laden and thus less accessible. This is true also of legal 
language,  which  uses  a  specialised  vocabulary  which  is  often  intimidating  to  the 
uninitiated.  
Third, as already noted, there is a prevailing bias towards objective and empirical 
‘expertise’, towards hard data and objective accounts. Migration studies, as the most 
obviously ‘empirical’, benefits from this prevailing bias.  
Fourth  and  finally,  as  emphasised  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  aims  of  legal 
discourse are different from those of competing accounts. The aim of legal discourse 
is, ultimately, to simplify and reduce a complex social reality in order to apply rules 
and  determine  outcomes.  In  contrast,  the  competing  perspectives  aim  at 
understanding, and are thus open rather than closed in their orientations, and can 
deal  at  greater  or  lesser  levels  of  specificity  and  complexity.  Thus,  it  should  be 
emphasised, my critique here is not that legal discourse is impoverished and can be 
made  better  by  more  imaginative  language;  rather,  it  is  that  the  discursive   200 
competition surrounding migration is structurally unequal, and that legal discourse is 
thus inevitably and particularly vulnerable to such competition. 
9  Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that migration is embedded in a ‘discursive constellation’ 
which  discursively  competes,  and  thus  challenges,  immigration  law.  In  these 
accounts, migration is a complex, patterned, social process, caused and perpetuated 
by an equally complicated range of factors. It is a phenomenon which, while having 
global implications, is differently experienced by different communities at different 
times. Migration is also a connotative phenomenon, one that unerringly locates the 
fault lines of a number of significant contemporary anxieties. These anxieties may be 
conveniently labelled as “identities, borders and orders”.
961 
Identities, which are assumed as relatively unproblematic in legal discourse and 
fixed by legal categories, prove highly complex in other accounts. The accounts of 
liberal, communitarian and cosmopolitan selves indicate alternative conceptions of 
identity; multiculturalism emphasises the significance of group identities for personal 
identities;  the  political  story  evidences  cleavages  in,  and  competing  visions  of, 
national identities. The historical perspective and postcolonial studies go further in 
emphasising  the  specificity  and  irreducible  complexity  of  identities, tracing  at  the 
micro-level  the  interaction  between  structure  and  agency  that  shapes  individual 
identities. 
The  easy  equation  between  community  and  State  in  legal  discourse  is  also 
revealed as simplistic. The internal and external complexity of States is repeatedly 
emphasised  in  historical  and  political  accounts,  while  the  geographical  story 
emphasises  the  specificity  and  physicality  of  territory,  and  its  relation  to  the 
community  and  State.  The  apparent  unity  of  the  State  in  legal  discourse  is 
‘disaggregated’ by globalisation theory. The simple legal model of power relations is 
challenged not only by the increased complexity of these accounts, but also more 
explicitly by the global justice and open borders debate, and by postcolonial studies.  
The  failure  of  legal  discourse  to  deal  adequately  with  the  complexity  of  the 
phenomenon of migration renders legal discourse vulnerable to attack on different 
fronts. Decisions that obscure the politics of migration are described as “bizarre or 
inexplicable”,  and  judges  “out  of  touch”.  On the  other  hand,  describing  claims  as 
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“frivolous”  or  as  of  “no  legal  merit”  runs  the  risk  of  linguistic  (and  also  physical) 
oppression — a risk captured in the slogan “No one is illegal”, a slogan that openly 
challenges the adequacy and power of legal classifications.  
While this analysis applies to other fields of law, it is more acute in immigration 
law. Immigration law is more susceptible to the challenge because of its normative 
weakness and the haphazard nature of the legal constellation. Further, the mobility 
and multiplicity of the connotations of migration, the prominence and significance of 
the anxieties it symbolises and evokes, and the life-changing and potentially death-
causing  implications  of  immigration  decisions,  make  the  gap  between  the  legal 
imagination of migration and those in richer, more complex accounts, both more 
obvious and significant. 
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Chapter 6 — Regulating disputes  
1  Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapters have emphasised the challenge of coherence and 
competition,  this  chapter  turns  to  the  challenge  of  capacity.  I  argue  here  that 
immigration  exposes  several  significant  limitations  to  the  capacity  of  the  social 
practice of law to resolve disputes and regulate human behaviour. While some of 
these limitations are unique to immigration law, most of these are general limitations 
whose effect is exacerbated in immigration.  
The chapter focuses on dispute resolution and regulation because they are core 
social  functions  of  law.  Both  domestic  immigration  law  and  EU  immigration  and 
asylum law have a predominantly regulatory character, while the main objective of 
adjudication, and thus immigration review, is to resolve disputes. The difficulties of 
the law in performing these social functions underlie, and explain much of, the story 
of  immigration  review.  It  is,  in  large  part,  a  story  about  the  misrecognition  of, 
frustration with, and responses to these fundamental limitations to the capacity of the 
law. 
It is important to clarify that I do not argue that the law in this field is inherently 
incapable of resolving disputes or regulating human behaviour. It is clear enough that 
some disputes are indeed resolved adequately through immigration review, and that 
there are real effects on human behaviour, although the extent of its effectiveness is 
much debated, and very difficult to measure. Moreover, the effectiveness of the law 
varies greatly across different kinds of disputes and human behaviour. Rather, I argue 
that, for a range of reasons peculiar to immigration, there are significant structural 
limitations that render immigration law and review less capable of resolving disputes 
and regulating behaviour than in other spheres of law.  
I begin first with dispute resolution, touching briefly on the insights of different 
scholarly traditions before examining the ways in which the function of dispute model 
resolution is inappropriate and misleading. The second section of the chapter, on 
regulation,  follows  a  similar  structure,  beginning  with  the  insights  of  regulatory 
studies and the literature on policy failure, before turning to three major limitations: 
the regulatory context; the constraints of policy-making and law-making processes; 
and the design and implementation of policy.    203 
This  framework  both  organises  and  illuminates  the  complaints  made  of 
immigration law and review described in chapter 1. It provides a structured way of 
thinking  through  these  complaints,  and  this  structure  illuminates  how  these 
complaints manifest more general limitations of law, and the different causes of these 
limitations. This chapter concludes by examining how the different causes of these 
various  limitations  may  be  disentangled,  and  how  these  different  causes  invite 
different  approaches  to  these  limitations.  However,  the  logical  conclusions  to  be 
drawn from this analysis will be transformed, and probably frustrated, by political and 
institutional dynamics.  
2  Dispute resolution 
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  Approaches to dispute resolution Approaches to dispute resolution Approaches to dispute resolution Approaches to dispute resolution    
Dispute resolution has been a focus in three distinctive fields of legal theory: 
anthropology of law, socio-legal studies, and alternative dispute resolution (‘ADR’) 
studies. Central to these fields is the insight that a core function of law is to resolve 
disputes over conflicting interests within a community. How it does this, whether it 
does this effectively, and the influences of social factors are underlying themes of the 
research. 
Anthropologists have long described the customs, reasoning and procedures for 
resolving disputes in different cultures, and the cross-cultural concept of disputing 
“displac[ed] [the ethnocentric concept of] law as the subject of study” in the 1970s.
962 
In the anthropological field, a dispute was defined as “the public assertion, usually 
through some standard procedures, of an initially dyadic disagreement”.
963  
The extension of anthropology of law to studies of advanced Western societies 
has overlapped with the closely affiliated traditions of ‘law and society’ scholarship 
(predominantly used in the US), ‘socio-legal studies’ (predominantly used in Britain), 
and the more theoretically inclined ‘sociology of law’.
964 These studies, revealing as 
they do the inequalities and inaccessibility of litigation, have also fed into the ‘access 
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to justice’ movement.
965 In these fields, the focus is on the empirical investigation of 
dispute settlement as a social process. 
The process-oriented approach is exemplified in Felstiner, Abel and Sarat’s classic 
analysis of disputes as a process of ‘naming’ (recognising the dispute); ‘blaming’, and 
‘claiming’.
966 The social dimension of this process is emphasised in investigations of 
the  influence  on  litigation  of  social  factors  including  the  form  of  social 
organisation,
967 the difference between ‘one-shot’ and ‘repeat players’ as litigants,
968 
and the role of participants in defining and transforming the dispute.
969  
As noted earlier, the subjectivity of legal processes has been investigated through 
the concept of ‘legal consciousness’.
970 This turn towards subjectivity is also evident in 
research  examining  the  independent  legitimating  effect  of  different  aspects  of 
procedural justice.
971 
The various emphases of the socio-legal approach is epitomised best in the UK by 
the  major  Paths  to  Justice  project,  which  examined  empirically  the  incidence  of 
“justiciable problems” and the ways in which these justiciable problems were, or were 
not, translated into legal problems.
972 Part of this research also involved qualitative 
interviewing, which allowed examination not only of what “people do” but also what 
people “think about law”, as the subtitle of the book has it. A similar study in relation 
to administrative law has been initiated.
973 
The influence of this work and concerns about access to justice have fed into the 
field of ADR studies, which centres on the notion of courts as resolving (or, more 
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generally, inadequately resolving) disputes. However, as Twining notes, ADR studies 
is largely atheoretical,
974 drawing instead from the paradigm of the dispute already 
developed in anthropology of law and socio-legal studies. Notably, however, the focus 
of ADR itself — on forms of mediation, arbitration and informal dispute resolution — 
assumes the possibility of an accommodation or compromise of interests. 
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  The paradigmatic dispute The paradigmatic dispute The paradigmatic dispute The paradigmatic dispute    
Together, these fields have constructed a paradigm of ‘dispute’ which, as Kidder 
argues,  has  its  own  “baggage  of  assumptions”  —  namely:  1)  egalitarianism,  2) 
individualism, 3) the discreteness of cases, and 4) the function of dispute resolution in 
restoring  harmony.
975  Disputes  are  conceptualised  primarily  as  involving  two 
individuals  within  a  community,  in  a  state  of  approximate  equality,  in  discrete 
conflicts of interests, with the objective of producing “a settlement in the specific case 
which permits the group to return to normal”.
976 In this paradigm, the adjudicator is a 
third  ‘neutral’  party  (in  aspiration,  if  not  in  practice).  This  paradigm  marries  the 
structure of civil law with a structural-functionalist tradition which (as later critiques 
noted)
977 emphasised stability, harmony and consensus at the expense of dissensus, 
conflict, and coercion.  
The first, and most fundamental, limitation of immigration review is that the 
nature and structure of an immigration dispute does not fit within this paradigm. The 
very  notion  of  ‘dispute’  is,  I  argue,  inapposite  and  misleading,  obscuring  several 
significant features of immigration ‘disputes’: the ‘outsider’ status of the migrant; the 
individual-State relationship; and the rights, interests and values at stake. 
2.2.1  ‘IN’ AND ‘OUTSIDE’ THE COMMUNITY 
The notion that dispute resolution processes work to defuse conflict and restore 
social harmony is itself premised on the assumption that the dispute arose within the 
community,  rather  than  between  insiders  and  outsiders.  Of  course,  this 
characterisation of immigrants as outsiders oversimplifies, for most immigrants who 
can avail themselves of immigration review are physically within, and to greater or 
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lesser degrees integrated in, the society. Nevertheless, this structural feature has two 
important implications. 
The  first  important  implication  is  that  participants  in  immigration review  are 
likely to be socialised differently — to carry with them different cultural norms and 
expectations, and to behave and interpret behaviour differently. As anthropological 
work  has  demonstrated,  processes  of  dispute  resolution  are  highly  culturally 
contextual, and often dependent upon unifying cultural norms.  
Some  of  the  consequences  that  arise  from  this  feature  are  obvious.  As  noted 
earlier,  the  presentation  and  evaluation  of  evidence  and  the  interpretation  of 
credibility  is  made  much  more  difficult  once  we  take  away  many  of  the  shared 
assumptions  about  what  is  important,  and  how  one  should  behave.  ‘Legal 
consciousness’ and attitudes towards government and the law vary considerably. This 
is  exacerbated  in  immigration  review  because  of  the  diversity  of  cultural  contexts 
involved.
978 Further, the persecution or failure of governments that founds refugee 
status unavoidably shapes the refugee claimants’ perception of governments and the 
law. Indeed, the very restrictiveness of refugee policies encourages refugee claimants 
to evade or breach the law.  
Many of the social norms that usually result in compliance with the law may be 
absent: the desire to avoid the interruption of a peaceful life; the desire to maintain 
one’s reputation within a social community; the belief that overall the system of law is 
beneficial for one’s peace and well-being; the belief that the law generally provides 
justice;  or  the  belief  in  the  legitimacy  of  a  democratic  government  in  which  one 
participates. Many migrants’ experiences are also more likely to be coloured by the 
coercive  aspects  of  the  law,  in  the  forms  of  detention,  criminal  punishment,  and 
removal. Further, those that enter irregularly may perceive themselves as ‘outside’ the 
protection  of  the  law  altogether.  As  one  Guatemalan  irregular  migrant  said:  “I’m 
illegal, I have no rights. I’m nobody in this country. Just do whatever you want with 
me.”
979 
While the differential socialisation of migrants has an important practical effect 
upon the effectiveness of immigration law and review, another effect of the insider-
outsider structure of immigration review is normative. Implicit in the paradigm of 
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dispute resolution is the recognition of the importance of retaining harmony within a 
community, a factor which has less force when the person is ‘outside’ the community.  
The claims to procedural justice of non-citizens are thus weaker, as is evident in 
the  late  development  of  immigration  review,  and  the  long  judicial  tradition  of 
excluding  natural  justice  from  immigration  decisions.  The  link  between  the 
community and the claims to procedural justice is manifest in the structure of review 
rights, which privileges those present in Australia and British family visitors, and in 
the different standards of access to courts depending on residence in Art 16 of the 
Refugee Convention. As Ruddock put it: “You do not have to give people who arrive 
on your shores, and are in all senses foreigners, access to your courts in the same way 
you give your own people”.
980  
This normative difference partly explains the special susceptibility of immigration 
review to continual reforms and attacks, and the toleration of procedural variation in 
this field. Importantly, this normative difference also makes the State’s interest in 
resolving  the  dispute,  and  in  recognising  the  interests  of  the  immigrant,  much 
weaker. 
2.2.2  THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE 
Another aspect of the distortion of the paradigmatic dispute is that the dispute is 
not between equal individuals but between the individual and that of the State. Two 
other implications flow from this: a gross disparity of power, and more fundamentally, 
the fact that the ‘dispute’ is an artificial creation of the State.  
While  all  administrative  fields  are  afflicted  by  a  stark  disparity  in  power, 
immigration review exhibits perhaps the most gross inequality of power visible. As 
socio-legal  studies  has  graphically  demonstrated,  the  processes  and  outcomes  of 
dispute  resolution  are  crucially  shaped  by  factors  such  as  linguistic  and  cultural 
competence, access to financial and legal resources, and experience of legal processes.  
While the variable social characteristics of migrants produce much variation in 
the extent of the disparity, in general the migrant is at a greater disadvantage than a 
citizen. They are much less likely to be linguistically and culturally competent; less 
likely to have access to financial resources including legal aid; and more likely to be 
experiencing the legal system for the first time. These effects are partly mitigated by 
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various  features  of  immigration  review,  such  as  the  more  inquisitorial  procedure; 
translation and interpretation; legal representation, including pro bono counsel; court 
waivers and (in the UK) free tribunal hearings, as discussed in chapter 1.  
However, the State does not simply have more resources and additional benefits 
as  a  ‘repeat  player’.  Rather,  it  is  the  State  that  generates,  frames  and  judges  the 
dispute. It is the State that makes the rules that generate the dispute in the first place; 
it is the State that creates and modifies the laws which govern the dispute; it is the 
State that creates and modifies the review structure through which the dispute is 
processed; and it is the State that enforces the judgment. 
To  a  certain  extent,  this  all-pervasive  power  is  partly  restricted  by  the  more 
autonomous legal regimes of refugee law and, in the UK, human rights law. Famously, 
article 3 of the ECHR has been interpreted as preventing States from returning people 
to States where there is a real risk they will suffer torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment.
981  
However,  while  these  qualifications  on  sovereignty  are  both  important 
theoretically and practically, the implications of these ought not to be overstated. In 
theory, these apparent ‘exceptions’ are consequences (albeit unforeseen, in the case of 
Art  3)  of  the  States’  decisions  to  ratify  these  Conventions;  and  the  rules  in  the 
Conventions  were  also  framed  by  States.
982  In  theory,  too,  the  effect  of  these 
Conventions  is  binding  on  an  international  plane,  but  not  directly  binding 
domestically,  and  the  States  retain  the  power  to  legislate  in  breach  of  those 
Conventions. In practice, too, it is relatively rare for a claim under Article 3 ECHR to 
succeed where no refugee claim is made out,
983 and there are, as Chapter 1 discusses, 
many indirect ways in which those claims may be prevented or restricted.        
While the general picture of the all-pervasive power of the State is true of many 
civil and administrative disputes, its effects are magnified in immigration review, for 
several reasons. First, the rules by which disputes are generated are important. Thus, 
although civil disputes may be governed by positive laws made by manifestations of 
the State, those rules commonly work to accommodate the different interests within a 
community.  In  administrative  disputes  over  (for  example)  social  security,  tax  and 
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planning, the rules seek to distribute benefits and burdens across the community. 
These rules, therefore, govern relations as between individuals or segments of the 
community, whereas immigration law governs relations directly between the State 
and  the  migrant,  and  is  made  expressly  in  the  ‘national  interest’,  namely  in  the 
interests of the State.  
Second, as was described in chapter 2, the rules themselves are weighted heavily 
against the migrant. This is exacerbated by the fact that immigration law is largely 
made by the executive, and is subject to rapid change and political volatility. This 
both undermines the protective function of legal certainty and makes the State’s role 
in generating the rules of the dispute and the procedures of the dispute more visibly 
political.  
Third, the pervasive power of the State in the dispute is made more evident by its 
exclusionary and coercive aspect in immigration, in contrast to the aspect of welfare 
protection in, say, social security. It is the oppressive aspects of the State — its powers 
to exclude, detain, and deport — that loom large in immigration disputes.  
Fourth, while in other administrative disputes the claim is in truth made against 
one  manifestation  of  the  government  —  the  Department  of  Social  Security,  for 
example — in immigration the claim is in truth one of right of residence in the State 
itself, further magnifying the role of the State in immigration disputes.  
The relationship between the individual and the State in immigration disputes, 
therefore, is misleadingly analogised to a dispute between individuals, obscuring both 
the gross disparity of power and the pervasive role of the State in constructing and 
framing the ‘dispute’.  
2.2.3  RIGHTS, INTERESTS AND VALUES  
The  third  feature  of  the  structure  of  immigration  disputes  that  reveals  the 
inappropriateness  of  the  dispute  paradigm  is  the  differing  nature  of  the  rights, 
interests and values in immigration disputes. In the paradigmatic dispute, the conflict 
usually  arises  over  interests  that  may  be  accommodated,  compromised,  or  set  off 
against competing interests, and is governed by a normative framework of rights and 
obligations — features that are particularly clear in tort law, contract law and criminal 
law, the heartlands of law’s empire. 
This is not true, for several reasons, in immigration disputes. First, the major 
interest in an immigration dispute — the right to enter or remain — is not readily   210 
subject to compromise or accommodation, since it is the ‘interest of all interests’. As 
Walzer has noted, all interests in a community are affected by, and incorporated in, 
the right to remain; membership of the community is a precondition to all other social 
goods.
984  The  dispute  thus  has  an  ‘all-or-nothing’  character,  and  is  not  typically 
‘balanced’ by offsetting interests and obligations.  
Second,  as  I  outlined  earlier,  immigration  law  does  not  encode  a  coherent 
normative framework of rights and obligations; it excludes or de-emphasises factors 
that  are  normatively,  though  not  legally,  significant;  and  is  largely  premised  on  a 
model of immigration as a ‘privilege’. Both the inadequacy of the legal constellation to 
capture the substantive disputes in issue, and the lack of normative consensus upon 
what rights should be accorded to migrants, differentiate the immigration case from 
the paradigmatic dispute.  
Third, in many immigration cases, what is at stake is closer to what Aubert calls a 
‘conflict of values’, which is “based upon a dissensus concerning the normative status 
of a social object”, and which is therefore less amenable to dispute resolution.
985 As I 
have already argued, what underlies many immigration disputes is a disagreement not 
about the application of the rules themselves, but rather about the fairness of those 
rules. This varies widely according to the dispute, but in the most problematic kind — 
that of North-South irregular immigration — this is very likely, since what is really in 
dispute is the fairness of global inequality, expressed eloquently by Kingsley Ofosu:  
I don't want my son to live the same life I have led. I don't want my family to suffer. We 
are all in the same world. Some people are suffering and some people are enjoying and I 
don't know the reason why.
986  
2.2.4  THE MISLEADING DISPUTE 
These  three  structural  features  of  immigration  ‘disputes’  —  the  migrant  as 
outsider;  the  relationship  between  the  individual  and  the  State;  and  the  different 
structure  of  rights,  interests  and  values  —  are  distorted  and  obscured  by  the 
characterisation  of  immigration  cases  as  disputes  susceptible  to  resolution  in  the 
same manner as other disputes.  
The  paradigm  of  the  dispute  misleads  us  in  important  ways.  It  encourages 
comparisons with other administrative or legal fields that downplay the distinctive 
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characteristics  of  immigration  disputes,  and  consequently  overrate  the  capacity  of 
immigration review to resolve disputes. For example, the frequent complaint that the 
high rates of appeal, the lack of legal merit of many cases, high withdrawal rates, and 
low success rates are manifestations of abuse fails to recognise that these features are 
probable outcomes of the structure of migration disputes. The high stakes involved 
are likely to lead to high appeal rates, and this is compounded by the gross disparity 
in  power,  perceptions  of  bias,  the  inadequacy  of  the  legal  constellation,  and  the 
probability of an underlying conflict of value. Low success rates and cases lacking 
legal merit are probable outcomes of a legal constellation that offers limited avenues 
for successfully challenging migration disputes.  
Further,  comparisons  are  misleading  because  the  high  stakes  and  the  lack  of 
interests  that  may  be  accommodated  or  compromised  mean  that  dispute 
management strategies common in other fields — in Galanter’s terminology, ‘lumping 
it’, ‘exit’ or informal modes of dispute resolution
987 — are not usually available. The 
only  real  possibilities  are  that  migrants  ‘accept  the  verdict’  or  are  coerced  into 
compliance. 
The first possibility is real, but varies widely across types of migrants, because the 
acceptance  of  the  dispute  resolution  process  often  depends  on  shared  values  and 
norms governing  the  dispute,  and  the  stakes involved.  It  is  least likely  in  refugee 
contexts, where the stakes involved may well be life or death, and where values and 
norms are most likely to differ. Furthermore, as Felstiner argues, the effect of losing in 
adjudicative contexts is to alienate the loser by rendering “what [they] consider as 
history … either an illusion or a lie”.
988 The focus on credibility and the disjuncture 
between the popular understanding of a refugee and the legal definition exacerbate 
this, since the rejection of their claims appears to invalidate their experiences.  
The second option of coercion raises its own difficulties. Deportation is a “cruel 
power”  that  “requires  the  coercive  hand  of  the  state  on  what  are  often  extremely 
vulnerable  men,  women  and,  perhaps  most  controversially  of  all,  children.”
989  As 
refugee advocates often point out, these are people who have generally committed no 
crime,  yet  they  are  granted  more  limited  legal  protections  than  criminals:  in  the 
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words of one Amnesty report, “seeking asylum is not a crime”.
990 Coercion is also 
complicated  and  resource-intensive,  as  I  will  discuss  further  later,  and  thus 
impractical as a routine form of enforcement.  
Finally,  and perhaps  most  importantly,  the  dispute resolution  model  misleads 
immigrants as to the limitations of immigration review, as is revealed time and again 
in observations of unrepresented applicants. For example, in one tribunal hearing, 
after an applicant had detailed the sad story of his failed marriage, he disarmingly told 
the member that “I don’t understand the law” but asked “[i]s it fair that she gets to go 
back and leave me with nothing?” The member explained that the law did not always 
protect against injustice, and that it was not fairness that was in issue — a confusion 
made more vivid by the fact that the only legal issue before the member was whether 
the applicant had suffered domestic violence.
991  
Frustrated judges have spoken of this disjuncture between the expectations of 
migrants and their limited function, some more sympathetically than others.
992 As 
one judge put it:  
He appears, understandably enough, to have been under some misunderstanding as to the 
very limited ability of the Court to intervene to correct what he thinks is an injustice that 
he has suffered at the hands of the Tribunal. He has no legal or procedural criticisms of 
what the Tribunal did. He simply wants the Court to "consider his plight".
993 
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3  The displacement of the ‘dispute’ The displacement of the ‘dispute’ The displacement of the ‘dispute’ The displacement of the ‘dispute’        
Here I briefly note an additional limitation on the dispute resolution model that 
has been discussed at length earlier, namely the way in which the legal constellation 
serves to displace and transform the underlying dispute into its own, more limited, 
legal categories. 
Underlying most immigration cases is a desire by migrants to enter or remain, 
driven  by  factors  that  are  not  recognised  or  given  due  weight  by  the  legal 
constellation. Often, there is no real ‘dispute’ between the individual and the State, 
but rather a mismatch between the substantive claims to entry or residence — the 
fact that some people are “suffering” while others “enjoying”; personal links to the 
State; fear of return — and the legal rules and procedural rights that govern entry and 
residence.  
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We see the displacement of these substantive disputes in, for example, SZAYW, 
where the Palestinian issue was transformed into the very narrow question of whether 
the hearing was ‘in private’.
994 In K, the practice of FGM was transformed into the 
technical question of whether she was a member of a ‘particular social group’.
995  
As already noted, these transformations enable decisions to be made, but the 
distortions  compound  the  original  problem  —  that  the  underlying  dispute  is  not 
resolved  in  the  process.  Australian  judges  have  vociferously  condemned  the 
“meaningless  gobbledegook”
996  of  submissions  that  recite  the  “rehearsed 
catchwords”
997 of the grounds constituting jurisdictional error, overlooking the fact 
that  unrepresented  applicants  simply  do  not  understand  the  ways  in  which  their 
dispute  have  been  transformed  by  the  legal  constellation.  As  a  result,  applicants 
frequently do not understand why they have failed or succeeded; even if they do, they 
often  see  their  grievance  as  not  being  adequately  addressed.
998  This  perpetuates 
frustration and disillusionment. 
The limitations of the law also frustrate decision-makers and judges, as is evident 
both in their remarks about the “harsh” and “tragic” outcomes of their cases,
999 and in 
their comments about applicants “playing the system”.
1000 Such comments strongly 
suggest that judges are discomfited, on the one hand, by the dissonance between the 
limitations of the law and its aspirations to justice; and, on the other, by the failure of 
some  applicants  to  use  the  review  process  ‘correctly’,  namely  as  a  way  to  resolve 
(legally cognisable) disputes.  
The  frustration  and  disillusionment  perpetuated  by  the  transformation  of 
disputes by the legal process is also felt by the wider public, as the legal decision is re-
transformed into a broader social context. This was vividly exemplified by the case of 
the  Afghan  hijackers,
1001  which  the  tabloid  press  re-interpreted  as  providing  a 
“welcome mat for terrorists”.
1002 The case sparked calls for the HRA to be scrapped,
1003 
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demonstrating the potential for the legal transformation of disputes to undermine the 
legitimacy of the law.  
The capacity of the law to resolve disputes in immigration is therefore limited to 
a greater degree than in other fields, both because we proceed, mistakenly, on the 
assumption that immigration review functions to resolve disputes, and because the 
transformation wrought by the legal constellation tends to create artificial disputes 
that misrecognise the underlying issues. These structural limitations create a dynamic 
of negative feedback. The failure of migrants to ‘accept the verdict’ is perceived by 
governments and judges as “abuse”, which may affect the impartiality of the decisions 
and the faith of migrants, their advisers and advocates. It also forces greater reliance 
on the coercive power of the law, paradoxically exposing both the weakness of the 
threat of coercion and the “cruel power” of the State. Further, the transformation of 
the ‘dispute’ increases the probability that migrants fail to ‘accept the verdict’, as well 
as increasing the frustration of tribunal members, judges, and the wider public. The 
story of immigration review, therefore, is partly explicable as a story of frustration and 
disillusionment generated and perpetuated by these limitations on the capacity of the 
review process to resolve disputes.  
3  Regulation 
Frustration and disillusionment also result from the limitations on the capacity of 
law to regulate human behaviour. I use regulation in the broad sense of “deliberate 
state influence … cover[ing] all state actions designed to influence industrial or social 
behaviour”.
1004  
The regulatory function of law has become more prominent in recent decades as 
demands on States have increased, and correspondingly the scholarship on regulation 
has  flourished.
1005  However,  regulatory  studies  has  emphasised  regulation  in  the 
narrower sense of “the promulgation of a binding set of rules to be applied by a body 
devoted  to  this  purpose”,
1006  focusing  on  fields  such  as  civil  aviation, 
telecommunications and environmental regulation. Only latterly has the regulatory 
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perspective  been  brought  to  bear  on  more  mainstream  fields  of  law,
1007  and  the 
regulatory perspective has not yet been brought to bear on immigration law.
1008  
Yet,  as  chapter  1  demonstrated,  the  most  potent  criticisms  of  migration  law 
concern regulatory failure. Of these, the two most prominent criticisms concern the 
capacity of the State to ‘say who comes’; and to enforce those rules by removal.  
A caveat is necessary here. Clearly, the effectiveness of laws is only one aspect of 
the legitimacy of laws. In general, the more effective a law, the greater its legitimacy; 
and the greater the normative legitimacy of a law, the more effective it is. However, 
these general propositions do not always hold true. A law that is extremely effective in 
achieving its purpose — such as mandatory detention — may not achieve normative 
legitimacy. So too the normative legitimacy of a law — for example, racial equality — 
may not find effective expression in law.
1009 In arguing that there are limitations to 
immigration law’s effectiveness, I am not implying that perfect effectiveness is either 
necessary nor, indeed, desirable, for such regulation has its “dark side”.
1010  
This  section  applies  what  I  call  the  ‘regulatory  lens’  to  immigration  law,  and 
examines the structural limitations on the capacity of law to regulate immigration. I 
begin by describing the features of the ‘regulatory lens’ and the literature on ‘policy 
failure’ in migration studies, before examining three major limitations: policy design 
and implementation; the regulatory context; and the constraints of the policy and 
law-making  processes.  The  argument  is  simple:  immigration  provides  a  highly 
complex regulatory challenge for law, and it is this complexity which has encouraged 
governments  to  adopt  other  regulatory  modalities.  It  is  this  move  away  from 
regulating immigration through law, and instead toward regulation through ‘code’, 
which accounts for the ‘lawlessness’ of contemporary immigration law,
1011 and which 
has provoked the anxieties about the loss of law’s empire that partly explain the story 
of immigration review.  
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3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  The regulatory lens The regulatory lens The regulatory lens The regulatory lens    
The  ‘regulatory  lens’  comprises  five  distinct  emphases  evident  in,  although 
neither discovered by nor exclusive to, regulation studies. The first, most obvious, 
emphasis is its focus on the effectiveness of law in achieving its policy aims. As Rubin 
has cogently argued, the orthodox emphasis on legal doctrine ignores the post-war 
quantitative shift in legislation and instrumental laws at its peril.
1012 
Second, law is conceived of as merely one form of regulation which interacts with 
non-legal forms of regulation. Lessig identifies four modes of regulation, which differ 
in their characteristics and values: law, (social) norms, market, and architecture (or 
code), such as physical and electronic infrastructures.
1013 Most notably, they differ in 
their relation to subjectivity: while the law must be ‘internalised’ for breaches of law 
to be prevented, code requires no subjective adjustment: either there is a door that 
allows  entry  and  exit,  or  there  is  not.  These  different  forms  of  regulation  are 
conceptualised as interacting with different regulatory actors in a play for power in a 
‘regulatory space’.
1014  
Third, regulation studies focuses on the strengths and weaknesses of modalities 
of  regulation  other  than  the  ‘command’  paradigm  of  legislation,  such  as  self-
regulation; the distribution of wealth; the use of market mechanisms; the provision of 
information; direct action by States and their agencies; and the conferral of rights.
 1015  
Fourth, regulatory studies emphasises the need for regulation to be responsive to 
its regulatory context, to recognise and use the social practices of the field, and seek 
to harness the regulatory capacities, interests and norms of its actors.
1016 This insight 
may be fruitfully applied to immigration law, a major feature of which is the diversity 
and extent of its social context and practices.  
Fifth,  regulation  theory  focuses  specifically  on  the  constraints  of  the  policy-
making and legislative process.
1017 Different theories place different emphases on the 
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role  of  the  public  and  private  interest,  as  well  as  the  self-promoting  role  of 
institutional dynamics.  
Applying the regulatory lens to immigration law re-frames immigration law as 
one form of regulation, interacting with norms, the market, and ‘code’. While the 
‘command’ paradigm remains prevalent, later legislation uses different modalities of 
regulation, such as policies of destitution, regulatory schemes for migration agents, 
and regulation through contract of detention centres.
1018 The regulatory lens directs 
attention to the way regulatory actors and institutional dynamics constrain and shape 
the processes of making policy and law. Most importantly, the regulatory lens focuses 
our attention on the (in)effectiveness of immigration law. 
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  ‘Policy failure’ ‘Policy failure’ ‘Policy failure’ ‘Policy failure’        
Migration  studies  has  extensively  considered  the  ineffectiveness  of  migration 
laws,  seeking  to  explain  the  “significant  and  persistent  gaps  …  between  official 
immigration  policies  and  actual  policy  outcomes”.
1019  These  gaps  comprise  both 
unintended  consequences  of  policy,  and  inadequate  implementation  or 
enforcement,
1020 although, as Castles warns, stated policy objectives cannot always be 
taken at face value, and may be internally ambivalent or contradictory.
1021  
The most high-profile policy gap is the continuation of streams of ‘unwanted’ 
immigration. Most spectacularly, the US is estimated to host 11.9 million irregular 
immigrants.
1022 The Home Office has estimated that in the UK there were between 
310,000 and 570,000 irregular immigrants in 2001,
1023 with a much smaller stream of 
irregular immigration in Australia, estimated at 46,400 as at 30 June 2007.
1024 Most 
important, perhaps, has been the continued high levels of refugee claims. A recent 
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Home  Office  research study  concluded  that  to  a  large  extent  asylum  was  “policy-
resistant”.
1025  
Other  policy  gaps  are  evident  in  skilled  migration,  such  as  the  “taxi  driver 
syndrome”
1026  in  which  immigrants  recruited  for  their  skill  are  unable  to  get 
appropriate  jobs,  with  substantially  less  than  half  of  Australian  skilled  migrants 
remaining in their nominated occupation.
1027  
High-profile policy gaps also exist in the sphere of enforcement, especially in the 
field of removals and illegal employment. In the UK, record annual deportation rates 
of over 15,000
1028 must be compared with the above estimate of irregular immigrants 
and the estimated 283,500 failed refugee claimants liable to removal.
1029 In Australia, 
only  6,768  removals  and  departures  were  recorded  against  the  46,400  estimated 
overstayers in 2007.
1030  
Illegal employment is also under-enforced: in the UK, between 2003-2007, only 54 
people were found guilty of illegal employment.
1031 While in Australia, 3,870 people 
were  detected  working  unlawfully  in  2004-2005,  it  is  likely  most  of  the  48,000 
estimated overstayers were also working illegally.
1032 Evidence has also emerged of 
patterns of under-payment of students
1033 and temporary labour.
1034 
However, there are two important caveats to this picture of ineffectiveness. First, 
the effectiveness of policies varies greatly depending on the sphere being examined. 
In some spheres, such as detention and interception policies, the complaint is instead 
one of too great effectiveness.  
The  second  caveat  is  that  the  evaluation  of  effectiveness  poses  significant 
methodological problems. The primary issue is one of determining the appropriate 
criteria for evaluation, since no methodology of evaluation can be entirely value-free. 
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As Thomas argues, there may be competing normative models of evaluation.
1035 These 
may lead to biases in the criteria of evaluation: as audits have shown, the performance 
indicators  adopted  are  often  too  reliant  on  quantitative  rather  than  qualitative 
outcomes.
1036  
I do not attempt to formulate such a methodology here. As Thomas’ analysis 
shows,  the  fruitfulness  of  such  an  approach  is  limited,  partly  because  the  criteria 
themselves  are  in  tension  and  no  consensus  exists  on  their  priority,  and  partly 
because of the difficulty of assessing these criteria in any truly objective sense. Rather, 
here I simply seek to highlight the myriad obstacles to the effectiveness of migration 
law.  
Some  of  these  obstacles  have  already  been  referred  to  in  chapter  3,  such  as 
globalisation, the internal complexity of liberal States, and the functional imperatives 
of  the  State.  The  range  of  obstacles  may  be  conveniently  classified  into  three 
categories: policy design and implementation; features of the regulatory context; and 
the constraints of the policy-making process. It is to these three major limitations that 
I now turn. 
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  Obstacles to effectiveness Obstacles to effectiveness Obstacles to effectiveness Obstacles to effectiveness        
3.3.1  POLICY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Immigration policies often fail because of inadequate knowledge; unarticulated, 
incoherent  or  ambivalent  aims;  and  poor  implementation.  These  are  general 
limitations of policy design, but in the case of immigration these limitations are acute. 
3.3.1.1  Knowledge 
As  migration  studies  has  demonstrated,  immigration  is  a  highly  complex, 
variable, long-term phenomenon. These features make it difficult to understand and 
predict migratory behaviour. 
For example, people often migrate for multiple reasons. People may be fleeing 
oppressive  circumstances  and  also  seeking  a  better  life;  people  may  agree  to  be 
smuggled  only  to  be  exploited  without  their  consent;  and  marriages  may  be 
contracted partly on the status of a person’s residence in a country. These multiple 
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motivations make it difficult to distinguish between refugees and economic migrants; 
between  smuggling  and  trafficking;  and  between  ‘genuine’  and  ‘sham’  marriages. 
These  multiple  motivations  may  also  make  it  difficult  for  policies  to  have  their 
intended effect: as an Australian review into skilled migration concluded, “whatever 
Australia’s perception might be, skilled migration was not primarily about jobs — at 
least for the migrant.”
1037  
The  variability  of  immigration  also  poses  difficult  problems.  The  nationality, 
ethnicity,  age,  gender  and  class  of  immigrants,  and  the  economic  and  political 
circumstances, affect the ways they migrate and integrate.
1038 Immigration policies 
therefore  need  to  be  exceptionally  sophisticated  and  responsive  to  changing 
immigration streams.  
Further,  migratory  behaviour  must  be  considered  over  a  long-term  scale,  as 
intentions change during the life cycle. The settlement of guestworkers in Germany is 
a  prominent  example  of  how  temporary  migration  may  convert  into  permanent 
migration,
1039 but it may also work in the other direction, as is evidenced by the return 
migration of subsidised British passengers from Australia.
1040  
3.3.1.2 Aims 
As already noted, effectiveness is evaluated in accordance with aims. However, 
the  aims  of  a  policy  are  more likely  in  immigration  to  be  ambivalent, unclear,  in 
competition with other objects, unachievable, or simply objectionable.  
As has been observed, neither Australia nor the UK has a clearly articulated set of 
overarching  policy  aims.  However,  the  lengthy  Canadian  legislative  statement  of 
goals, discussed in chapter 4, merely demonstrates the inevitable tension between 
these goals.
1041 This occurs, as Boswell suggests, because immigration exposes tensions 
between  the  competing  imperatives  of  the  State.
1042  For  example,  the  pursuit  of 
economic  growth  is  in  tension  with  the  protection  of  the  labour  market  and 
environmental sustainability, while the objective of family reunion may be tension 
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with economic growth and social cohesion. Inherent in immigration policy, therefore, 
are conflicting aims, resulting in paradox and compromise. 
If we take ‘national interest’ as a proxy for the aim of immigration policy, some of 
these tensions become clearer. At the micro-level, there may be competing tensions 
in  a  particular  decision  since  different  dimensions  of  an  individual  may  point  to 
different conclusions. For example, in Teoh the applicant’s deportation would have 
promoted the national interest in preventing crime, but would also have involved 
reducing a large Australian family to subsistence level.
1043  
At a higher level, there is likely to be dissensus about what is, or is not, in the 
national interest. As Dauvergne argues, refugee admissions may be in the national 
interest in the sense that it affirms the nation as humane and good.
1044 However, this 
may be contested by individuals who see no benefit in refugee admissions, such as the 
young male from Cardiff who opined: ‘There was that boat full of refugees which the 
Australian government was going to blow up rather than let it land, which I think is 
right personally.’
1045  
That dissensus is also related to the fact the burdens and benefits of migration are 
unevenly distributed, both across regions and across different measures of ‘benefit’, 
resulting in variation of attitudes between age groups, classes, and residences. For 
example,  Australian  studies  have  shown  the  university-educated  are  35%  more 
positive towards immigration, and Melburnians are especially pro-immigration.
1046 In 
the UK, 75% of Londoners were positive about multiculturalism, compared to 39% in 
the  North  East.
1047  Indeed,  cosmopolitans  may  also  contest  the  assumption  that 
national interest should be the ultimate aim of immigration policy.  
Tensions  are  also  apparent  in  the  stated  policy  objectives  of  immigration 
tribunals — in Australia, that of “providing a mechanism of review that is fair, just, 
economical, informal and quick”,
1048 and in the UK, that of being ‘fair, fast, firm’.
1049 
While  these  tensions  are  evident  in  any  adjudicative  system,  it  is  exacerbated  in 
immigration  because  of  the  mismatch  between  the  ‘informal’  and  ‘cheap’  ideal  of 
justice  in  tribunals,  and  the  inherent  complexity  and  significance  of  immigration 
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decisions. Less obviously, as described in chapter 3, there is ambivalence about the 
purpose of the courts in immigration review — with competing roles as guardian of 
common law freedoms, or as the handmaidens of the legislature.  
Another difficulty is that some aims remain officially unarticulated, such as the 
political desire to reduce refugee applications, or the desire to placate BNP or One 
Nation voters. In the US, it has been suggested that tight immigration policies and lax 
enforcement achieve the unarticulated goal of enabling flexible labour markets while 
appeasing the electorate.
1050  
One unarticulated purpose of immigration review has been its use as part of the 
quid pro quo for the tightening of immigration policies, as evident in the story of 
immigration review. Another significant unarticulated goal of immigration review is 
the desire to insulate governments: both from legal challenges (most obviously in the 
1989 reforms in Australia, and in the creation of SIAC and asylum appeals in the UK), 
and also from political backlash. Ministers have, time and again, repeated the formula 
that  a  refugee  claimant  has  been  determined  not  to  be  a  refugee,  or  that  the 
Department  has  been  vindicated  by  the  review  process.  Ministerial  attacks  on 
tribunals  and  courts  also  serve  to  displace  political  pressure,  relocating  highly 
sensitive political decision-making into the apparently more ‘neutral’ sphere of the 
law. In relation to these hidden purposes, therefore, the story of immigration review 
may in part be read as a ‘success’. 
Finally, some aims may simply not be achievable, given the constraints of the 
regulatory  context  or  finite  resources.  Although  the  British  ‘deportation  gap’  is  a 
function of many factors,
1051 the NAO’s estimate that an enforced removal cost an 
average of £11,000,
1052 for a total of £4.7 billion,
1053 makes it obvious that the aim of 
removing all those liable to removal is simply not practically feasible.  
3.3.1.3  Implementation 
Lastly, I merely note here that implementation continues to be a chronic problem 
in  immigration,  as  discussed  in  chapter  1.  Political  volatility,  the  complexity  of 
                                                   
1050  See,  eg,  Brendan  Mullan,  ‘The  regulation  of  international  migration:  The  US  and  Western 
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legislation and policy, and media misinformation and scandal-mongering are part of 
the policy-making constraints discussed below, but also adversely affect the capacity 
to implement policies effectively.
1054 
3.3.2  THE REGULATORY CONTEXT 
While policy design and implementation are subject to unusual constraints in 
immigration, a more significant constraint is the regulatory context of immigration. 
In particular, four features of the regulatory context provide a complex of challenges: 
the  audience  of  regulation;  the  natural  and  structural  constraints  in  regulating 
migration; the transnational logic of migration; and conflicts and tensions with other 
modes of regulation. 
3.3.2.1 Audience 
Migration laws attempt to regulate one of the most diverse audiences that can be 
imagined. Migrants come from all over the world, with different cultural expectations 
and norms, different languages, and different motivations and personalities.  
This audience creates three problems for regulators. First, as discussed earlier, the 
responses of migrants to policies and laws may diverge from the expectations of the 
host society. While skilled migrants from the North may readily seek to comply with 
the law, the more diverse streams of refugees, humanitarian entrants and irregular 
immigrants may simply see immigration policies as an “opportunity structure”, an 
obstacle one must navigate.
1055  
Second, migratory behaviour is much more complex than in classic regulatory 
fields, such as telecommunications or competition. The multiple motivations at work, 
and the complexity of the migratory process, make it difficult for regulatory tools to 
have their intended effect. For example, it is often suggested that the introduction of 
stricter immigration controls may be counter-productive, since immigrants then feel 
unable to return, or are obliged to stay longer in order to compensate for the higher 
costs of entry.
1056 An example was the introduction of restrictions on Commonwealth 
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immigration,  which  probably  increased  immigration  at  least  in  the  short-term  as 
immigrants rushed to beat the ban and temporary migrants sought family reunion.
1057  
Third,  migratory  behaviour  may  simply  be  beyond  the  regulatory  reach  of 
domestic laws, since the policies of destination countries play a smaller role in the 
decision to move than is commonly recognised. Refugees’ choices of destination are 
motivated  less  by  policies  than  by  cost,  access  to  migration  networks  and  the 
smugglers’ interests.
1058 Very often, refugee claimants know nothing more than that 
their  destination  is  a  “free  country”.
1059  Even  Australian  skilled  migrants  rarely 
consulted government information in their decision.
1060 
This  makes  the  modification  of  the  behaviour  of  migrants  very  difficult,  and 
explains  the  shift  towards  devolving  immigration  control  as  secondary  actors  are 
more amenable to the law, within the territorial jurisdiction, share similar social and 
cultural values, and (most importantly) have greater incentives to comply with the 
law. However, this devolution creates its own problems. Most obviously, it creates the 
problem of ‘lawlessness’, since the effect is to transfer decision-making powers away 
from States to secondary actors whose actions are not susceptible to processes of legal 
or political accountability. There is almost no information available, for example, on 
how many people carriers refuse to board, and no legal or political scrutiny of those 
decisions.  
The  devolution  of  control  also  results  in  over-inclusive  enforcement.  Carriers’ 
sanctions  inevitably  exclude  genuine  refugee claimants;
1061  certificates  of  approvals 
jeopardise  genuine  marriages  as  well  as  ‘marriages  of  convenience’;
1062  regulating 
immigration  advisers  drives  out  good-quality  practitioners.
1063  This  is  caused  both 
because  cruder  rules  are  easier  to  implement,  and  because  other  factors  are 
introduced  into  the  decision-making  process,  such  as  secondary  actors’  financial 
interests  and  desires  to  maintain  a  harmonious  relationship  with  the  State. 
Devolution of control also introduces the power and interests of secondary actors into 
the  policy-making  and  legislative  process,  as  was  vividly  demonstrated  by  the 
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mobilisation of the legal community in the debates over the ouster clauses, and in 
carriers’ challenges to legislation.
1064  
The  two  broad  audiences  of  immigration  regulation  —  the  immigrants 
themselves, and secondary actors involved in immigration control — therefore pose 
different regulatory difficulties. Reaching the immigrants poses significant problems 
caused by the diversity of the audience and the limitations of regulatory reach. While 
these problems are reduced significantly in relation to secondary actors, devolution 
creates  further  problems  of  ‘lawlessness’,  over-inclusiveness,  and  political 
mobilisation.  
3.3.2.2 Natural and structural constraints 
A second distinctively difficult feature of the regulatory context is the extent to 
which migration is constrained by non-legal factors, as migration studies has revealed. 
The  most  difficult  problems  are  caused  by  natural  (inherent  and  irremovable) 
constraints, and structural constraints.  
As discussed in chapter 5, the natural constraint of geography and the structural 
constraints of global inequality and globalised labour patterns powerfully influence 
migration patterns. Migration is also driven by natural desires and aversions which 
are very difficult for a destination State to modify. For some refugee claimants, the 
fear of return is so strong that not even experiences of destitution and detention can 
persuade them to return. As Louisa, a refugee claimant, said: “[E]ven if I wanted to go 
home I would be killed. Either way you can't win. You are not allowed to be here. You 
are not allowed to be there. You are nowhere.”
1065 
 Again, the extent of the difficulty varies across streams of migration, with skilled 
migration  more  susceptible  to  inducements  and  policy  changes.  Changes  to 
Australian selection criteria in 1999, for example, showed significant improvement in 
employment outcomes.
1066 There remains evidence, however, of policy gaps, with only 
66% of those with degrees in 2001 in employment in Australia, and 26.2% of these not 
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in  the  labour  force.
1067  The  very  low  levels  of  intra-EU  mobility  provide  further 
evidence of the difficulty in inducing ‘wanted’ streams of migration.
1068 
The difficulties of dispute resolution discussed earlier may also be reconfigured as 
natural  constraints.  Natural  desires  to  achieve  a  favourable  outcome  and  to  seek 
fairness may conflict with legal rules that preclude such outcomes and weight fairness 
differently,  and  with  bureaucratic  imperatives  to  limit  the  number  of  reversed 
decisions and reduce demands on resources. The natural desire to prolong residence 
produces high rates of appeal and legally weak claims, and is thus in tension with the 
bureaucratic  (and  political)  demand  of  efficiency.  Indeed,  the  desire  to  prolong 
residence may simply override the law, as the notorious fact of ‘disappearances’ from 
the system suggest.  
3.3.2.3 Transnational logic 
A  particularly  important  structural  constraint  is  that  “state  migration  control 
efforts still follow a national logic, while many of the forces driving migration follow a 
transnational  logic”.
1069  Migration  flows  are  increasingly  driven  by  North-South 
movements  generated  by  global  inequality;  communication  and  transport 
technologies  foster  migration  flows;  and  the  development  of  transnationalism  all 
evince the transnational logic of migration. 
Policies and laws, on the other hand, remain primarily based at the domestic 
level,  although  (as  already  noted)  there  is  increasing  regional  and  international 
regulation and co-operation. While much emphasis has been placed on these efforts, 
there are inevitable limits. Countries of emigration have their own interests, including 
substantial  financial  interests  by  way  of  remittances,  which  militate  against  co-
operation or require substantial ‘carrots’ to entice them into co-operation.
1070 Even 
where they do co-operate, the States may have limited capacity to regulate irregular 
immigration.
1071 As a result, destination States have little effective control over the 
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initiation of migration streams and also experience problems in returning ‘unwanted’ 
migrants.
1072  
Regional and transnational schemes may also conflict with the liberal norms of 
States. The Dublin II scheme, for example, is open to the criticism that other States — 
such as Greece
1073 — do not comply in fact with the Refugee Convention or ECHR. A 
primary criticism of the ‘Pacific Solution’ policy was that the processing system, as 
well as access to review, was different from that on mainland Australia. As discussed 
in chapter 3, the sleight of hand involved in doing something elsewhere that would 
not be acceptable in one’s own country is not politically convincing. Indeed, such 
regional and transnational attempts may undermine the application of those norms 
within  one’s  own  country,  as  was  demonstrated  by  the  Indonesian  outrage  that 
provoked the 2006 Australian proposal to extend offshore processing to all claimants 
who arrived in Australia irregularly.
1074  
In immigration review, the limitation of the national logic of policies and laws is 
most  clearly  revealed  in  the  primarily  territorial  principles  of  jurisdiction.  As 
discussed in chapter 3, the jurisdictional limitations of the law enable the policies of 
extra-territorialisation that exclude or weaken access to review and, more generally, 
legal  accountability.  The  Pacific  Solution,  the  Prague  pre-clearance  pilot,  out-of-
country appeals, and the practice of ‘turnaround’ at airports are obvious examples. 
Here, then, the capacity of governments is expanded by the transnational logic of 
migration,  but  the  risks  of  over-inclusiveness  and  the  tension  with  liberal  norms 
remain significant hurdles, as the eventual demise of the Pacific Solution and the 
Prague pre-clearance pilot evidence.  
3.3.2.4 Other modes of regulation 
The  natural  and  structural  constraints  of  immigration  are  compounded  by 
conflicts and tensions with the three other modes of regulation identified by Lessig: 
social norms, the market, and ‘code’.  
The social norms prevailing both in countries of emigration and immigration may 
be  in  tension  with  the  regulation  of  immigration.  In  many  countries  of  high 
emigration, a ‘culture of emigration’ has developed. The UK, for example, promotes 
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emigration with programs such as ‘A Place in the Sun’. A culture of emigration may 
benefit, and be encouraged by, the receiving country, but in contemporary North-
South movements, they are likely to conflict.  
As  has  been  detailed  throughout  this  thesis,  the  liberal  norms  of  many 
destination States, including Australia and the UK, are also a source of tension.
1075 The 
discursive competition of cosmopolitanism and open borders, and the standards of 
human  rights  and  liberal  norms  implicit  in  constitutional  and  administrative  law, 
inflect and constrain the actions of States.  
Immigration  laws  may  also  conflict  with  the  regulatory  mode  of  the  market. 
Global inequality acts as a market mechanism to promote irregular migration, while 
globalised  economic  structures  require  globalised  States  to  develop  stratified 
migration policies to facilitate the movement of multinational employees.
1076 On the 
other hand, immigration law may also utilise market methods to regulate migration, 
such as the rapid increase in visa fees in both countries, and the introduction of high 
review  fees  in  Australia.  Immigration  law  may  also  conflict  with  ‘code’,  or 
architectural  forms  of  regulation,  such  as  geography  (as  already  discussed)  and 
technology which makes migration easier to imagine, achieve and sustain. 
 These conflicts are applicable also to immigration review. As already noted, the 
diversity  of  social  norms  of  countries  of  origin  has  manifold  effects  in  migration 
review, while the liberal norms of the receiving society have clearly influenced the 
development of immigration review. On the other hand, other modes of regulation 
have  been  used  to  support  immigration  laws,  such  as  the  mobilisation  of  market 
mechanisms  in  aid  of  migration  law  through  the  reduction  of  legal  aid,  and  the 
enforced destitution of refugee claimants.  
In sum, then, the regulatory context of immigration presents a range of unique or 
unusually  difficult  challenges:  the  diversity  and  complexity  of  the  audience;  the 
conflict  with  natural  and  structural  constraints;  the  mismatch  between  the 
transnational logic of migration and the national logic of immigration policy; and 
conflicts with other modes of regulation.  
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3.3.3  POLICY-MAKING AND LAW-MAKING 
The  shape  and  dynamics  of  the  policy-making  and  law-making  processes 
constrain and transform responses to the unique challenges of the regulatory context 
of immigration. These constraints and transformations are products of institutional 
design,  the  distribution  of  political  power,  the  high  salience  of  immigration, 
institutional deficiencies, and institutional biases. 
3.3.3.1  Constitutional designs 
An obvious constraint is the overall structure of a balance of powers between the 
courts, the executive and the Parliament. The separation of powers deliberately builds 
tension and conflict within a system, with the effectiveness of governmental policies 
occasionally subordinated to other constitutional values.
1077 Hence, as judges are wont 
to emphasise, conflict between the executive and the judiciary is both inevitable and a 
sign  of  a  healthy  democracy.
1078  This  tension  and  conflict  is  more  apparent  in 
immigration because, as has been discussed, immigration often exposes competing 
constitutional values.  
Further, immigration exposes the fundamental tension between liberal principles 
and  majoritarian  democracy:  the  protection  of  minorities.  While  majoritarian 
decision-making  may work  well  for  most  areas  of  government,  it  has  the  obvious 
potential to oppress minorities.  
This  is  even  more  true  where,  as  in  immigration,  the  minorities  are  under-
represented or absent in the political process, and is compounded by the fact that 
immigrants do not constitute a cohesive political bloc, since immigrants come from 
different  countries,  different  classes  and  educational  backgrounds.  Contemporary 
trends  towards  greater  diversity  of  source  countries,  and  more  mixed  streams  of 
immigration, further diffuse the political cohesiveness, and thus the political power, 
of the immigrant lobby. 
In both Australia and the UK, the protection of minorities has not historically 
been entrenched through, for example, a bill of rights. This gap in institutional design 
has been obscured in part by prevailing liberal traditions and norms, and by periods 
of bipartisan consensus on immigration. However, as immigration has become more 
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politically  salient,  the  weakness  of  these  countervailing  factors  has  been  exposed, 
nowhere more dramatically than in the Tampa affair. This institutional weakness has 
the consequence of displacing the pressure to protect minorities on to the courts, 
squarely exposing the unresolved tension between the courts’ subordinate role in a 
majoritarian democracy and its constitutional role of preserving legal values such as 
the rule of law and basic concepts of fairness.  
3.3.3.2 Power distributions 
The  imbalance  in  constitutional  design  is  mirrored  by  imbalances  in  the 
distribution  of  political  power.  Contemporary  immigration  is  characterised  by  a 
disjuncture between concentrated and politically powerful support among the elite 
for  immigration,  and  diffuse  popular  support  for  immigration  restrictions.
1079  This 
explains, as Freeman has demonstrated in the context of the US, why programmes of 
unskilled labour continue despite popular demands for immigration restriction.
1080 
This  structural  feature  is  evident  in  most  developed  countries.
1081  Australian 
surveys  demonstrate  that  since  the  early  1970s  there  has  been  “virtually  no 
consistency for a larger intake”.
1082 However, since 1998 there has been a significant 
shift, with only a minority (in the latest survey 35%) believing immigration was too 
high,  although  paradoxically  the  net  intake  almost  doubled  during  the  same 
period.
1083  In  the  UK,  between  1995-2003,  there  was  a  marked  increase  in  those 
wanting  a  reduction  in  immigration,
1084  with  78.11%  of  respondents  concurring  in 
2005.
1085 Nevertheless, net migration has reached historic highs during this period (see 
Appendices,  Figs  1  and  2).  While  labour  migration  continues  despite  restrictive 
immigration tempers, placatory measures are taken in the refugee and family streams 
of migration, streams that have more diffuse support and which tend to diverge more 
culturally and ethnically.  
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3.3.3.3 The salience of symbolism 
As  discussed  more  fully  in  chapter  5,  immigration  is  highly  salient  to  several 
significant  contemporary  anxieties,  including  the  decline  of  politics,  personal  and 
national identities, and the role of the State. Immigration thus symbolises underlying 
anxieties  about  change  and  difference.  However,  the  salience  of  immigration  is 
contingent, rather than inherent. Since the late 1990s in the UK, immigration has 
been perceived to be one of the top 3 issues of national concern, but prior to this as 
few as 5% of the population identified it as a national concern.
1086 
The contemporary symbolism and salience of immigration structures the policy-
making  and  law-making  process,  resulting  in  the  volatility  and  complexity  of 
immigration  policy  and  law,  and  the  ambivalences,  tensions  and  compromises 
identified by Boswell. Its symbolism and salience preclude coherence in immigration 
policy, make it difficult to articulate coherent objectives, and affect the capacity of 
governments to implement policies effectively.  
3.3.3.4 Institutional deficiencies 
Immigration  also  exposes  more  acutely  the  various  institutional  deficiencies 
already  familiar  to  public  lawyers.  As  explored  in  chapter  3,  the  limitations  of 
parliamentary scrutiny — including the limited time for scrutiny and consultation, 
and the dominance of party — were dramatised in the ouster clause sagas. The toxic 
combination of resource limitations and political imperatives produce poor quality 
decision-making  imbued  with  a  ‘culture  of  refusal’.
1087  The  institutional  limits  of 
courts  —  the  limits  of  jurisdiction,  institutional  competence,  and  administrative 
capacity — are all peculiarly revealed in immigration, as this thesis has emphasised.  
Immigration  also  reveals  the  structural  deficiencies  of  the  media.  The  media 
prefers simple stories about controversies that fit neatly into pre-existing frames,
1088 
and tends to simplify and distort the complex issue of immigration
1089 — and, in the 
case of tabloids, simply tells outright lies.
1090 The high symbolic salience of the asylum 
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issue means that it is both over-represented as well as misrepresented in the media.
1091 
The  result  is  that  the  public  are  extremely  misinformed  about  asylum  and 
immigration  issues.  As  one  study  concluded,  people  held  very  strong  views  while 
admitting they had very little knowledge.
1092 Many people described all non-white 
people  as  asylum-seekers;  believed  that  all  people  who  entered  illegally  were  not 
‘genuine’ asylum-seekers; and had little knowledge of international affairs. People also 
wildly overestimated the numbers of migrants and asylum-seekers, with more than a 
quarter guessing they constituted the majority of the population, although in fact it 
was closer to 5%.
1093 Another poll revealed that people believed Britain hosted nearly a 
quarter of the world’s refugees, although in reality it hosts under 2%.
1094  
The limitations of executive action, parliamentary and judicial scrutiny, together 
with widespread public confusion compounded by media misrepresentations, create 
inherently and significantly flawed policy-making and law-making policy processes. 
Government  reactions  to  ill-informed  but  highly  charged  public  sentiment  are 
inadequately  scrutinised  by  Parliament  and  the  courts,  and  inaccurately  and 
confusingly  reported  by  the  media,  perpetuating  the  cycle  of  misinformation  and 
overreaction.  
3.3.3.5  Institutional biases 
Finally, the policy-making and law-making processes privilege certain kinds of 
information. While these institutional biases are common, their application in the 
immigration context is more problematic.  
Documents written in the language of government and policy are the primary 
method of conveying information, tending therefore to entrench the interests of the 
powerful.  This  effect  is  exaggerated  in  immigration  because  of  the  relative 
disadvantages of immigrants in linguistic and cultural competence, as well as political 
and social capital. Again, there is variation here across streams of immigration, as the 
recent court victory (and political mobilisation) of skilled immigrants evinces.
1095  
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Further, as already noted, quantitative information is processed more easily than 
qualitative  information,  and  ‘objective’  information  preferred  to  subjective 
information.  We  see  this  in  the  over-emphasis  of  quantitative  targets,  and  in  the 
privileging of country information over oral testimony.  
Thus, while the constraints of policy-making and law-making processes apply to 
all legal fields, their effect is unusually pronounced in immigration. Constitutional 
designs,  imbalances  in  power  distributions,  the  symbolic  salience  of  immigration, 
institutional  deficiencies  and  institutional  biases  are  structural  constraints  that 
impede the effectiveness of the regulation of immigrants.  
4  Conclusion 
The  limitations  of  immigration  law  in  performing  the  functions  of  dispute 
resolution and regulation are legion, as this survey demonstrates. At best, the effects 
of immigration law are partial; at worst, they are counter-productive. These different 
limitations have different causes, which invite different approaches to them. I sketch 
in a preliminary way these different approaches here, fleshing their implications out 
more fully in the conclusion. 
Most fundamental are the limitations inherent to any sphere of society or human 
activity, limitations which may be exacerbated by particular features of immigration. 
This includes matters such as our limited knowledge; the ambivalence of our aims; 
the complexity and agency of humans; and the necessity of over-simplification and 
transformation for the purposes of human action and judgment. 
These are limitations that we must live with, but which we can recognise and 
minimise.  We  can  draw  on  the  rapidly  amassing  body  of  research  into  the 
phenomenon of migration in developing improved, and more responsive, forms of 
regulation. We can be clearer about our aims, recognising explicitly their tensions and 
building them, and the trade-offs involved, into our decision-making frameworks. We 
can be more attentive to the gap between the irreducible complexity of humanity, and 
the frameworks by which we attempt to govern them, seeking to minimise that gap 
where possible, and to acknowledge the shortfall where not.  
Limitations  also  occur  at  the  institutional  level,  due  to  gaps,  deficiencies  and 
biases in institutional design. These factors are more contingent, but still very difficult 
to reform. The different socialisation of immigrants and much of the discussion on 
the constraints of policy-making and legislative processes fall into this category. The 
appropriate approach here would be to identify these limitations and, where feasible,   234 
redesign  or  ameliorate  those  features.  Moves  have  already  been  made  in  this 
direction, with cross-cultural training, improved quality assurance processes,
1096 the 
reform of administrative cultures,
1097 and media training and regulation.
1098  
A  third  category  of  limitations  is  peculiar  to,  and  sometimes  unique  to, 
immigration law. The ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ divide; the direct relationship between 
the State and the individual; the diversity of the audience; some of the natural and 
structural constraints; the symbolic salience of immigration; and the transnational 
logic of migration all come to mind.  
The  most  fruitful  approach  here  seems  to  be  one  of  awareness  and 
understanding,  and  of  re-engineering  our  yardsticks  accordingly.  We  should 
recognise the distinctiveness of the regulatory context, and save ourselves frustration 
and disillusionment when immigration proves different, with the consequent danger 
of undermining faith both in government and the law.  
However, we should also be careful not to over-emphasise this difference, but to 
subject  divergences  to  justification.  Thus,  for  example,  whether  we  locate  the 
justification of procedural fairness in the dignity of the individual or the promotion of 
better administration,
1099 these justifications apply equally to immigrants, although 
the  instrumental  approach  allows  greater  room  to  justify  restrictions  based  on 
pressure on resources.   
Yet,  of  course,  there  is  a  sense  that  the  call  for  greater  awareness  and 
understanding is either trite or over-optimistic. Logic, reason and analysis are helpful 
only up to a point. As this analysis has shown, there are a range of powerful interests, 
as well as structural constraints, which greatly constrain the potential for awareness 
and  understanding.  It  is  all  too  easy  to  blame  immigration  for  the  travails  of  the 
modern  world,  and  there  are  politicians  and  media  owners  who  benefit  from 
exploiting and displacing that blame.  
The gravitational force of these interests and constraints will, however, wax and 
wane over time, and the outcome is capable of being mediated by leadership and by 
changing circumstances. A pervasive labour shortage, the decline in refugee numbers, 
                                                   
1096 See, eg, the Quality Initiative Project: UNHCR, Quality Initiative Project: Fourth Report to the 
Minister (2007). 
1097  DIMIA,  Report  from  the  Secretary  to  Senator  the  Hon  Amanda  Vanstone  MIMIA: 
Implementation of the recommendations of the Palmer Report of the inquiry into the circumstances 
of the immigration detention of Cornelia Rau (2005). 
1098 See, eg, the MediaWise project: http://www.mediawise.org.uk/display_page.php?id=83. 
1099 See DJ Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures: A Study of Administrative Procedures (1996); 
TRS Allan, ‘Procedural fairness and the duty of respect’ (1998) 18 OJLS 497.   235 
and  a  change  in  government  has  seen  a  dramatic  shift  in  immigration  policy  in 
Australia in the past year. Nevertheless, the structure of paradox, compromise and 
ambivalence  will  remain  essential  features  of  immigration  policy,  as  the  tentative 
embrace of the Pacific guestworker pilot scheme,
1100 the boost in temporary labour 
along  with  plans  for  greater  control,
1101  and  the  commitment  to  retain  mandatory 
detention (albeit transform it into a risk-based model) all testify. The challenge of 
capacity is, although variable, ultimately a fundamental one. 
                                                   
1100 Paul Kelly, ‘Pacific solution to welfare reform’, The Australian, 20 August 2008, 10. 
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Chapter 7 — Deconstructing and reconstructing law’s 
empire 
1  Introduction 
This  last  chapter  turns  from  the  challenges  of  coherence,  competition  and 
capacity to the challenge of ‘institutional legitimacy’, to borrow Boswell’s term. That is 
to  say,  immigration  law  importantly  engages  and  challenges  certain  normative 
foundations of the social practice of law. It is this challenge, above all others, that has 
animated the story of immigration review.  
Implicit in the story of immigration review is a critique of immigration law that 
articulates a core understanding of the purpose and province of the law, revealing 
what might be called, despite its old-fashioned overtones, the ideological dimension 
of  law.  By  defining  what  is  wrong  with  immigration  law  and  immigration  review, 
critics  are  also  giving  an  internal,  contextual  and  contemporary  account  of  the 
conditions which confer legitimacy upon the law.
1102 
 On the one hand, then, this chapter challenges the belief that legal critiques are 
merely disguised political rants, suggesting that there is a deeper sense in which these 
legal critiques are ultimately concerned with conditions of legality. However, these 
legal critiques offer only a weak critical purchase on immigration law, a deficiency 
that this deeper account of legality cannot remedy.  
I  begin  by  briefly  examining  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  the  common 
standards  used  in  the  critical  literature,  before  turning  to  the  deeper  account  of 
legality. This account comes in two parts, the first concerning specific major legal 
standards: the conditions of a ‘fair trial’; the legal values of clarity, coherence and 
certainty; and the principle of access to justice. These are relatively concrete common 
law standards, reflected in regional and international law, which are central to our 
understanding of justice.  
The second half maps the broader normative concern underlying these standards 
— namely, the role of the law in acting as a counter-weight to the realm of politics. 
                                                   
1102  I  adopt  here  the  empirical  usage  of  legitimacy  adopted  in  social  sciences,  rather  than 
investigating the philosophical conditions of legitimacy: David Beetham, The Legitimation of Power 
(1991), 3-8.   237 
Just as we define ourselves against the Other, law defines itself against politics: the 
rule of law as opposed to the power of politics.  
This  second  half  consists  of  three  interrelated  claims.  First,  the  law  is  unlike 
politics  in  that  its  treatment  of  people  is  not  primarily  dictated  by  their  power. 
Second, law claims to act autonomously from politics. Third, the law controls the 
power of the State, as captured in the principle of the rule of law. This is not intended 
to  be  a  watertight  classification  or  categorisation,  or  any  kind  of  universal 
philosophical  statement.  Rather,  it  is  a  useful  way  of  capturing  the  internal, 
contextual, understandings of legitimacy implicit in the story of immigration review. 
Immigration law challenges these normative claims, and thus the deeper account 
of  legality,  in  various  ways.  However,  critiques  grounded  on  this  deeper  account 
ultimately  fail  to  convince,  because  —  as  I  shall  demonstrate  —  in  the  end  the 
account of legality must ultimately regress to the very question it is meant to resolve: 
the boundaries between law and politics.  
2  Comparisons and evaluations 
In the critical literature, the story of immigration review is portrayed as a story of 
loss and variation, as assessed against a variety of different standards. Here, I briefly 
discuss and critique some of the more common comparators: historical standards; 
other  jurisdictions;  judicial  procedures;  other  fields  of  administrative law;  and  the 
standards of human rights law, refugee law, and constitutional and administrative 
law.  
2.1 2.1 2.1 2.1  Historical comparisons Historical comparisons Historical comparisons Historical comparisons    
Chapter 1 described the story of immigration review by comparing the ‘model’ of 
immigration  review  with  subsequent  changes.  The  historical  comparison  with  the 
model of immigration review has two strengths.  
First, it is concrete. We are not comparing it to an ideal, or outside of its context; 
rather,  we  are  saying  this  was  what  used  to  exist,  and  does  not  any  longer  —  a 
narrative of loss. Thus, the loss of appeal rights in the UK is lamented, although the 
much  smaller  jurisdiction  of  the  MRT  evokes  no  similar  anxiety.  The  story  of 
immigration  review  can  thus  be  plausibly  constructed  as  a  conservative  one  of 
‘defending’, rather than expanding, law’s empire. 
The second strength is its appeal to the still prevalent assumption that time and 
progress go hand-in-hand. Thus, reductions in procedural standards are described as   238 
‘backward’ steps; human rights must be interpreted ‘progressively’; and we ‘learn’ not 
to repeat earlier judicial mistakes.
1103 The story of immigration review does not fit this 
narrative, and it thus provokes an anxiety also underlying other ‘rollbacks’ in the legal 
sphere, such as the debates about ‘new public management’ and the role of contract 
in  administrative  law,  or  more  prominently  the  return  of  practices  of  executive 
detention. 
There  are,  however,  weaknesses.  All  depends  on  the  choice  of  comparator:  a 
comparison between contemporary immigration review and the very limited recourse 
available for most of the 20
th century produces an entirely different, and much more 
favourable,  picture.  Further,  the  model  of  immigration  review  itself  is  open  to 
criticism.  From  the  beginning,  the  systems  have  been  troubled  by  backlogs  and 
exceptionalism.  In  many  ways,  there  have  been  improvements,  such  as  the 
introduction of refugee and human rights appeals, which have come together with 
reductions in procedural protection. Historical critiques, therefore, are undermined 
by the plasticity and weakness of historical standards.  
2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2  Comparisons with other jurisdictions Comparisons with other jurisdictions Comparisons with other jurisdictions Comparisons with other jurisdictions    
The same criticisms may be made of arguments based on comparisons with other 
jurisdictions. These comparisons are prevalent in the literature, partly because the 
jurisdictions are increasingly borrowing policies from each other, and partly because 
there  are  striking  parallels  with  the  story  of  immigration  review  in  other 
jurisdictions.
1104  The  UK  has  been  notably  influenced  by  Australian  policy:  it  has 
adapted Australia’s ‘points-style’ system (itself adapted from the Canadian model); 
introduced an Australian-style scheme to retain international students;
1105 proposed a 
system  of  offshore  processing  inspired  by  the  Australian  Pacific  Solution;
1106 
introduced a refugee resettlement scheme;
1107 and proposed the unified concept of 
‘permission’, equivalent to the Australian ‘visa’.
1108  
                                                   
1103 See Poole, n648. 
1104  See,  eg,  Catherine  Dauvergne,  ‘Chinese  fleeing  sterilisation:  Australia’s  response  against  a 
Canadian backdrop’ (1998) 10 IJRL 77; James Renwick, ‘Constitutional aspects of detention without 
trial in Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom’ (2006) 9 Consititut Law Pol Rev 37. 
1105 The International Graduates Scheme, now subsumed under Tier 1. This trend is global: see 
Brigitte Suter and Michael Jandl, Comparative Study on Policies towards Foreign Graduates (2006).  
1106 See n219. 
1107 See n329.  
1108 See n309.   239 
The story of immigration review has echoes elsewhere. For example, in Canada 
there is now a single-person, single-tier system of refugee appeals,
1109 with limited 
legal aid,
1110 which is suffering unprecedented staffing shortages amid allegations of 
political interference.
1111 In the US, there has been a proliferation of different appeal 
procedures, restrictions on access to judicial review, and a recent upsurge in judicial 
review applications.
1112  
However, for present purposes, the most important use of other jurisdictions is to 
argue  for  both  increases  and  reductions  in  procedural  protection.  The  progressive 
reduction of UK legal aid, for example, can be justified by comparison to the more 
limited  legal  aid  available  in  other  countries.
1113  The  scope  of  immigration  appeal 
rights in Canada,
1114 New Zealand,
1115 and the US
1116 is more limited in most respects 
than in both Australia and the UK. On the other hand, advocates often point to better 
models  elsewhere,  with  the  Canadian  refugee  determination  system  commonly 
considered the ‘Rolls Royce’ in refugee status determination procedures. 
This  kind  of  argument  has  several  weaknesses.  First,  as  with  the  historical 
comparison,  all  depends  on  the  comparator.  Second,  useful  comparisons  between 
models  of  immigration  review  are  notoriously  difficult  to  make,  because  of  the 
varying legal frameworks, different caseloads, and the necessity of a detailed, up-to-
date, contextual knowledge of their operation.  
                                                   
1109 The provisions for a refugee appeal division in Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 2001, ss 
110-111, were never commenced. 
1110 Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Evaluating Canada’s new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in its 
global context’ (2003) 41 AltaLRev 725. 
1111Cristin Schmitz, ‘Bar condemns Conservatives’ treatment of refugee board’ The Lawyers Weekly, 
11 May 2007. 
1112 Lenni B Benson, ‘Back to the future: Congress attacks the right to judicial review of immigration 
proceedings’ (1997) 29 ConnLRev 1411; John RB Palmer et al, ‘Why are so many people challenging 
Board of Immigration Appeal decisions in federal court? An empirical analysis of the recent surge 
in petitions for review’ (2005) 20 GeoImmigrLJ 1.     
1113 See, eg, UK, Hansard, HL, 10 September 2003, vol 652 col 297 (Lord Filkin) 297. 
1114 There is a right of appeal to the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board against decisions that 
a  person  is  ‘inadmissible’;  decisions  on  detention;  refusals  of  family-sponsored  entry;  removal 
orders; orders for the removal of refugees and permanent residents; and decisions regarding the 
failure to fulfil residency obligations. The primary decision on refugee status is made by the Board, 
and is subject only to judicial review. See generally http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/index_e.htm. 
1115  There  are  currently  four  tribunals  covering  refugee,  refusal  of  residence,  removal  and 
deportation  decisions,  although  the  Immigration  Bill  2007  proposes  to  streamline  these  into  a 
single Immigration and Protection Tribunal: Immigration Act 1987 (New Zealand), Pt 5, ss 103, 107, 
129N-129Q. This Bill has not yet received its Second Reading (as at 21 October 2008). 
1116 The structure is extremely complicated, but the ‘standard’ procedure involves an independent 
Immigration Judge making the decision to expel, with an appeal on the papers to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals. These decisions are challengeable before the US Court of Appeals through 
petitions for review or habeas corpus. For a useful overview, see Palmer et al, ‘Why are so many 
people challenging BIA decisions,’ n1112.   240 
Most importantly, comparisons with other jurisdictions provide both an elastic 
and a weak standard for procedural norms, because of the huge variations in the 
scope  and  structure  of  appeal  systems.  In  the  field  of  asylum,  most  European 
countries  use  administrative  courts,  with  some  including  a  specialist  tribunal  or 
interdepartmental  advisory  committee  (see  Appendices,  Table  9).  The 
interdepartmental  committee  model  also  prevails  in  other  jurisdictions  such  as 
Brazil.
1117 Even within the common law world, in which the model of tribunal plus 
judicial review prevails, there are wide procedural variations.  
This diversity demonstrates the variability of the content of procedural fairness. 
Some common procedural norms may be deduced: the principle of an independent 
review on the facts as well as the law; the requirement of an oral hearing in most 
cases; the possibility of representation; the participation of UNHCR; and some form of 
judicial oversight. Art 39 of the Procedures Directive, dealing with appeals, illustrates 
this variability starkly, providing only the “right to an effective remedy before a court 
or  a  tribunal”  against  specified  decisions,  with  everything  else  —  including  the 
suspensive effect of decisions, time limits, procedures for withdrawal or abandonment 
—  left  up  to  Member  States.  The  Directive,  and  its  negotiating  history,
1118  thus 
demonstrates the lack of consensus on procedural issues, which weakens the bite of 
any evaluation.  
2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3  Comparison with judicial procedures Comparison with judicial procedures Comparison with judicial procedures Comparison with judicial procedures    
Alternatively, as the Federal Court judges did in Selliah,
1119 one might compare 
systems of immigration review instead with judicial procedures, which remain the 
‘gold standard’ of fair decision-making in legal thought. Judicial standards are well-
developed, evince greater consensus, and incorporate stronger procedural safeguards.  
However, the obvious weakness in this approach is that tribunals were expressly 
developed as an alternative to judicial procedures. Indeed, the MRT/RRT model was 
deliberately chosen to avoid the quasi-judicial procedures of the AAT.
1120 Thus, we see 
judges warning against the evaluation of tribunal reasons against judicial standards of 
                                                   
1117 An interdepartmental committee, including an NGO representative, determines refugee status 
subject to an appeal to the Minister for Justice: see Liliana Lyra Jubilut, ‘Refugee law and protection 
in Brazil: A model in South America?’ (2006) 19 JRS 22. 
1118 Ackers, n489. 
1119 Selliah, n118. 
1120 Saunders, ‘In search of a system’, n33.   241 
reasoning.
1121  This  well-worn  debate  evinces  a  conflict  between  the  well-defined 
dominant  judicial  standard  of  fairness,  and  the  varied  and  vaguer  definition  of 
fairness in the context of a tribunal. Those favouring the flexibility of tribunals are 
deprived  of  any  sharp-edged  evaluative  standard,  capable  only  of  invoking  open-
textured  administrative  values  or  principles,  or  invoking  the  practice  of  other 
tribunals. 
2.4 2.4 2.4 2.4  Comparison with other administrative fields Comparison with other administrative fields Comparison with other administrative fields Comparison with other administrative fields    
Comparing  immigration  with  other  administrative  fields  provides  a  stronger 
standard  of  evaluation,  since  these  fields  provide  stronger  procedural  protections. 
Immigration  review  has  significantly  departed  from  the  mainstream  model  of 
administrative law in both jurisdictions, although its ‘exceptionalism’ has been more 
consistent in Australia. 
This exceptionality is marked most prominently by their structural divergence. 
The MRT and RRT remain the only significant exceptions to the centralisation of 
administrative  law  in  the  AAT.
1122  The  only  other  non-AAT  tribunals,  the  Social 
Security  Appeals  Tribunal  and  the  Veterans’ Review  Board,  are  first-tier  tribunals, 
with  rights  of  appeal  to  the  AAT.  The  immigration  field  is  also  the  only  major 
administrative field to be excluded from the scope of the ADJR Act. 
The MRT and RRT are also unusual in being single-tier tribunals in mass volume 
jurisdictions, in comparison to the three-tier appeal system for social security (with 
the additional tier of internal review) and the two-tier system in veterans’ affairs. The 
MRT/RRT and the AIT also exclude more categories of decisions. Further, the other 
tribunals normally sit in panels of between 2 and 3 members; have more generous 
(and  extendable)  time  limits;  and  are  free  or  cost  substantially  less  than  the 
MRT/RRT.
1123 At the AAT, members are appointed by the Attorney-General for longer 
terms,
1124 and there are a significant number of judicial members.  
 In  the  UK,  the  IAA  was  originally  unusual  in  that  the  adjudicators  (and, 
originally, asylum support adjudicators) were appointed by the Home Secretary rather 
than the Lord Chancellor; time limits were not extendable; appeals were lodged with 
the Home Office; and there was no right of appeal to the courts, all matters criticised 
                                                   
1121 MIEA v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272; Slimani (Content of Adjudicator Determination) 
Algeria [2001] UKIAT 00009, [8].  
1122 Criticised in ARC, Better Decisions: Review of Commonwealth Merits Tribunals (1995), 187-188. 
1123 AAT review currently costs $639, while review at the other tribunals is free.  
1124 The maximum term is 7 years: AAT Act, s 8A.   242 
by  the  Council  on  Tribunals.
1125  The  brief  introduction  of  a  fee  for  family  visitor 
appeals was also exceptional. In these matters, the present model moves immigration 
review back into the mainstream. However, the present exclusion of the AIT from the 
recent  unification  of  tribunals  into  the  First  and  Upper-Tier  Tribunals  (under 
review);
1126 the reduction of the two-tier model; the non-suspensive effect of many 
decisions; the very tight time limits; and the highly complicated appeals routes have 
moved in the other direction. 
These  exceptional  features  are  said  to  be  justified  by  exceptional  features  of 
immigration  review,  principally  the  volume  of  decision-making;  the  inherent 
incentive to appeal in order to prolong stay; high rates of legal challenge; low rates of 
success  and  high  rates  of  withdrawal  or  settlement;  backlogs  and  delays;  and  the 
lesser entitlements of non-citizens to procedural justice. However, other exceptional 
features  point  the  other  way:  the  importance  and  complexity  of  the  decision, 
especially in refugee contexts; high error rates and poor quality decision-making; and, 
in the case of refugees and humanitarian situations, the existence of international 
legal (and ethical) obligations.  
Comparisons  with  other  administrative  fields  provide  a  stronger  standard  for 
critique, and appear to have influenced the movement of immigration review back 
into the mainstream in the UK. However, one of the primary difficulties in devising a 
model of immigration review is precisely the cross-cutting nature of its exceptional 
characteristics. 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5  Comparisons with other legal standards Comparisons with other legal standards Comparisons with other legal standards Comparisons with other legal standards    
Perhaps the most dominant comparison is the explicit evaluation of these models 
against the obligations and norms of human rights law, refugee law, and public law.
1127 
As  noted  earlier,  immigration  law  itself  provides  no  internal  evaluative  standard, 
excepting the troubled, and minimalist, one of effectiveness.  
Human rights law provides stronger and more detailed norms, including rights to 
a fair trial (Arts 6 ECHR, 14 ICCPR), an effective remedy (Arts 13 ECHR, 2(2) ICCPR), 
                                                   
1125  See,  eg,  Council  on  Tribunals,  Annual  Report  1972-1973  (1973),  15-17;  Council  on  Tribunals, 
Annual Report 1985-1986 (1986) 48-50; Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1988-1989 (1989), 31-33.  
1126 See UK Border Agency, Immigration Appeals, n133.  
1127  See,  eg,  Savitri  Taylor,  ‘The  right  to  review  in  the  Australian  on-shore  refugee  status 
determination process: Is it an adequate procedural safeguard against refoulement?’ (1994) 22 FL 
Rev 300; Simon Evans, ‘The rule of law, constitutionalism and the MV Tampa’ (2002) 13 PLR 94; 
Taylor, ‘Protecting the human rights of detainees,’ n1018.   243 
equality and non-discrimination (Arts 14 ECHR, 14 and 26 ICCPR), and access to a 
court (Art 16 of the Refugee Convention). Arts 5 ECHR and 9 ICCPR also relevantly 
provide limits to detention. The non-refoulement obligation under both the Refugee 
Convention  and  CAT  also  enables  a  critique  of  inadequate  procedural  protection. 
Other standards may be drawn from constitutional and administrative law, such as 
the constitutional principles of separation of powers and the rule of law, and the 
principles of judicial review.  
These legal standards have a common strength, and a common weakness. The 
strength  is  that  they  are  legal  standards,  which  may  have  legal  (real-world) 
implications.  Importantly,  they  invoke  the  expertise  of  legal  scholars  and  remain 
firmly on the right side of the law/politics divide.  
The weakness, however, is that, as described in chapter 2, these legal standards 
are haphazard, normatively incoherent, open-textured, and embed compromises. In 
Australia, critiques using human rights and refugee law standards suffer from the 
additional disadvantage that such standards are not, for the most part, ‘hard law’.  
3  An account of legality 
The norms of specific legal regimes, however, are often discrete and historically 
contingent  manifestations  of  broader  legal  norms  and  values,  which  together 
constitute a deeper account of legality. This account includes most prominently major 
legal norms, such as the procedural requirements of a fair trial; conditions of clarity, 
certainty, consistency and coherence; and the principle of access to justice. However, 
these  relatively  specific  and  concrete  norms  are  themselves  based  on  a  broader 
normative claim: the claim of law to act as a counterweight to politics.  
3.1 3.1 3.1 3.1  Fair trials Fair trials Fair trials Fair trials    
The  most  concrete  standards  in  the  account  of  ‘legality’  are  embodied  in  the 
concept of the ‘fair trial’. This concept extends beyond the standards of common law 
judicial procedures, although the affinities are obvious. The fundamental importance 
of this concept is evident from its iteration in multiple legal regimes and orders: in the 
common law principles of procedural fairness or natural justice; and in both regional 
and international human rights law.
1128 Its relevant features can be extracted from 
                                                   
1128 In addition to those mentioned earlier, see EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, art 47; UDHR, 
arts 8, 10, 11.   244 
domestic and international jurisprudence, and are helpfully summarised in the Draft 
UN Body of Principles on a Fair Trial and a Remedy,
1129 and by Boeles.
1130  
Some  of  these  features  might  be  considered  ‘enabling’  features,  in  that  they 
facilitate a fair trial: for example, notice of the nature and purpose of proceedings; the 
opportunity  to  prepare  a  case;  the  availability  of  legal  representation;  and  the 
availability of interpretation and translation. Others relate to the features of the trial 
itself:  the  principle  of  equality  of  arms;  the  opportunity  to  present  and  meet 
arguments and evidence; the independence of the judiciary; and the general principle 
of an open hearing. A third set of features relate to ‘curative’ powers: the reasonable 
expedition of a decision; the availability of powers to suspend administrative action; 
and the availability of appeal. 
The  strong  consensus  underpinning  these  procedural  principles,  and  their 
concreteness, bolsters one prevalent form of critique, in which immigration review is 
shown to depart from these principles as a result of political pressure or pressure on 
resources (the critique of the ‘unjustified departure’). This critique may be levelled 
against many of the practically important challenges in immigration review, such as 
tight  time  limits;  the  inadequacy  of  legal  representation  and  interpretation; 
restrictions on appeals and judicial review; and allegations of bias. (This last matter is 
especially relevant in Australia, given that members are appointed for short terms
1131 
amid allegations of political interference under Labor and Liberal governments.
1132) 
These are contingent features of immigration review which are more susceptible to 
change.  
The critique of the unjustified departure is an eminently legal critique, since it 
takes as its point of departure a strongly affirmed legal norm and relegates political or 
resource-based  justifications  to  a  second  tier.  Its  prevalence,  however,  obscures 
structural problems. These problems are less popular partly because, in an age which 
places a premium on the utility of research, they are less readily capable of resolution.  
Such  fundamental  problems  are  akin  to  ‘dirty  secrets’:  things  we  keep  in  the 
closet because we don’t know what to do with them. For example, we must assume 
                                                   
1129  ‘The  Administration  of  Justice  and  the  Human  Rights  of  Detainees’  UN  doc 
E/CN4/Sub2/1994/24 of 3 June 1994.  
1130 Pieter Boeles, Fair Immigration Proceedings in Europe (1997). 
1131 Recent practice has been to appoint for 3 years: MRT, Annual Report 2003-2004 (2004). 
1132 JSCM, The Immigration Review Tribunal Appointments Process (1994); LCAC, Administration 
and  Operation,  n104,  2-103;  Stephen  Legomsky,  ‘Refugees,  administrative  tribunals,  and  real 
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interpretation  is  accurate,  despite  evidence  of  poor  quality  interpretation;  and  we 
must accept the perils of cross-cultural communication. Similarly, the gross disparity 
in power between the State and the individual is glossed over because there is no 
practicable alternative. 
There are two avenues of attack here. First, we can argue that there is indeed 
utility  in  the  exercise,  albeit  less  direct  and  obvious.  By  drawing  attention  to  the 
problem, we can be more alert, sensitive and sympathetic to its effects. Thus, judges 
and  tribunal  members  who  are  alert  to  the  perils  of  interpretation,  cross-cultural 
communication,  and  the  disparity  of  power  will  be  less  ready  to  make  adverse 
inferences,  and  conduct  inquiries  with  greater  sensitivity.  There  is,  indeed,  ample 
evidence of this.
1133 Further, by diagnosing the problem we can adopt a strategy of 
amelioration, such as accrediting and auditing interpreters, providing cross-cultural 
training, and increasing the evidential onus on the State.  
Second, we can challenge the assumption that knowledge is not valuable in and 
of itself. There is independent value in pointing out the fundamental limitations of 
our  social  structures  and  organisations,  and  seeking  to  understand  them.  Such 
recognition promotes both humility and insight. To recognise that there are limits in 
the law does not imply the law is valueless, but allows us to see more clearly what it 
can and cannot achieve.  
Another, even more important, reason why such structural problems tend to be 
neglected is because the standards articulate partial criteria of evaluation. Boeles, for 
example, argues that a key aspect of a fair trial is the capacity of the forum to take into 
account  all  aspects  of  the  dispute.
1134  The  narrow  and  distorted  framing  of 
immigration disputes and the limitations on the jurisdiction of the courts can thus be 
rewritten as challenges to a fair trial.  
However,  while  Boeles  captures  the  sense  in  which  a  dispute  resolution 
mechanism must capture the substance of the dispute, dispute resolution must also 
delimit the issues in order to resolve it. In that sense, Boeles’ claim captures only a 
partial  truth,  and  the  legal  standard  he  offers  is  thus  fuzzy  at  the  edges.  To  the 
argument that immigration disputes are artificially distorted, one might well reply: 
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but aren’t all legal disputes? The argument relies not upon a distinction of category 
but rather on a (more contestable) distinction of degree. 
A similar concern arises when fundamental problems are caused by competing 
principles. For example, the criticism that litigants misunderstand the limitations of 
judicial review engages two competing principles: that a person should be aware of 
the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  proceedings,  and  that  judges  must  refrain  from 
jumping into the “abyss of substantive review”.
1135 These principles are not equally 
weighted: while the latter directly concerns the legitimacy of the judiciary, the former 
is  procedural  in  character  and  considered  capable  of  being  remedied  by  accurate 
information, decent legal advice, and clear explanations of their limited functions. 
Such criticisms, therefore, are compromised.  
Thus, while the fair trial standard enables a distinctively legal form of critique, 
there are two weaknesses in this approach. First, the unequal competition between 
the legal norm and the political or resource-based justifications means that the latter 
might qualify, but will never defeat, the first-order legal norm. While this may be 
logically and normatively preferable, it is disconnected from the political realities of 
immigration law-making, and thus fails to engage policy-makers, limiting the political 
efficacy of the solutions offered.  
Second, the predominance of the ‘unjustified departure’ critique obscures more 
fundamental problems. These are less prominent in the literature because there are 
no easy solutions to them, because they engage more open-textured standards, and 
because they arise from tensions between competing principles.  
3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2  Clarity, certainty, consistency, and coherence Clarity, certainty, consistency, and coherence Clarity, certainty, consistency, and coherence Clarity, certainty, consistency, and coherence    
Another form of critique invokes the legal values of clarity, certainty, consistency, 
and  coherence.  These  legal  values  are  most  directly  manifested  in  the  ECtHR’s 
interpretation of the phrase ‘in accordance with the law’ as including requirements of 
accessibility  and  foreseeability.
1136  The  ECJ  has  adopted  a  like  approach.
1137  In  the 
common  law,  these  values  are  similarly  given  effect  in  judicial  interpretative 
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1136 See, eg, Sunday Times v UK (no 1), 26 April 1979, Series A no 30, [49]; Malone v United Kingdom, 
2 August 1984, Series A no 82, [66]-[67].  
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presumptions.
1138 The value of certainty may also be given effect through statute, such 
as in transitional arrangements or the protection of ‘accrued’ rights from repeal in 
Australia.
1139  The  doctrine  of  legitimate  expectations  may  also  be  seen  as  a 
manifestation of that value, while Art 8 ECHR may also indirectly protect certainty in 
immigration  contexts, as  the  example  of  the litigation  over recent  changes to  the 
HSMP illustrates.
1140  
The evaluation of laws with respect to these values is almost instinctive, and rife 
in immigration law because of its notorious obscurity, uncertainty, inconsistency and 
incoherence. As an Australian expert observed: 
I lecture in this area, and I do not understand the stuff. I am chairman of the specialisation 
committee.  I  examine  other  lawyers  to  see  whether  they  are  good  enough  to  be 
immigration  law  specialists.  I  do  not  understand  this  stuff.  I  guarantee  that  every 
migration  officer  I  have  spoken  to  does  not  have  a  complete  knowledge  of  their  own 
immigration laws.
1141 
As  this  thesis  has  elaborated,  there  are  many  causes  of  this  complexity.  The 
volume  of  legislation,  its  frequent  amendment,  the  technicality  of  the  refugee 
definition, the limited jurisdiction of the courts, and the interaction of various legal 
regimes  are  all  special  features  of  this  field  of  law.  Refugee  law  poses  additional 
challenges  since  it  is  ultimately  premised  on  future  risk.
1142  As  Rashid  and  R(S) 
evidence, this may lead to refugee claimants living in uncertainty for years. Further, 
the Convention’s promise of a universal system of protection is greatly undermined by 
procedural and interpretative variations, resulting in an “asylum lottery”.
1143 
These  structural  features  partly  arise  out  of,  and  are  exacerbated  by,  four 
underlying features of immigration law. The high political salience of immigration 
encourages perpetual amendment, micro-management, and compromise. Competing 
tensions in the ‘national interest’ also promote compromise and ambivalence. The 
fluidity  of  the  regulatory  environment,  described  in  chapter  6,  encourages 
amendments  to  respond  to  new  patterns  and  challenges.  Finally,  the  inherent 
administrative  tensions  between  discretion  and  rule-making  are  magnified  in  the 
immigration context because of the tension between the high volume of decisions and 
                                                   
1138 See, eg, Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427, [8]-[13]; Plaintiff S157, n192, [30]. 
1139 Under s 8 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). 
1140 HSMP Forum, n323. 
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greater pressures on time, on the one hand, and the complexity of human beings and 
the national interest on the other.  
Given these challenges, it is not surprising that criticisms based on these values 
are frequent. These are distinctively legal criticisms grounded in uncontroversial legal 
values. However, they run into the same problems as those based on a fair trial: there 
are no easy solutions; these are partial standards; and these are standards that may 
engage competing principles.  
3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3  Access to justice Access to justice Access to justice Access to justice    
A third prominent form of critique takes as its legal standard the principle of 
access to justice, which is also entrenched in multiple legal orders and regimes. In 
international and regional human rights law, it is captured in the rights to an effective 
remedy
1144 in addition to a fair and public hearing.
1145 In the Australian Constitution, it 
is partially captured by s 75. It has also been resoundingly affirmed as a “fundamental 
and constitutional principle” in the UK,
1146 with the rights of access to a court and 
legal advice “inherent and fundamental to democratic civilised society.”
1147 Lord Woolf 
captured the issue pithily: ‘What is the use of courts, if you cannot access them?’
1148 
The challenge of access to justice is squarely and centrally raised in the story of 
immigration  review,  manifested  in  various  forms.  Issues  of  legal  representation, 
interpretation and translation, and time limits, as discussed in chapter 1, practically 
impede access to justice. The unusually restrictive conditions on appeals and judicial 
reviews — including accelerated appeals, non-suspensive appeal, tight time limits, 
and  jurisdictional  restrictions  —  challenge  the  principle  of  access  to  justice  more 
directly. Policies of extra-territorialisation pose an enormous practical challenge, with 
such policies precluding access to the UK for over 70,000 people between 2006 and 
early  2008.
1149  Such  policies  not  only  greatly  affect  rights  of  appeal,  but  create 
important practical barriers in exercising such rights even where they do exist. Finally, 
the least visible challenge is that of migration policies themselves. It is the policies, 
ultimately,  that  determine  the  rules  of  admission  and  thus  the  viability  of  legal 
challenge, but the substantive justice of these policies is largely not justiciable.  
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Strong critiques of this kind abound,
1150 but once again they run into the difficulty 
that  access  to  justice  is  a  partial  standard.  No  system  of  law  can  adjudicate  all 
disputes,  an  observation  particularly  apt  in  immigration,  which  has  historically 
provided few avenues of legal challenge, and which generates a disproportionately 
large caseload. Indeed, the ICCPR expresses the partiality of the standard by providing 
in Art 13 that aliens are, subject to security grounds, entitled to submit reasons against 
a  decision  to  expel,  and  have  that  decision  reviewed  by  a  competent  or  specially 
designated authority. Clearly, therefore, Art 2(3) of the ICCPR does not entitle aliens 
to  the  right  of  legal  challenge  against  expulsion,  let  alone  a  decision  refusing 
admission. 
The partiality of the standard returns us to the dilemma of first-order legal norms 
and  second-order  political  justifications.  For,  while  the  standard  is  partial,  the 
normative justifications for the standard — crucially, ensuring the interests, rights 
and  fair  treatment  of  the  individual;  ensuring  the  accountability,  accessibility  and 
transparency  of  the  administration;  and  the  improvement  of  administrative 
processes
1151  —  all  point  toward  extensive  access  to  justice  in  immigration.  The 
interests involved are most significant; there is empirical evidence of poor decision-
making and a lack of public confidence; and there is an inherently strong desire to 
challenge decisions. The ARC’s guidelines as to which decisions should be subject to 
appeal  point  to  the  same  conclusion.
1152  Rather  than  being  normatively  grounded, 
therefore, it is blindingly obvious that restricted access to justice in immigration is the 
product of political and resource pressures, returning us to the unequal competition 
between  legal  norms  and  political  constraints  —  or,  even  worse  —  to  a  purely 
pragmatic distribution of limited resources between different legal fields.  
As  this  overview  has  demonstrated,  distinctively  legal  critiques,  based  on 
relatively concrete legal standards, benefit from an underlying normative consensus 
and their distinctively legal character. This gives legal scholars a position of relative 
authority, while preserving the distinction between a legal and a political critique of 
immigration  law.  Further,  the  methodology  of  the  law  —  reasoning  from  legal 
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principles  and  legal  values  —  is  employed  effectively  to  contest  and  ultimately 
displace the methodology of politics. 
However, as we have seen, such critiques suffer from four major defects. They 
obscure more fundamental problems by favouring those that can readily be resolved. 
They  provide  little  guidance  when  competing  principles  are  in  play.  They  pit 
normative principles against second-order political constraints and thus fail to engage 
with  political  imperatives.  Finally,  they  expose  the  partiality  of  the  broader  legal 
principles that they rely upon.  
4   Law as a counter-weight to politics 
We turn now from the relative precision of these legal standards to the deeper 
and murkier territory of the broader normative claim underpinning those standards: 
that law acts as a counter-weight to politics. It is here that we meet the greatest 
challenge of immigration to the law.  
This  general  claim  may  be  disentangled  into  three  separate,  and  distinctive, 
claims.  First,  law  constructs  people  differently  from  politics.  Second,  the  law 
differentiates  itself  by  its  autonomy  from  politics,  distinguishing  itself  by  its 
independent institutions, framework and methodology. Third, and intimately related 
to the second, law claims to control or check executive power, as expressed in the 
principle of the rule of law. This goes one step further than the previous claim: not 
only is law not merely a branch of politics, but it also acts as a counterweight to 
politics. 
4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1  The people of the law The people of the law The people of the law The people of the law    
While law focuses on the equality and rights of people, and seeks to protect their 
vulnerability,  politics  focuses  on  their  differential  social  power  and  interests,  and 
vulnerability is a marker of political weakness. Of course, politicians and political 
scientists  subscribe  to  the  principles  of  equality  and  rights,  and  may  also  seek  to 
protect  political  vulnerability;  and,  conversely,  lawyers  and  judges  are  influenced 
greatly by social power and interests. However, distilled to their essence, law and 
politics are distinguished by different methodologies that claim to distribute power 
according to these attributes. 
This is most obviously manifested by the law’s commitment to the twin principles 
of equality before the law and the prohibition of discrimination, and the democratic 
commitment  to  majoritarian  rule  and  the  distribution  of  political  power  between   251 
different  groups  and  classes.  The  norms  of  equality  before  the  law  and  non-
discrimination, as noted earlier, are manifested in specific regimes, most prominently 
human rights. Indeed, as Lord Steyn emphasised in Prague Airport, “[t]he great theme 
which  runs  through  subsequent  human  rights  instruments,  national,  regional  and 
international,  is  the  legal  right  of  equality  with  the  correlative  right  of  non-
discrimination  on  the  grounds  of  race.”
1153  As  Lord  Bingham  also  noted  in  the 
Belmarsh  case,
1154  and  Lord  Scarman  in  Khawaja,
1155  these  principles  have 
constitutional importance in the common law.  
As has been emphasised throughout this thesis, immigration poses a challenge to 
this claim of equality since it is fundamentally premised not only on inequality, but 
inequality based on one of the ‘suspect’ grounds of discrimination, that of nationality 
(and, indirectly, race). It is also exacerbated because this legal inequality is attached 
to  a  social  inequality,  since  migrants  are  inherently  likely  to  be  less  socially  and 
financially powerful. This inequality is at its starkest in the differential treatment of 
citizen and non-citizen in relation to the coercive practice of detention.  
Clearly, there is a tension between the equality of citizens, and the equality of 
humans,  since  the  institution  of  citizenship  itself  demands  exclusion,  and  since 
greater  bonds  of  co-operation  and  obligation  arise  between  citizens.
1156  A  further 
difficulty  arises  because,  as  discussed  earlier,  neither  Australia  nor  the  UK  has  a 
clearly defined sense of the entitlements of citizenship.  
Another  tension  arises  in  the  distinction  between  social  citizenship  and  legal 
citizenship,
1157  manifested  in  the  debates  over  migrants’  access  to  health  care  and 
welfare.
1158  The  extension  of  many  of  the  substantive  benefits  of  citizenship  to 
‘denizens’ follows the logic of a welfare state, but not the logic of the citizen/non-
citizen dichotomy of the law.
1159  
This debate articulates clearly the competition between the principle of equality 
of citizens, and the principle of equality as humans, and evidences the difficulty in 
locating  the  logical  boundary  between  these  two  principles,  since  the  founding 
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principle of democracy that “each individual has equal value”
1160 is logically applicable 
across  political  boundaries.  As  I  described  in  chapter  5,  nationalism  and 
cosmopolitanism  co-exist  and  compete:  we  can  understand,  and  respond  to,  the 
appeal of ‘British jobs for British workers’,
1161 as well as the cry that “some people are 
suffering and some people are enjoying and I don’t know the reason why”.
1162 There 
are,  therefore,  internal  tensions  in  principle  of  equality  concerning  its  sphere  of 
application — tensions that are most exposed in relation to non-citizens.  
The principle of equality is also a partial standard. Outside of a delimited sphere 
of application — where human rights are not engaged, and where no ‘internal’ legal 
regimes is invoked — the premise of inequality in immigration law reasserts itself.  
Immigration  also  exposes  the  weakness  of  the  law’s  methodological  focus  on 
rights, because of the model of immigration as a privilege and the relative weakness of 
the patchwork of rights. As discussed earlier, the patchwork of rights include legally 
enforceable rights of entry upon fulfilment of the visa criteria or Rules; the States’ 
obligations of non-refoulement and respect for family or private life; procedural rights, 
and the corpus of EU rights. These rights have important limitations. The rules of 
admission are weakly entrenched, frequently amended, and qualified by a range of 
statutory  provisions.  The  non-refoulement  obligations  are  carefully  limited  and 
respect for right to private or family life outweighs immigration control only in a “very 
small minority” of cases.
1163 Procedural rights are greatly weakened if they are not 
attached  to  substantive  rights:  in  Kioa,  for  example,  the  finding  of  a  breach  of 
procedural  fairness  amounted  to  a  “very  slender  technical  victory”,
1164  since  the 
substantive decision was unlikely to be changed. Indeed, the history of immigration 
review evidences that the conferral of procedural rights is usually accompanied by a 
substantive reduction in protection. The rights conferred by EU law are substantial, 
but, as commentators have observed, these rights often have significant exceptions 
attached,  are  sufficiently  open-textured  to  permit  of  many  variations,  and  often 
permit States to continue invidious practices.
1165  
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Weak rights lead to the under-protection of immigrants, as we see in decision 
after decision. In Musgrove, an immigrant could not maintain an action without a 
legal  right  of  entry,
1166  echoed  in  Beaumont  J’s  finding  in  Tampa  that  a  claim  for 
habeas corpus was similarly precluded.
1167 The absence of a right to residence meant 
that natural justice did not apply to deportations.
1168 Immigration decisions did not 
affect ‘civil right(s) or obligation(s)’ and thus did not attract the fair trial guarantees 
under Art 6 ECHR.
1169 The ECJ found that the Family Reunification Directive did not 
breach fundamental rights because, inter alia, there was no human right to family 
reunification.
1170  
What is troubling is the disjuncture between the importance of the interest, and 
its non-recognition as a right. As noted earlier, the interest in one’s residence is a 
precondition  to  the  exercise  of  all other  kinds  of  rights.
1171  We  are  accustomed to 
thinking that the more important an interest is, the more likely it will be recognised 
as  a  right;  and,  indeed,  the  more  fundamental  it  is,  the  more  likely  it  will  be 
recognised as a human or, in the phraseology of the EU, a fundamental right.  
This disjuncture is even more troubling if we believe, as Dworkin does, in rights 
as being sourced in the ideas of human dignity and political equality, which protect 
the weaker members of the political community.
1172 The idea of human dignity surely 
applies equally to all humans; and the idea of political equality, although Dworkin 
limits it to the political community, is (as we have seen) logically capable of extension 
beyond the political community. Why then is the immigrant peculiarly divested of 
rights? 
The  framework  of  rights  is,  of  course,  a  pervasive  manifestation  of  the  law’s 
ultimate concern about the vulnerability of people to the politics of power. Other 
examples of this protective function of the law abound: we see it in the development 
of most of equity; the development of the tort of negligence; and most obviously, in 
the  development  of  human  rights  law.  It  is  the  responsiveness of  the  law  to  that 
vulnerability, and its ability to counteract the pure effects of political power, that 
indelibly links law to justice and makes the law, for all its limitations, a principal 
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avenue for challenging political power. Rights are therefore particularly necessary in 
the  case  of  immigrants  and  refugees,  since  they  are  by  definition  weaker,  more 
vulnerable, members of the community; yet, as we have seen, the rights of immigrants 
and refugees are sparse indeed.  
Thus, the premise of inequality in immigration law, the relative weakness of the 
framework of rights, and the relative failure of the law to respond to the vulnerability 
of the immigrant all create tension with the claim of the law to protect the equality 
and rights of the vulnerable. Here, indeed, we see some convergence between the 
political and legal construction of the person, as the political weakness of immigrants 
is translated into legal weakness, giving an impression of oppression.  
Thus,  as  Dauvergne has  argued,  the  legal  vocabulary  of rights  may  in  fact  be 
dangerous  for refugees,  providing  not enough  critical  bite  but  also  constructing  a 
conflictual paradigm on the basis of ‘hard’ rights, rather than seeking consensus on 
the ‘softer’ and more generous basis of humanitarianism.
1173 Yet, as Savitri Taylor has 
replied, the alternative is to deprive oneself of the only discourse powerful enough to 
challenge that of politics, and practical enough to have real effects in the lives of 
immigrants and refugees.
1174  
4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2  Law’s autonomy from politics Law’s autonomy from politics Law’s autonomy from politics Law’s autonomy from politics    
Dauvergne’s argument, however, underlines the intimate connection between law 
and politics in the field of immigration, a connection which undermines law’s claim to 
its  autonomy  from  politics.  As  this  thesis  has  emphasised,  much  of  the  story  of 
immigration review can be explained as a struggle over the boundaries of law and 
politics, a struggle that is fiercer in immigration because of its high political salience 
of immigration and the relative absence of legal autonomy. 
Claims for the autonomy of the law point to the distinctive methodology of the 
law (the focus on equality, rights and protection; the use of logical reasoning and 
rules); the distinctive nature of the legal framework (centring on enacted laws and 
adjudication to develop a consistent and coherent set of obligations and rights); and 
the  distinctive  character  of  its  political  structure,  with  its  different  actors  and 
institutions and relationships between them.  
                                                   
1173 See n934. 
1174  Savitri  Taylor,  ‘Importance  of  human  rights  talk  in  asylum  seeker  advocacy:  A  response  to 
Catherine Dauvergne’ (2001) 24 UNSWLJ 191.   255 
 Immigration challenges those claims to autonomy in ways that extend beyond its 
claim  to  construct  people  differently.  Historically,  immigration  law  has  been 
characterised by the refusal to apply the ‘judicial method’ of reasoning and rules to 
the same extent as in other fields. The sovereignty of States and their right to exclude 
has been used to foreclose judicial reasoning in a stream of cases, beginning with 
Musgrove,  continuing  in  the  declaration  that  questions  of  immigration  cannot  be 
“hedged  […]  around  with  principles  of  the  kind  that  the  judiciary  are  wont  to 
consider”;
1175 and more recently in the decision in Tampa that the only question worth 
answering  was  whether  the  executive  power  authorised  non-statutory  expulsions. 
That  tendency  reaches  its  apogee  in  the  US,  where  the  plenary  power  doctrine 
demands an extreme level of judicial deference.
1176 As Schuck put it, in terms that 
resonate in Australia and the UK: 
Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably no other 
area  of  American  law  has  been  so  radically  insulated  and  divergent  from  those 
fundamental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that 
animate  the  rest  of  our  system.  …  [I]mmigration  law  remains  the  realm  in  which 
government authority is at the zenith, and individual entitlement is at the nadir.
1177  
The claim to legal autonomy is also undermined in immigration because of the 
relative lack of judicial autonomy in immigration law. As discussed in chapter 2, the 
volumes  of  tightly  worded  legislation  greatly  confine  judicial  discretion,  a 
confinement  that  is  exacerbated  by  the  pattern  of  legislative  reversals  and  the 
legislative confinements of judicial interpretation.  
The problem is greater in Australia, because of the absence of human rights law, 
the near-invisibility of international law, the more conservative approach to judicial 
review, and the constitutional emphasis on the powers of the State. Judicial agency is 
also key: part of the story of immigration review is the divergence between the two 
highest courts in both jurisdictions, with a more liberal Federal Court and House of 
Lords willing to assert their legal autonomy, in contrast to a more ‘obedient’ High 
Court of Australia and English Court of Appeal. However, as the example of the ouster 
clause reminds us, the autonomy of the judiciary is less institutionally entrenched in 
the  UK  than  in  countries  in  which  the  Constitution,  rather  than  Parliament,  is 
sovereign. 
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Indeed, while the House of Lords’ approach has generally enabled a more liberal 
approach, it has come at the cost of constitutional conflict. The reappraisal of the role 
of the courts and constitutional arrangements following the HRA has been marked by 
conflict over high-profile immigration cases, which have provoked damaging calls for 
repeal of the HRA.
1178 The growth in sources of ‘soft law’, and the movement of the EU 
into this field, enable greater legal autonomy but engender further controversy over 
the democratic credentials and legitimate role of such actors in this highly sensitive 
sphere.  
These challenges to the claim of law’s autonomy must be located in the wider 
context of the changing boundaries of law and politics. In Australia and the UK, the 
historical tradition of the common law has traditionally granted the judiciary a central 
role, and it continues to play a central and creative role in certain heartlands, such as 
tort and judicial review. However, the 20
th century saw an explosion in legislative and 
regulatory  activity,  diminishing  the  role  of  the  judge.  Whole  fields  of  law  have 
emerged that are the province of regulatory regimes, with comparatively little judicial 
involvement. 
Even  in  its  heartlands,  the  authority  of  the  judiciary  has  been  increasingly 
challenged.  The  flourishing  of  ADR,  policies  of  mandatory  or  less  discretionary 
sentencing, and debate about the creation of a ‘compensation culture’ driven by the 
expansiveness  of  negligence  law
1179  are  disparate  manifestations  of  the  decreasing 
political deference to the judiciary.  
This  has  accompanied  major  social  changes  which  have  diminished  the 
professional status of the legal community and undermined its cohesiveness, while 
also diversifying the values and orientations of the political elite. This has produced 
greater  friction  between  the  values  of  the  judiciary  and  Parliament,  a  disjuncture 
evidenced again and again in the story of immigration review — in Simon Brown LJ’s 
astonishment that a government would do such an “uncivilised” thing as to render 
refugee  claimants  destitute;
1180  at  the  Federal  Court’s  obvious  outrage  at  the 
government’s pursuit of the pro bono community for costs in Tampa;
1181 and perhaps 
most revealingly, in Lord Woolf’s sense of betrayal at the ungentlemanly conduct of 
                                                   
1178 N1003. 
1179 CAC, Compensation Culture (2006). 
1180 JCWI, n78. 
1181 Tampa (Costs), n97.   257 
the government in its misuse of judicial consultations over the ouster clause.
1182 We 
can  similarly  trace  the  decay  of  a  mutually  supportive  consensus  between  the 
judiciary and Parliament in the decline of the convention that the Lord Chancellor or 
Attorney-General would protect the judiciary from attack
1183 and, in Australia, in the 
slanderous attack on the integrity of Kirby J by an MP.
1184  
This  disjuncture has  been  dramatically  exposed  not  only  by  the  governments’ 
harsh, previously unthinkable, refugee policies, but by the attacks on civil liberties in 
the name of the ‘war against terror’. In an influential speech, Lord Steyn attacked the 
Guantanamo Bay camp as a “legal black hole”.
1185 It is no coincidence that the House 
of  Lords’  most  important  constitutional  case  for  decades  was  one  that  combined 
immigration and terrorism, for nothing dramatised the weakness of law’s claim to 
autonomy better.  
The story of immigration review thus becomes a story about the assertion of legal 
autonomy,  and  the  defence  of  law’s  empire.  In  defending  law’s  empire,  however, 
different players rely on different elements of law’s empire, revealing the ambiguity of 
the concept of law. For empires, of course, are partly methods of exercising authority; 
partly institutions; and partly ideals. Law’s empire may similarly be disaggregated. It 
may merely denote the existence of positive legal rules. It may refer to distinctively 
legal institutions, especially the judiciary. It is in this sense that judicial authority is 
affiliated  with  the  defence  of  law’s  empire;  and  it  is  this  institutional  sense  that 
engaged the majority in Al-Kateb. However, law’s empire also crucially connotes the 
ideological dimension of the law: its commitment to legal standards and values, and 
to the central claim that law acts as an important counterweight to politics.  
Immigration  has  an  unusual  ability  to  expose  tensions  between  these  three 
aspects. Harsh immigration laws provoke tensions with the ideological dimension of 
law’s empire; but attempts to assert legal autonomy and mediate the harshness of 
those laws provoke tensions with the legitimacy of judicial institutions. Immigration 
exposes  the  fact  that  these  three  aspects  of  law’s  empire  do  not  inevitably  travel 
together,  and  provides  ammunition  for  damaging  charges  of  illegitimacy  and 
hypocrisy.  
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It is those alternative charges of illegitimacy and hypocrisy that lie behind the 
paradigm  of  the  battle  between  the  executive  and  the  judiciary.  For  those  who 
subscribe to the democratic theory of judicial legitimacy, expansive judicial review is 
illegitimate; for those who privilege the ideological dimension of the law, immigration 
law  betrays  those  ideological  values.  It  is  this  tension  that  animates  most  legal 
criticism, and which charges academic debate. 
The difficulty, however, of a legal critique based on the inadequate degree of 
autonomy of law from politics in this field is that this claim is a classic example of a 
partial truth. For law is after all intimately bound up with politics; it is sustained and 
nourished by it. The word ‘autonomy’ is carefully chosen: law is not independent of 
politics. To borrow from the political arrangements of the two jurisdictions, law may 
be conceived of as a unit of devolution, or a Territory within a federal State; it enjoys a 
limited sphere of competence that is conferred by the national government, but exists 
within and depends upon the larger political structure. Like all such arrangements, 
the boundaries between the law and politics are not sharp-edged; there is a certain 
amount  of  inevitable  slippage.  The  dynamism  of  the  boundaries  reflects  the 
dynamism of the different legal spheres, and much depends upon how such power is 
exercised in practice.  
There is, thus, no hard-edged standard of legal autonomy, and there are no fixed 
boundaries  that  enable  us  to  distinguish  precisely  when  one  sphere  illegitimately 
trespasses on another. Perhaps more importantly, we are still somewhat vague as to 
why and when law should remain autonomous from politics. The historical shift of 
immigration  from  the  exclusive  preserve  of  politics  to  a  colony  of  law’s  empire 
suggests  that  it  is  not  so  much  the  inherent  characteristics  of  a  field  but  rather 
changing  perceptions  of  governance  that  determine  these  matters.  For,  ironically, 
although on the one hand law’s empire has been on the defensive, as I have suggested, 
the reach of law has in fact expanded greatly in the 20
th century, as is evident in the 
‘legalisation’  of  immigration  itself.  Changing  normative  paradigms,  evident  in  the 
historical dynamism of the legal constellation, underlie our intuitive judgments about 
the appropriate place and purpose of law as much as the State.  
Thus,  inevitably,  criticisms  grounded  on  insufficient  autonomy  soon  flail  in 
political quicksand. For while certain normative paradigms may be hegemonic in one 
field,  the  stubborn  truth  remains  that  these  normative  paradigms  co-exist  and 
compete  in  the  terrain  of  political,  and  legal,  discourse.  These  fundamental   259
disagreements about the normative premises of law’s empire mean that such legal 
critiques will always be contestable on a political level, sapping such critiques of much 
of their critical purchase. It will, in short, always be possible to dismiss liberal or 
restrictive  arguments  as  political  rather  than  legal  arguments,  embodying  a  policy 
preference  upon  which  there  is  no  normative  consensus;  and  thus  the  critic  is 
deprived of any distinctively legal authority and any conclusive argument. 
4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3  Controlling power Controlling power Controlling power Controlling power    
Finally, intimately related to the claim of autonomy is the more substantial claim 
that law ‘controls’ or ‘checks’ power, as expressed directly in the principle of the rule 
of law. At its heart, it is a claim about the supremacy of law over politics, a supremacy 
that  may  be  limited  in  application  but  which  captures  the  ultimate  subjection  of 
politics to law.  
The field of immigration provides plenty of examples to counter that claim. For 
most of the 20
th century, judges refused to touch immigration, reserving it to the 
special field of politics, as we have seen. More dramatically, interceptions on the high 
seas and administrative detention provide rare examples, in our modern democratic 
societies, of the exercise of the coercive power of the State on vulnerable individuals 
with little legal restraint. Indeed, the high seas might be seen as another kind of ‘legal 
black hole’, a space where the law literally seems not to run. An outstanding example 
of the failure of law to control executive power is the case (referred to earlier) of the 
refugee claimants who arrived in Melville Island, which was retrospectively excised 
from  the  migration  zone  by  regulations  later  disallowed  by  the  Senate.
1186  The 
regulations were, however, still legally effective during the relevant period and thus 
precluded a claim for habeas corpus,
1187 with the judge also following Beaumont J’s 
view in Tampa that the claim would effectively force the claimants to be brought into 
Australian  territory.  Here,  the  law  signally  failed  to  ‘subject’  politics  to  any  real 
constraint. 
Indeed, the story of immigration review testifies to the way in which the law may 
be  navigated  around,  undermined  or  bypassed.  Governments  escape  the  mesh  of 
domestic law by exporting the border; by escaping to friendlier and more secretive 
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intergovernmental  avenues;
1188  and  by  fireproofing  their  attacks  on  the  law  by 
enacting ouster clauses and ‘validating’ legislation.  
As the battle over the ouster clauses demonstrated, this is not to say that the rule 
of law is (depending upon one’s perspective) an empty threat or a hollow promise. 
Rather, it is to say that the rule of law is another partial truth. Not every field is 
subject to the full rigour of the law; and, ultimately, the rule of law works because of 
political acquiescence, not because of the coercive powers of the law itself. Political 
acquiescence is normal, because (as Boswell points out) conformity to the rule of the 
law is a condition of institutional legitimacy. Nevertheless, these counter-examples 
expose the fragility of the rule of law. 
The imperial metaphor is useful here. Just like imperial rule, the rule of law is real 
but variable, and its strength weakens the further its rule extends beyond the heart of 
empire. If immigration is a colony of law’s empire, it is ruled like a colony: with fewer 
guards and less centralised control, and with more opportunity for resistance and 
evasion, through the uneasy co-existence of informal practices with the formal rules 
of Empire, and through greater reliance on coercive rather than ideological power.  
To say, therefore, that immigration is ‘lawless’, or conflicts with the rule of law, 
thus courts the dangers common to all critiques based on partial truths: it lacks a 
‘hard edge’; it lacks a normative consensus with which to define when and where the 
rule of law should apply; and it destabilises the legal authority upon which one stands, 
dragging one instead into the quicksands of political theory. 
Unlike the concrete and limited legal standards canvassed earlier, therefore, the 
broader  normative  claims  do  not  provide  a  secure  legal  base  for  criticism.  Those 
wishing to argue in this vein must confront the criticism that they are simply pro-
refugee or legal romantics.  
5  Conclusion 
Embedded in the large critical literature of immigration and refugee law is an 
implicit critique based on this broader account of the ideological dimension of the 
law. Immigration departs from a variety of concrete legal standards; its logic is in 
tension with some of the broader legal standards; but, most critically, it undermines 
the normative claim of law that it acts as a counterweight to politics. 
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One  may,  therefore,  move  beyond  the  limited  critical  purchase  of  evaluating 
immigration laws by reference to international law, refugee law or constitutional and 
administrative law. However, the further we move away from the relative precision of 
these standards, the closer we come to the boundary between law and politics and to 
exposing the soft centre of law’s empire. For, while liberal democratic societies rest 
fairly securely upon a normative consensus on the desirability of majoritarian control, 
a  degree  of  vagueness  and  ambiguity  pervades  the  sphere  of  the  law.  We  may 
subscribe  to  the  broad  principles  of  law’s  ideological  dimension,  but  we  lack  any 
secure normative consensus, or hard-edged tools, to enable us to delimit accurately 
and uncontroversially the sphere of their application. Wishing to defend law’s empire 
from the safe ground of legal authority, ground we think of as decontaminated from 
the  toxins  of  politics,  we  neglect  the  fundamental  problems  in  favour  of  visible, 
severable deformities. Wanting to attack the fundamental problems, we find ourselves 
sliding into the murky and marshy borderlands between law and politics.  
This  accounts  for  the  peculiar  disjuncture  between  the  underlying  passion  of 
many legal critics, and the comparative weakness of their legal critiques. It explains 
the  divisiveness  of  immigration  within  the  legal  community,  and  the  underlying 
reasons for the conflict between the legal and political spheres. It explains why the 
story of immigration review is most fruitfully re-read not within the conventional 
paradigm of executive and the judiciary, but rather as a cautionary tale about law 
itself. Immigration review is a site in which lawyers, judges and politicians construct, 
deconstruct, and reconstruct our understandings of law’s empire. Its story, in the end, 
acts as a mirror reflecting our deepest anxieties about, and our deepest investments 
in, the law, and its darker, longer, shadow — that of politics. 
 
Conclusion  
1  Introduction 
This thesis began with the question: What does the story of immigration review 
in Australia and the UK tell us about the contemporary legal sphere? This thesis has 
drawn from the story of immigration review four key lessons. First, we can explain 
why immigration poses a challenge for law. Second, we can perceive more acutely the 
strengths  and  weaknesses  of  law  and  politics.  Third,  we  can  re-tell  the  story  of  
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immigration review more accurately as a struggle over law’s empire. Fourth, we can 
begin to re-imagine and retool our strategies for defending law’s empire.  
2  Four challenges 
First,  immigration  law  is  not  controversial  merely  because  it  is  politically 
controversial,  but  also  because  it  poses  four  major  challenges  for  the  law:  the 
challenges of coherence, competition, capacity and, most significantly, the challenge 
to the normative claim that law acts as a counterweight to politics.  
As chapter 2 demonstrated, immigration exposes an unusual degree of normative 
tension  within  the  legal  constellation.  These  tensions  are,  as  chapter  3  revealed, 
managed  by  judges  through  normatively  unsatisfactory  strategies  of  fudging, 
trumping and boundary-drawing.  
Immigration  also  exposes  the  reductiveness  of  legal  discourse  and  its  relative 
inability to compete with more powerful social discourses, as explored in chapters 4 
and 5. It exposes the limits of its capacity to resolve disputes and regulate, as was 
discussed in chapter 6. Finally, as I argued in chapter 7, immigration exposes the 
fluidity and fictiveness of the boundary between law and politics, which undermines 
the claim of law to act as a counterweight to politics, and its capacity to act as a 
critical standard. 
These challenges have different, and multiple, causes. Significantly, the causes are 
both  common  to  all  spheres  of  law,  but  unusually  pronounced  in  the  case  of 
immigration.  Thus,  by  pushing  law  to  its  limits,  immigration  law  sheds  light  on 
inescapable, and basic, limitations of the law in general. Immigration is a special case 
that, by exaggerating the basic limitations, illuminates them more vividly.  
For example, the legal constellation of immigration review reflects the haphazard 
embedding  of  shifting,  competing  and  co-existing  normative  paradigms.  This  is 
complicated  by  the  increasing  plurality  and  diversity  of  legal  actors,  and  the 
increasing  polyvalence  of  values  that  partly  reflects  growing  normative  dissensus. 
These are features that are evident throughout the legal sphere, but the challenge is 
particularly acute in immigration because of the degree of difference between the 
political structures of the legal regimes and the peculiar premises of immigration law. 
The reductiveness of legal discourse, so evident in the challenge of competition, 
arises  partly  out  of  the  structure  of  logic  and  reason,  and  the  language  of  liberal 
individualism, that mark legal discourse. Ultimately, however, it is the product of the  
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function of the law to determine, decide and resolve. The law’s relative incapacity to 
compete with more powerful social discourses arises partly from this reductiveness, 
but also as a consequence of its limited communicative sphere, relative inaccessibility, 
and relative closure from other social discourses. Again, these reflect basic limitations 
of the law, but they are made vivid in the case of migration because of the richness 
and complexity of the phenomenon, and its high symbolic salience. 
Similarly,  immigration  reveals  the  premises  underlying  the  model  of  dispute 
resolution  more  clearly  because  of  the  absence  of  some  of  those  premises  —  the 
assumption  that  it  relates  to  those  ‘within’  the  community;  the  assumption  of  a 
‘natural’ dispute between relatively equal individuals mediated by a neutral arbiter; 
and the capacity of the interests involved to be compromised or resolved through a 
normative  framework  of  rights  and  obligations.  It  also  reveals  the  regulatory 
constraints on the law imposed by the peculiarly complex regulatory context, and 
generated by the high political salience of migration and the complexity of the social 
phenomenon. 
Finally, while some of the challenges to the deeper account of legality arise partly 
out  of  contingent  political  outcomes,  the  fundamental  challenge  arises  out  of  the 
peculiarly  intimate  connection  in  immigration  between  law  and  politics,  which 
dramatises the ultimate dependency of law upon politics.  
3  Law — what is it good for?  
These challenges expose the strengths and weaknesses of law. Law provides an 
attractive  venue  for  challenging  the  power  of  politics  because  of  its  distinctive 
methodology,  institutions  and  norms.  The  political  vulnerability  of  migrants  and 
refugees is offset in part by the legal focus on the individual, equality and rights; by 
the methodology of logic, reason and rules that displaces the politics of power; and by 
the  distinctive  commitment  to  countervailing  legal  norms,  including  the  counter-
majoritarian principle of legal equality.  
Crucially, it is also attractive because the crystallisation of normative paradigms 
into  laws  serves  the  function  of  (apparently)  ‘depoliticising’  those  paradigms.  Law 
functions  both  to  construct,  and  to  mark,  normative  consensus.  The  (contested, 
malleable) political claim is transfigured into a legal standard that claims a consensus, 
providing  a  more  secure  ground  for  both  criticism  and  defence.  We  see  this,  for 
example,  in  the  strong  affirmation  of  equality  in  Prague  Airport,  buttressed  by  
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multiple legal authorities; and in the very persistence, and continued invocation, of 
the legal category of refugee itself. 
Perhaps  most  importantly,  however,  law  remains  an  attractive  venue  for 
challenging political power because of its capacity to counteract or mitigate political 
outcomes directly. While education, political activism and lobbying, the production 
of a more favourable political climate, and re-imaginings of the refugee and irregular 
immigrant  in  political  science,  sociology  and  literature  may  ultimately  be  more 
effective, they cannot, in the end, directly invalidate legislation or, in the case of the 
UK, render it politically unviable.  
However, the focus of this thesis has rather been on the weaknesses of the law. A 
prominent thread of this thesis has focused on the tensions between and within the 
legal regimes that make up the legal constellation, as well as between and within the 
imperatives of the law.  
As detailed in chapter 2, the degree of tension is marked because of three unusual 
premises of immigration law — the premise of inequality between citizen and non-
citizen; the premise of unfettered State power; and the premise of immigration as a 
political privilege rather than a legal right. These premises reflect the predominantly 
‘external’ perspective of the State in immigration law, and directly conflict with other 
predominantly  ‘internal’  legal  regimes  that  are  commonly  premised  on  equality, 
constraints on executive power, and a coherent framework of rights.  
The legal constellation is also structured by tensions between shifting normative 
paradigms that are reflected in the different legal regimes. While, at its inception, 
immigration law treated the immigrant as a ‘non-person’, unable even to access the 
courts, refugee law envisaged a particular kind of person as having a valid claim to 
State  protection,  while  human  rights  envisages  the  person  as  being  attached  to  a 
carefully  delimited  but  fundamental  bundle  of  rights.  However,  we  also  see  in 
immigration  legislation,  and  most  evidently  in  the  developing  EU  immigration 
regime,
1189 the emergence of the ‘denizen’ of the State — a person entitled to a more 
substantive set of rights, including a (contested) set of procedural rights in relation to 
their residence.  
The legal regimes also reflect different conceptions of the State, with the feudal 
conception of allegiance to the sovereign morphing into the Westphalian conception 
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of  ‘sovereignty’  entrenched  in  immigration  law,  which  in  turn  gives  way  to  the 
‘welfare’  and  ‘liberal  democratic’  notions  of  the  State  implicit  in  other  regimes. 
Shadowing these shifts are shifts in the conception of ‘community’, from an ethnically 
grounded  conception  (manifested  directly  in  ‘White  Australia’)  to  alternative 
traditions of civic liberalism, communitarianism, and cosmopolitanism, and from a 
clearly discrete, relatively closed and cohesive political community to a more diverse, 
plural  and  interconnected  political  community.  These  in  turn  construct  different 
compromises within the legal regimes between the rights of the individual and State 
power,  varying  from  the  virtual  absence  of  individual  rights  in  the  Australian 
Constitution; to the internal compromises embedded in the refugee definition, and 
the qualifications, derogations and the ‘margin of appreciation’ in human rights; and 
the even more vivid compromises evident in the multitude of enabling provisions and 
minimum standards in EU asylum law.  
This legal constellation does not make a pretty picture. This is, in part, because 
the hardened residue of obsolescent normative paradigms in these legal constellations 
may simply be offensive. It offends our contemporary notions of equality and human 
rights that a vulnerable non-citizen may be detained indefinitely in Australia (and 
with no statutory limit in the UK), for the purposes of administrative convenience,
1190 
while  criminals  enjoy  a  well-developed  regime  of  judicial  supervision  and  capped 
detention. As Black CJ in Tampa intimated, it offends our notion of the rule of law 
that  Australia  may  resort  to  an  undefined  ‘executive  power’  to  repel  vulnerable 
refugee  claimants,  when  the  legislature  has  laid  down  a  precise  code  governing 
exactly the same activities. It offends our notions of fair dealing and legal certainty 
that people can be induced to settle in a country on the promise of certain conditions, 
but  are  unable  to  continue  their  residence  because  of  sudden  changes  in  those 
conditions, as happened to immigrants under the HSMP programme in the UK.
1191 
Indeed,  immigration  law’s  structure  of  hyper-law  coupled  with  lawlessness 
undermines the promise of the law to provide relatively certain and stable rules which 
enable  us  to  structure  our  lives  accordingly.  Of  course,  flexibility  and  change  is 
inherent  in  the  law;  but  the  rapidity  of  amendment  of  immigration  law,  its 
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inaccessibility  and  complexity,  the  importance  of  security  of  residence,  and  the 
relatively  small  pool  of  enforceable  rights  mean  that  that  promise  is  not  merely 
qualified, but illusory. In Rashid and R(S), policies are withdrawn while applications 
are mired in endless backlogs; in Prague Airport, extra-statutory concessions may be 
written in thin air; and, throughout, claims may be submitted one day and judged by 
different criteria the next.
1192  
These tensions are affiliated with the broader tensions between and within the 
imperatives  of  the  law,  of  which  the  most  obvious  is  the  tension  between  the 
imperative  of  regulation  and  the  ideological  imperative  of  legitimacy.  Perfectly 
effective  regulation  ultimately  conflicts  with  the  foundational  liberal  values  of 
autonomy, freedom, and human dignity. There is, after all, a slippery slope between 
modifying a person’s choices, and making those choices for them. In the context of 
immigration, regulation also slips easily into physical coercion and exclusion, as we 
see  in  the  practices  of  surprise  deportations  at  dawn;  in  the  pitched  battles  over 
immigration  detention;  and  in  the  images  of  navies  and  coast  guards  herding 
vulnerable refugee claimants back to unstable and poor lands. 
 A most prominent tension within an imperative of the law, rather than between 
imperatives,  is  the  tension  between  rival  conceptions  of  judicial  legitimacy  so 
effectively dramatised in the contrasting decisions of McHugh J in Al-Kateb and Lord 
Bingham in the Belmarsh case. These conceptions, as we saw in chapter 3, are shaped 
by the clarity of the challenge to the law and, importantly, structured by the legal 
constellation.  For,  as  we  saw,  “obedience”  to  a  legal  text  may  have  very  different 
outcomes: obedience to a closely confined text such as the Migration Act 1958 may 
mandate indefinite detention, while obedience to the HRA has the opposite effect.  
 These tensions between rival conceptions of judicial legitimacy expose a major 
weakness of law: its dependence upon normative consensus, and its relative inability 
to either generate it or resolve it. Of course, just as flexibility and change are inherent 
in law, so too law lives with, and copes with, a relative degree of normative dissensus. 
Indeed,  the  forms  of  law  flourish  in  a  climate  of  normative  dissensus,  since  the 
declining force of social norms encourage a turn to law. 
                                                   
1192 See, eg, MO (Nigeria), n300. In Australia, this is systematised in the form of criteria that must be 
satisfied  ‘at  the  time  of  decision’,  in  addition  to  criteria  that  must  be  satisfied  at  time  of 
application.  
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Yet the law’s power is, as I have insisted throughout, a combination both of might 
and  right. We  will,  perhaps,  never  agree  exactly  on  what  is right;  but  history  has 
shown us in abundance that there may be disagreements so deep and profound that 
they fundamentally undermine the normative force of law. Nazi laws, the laws of 
apartheid, and the laws of segregation are prominent examples, and notably they are 
all examples of disagreements about the rights of minorities and claims to equality. It 
is  this  fundamental  disagreement  about  the  moral  status  of  the  human  that  also 
underpins the peculiarly volatile politics of immigration, and generates the unusual 
degree of normative dissensus that leads, on the one hand, to the unprecedented 
formation of networks ‘harbouring’ refugees in Australia;
1193 and the threats of the 
Conservative Party to withdraw from the Refugee Convention,
1194 scrap the HRA and 
even ‘temporarily’ withdraw from the ECHR.
1195 One may dismiss both examples as a 
fringe  reaction,  with  the  latter  examples  amounting  to  mere  populist  pandering. 
However, although we may disagree with these reactions, there is a social significance 
to this polarisation of debate, and to their consequent challenges to the legitimacy of 
the  law  from  different  directions.  For  immigration  stretches  the  law’s  capacity  to 
resolve disputes, both individually and normatively, to breaking point.  
As we saw in chapter 3, these tensions may be judicially managed, but in a way 
that merely papers over rather than conclusively resolves the underlying dissensus. 
Rather,  the  peculiar  degree  of  polyvalence  that  permeates  the  legal  constellation 
enables  multiple  legal  answers  that  are  therefore  also  subject  to  multiple  legal 
criticisms.  These  legal  answers  and  criticisms  are  themselves  undermined  by  the 
social  power  and  complexity  of  competing  discourses,  a  powerful  challenge  of 
competition that makes it easier to spot the cracks under the legal façade.  
  
This disjuncture between the flourishing of forms of law and the challenge to the 
norms of law — between what law denotes and connotes — lies at the heart of the 
story  of  immigration  review.  It  is  precisely  the  conflation  between  the  various 
elements of empire — the method of exercise, the institution, and the ideological or 
‘soft’  power  that  legitimates  it  —  under  the  identical  denomination  of  ‘law’  that 
                                                   
1193 Murray Mottram, ‘A network prepares to hide escapees’, The Age, 2001, 15. 
1194  As  the  Conservatives  pledged  before  the  2005  election:  James  Chapman,  ‘Howard:  I’ll  give 
Britain back its borders’, Daily Mail, 30 March 2005, 1. 
1195 Andy McSmith, ‘Cameron threatens to scrap Human Rights Act’, The Independent, 2006, 4.  
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provokes defences of law’s empire. Just as it is the mobility and multiplicity of the 
connotations of migration that gives it its peculiarly high political salience, it is the 
mobility  and  multiplicity  of  the  connotations  of  ‘law’  that  animates  the  story  of 
immigration review. 
For, as with real empires, the ‘soft’ power of law — its ideological dimension — 
stretches beyond that of its institutional reach, or ‘hard’ power, of law. While the gap 
between the institutional limits of a national legal system, and the normative claims 
of  the  rule  of  law  and  access  to  justice,  is  most  vividly  revealed  in  the  extra-
territorialisation  of  immigration  control,  more  mundane  institutional  limits  also 
proliferate in the story of immigration review: in the limitations on legal aid; in the 
restrictions on judicial review; in the gap between concrete heads of judicial review 
and their underlying norms; and in the institutional limits of resources, capacity and 
political will that constrain the full application of legal norms in immigration review. 
However, this thesis also reveals — more subtly and indirectly — the weaknesses 
of politics. Immigration exposes the inherent tension within the concept of a liberal 
democracy — the process of majoritarian decision-making tending to undervalue the 
liberal principle of protection of minorities. It reveals the disjuncture between the 
public language of civic liberalism and the competing and co-existing constructions of 
identity and community. It also exposes the gap between the State’s claim to full legal 
sovereignty,  and  the  actual  limitations  on  its  capacity  to  exercise  it.  Indeed,  as 
Agamben (drawing on Arendt) has argued, the figure of the refugee has exposed the 
“originary fiction of sovereignty” — the link between man and citizen, nativity and 
nationality that forms the implicit premise of human rights.
1196 
Significantly, it has exposed deficiencies in the operationalisation of democracy in 
these jurisdictions, nowhere more vividly than in the ouster clause sagas. The story of 
immigration review exposes how two-party political structures fail to provide any real 
accountability in times of electoral dominance. It exposes the relative poverty and 
fragility  of  the  judicial  tools  available  to  counteract  oppression  of  minorities;  the 
defects  of  parliamentary  scrutiny;  the  surrogate  and  under-representation  of 
immigrants; and the mediation of ‘popular will’ through the interactions and effects of 
interest groups and corporatist decision-making structures.  
                                                   
1196 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1995) 131.  
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Importantly, immigration also reveals the weak foundation of policy-making in 
reality rather than perception. ‘Migration myths’ about the scale and level of asylum, 
the benefits that accrue and the motivations that lie behind them, and the attribution 
of personal immorality evident in pejorative adjectives such as ‘bogus’ and ‘fraudulent’ 
have shaped migration policy in both jurisdictions. Nor is there any straightforward 
correlation  between  the  scale  of  migration  and  its  unpopularity,  with  hostility  to 
immigration declining in Australia during a period of record growth.
1197  
Immigration,  therefore,  exposes  the  gap  between  the  claims  of  both  law  and 
politics  and  their  practice,  revealing  the  inadequacy  of  the  constitutional 
commonplaces which structure our legal and political reasoning.  
4  Law’s empire 
The story of immigration review also reveals the competition between politics 
and law which is at the heart of this story of struggle over law’s empire. The ouster 
clause  episodes,  the  cases  on  indefinite  detention  and  extra-territorial  processing 
schemes, and the expansion of judicial review — the key landmarks of the story of 
immigration review — reflect strategies of trumping and fudging in the defence of 
law’s empire, differently interpreted. The outcomes reflect interactions between the 
nature of the challenge, the legal constellation and judicial agency. Read carefully, 
these are less stories of liberal against conservative judges, than of different judicial 
interpretations of what the law stands for, which emerge out of the polyvalence and 
normative incoherence of the legal constellation.  
The  story  of  immigration  review  reveals  that  immigration  law  is  not  merely 
controversial  in  the  legal  sphere  because  it  is  politically  controversial,  but  that 
immigration law challenges our conceptions of legality, expressed in the relatively 
concrete  standards  of  a  fair  trial,  access  to  justice,  and  the  values  of  clarity, 
consistency, coherence and certainty, and access to justice, as well as in the broader 
normative claims of law that it constructs people differently, is autonomous from, and 
ultimately a counterweight to, politics. It does so because of the many unjustified 
variations of immigration review from fair trial standards; because of its notorious 
complexity,  incoherence  and  inaccessibility;  and  because  of  the  many  tools  of 
exclusion  employed  in  immigration  review.  It  does  so  because  immigration  law 
                                                   
1197 Katharine Betts, ‘Migrants’ attitudes to immigration: 1990-2004’ (2005) 13 P&P 21.  
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incorporates a premise of inequality and a relatively small pool of rights that leads to 
the under-protection of the politically vulnerable; because of the predominance of the 
executive in law-making and attempts to confine judicial discretion that limit the 
autonomy of the law; and because of the many ways in which politics appears to 
trump  the  law  and  thus  undermines  the  claim  of  law  to  ultimate  authority  over 
politics. 
 The  strength  and  depth  of  these  fundamental  challenges,  however,  generate 
surprisingly  weak  critiques  of  the  distinctively  legal  kind.  Despite  the  multiple 
challenges immigration law poses, distinctively legal critiques have largely been based 
on relatively concrete legal standards, often adopted from other legal regimes. These 
legal standards tend to obscure the political dimension of the critique, placing critics 
on  superficially  ‘safe’  legal  ground.  Yet  this  strategy  also  obscures  the  more 
fundamental  problems  of  immigration  law,  and  ultimately  rely  upon  broader 
normative  claims  that  are,  in  reality,  partial  truths.  The  essential  difficulty  with 
distinctively  legal  critiques  is  that  they  must  presume,  or  advocate,  the  very 
boundaries between law and politics that are being fought over in the struggle over 
law’s empire.  
In doing so, these critiques reveal the soft centre of law’s empire: the piecemeal, 
open-textured and partial nature of the deeper account of legality that passes for a 
theory of legitimacy. As chapter 1 discussed, Blunkett and Ruddock both pointed to 
the intuitive and relatively concrete appeal of majoritarian decision-making as the 
core of the democratic methodology. While such an appeal is politically simplistic, it 
does point up the much weaker, much less concrete, and much more contested claims 
of the legal methodology. Is the law ultimately there to provide justice? Or is the law 
merely a set of formal rules? Do judges supply the wisdom of the common law, or are 
they  merely  handmaidens  to  the  legislature?  It  is  the  dynamic  between  this 
irresoluble  tension  that  animates  the  related  debates  between  the  liberal 
constitutionalists  and  the  functionalists  in  administrative  law;  between  the 
progressives and the paragons of textual fidelity; and between those, like Gaudron J in 
Teoh,  who  see  international  human  rights  law  as  a  manifestation  of  our  deepest 
values, and those who, like McHugh J, see it as merely an promise of the executive 
that can only be made good by its transformation into domestic legislation.   
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5  Where from here? 
To acknowledge these fundamental problems invites the charge of futility. If the 
problems are fundamental and inescapable, then the analysis leads to a dead end. 
This embraces two fallacies: first, that insight is not in itself valuable; and second, that 
simply because something cannot be made perfect, it is pointless to try and make it 
better. 
This is not to run away from the fact that immigration will continue to generate 
difficult policy and legal questions and continue to push at the limits of the law. 
Indeed, the diagnosis I have made so far of those limitations has emphasised the very 
powerful social forces and structures that make most reform proposals look either 
puny or pathetically optimistic. This is, as I underlined at the outset, not a thesis 
disguising a policy proposal. Nor is it one that promises that salvation will follow 
enlightenment.  
Nevertheless, it is useful to sketch some of the ways we can use the lessons we 
have learnt thus far. First, we can save much time, energy and intellectual frustration 
and disillusionment by recognising the basic limitations of the law. By recognising the 
polyvalence of the legal constellation, we can avoid falling into the trap of seeking an 
illusory  normative  coherence  and  of  offering  purely  doctrinal  solutions.  By 
recognising  the  limitations  of  legal  discourse, we  are  encouraged  to  look  at  other 
disciplines  and  to  redress  the  law’s  biases  and  omissions  through  them.  By 
recognising the limitations of distinctively legal critiques, we can realise that greater 
gains can be made elsewhere.
1198 By refusing to believe in the law as a white knight, we 
can save ourselves from despairing each time this belief is falsified.  
Second, we can tailor our strategies more appropriately. We can disentangle the 
contingent  variations  from  the  fundamental  limitations,  and  address  our  critiques 
accordingly.  There  are  abundant  contingent  variations  that  are  difficult  to  justify 
normatively or pragmatically: the high review fees and extremely stringent legal aid 
rules in Australia; retrospective funding orders and the drying up of legal aid in the 
UK;  blunt  restrictions  on  jurisdiction;  prolonged  detention;  and  attacks  on  the 
judiciary, to name just a few. The inclusion of a de facto refugee status in Australia 
would also reduce pressure on the refugee definition, and enable compliance with 
                                                   
1198 As, indeed, North American scholarship sometimes does: see, eg, Chang, n937; Johnson, n938. 
See also Juss, n304.  
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international  conventions.
1199  Perhaps  the  most  important,  in  Australia,  is  the 
continued resistance to the creation of human rights law at the federal level. That is 
an  important  step  in  reframing  the  legal  constellation,  and  reshaping  the  legal 
imagination.  
We  can  also  begin  from  stronger  ground,  bypassing  the  limitations  and 
compromises of other legal standards by arguing from the premise of strong legal 
norms and the deeper account of legality. For example, as Cole argues convincingly in 
the context of US anti-terrorism laws and policy, beginning from the strong legal 
norm of equality, we can attack the slippery slope by which the inequalities inherent 
in  the  citizen/non-citizen  divide  are  used  to  justify  other  kinds  of  differential 
treatment,  or  to  mask  prohibited  forms  of  discrimination.  As  Cole  says,  “[t]he 
significance  of  the  citizen-noncitizen  distinction  is  more  often  presumed  than 
carefully examined.”
1200  
We  can  subject  the  competing  principles  of  equality  between  citizens,  and 
equality between humans, to reasoning and analysis. As Cole details, there are strong 
reasons for equality in procedural rights, equal protection under the laws, and most 
civil and political rights.
1201 As a starting point, one could consider the rights in the 
Declaration  on  the  Human  Rights  of  Individuals  Who  are  not  Nationals  of  the 
Country in which They Live
1202 which extends most civil and political rights equally to 
immigrants, with the usual exceptions in international law being the right to vote, run 
for elective office, and the right to enter and reside.  
This,  however,  is  premised  on  the  assumption  that  the  aliens  are  within  the 
territory. As a preliminary, it would be most useful to move away from the fixation on 
the  legal  binary  between  citizens  and  non-citizens,  and  instead  identify  the 
differential claims of citizens, lawful residents, irregular residents, those outside the 
country with special ties to the country, and those outside the country without such 
ties. As the jurisprudence of the ECtHR attests, what is needed most is attention to 
the individual circumstances that create greater or lesser interests in residence, and 
greater or lesser claims to security of residence, such as the length of residence; the 
circumstances of return; the age of entry; the interests in their continued life; their 
                                                   
1199 Field, n105. 
1200 Cole, n560, 212. 
1201 Ibid. 212-222. 
1202 GA res 40/144, annex, 40 UN GAOR Supp (No 53) at 252, UN Doc A/40/53 (1985).  
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impact upon a community; and their ties to those within the community. To a great 
extent, these more subtle hierarchies are already expressed in immigration law and 
policy, but there is no overarching set of principles, or any legal entrenchment, of 
these underlying factors.  
This example suggests two important strategies which build upon the strengths 
of  the  law:  the  strategy  of  principled  justification,  and  the  strategy  of  embedding 
values  into  the  legal  framework.  The  first  builds  upon  the  critique  of  unjustified 
departure by taking strong legal norms — most prominently, the principle of equality; 
the  principle  of  a  fair  trial,  access  to  justice  and  the  legal  values  of  certainty, 
consistency  and  coherence  —  and  requiring  principled  justification  for  departures 
from them. The second takes factors that affect our evaluation of fairness outside of 
the  realm  of  pure  policy  and  embeds  them  into  the  legal  structure,  at  a  level  of 
generality  that  enables  us  to  take  advantage  of  the  hidden  secret  of  legal 
methodology: the exercise of human judgment. The trend towards ‘objectified’ and 
routinised immigration decision-making evident in the UK and manifested so vividly 
in Australia is thus a trend in the wrong direction.
1203  
Let me give some concrete examples of how these strategies might work. One 
value that is chronically under-protected in immigration is the value of legal certainty. 
The value of legal certainty must be considered in relation to the flexibility the State 
needs to preserve in order to respond effectively to its regulatory context. One can 
appreciate  that  a  number  of  different  factors  will  weight  the  competing  interests 
differently. One would give greater weight to the value of legal certainty if a person 
was already in the country; if a person had resided in the country a long time; if the 
person had no real life to return to; if a person has formed significant attachments; if a 
person had been induced to treat the country as one’s ‘home’; and if a person would 
suffer disproportionately as a result of removal. One would give greater weight to 
flexibility if the category of entry was one of labour, rather than humanitarian or 
family, migration; if the outcome of the case was likely to result in a considerable 
number of people being allowed entry; or if the person was outside the country and 
had  no  particular  interests  in  residing.  Thus, the  legal  values  of  clarity,  certainty, 
                                                   
1203 See Sean Cooney, ‘The codification of migration policy: excess rules? – Part 1’ (1994) 1 AJ Admin 
L 125; Sean Cooney, ‘The codification of migration policy: excess rules? Part II’ (1994) 1 AJ Admin L 
181.  
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consistency  and  coherence  could  provide  valuable  ballast  to  an  analysis  of  the 
competing values and tensions within the legislation and decision-making structure. 
The balance of competing considerations will lead to clear outcomes in certain 
cases, and these could readily be transformed into rules of law. Thus, for example, 
after  a  certain  period  of  residence,  irregular  immigrants  could  be  regularised  (a 
position that currently obtains in the UK).
1204 Those who have had children with a 
citizen or denizen of the host State, where it would be unreasonable to expect that 
person to return to the country of origin with them, would be allowed to stay. Those 
who have lived most of their life in the country could not be deported on the basis of 
criminal convictions. In the case of refugee claimants, those who have waited more 
than a certain period for processing would be entitled to remain, removing most of 
the  hardest  cases from  the  system  and  providing  an  incentive  to  determine  more 
quickly. In general, applications should be considered according to the law and policy 
at the time of application, with any departures from that principle subject to greater 
political and legal scrutiny.  
One  might  similarly  develop  a  more  principled  framework  for  access  to 
immigration review, by according greater weight to those with family ties, to whom 
international  obligations  are  owed,  and  who  have  ties  of  prior  residence.  Such  a 
hierarchy is implicit in the Australian tribunals’ jurisdiction, and is also implicit in the 
proposals  for  appeal  rights  in  the  UK’s  draft  Immigration  and  Citizenship  Bill. 
Further, given the rationale of improving the administrative process, one might seek 
to identify which kinds of decisions provoke appeals, and which are more frequently 
set aside, as well as identifying which appeal rights would be merely displaced to 
judicial review.  
Further, if the justifications for restricting access to review are resource-based, 
then  the  solutions  should  be  resource-based.  In  effect,  after  a  long  journey,  this 
sensible approach appears to be prevailing, with the shift in Australia of migration 
cases to the FMC, and the very recent proposed shift of judicial review to the First and 
Upper Tier Tribunal.  
The strategies of principled justification and the embedding of norms and values 
into  the  legal  structure  are  based  on  an  overall  approach  of  convergence.  This 
                                                   
1204 After 14 years of residence: para 276B of the Rules.   
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recognises that the law is strongest when law as authority and law as ideology travel 
together — when the forms of the law cohere with the norms of the law.  
The most effective strategy, therefore, would be to ‘mainstream’ the principles of 
human  rights,  refugee  law  and  constitutional  and  administrative  law  into  our 
immigration law frameworks. This would require a thorough re-examination of the 
legislation  and  decision-making  structures,  rather  than  a  quick  and  futile  ‘fix’  of 
inserting a compendium of legislative objectives. In an ideal world, this examination 
would work through the legislation and policy and scrutinise its compatibility with 
other  legal  standards,  and  with  broader  legal  values  and  norms,  and  seek  to 
harmonise  them.  It  would  also  explicitly  articulate  that  decision-making,  and 
immigration review, should be guided by these legal standards and values, and that 
departures from them must be justified.  
What  would  such  ‘mainstreamed’  legislation  look  like?  It  would  begin  by 
identifying the broad, and sometimes diverging, interests served by an immigration 
policy, and identifying the principal considerations by which individual interests and 
rights  are  weighed  in  policy.  These  would  include  reference  to  important  human 
rights, such as the obligations of non-refoulement, the right to respect for family and 
private  life,  the  right  to  equality  in  all  except  specified  spheres  of  activity  and 
freedoms, the right to liberty, and the right to administrative justice. It would affirm a 
right  to  protection  from  persecution  or  for  humanitarian  reasons,  and  a  right  to 
family  reunification,  subject  to  express  qualifications.  It  would  include  the  legal 
norms and values discussed earlier, in particular the rule of law, the value of legal 
certainty,  and  a  reasonable  degree  of  proportionality  between  the  purpose  to  be 
achieved, and the method used. It would also include reference to the various factors 
discussed  earlier  that  differently  weight  a  person’s  claim  to  residence.  The  most 
important of these would be physical presence, length of residence, proximity and 
integration with the local community, and the proportionality and impact of return.  
What the ‘mainstreaming’ would do, in essence, is remodel immigration law on a 
bedrock of rights, and rely on broad principles subject to express qualifications that 
guide the evaluation of the competing interests more directly and accurately. It would 
entrench long-standing factors guiding the development of policy into the law, and 
thus align the legal with the political criteria of admission. It may sound idealistic, but 
the truth is there would be less shift in practice than one might imagine, since many  
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of these principles will already be reflected in policy, case law, or practice. Indeed, one 
might  rationally  expect  that  there  would  be  benefits  for  the  administration,  since 
decisions that reasonably reflected these decision-making principles would be less 
subject to challenge.  
At the same time, we can pursue a twin strategy of disaggregation: that is, we can 
distinguish carefully between the denotations and connotations of law. The refrain 
that the law is not there to do justice is misleading: the law is intimately concerned 
with  justice,  although  the  manifestations  of  law  may  not  themselves  produce  it. 
Moreover,  the  law  does  have  a  limited  normative  content  that  may,  in  the  right 
circumstances,  ‘trump’  the  positive  manifestations  of  law,  as  is  evidenced  by  the 
decision in Anufrijeva that the principle of access to justice required communication 
of a decision prior to the withdrawal of asylum support.
1205 
What we need to do, therefore, is make clear we distinguish between the forms of 
law, and the norms of law. Judges can articulate more clearly, and more honestly, the 
tensions between these. There is no need to suggest, as McHugh J did, that indefinite 
detention  is  not  only  legally  authorised,  but  also  normatively  authorised  by  the 
‘segregation’ of people from the community. One can simply state that the specific 
manifestations of law cannot be overridden, although those manifestations may also 
be  offensive  to  other  legal  norms.  Or,  as  Baroness  Hale  did  in  K,  one  can  draw 
attention to the historical limitations of the law, and seek to ameliorate the position 
as best one can through generous and purposive interpretation. One can simply own 
up to the fact that the law is not always right, or stretches far enough, or is adequate 
for contemporary values. It does no good to say that the law is not there to provide 
justice; rather, we should emphasise that this law does not provide justice. It is bare 
law, not good law.  
Yet one can also prevail upon the tradition of the common law in treating this as 
a last resort. There are many other ways in which laws can be interpreted and other 
choices made, as we have seen. What judges need to do is look beyond the text to the 
normative background, and begin their judicial reasoning from the broader norms 
and  legal  values  rather  than  seeking  refuge  in  boundary-drawing,  fudging  and 
trumping. As Baroness Hale has shown, judges can do a lot with empathy, a refusal to 
reify the law and a solid grasp of principle.  
                                                   
1205 N77.  
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Judges  can  also  be  more  sceptical  of  the  validity  of  the  constitutional 
commonplaces in this sphere. The step made in Huang, where the House of Lords 
noted that the democratic process worked less effectively in this sphere, was a step in 
the right direction. It need not lead down a path of scrutinising exactly how much 
democratic  debate  was  had,  and  how  many  immigrants  involved,  as  some  fear. 
Rather, it is merely judicial recognition of the incontestable fact that in this field, as 
Lord Woolf put it, “the other restraints on the executive [a]re not as great as ideally 
they should be”.
1206 Or, as the US Supreme Court put it more forcefully: “Aliens as a 
class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom … heightened 
judicial solicitude is appropriate.”
1207 
This is an important example of the kind of more sophisticated and nuanced legal 
thinking  that  we  need  to  encourage.  Legal  language,  as  I  have  suggested,  is 
structurally  impoverished,  but  it  is  also  capable  of  amelioration.  We  have  seen 
examples of judicial re-framing, of more and less sympathetic constructions of the 
individual, as well as of legislative articulations of national identity.  
Along with legal language, we need to challenge the categories of legal thinking 
embedded in it. We should resist and challenge the binary divisions between citizens 
and non-citizens; plenary sovereignty or no sovereignty; mere interests and privileges 
and fully enforceable rights; and law and justice.  
These  divisions  distort  our  thinking,  with  dangerous  implications.  As  noted 
earlier, the equation between non-citizen and non-person is all too readily made, and 
obscures the much more fluid political spectrum of belonging that exists. As Cole has 
eloquently argued, too, measures originally justified by reference to the more limited 
rights of the non-citizen tend also to presage restrictions on the rights of citizens.
1208  
Similarly, the mere adherence to the concept of sovereignty tends to blind us to 
the  fact  that  we  can  legitimately  require  liberal  States  to  exercise  its  sovereignty 
consistently with those liberal commitments.
1209 In like fashion, we need to recognise 
that  the  State  to  whom  we  defer  in  international  law  is  (in  the  Anglo-Australian 
system) merely the legal personality of the executive, which constitutionally is subject 
to the rule of law.  
                                                   
1206 Woolf, ‘Judicial review,’ n530, 579. 
1207 Graham v Richardson 403 US 365 (1971), 372. 
1208 Cole, n560. 
1209 Miller, n936, 221-222.  
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So, too, we need to recognise that although an outsider may not have a right of 
abode, that does not mean there are not interests, values and other rights at stake, 
and that indeed those interests and values may be worthy candidates for conversion 
into legal rights. Legal rights, after all, are created, not merely discovered.  
We also need to broaden our legal perspectives, to take in both the forms of non-
legal regulation and the multiple forms of political and legal governance, both locally, 
regionally and globally. Rather than obsessing about the primacy or decline of nation-
states, we need to apply the same kind of scrutiny to more plural arrangements as we 
have done in domestic arenas, and to ask why certain aspects of regulation should be 
located at this, rather than that, level.  
We need to recognise that we cannot blithely ignore the claims of justice and the 
ideological dimension of the law. In recognising the intimate connection between law 
and its ideological dimension, we need to move away from our fixation on the simple 
binary of law and non-law, and recognise that there are differing degrees and models 
of legitimacy, and different political structures, within the varying legal forms and 
structures. We need to demythologise the law as sacrosanct simply because of its 
status as law. Rather, we need to subject laws to critical scrutiny and ask: Who does 
this law speak for? How does this law speak? How was it made? What values does it 
declare? How is it legitimised? Who wields its power — and how, and why?  
In so doing, we should be careful not to invest too much, or expect too much, of 
the law. As chapter 3 showed, even the most apparently resounding of ‘victories’ for 
law  often  mask  fragilities.  The  gap  between  the  normative  claims  of  law  and  its 
institutional reach may be artfully obscured, just as the rhetoric of equality in Prague 
Airport masked the jurisdictional limitations of courts, or the constitutional rhetoric 
in  Plaintiff  S157  masked  the  difficulty  of  impeaching  the  ouster  clause  through 
constitutional routes.  
Nor should we accept the reification of the boundaries between law and politics. 
As the history of immigration review proved, these boundaries advance and retreat 
over time. There is nothing God-given either in the vision of judges as handmaidens 
of  the  legislature,  or  of  judges  as  dispensing  the  wisdom  of  the  common  law. 
Similarly, there is nothing God-given in a strict separation between law and politics, 
or  in  our  understanding  of  what  is  eminently  ‘political’  and  eminently  ‘legal’.  
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Boundaries are fact and fiction; constructed, deconstructed, reconstructed; there to 
be transgressed and contested as well as defended.  
 However, finally, we should resist the temptation to be seduced by the power 
play of law and politics, with the struggle over law’s empire effectively erasing the site 
of the struggle — the body of the migrant. Instead, we should be alert to the ways the 
discursive power of law and politics obscure and misidentify the highly complex social 
phenomenon of migration, and its real effects on human beings. We should be alert 
to the possibilities of empathy and imagination, and remain aware that in the end the 
law exists to serve humans, and not itself. 
6  Conclusion 
The  peculiar  features  of  immigration  law  —  its  marked  incoherence;  its 
entanglement  in  an  increasingly  complex  legal  constellation  and  creation  by  an 
increasingly  plural  landscape  of  legal  actors;  and  the  paradox  of  the  progressive 
broadening of the extent of law’s forms and the parallel thinning of the norms of law 
— are not unique. They are features of an increasingly complex contemporary legal 
landscape,  as  new  fields  of  human  action  become  subject  to  more  intensive 
regulation, and as our societies become ever more diverse and complex, producing 
ever-greater normative dissensus that undermines the binding power of social norms 
and encourages a turn to law.  
What does this foretell for the future of law? Extrapolating from the story of 
immigration review, it suggests the increasing disenchantment of and with law, as 
paradoxes,  compromise  and  conflict  become  increasingly  evident,  and  as  the 
disjuncture  between  the  forms  of  law  and  the  norms  of  law  becomes  ever  more 
apparent.  We  are  seeing  this  already  in  the  persistent  complaints  about  the 
fragmentation of international law.
1210 
What we also see is the way in which the rough and ready legal categories and 
tools with which we all work are coming under increasing strain. The simple model of 
domestic law, regional law, and international law misses the intimate interactions 
between  the  three  spheres.  Our  law/non-law  distinction  is  challenged  by  the 
intermediate and burgeoning category of ‘soft law’, by structures of hyper-law and 
                                                   
1210 See, eg, Martti Koskenniemi and Päivi Leino, ‘Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern 
anxieties’ (2005) 15 LJIL 553.  
280 
 
lawlessness, and by the growth of tensions between legal regimes. Our assumptions of 
the  democratic  legitimacy  of  law-making  are  not  only  inadequate  to  describe 
domestic processes, but inapplicable to regional and global contexts. Most critically, 
our assumption of closed liberal societies is revealed for the paradox that it is.  
How do we approach a world of decreasing normative coherence, and increasing 
institutional complexity? We need to avoid the frustration and disillusionment that 
can  result  not  by  engaging  in  Herculean  efforts  to  produce  coherence,  but  by 
recognising  the  polyvalence  and  partiality  of  legal  traditions  and  concepts.  The 
history of empires suggests that an ideology of unity is necessary, although diversity 
must be tolerated and resistance is inevitable. We need not lose faith in the ideology 
of empire merely because its practice fails to live up to it, but we need to be honest 
about the flaws both of practice and ideology, and flexible and creative in response. 
 In  the  end,  the  story  of  immigration  review  is  a  story  that  reveals  both  the 
fragility  and  the  tenacity  of  the  law.  It  reveals  the  fundamental  challenge  to  our 
deepest  concepts of  legality,  but  it  also  reveals  the  depths  of  our  commitment  to 
them. In confronting the increasingly complex and incoherent future of the law, we 
will  need  a  better  account  of  legality;  a  more  sophisticated  understanding  of 
constitutional  arrangements  and  the  limits  of  legal  logic  and  practice;  and  an 
awareness of the variety of strategies at our disposal and their efficacy in different 
circumstances. Most of all, however, what we need is a more nuanced and muscular 
understanding of the province and the purpose of law itself.  
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Appendices  
Decisions  Restrictions  Sections 
Refusal of leave to 
enter 
Out-of-country, unless held entry clearance or work permit   13(1); (3) 
  No appeal on ground of patriality based on ordinary residence 
of 5 years or for citizens by descent, and wives thereof 
13(3) 
  No appeal if Secretary’s personal decision to exclude as 
conducive to public good 
13(5) 
  Appeal dismissed if an illegal entrant  13(4) 
Refusal of certificate 
of patriality 
  13(2) 
Refusal of entry 
clearance 
To be dismissed if a deportation order in force  13(2), (4) 
  No appeal if Secretary’s personal decision to exclude as 
conducive to public good 
13(5) 
Variations of leave, or 
refusal of variations 
No appeal against duration if certified that Secretary’s personal 
decision departure conducive to public good based on national 
security or foreign relations 
14(1)-(3) 
  No appeal against variation made by statutory instrument, or 
refusal to make a statutory instrument 
14(4) 
Deportation orders  For breaching conditions, or conducive to public good, or 
family members thereof.  
15(1)(a) 
  No appeal against deportation order if certified that 
Secretary’s personal decision departure conducive to public 
good based on national security or foreign relations 
15(3) 
  Family member appealing cannot dispute evidence of family 
membership relied upon for entry 
15(6) 
  Appeal to I if deportation conducive to public good, or 
deportation of family member, or where related appeal by 
family member 
15(7), (8) 
Refusal to revoke 
deportation order 
Out-of-country  15(5) 
  No appeal if Secretary certifies exclusion conducive to public 
good, or revocation refused on that ground 
15(1), (4)  
 
  Family member appealing cannot dispute evidence of family 
membership relied upon for entry 
15(6) 
  Appeal to I if appeal against refusal to revoke deportation of 
family member, or where related appeal by family member 
15(7), (8) 
Removal directions  Out-of-country, unless directions given because of deportation 
order and appealing on ground of mistaken identity 
16(2) 
  Only on grounds that in law no power to give such directions  16(1) 
  No power to dispute validity of deportation order  16(3) 
  To be dismissed if no power to remove crew members but 
power to give like directions on ground of illegal entry 
16(4) 
Destination  Must be exercised on related appeal against refusal of leave to 
enter or deportation order 
17(1)-(3) 
  No appeal if a refusal of leave to enter, unless decision that he 
requires leave to enter or was refused leave while holding 
entry clearance or work permit 
17(5) 
Table 4: Jurisdiction of the IAA under the 1971 Act.  
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  Jurisdiction of the Australian 
tribunals 
Original  Current 
MIRO/IRT/MRT    From 1994   
Visa refusals   Applications within ‘migration zone’ and 
not during ‘immigration clearance’, for 
onshore visa  
337(a), 
338, 346 
338(2) 
  Offshore visa applications sponsored by 
Australian citizen, permanent resident, 
New Zealand citizen residing in 
Australia, or a company or partnership 
operating within the migration zone 
337(e), 
338, 346 
338(5) 
  Visitor visa for purpose of visiting 
nuclear family member, who is an 
Australian citizen or permanent resident 
337(g), 338 
346 
338(7) 
  Applications for a ‘special eligibility’ visa 
on the basis of previous permanent 
residence, when a nuclear family 
member is an Australian citizen or 
permanent resident 
337(f), 
338, 346 
338(6) 
Visa 
cancellations 
Visa cancellations within the migration 
zone, excepting: during immigration 
clearance, or cancellations made on 
character grounds 
337(b), 
338, 346 
338(3) 
  Refusals or cancellations of bridging 
visas that result in the person being 
detained 
337(c), 
(d), 346 
338(4) 
 
  Automatic cancellation of student visas    s 338(3A) 
Other decisions  Decisions as to points score by person 
offshore sponsored by Australian citizen, 
permanent resident or New Zealander 
337(h), 
338, 346 
338(8) 
  Sponsorship or nomination decisions    137B; 140E(1); 140J(2), 
140K(2); 338(9), 
339(2)(d); regs 
4.02(4)(c)-(i); 1.20H; 
5.19(1B)  
  Securities    s 338(9),reg 402(4)(f); 
Exclusions  Conclusive ministerial certification that 
review not in national interest 
346(2)(a), 
(4) 
338(1)(a), 339 
  Refusals and cancellations of temporary 
safe haven visas 
  338(1)(c) 
RRT       
Visa refusals  Refusals of protection visas, and refusals 
of visas prior to 1 September 1994 for 
which satisfaction of refugee definition is 
required 
411(b), (c)  411(b), (c) 
Visa 
cancellations 
Cancellations of protection visas, and of 
earlier visas as above 
411(b), (d)  411(b), (d) 
Other decisions  Refusal of refugee status prior to 1 
September 1994 
411(a)  411(a) 
Exclusions  If person is not physically in migration 
zone at time of decision 
411(2)(a)  411(2)(a) 
  Conclusive ministerial certification  411(2)(b), 
(3) 
411(2)(b), (3) 
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AAT (after 
1989) 
  From 
1989 
 
Deportations  Non-citizens present in Australia for less than 10 
years sentenced for crimes for at least a year 
55, 
180(1)(a) 
 
  Review of security assessments leading to 
deportation on character grounds 
56   
  Strengthened powers to cancel on character grounds    s 500(6A)-
(6L). 
Referrals  Referred decisions from IRT/MRT/RRT  381, 443*  381, 443 
Other 
decisions 
Regulatory decisions concerning migration agents  306*   
  Cancellation of business visas  136*   
Exclusions  Must be permanent resident or Australian citizen  180(2)   
  Must have entered and not left Australia  180(3)   
  Deportations of those convicted of certain serious 
offences, subject to inquiry by Commissioner 
57   
Table 5: Jurisdiction of the Australian tribunals, with original sections and corresponding 
current provisions in the Act. 
*Sections  originally  inserted  by  the  Migration  Reform  Act  1992.  Italicised 
provisions indicate subsequent amendments.  
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Provision  Australia (IRT/MRT;RRT)  Section   UK  Section 
Composition  Single-member for both MRT/RRT, 
although powers to constitute MRT 
by 2 or 3 members 
354(1); 421;  Adjudicators sit alone; IAT a 3-member tribunal; now, 
AIT to be constituted by direction, with default 3-
member tribunal 
1971 Act, Sch 5, para 
12; 2002 Act, Sch 5, 
para 7, AIT Practice 
Directions, [2.2] 
Qualifications  Not specified    Legal qualifications for at least one IAT member; now, 
qualifications must exclude either legal experience or 
“non-legal experience which makes him suitable for 
appointment” 
1971 Act, Sch 5, para 
12; 2002 Act, Sch 5, 
para 2 
      Now, President must hold or have held high judicial 
office 
2002 Act, Sch 5, para 
5 
Appointment  Governor-General (in reality, the 
Minister) 
395, now 396; 459  Originally, adjudicators by Secretary of State and IAT by 
Lord Chancellor; now, AIT by Lord Chancellor (Ministry 
of Justice) 
1971 Act, s 12; 2002 
Act, Sch 4, para 1 
Term of 
appointment 
Maximum renewable term of 5 years  397, now 398; 461  No minimum or maximum, but renewable  1971 Act, Sch 5, paras 
2, 8  
Grounds for 
removal 
Misbehaviour; mental or physical 
incapacity; bankruptcy etc; pecuniary 
conflict of interest; prolonged 
absence; unauthorised extra-
curricular activities; failure to disclose 
interests 
404, now 403; 468  Not specified; now, specified in terms of appointment  2002 Act, Sch 5, para 
3 
Objectives  “providing a mechanism of review 
that is fair, just, economical, informal 
and quick” 
353(1); 420(1)   Originally, not specified; now, to handle proceedings 
“fairly, quickly and efficiently” 
2005 Rules, r 4 
  “to act according to substantial 
justice and the merits of the case 
353(2)(b); 420(2)(b)     
Powers  “exercise all the powers and 
discretions that are conferred by this 
Act on the person who made the 
349(1); 415  Allows appeals if not in accordance with law (including 
Rules), or if an available discretion should have been 
exercised differently 
1971 Act, s 19(1); 2002 
Act, 86(3)  
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decision” 
      Now, also, violates Race Relations Act, HRA, EEA rights, 
or Refugee Convention 
2002 Act, s 84 
      Reviews facts on which decision or action is based  1971 Act, s 19(2) 
      For many decisions, may consider post-decision 
evidence 
2002 Act, s 85(4) 
      Originally, could make recommendations  1971 Act, s 19(3) 
  Summon and take evidence from 
person under oath or affirmation, or 
require person to produce documents 
363; 427(1), (3)  Summon and take evidence from person under oath or 
affirmation, or require to produce documents, as in court 
of law 
1984 Rules, rr 27, 29; 
2005 Rules, rr 50-51 
Conduct of 
investigation 
Tribunal empowered to “get any 
information that it considers 
relevant”, including by invitation for 
additional information 
360(1)(b), now 359; 
425(1)(b), now 424  
Powers to require particulars; otherwise, by usual 
adversarial procedure 
R 25; 
  May require investigation or medical 
examination 
363(1)(d); 427(1)(d)     
Hearings  Invitation to appear at hearing  360(1)(a), now 360-
360A; 425(1)(b), now 
425-425A  
Notice of hearing  1984 Rules, r 24; 2005 
Rules, r 46 
      Hearing in absence of party if not in UK; suffering from 
communicable disease or mental disorder; if cannot 
attend because of illness or accident; or if impracticable 
to give notice and no representative; now, also for 
unexplained absence; if representative present; risk of 
violent or disorderly conduct; notification that he does not 
wish to attend  
1984 Rules, r 34; 2005 
Rules, r 19 
  MRT hearings to be in public, unless 
not in public interest or impracticable 
to take evidence in public; RRT 
hearings in private 
365; 429  Hearings in public, except in cases of forged documents, 
or where exclusion requested by party, where conduct 
likely to interfere with proceedings or in cases of third 
party interests; now, exclusion in interests of public order, 
national security or to protect private life of party or 
interests of a minor, or exceptionally to protect interests 
1984 Rules, r 32; 2005 
Rules, r 54  
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of justice 
  Entitlement to access written 
material before MRT 
362A  Opportunity to inspect and copy documentary material  1984 Rules, r 30 
  Obligation to disclose, and allow 
opportunity to comment on, adverse 
information  
359AA, 359A-C; 
424AA, 424A-C; 
Evidence not available to all parties not to be considered  2005 Rules, r 51(7) 
      Now, adjournments only if appeal cannot otherwise be 
justly determined, esp in relation to evidence 
2005 Rules, r 21; 2005 
Fast-Track Rules, r 
28 
Representation  Not entitled to representation, 
although before MRT entitled now to 
assistant 
363(7), now 336A; 
427(6) 
Entitled to representation; now, restricted to registered 
representatives 
1984 Rules, r 26; 2005 
Rules, r 48 
  Other persons not entitled to 
assistant or representative 
366B; 427(6)     
  Assistant not entitled to present 
arguments unless exceptional 
circumstances 
366A(3)  Entitled to address authority  R 28 
Interpretation  Interpretation required if not 
sufficiently proficient in English 
363(7), now 336C; 
427(7) 
Now entitled to interpreter when giving evidence and 
otherwise as necessary 
2005 Rules, r 49A 
Evidence  Not bound by “technicalities, legal 
form or evidence” 
353(2)(a); 420(2)(a)  May receive oral, documentary or other evidence 
inadmissible in court of law 
1984 Rules, r 29; 2005 
Rules, r 51 
  Applicant may request Tribunal to 
call witnesses or obtain evidence 
361-362; 426  Applicant may call witnesses   R 28 
  May obtain evidence by telephone or 
video link 
366; 429A     
  No examination or cross-examination 
permitted 
363(6)(b), now 366D; 
427(6)(b)  
Examination and cross-examination allowed  R 28 
  Non-disclosure of certified or 
confidential evidence  
375-378; 437-440;   Non-disclosure of matters relating to forgery  R 30(2) 
  Only new information for subsequent 
applications to RRT 
416     
Determination  Tribunal may decide if applicant fails  362B; 426A  If not requested by party; if appeal allowed on papers; if  1984 Rules, r 12; 2005  
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without applicant  to appear  applicant outside UK and impracticable and no 
representative; if objection to destination not warranted; 
if no submission or hearing not warranted on 
preliminary issue; and if respondent has withdrawn or 
reversed decision; now, also if appeal lapses, is 
abandoned, or finally determined; procedural non-
compliance; Tribunal considers it may justly determine 
Rules, r 15 
Determination 
without hearing 
Originally, if more favourable 
decision available on papers 
359; 424  Where not materially different from previous review 
decision 
R 35 
      Where written agreement between parties  R 37(c) 
Preliminary issues      Where no appeal right; where forged documents; out of 
time; or no signature 
Rr 8(3), 11  
      Late notices of appeal  2005 Rules, r 10 
      Imminent removal cases  2005 Rules, r 11 
Decision  Written decision  368; 430  Written decision  1984 Rules, R 39; 
2005 Rules, r 22 
  Notification of decision within 14 
days 
368, now 368A, 368D; 
430, now 430A, 430D  
Notification as soon as practicable; now, notification 
within 10 days, and if respondent serves, within 28 days 
Ibid, also 2005 Rules, 
r 23(4), (5) 
  Publication of decisions, now only 
those of particular interest 
369; 431     
Time limit for 
decisions 
Prescribed period for MRT bridging 
visa decisions (7 days); 90 days for 
RRT decisions with obligation to 
report otherwise 
367, 1994 Regs, reg 
4.27; 414A, 440A 
Originally no limit; now, for asylum claims, 35 day limit 
for fixing hearings and making decision 
2005 Rules, r 23 
Time limits – in-
country appeals 
Originally 28 days, now 21 days for 
MRT, 28 days for RRT 
1959 Regulations, regs 
4.02(2), 4.10(1),4.31(2); 
1994 Regulations, regs 
4.10; 4.31(2)(b) 
Originally 28 days; now 5 days but extendable  1984 Rules, r 4; 2005 
Rules, rr 7, 10 
Appeals from 
abroad 
70 days  As above  Originally 3 months; now 28 days but extendable  Ibid 
Appeal to courts  28 days for FMC, Federal Court, 35 
days for High Court, with extension 
477, 486A  14 days to IAT; now, 5 days for reconsideration; 5 days if 
in detention, 10 days otherwise, to appeal court 
1984 Rules, r 15; 2002 
Act, s 103A(3)(a)(c)  
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to 56 days  2005 Rules, r 35 
Other decisions  Detainees – 7 working days, now 2 
working days in case of bridging visas 
and securities for MRT 
As above; 1994 Regs, 
reg 4.31(2) 
Originally 14 days for Secretary’s decision and appeals 
against destination 
1984 Rules, r 4 
  Visa cancellations and failure to 
revoke automatic cancellations – 7 
working days 
1994 Regulations, reg 
4.10(1)(b) 
   
  Cancellation on character grounds – 9 
working days at AAT 
500(6B)     
Fees  Originally, $200 and $300 at 
MIRO/IRT, with waiver in case of 
personal hardship; now, $1,400 for 
MRT/RRT if unsuccessful except for 
bridging visas and securities 
1959 Regulations, regs 
4.014(1); 1994 
Regulations, regs 4.13-
4.14, 4.31B-C 
None   
Offences  Failure of witness to attend  370; 432  Failure to attend or give evidence  1971 Act, s 22(6) 
  Refusal to be sworn or to answer 
questions 
371; 433     
  Contempt of Tribunal  372; 434     
Table 6: Powers and procedures of the Australian and UK immigration tribunals. 
Australian legislative references refer to provisions after the Migration Reform Act 1992, and any subsequent changes, for the MRT and RRT respectively. UK 
legislative references refer to original provisions under the 1971 Act and 1984 Rules, and subsequently the current provisions. Italicised provisions have been inserted 
subsequently; underlined provisions have been removed.  
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Review body  Scope  Year established and Act 
Entry Clearance Monitor  Reviews entry clearance 
decisions 
1993; s 10, 1993 Act 
Complaints Audit Committee  Monitors procedures for 
investigating complaints 
1994 (non-statutory) 
Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector 
of Prisons 
Inspects immigration 
removal centres 
1999 (original powers extended to 
immigration removal centres), s 152(5) 
of the 1999 Act; extended to short-
term holding facilities and escort 
arrangements in s 46 of the 2002 Act 
Visiting 
Committees/Independent 
Monitoring Boards 
Regular visits and 
monitoring of 
immigration removal 
centres 
1999; s 152 of the 1999 Act 
Race Monitor  Monitors ministerial 
authorisations in relation 
to racial discrimination 
2002; s 19E of Race Relations Act 1976 
(as inserted by 2000 amending Act) 
Advisory Panel on Country 
Information 
Expert advice on country 
information; assessment 
of countries for White 
List 
2003; s 142 of 2002 Act 
Advisory Board on 
Naturalisation and 
Integration 
Assessment of 
citizenship requirements 
2004 (non-statutory) 
UNHCR, Quality Initiative  Reviews quality of initial 
decision-making 
2004 (non-statutory) 
Certification Monitor  Monitors cases certified 
as clearly unfounded 
2004; s 111 of the 2002 Act 
Prisons and Probation 
Ombudsman 
Investigates deaths of 
immigration detainees; 
ad hoc investigations 
Non-statutory; established 1994, with 
jurisdiction over immigration removal 
centres April 2004 
Chief Inspector  General remit to inspect 
and report on UK Border 
Agency  
2008; s 48 of 2007 Act 
Accommodation Centre 
Monitor 
Monitors 
accommodation centres 
Never established; s 34 of 2002 Act 
Table 7: Establishment of review bodies. 
 
Decision  In-country  Out-of-
country 
Sections 
Refusal of non-
refugee protection 
claims 
Only if decision results in no permission, and not 
‘certified’ 
No  164(2)(a), 
165 
Refusal of refugee 
permission 
Yes, if not ‘certified’  No  164(2)(b), 
166 
Refusal of family life 
application 
Yes, if in UK at time of decision and effect is no 
permission, and not ‘certified’ 
Yes  164(2)(c), 
167 
Refusal of other 
immigration 
permission 
Yes, if application not infected by person’s 
deception; if in UK at time of decision; if had 
permission not infected by deception; and if effect 
is no permission 
No  164(2)(d), 
168 
- other restriction  No appeal on ‘straightforward’ grounds, including 
sponsorship information, and failure to comply 
with Rule as to prior permission  
  175(3) 
Cancellation of  Yes, if permission not infected by person’s  Yes  164(2)(e),  
  290 
non-refugee 
immigration 
permission 
deception; was cancelled upon arrival; and if 
temporary permission not seeking entry for other 
purpose 
169 
- other restriction  No appeal on ‘straightforward’ grounds, including 
sponsorship information, and failure to comply 
with Rule as to prior permission  
  175(3) 
Cancellation of 
refugee permission 
Yes, if in UK at time of decision  No  164(2)f), 
170 
Making of expulsion 
order 
Yes, if in UK at time of decision; permission not 
infected by deception; and order either on breach 
of condition of permission, automatic expulsion of 
foreign criminals, or family member thereof 
No  164(2)(g), 
171 
Refusal to cancel 
expulsion order 
No  Yes  164(2)(h), 
172 
Table 8: Proposed jurisdiction under the 2008 Bill. 
 
Structure  Countries 
Tribunal alone  Denmark; Malta; Sweden until 2006; Switzerland 
Administrative courts alone  Finland; Germany; Hungary (Metropolitan Court); 
Luxembourg; Poland; Portugal; Sweden  
Civil courts alone  Hungary 
Administrative review + courts  Iceland; Spain 
Tribunal + administrative courts  Austria; Belgium 
Interdepartmental committee + courts  Greece; the Netherlands; Norway  
Territorial commission+ courts + 
appeal to the President 
Italy 
Table 9: Refugee appeals systems in Europe. 
Compiled from ECRE Country Reports 2000-2005, available at www.ecre.org. 
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Figure 3: Net overseas migration, Australia 1901-2008. 
Source: DIMA, Immigration, Federation 1901-2000, 23; ABS, Catalogue Number 3412. 
 
 
Figure 4: Migration patterns in the UK since 1964.  
Source: HAC, Immigration Control (2006) 9. 
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